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This is Evolutionary Psychology, the podcast.

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Actual evolutionary psychology by actual evolutionary psychologists.

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Boom.

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Let's just say Steve.

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Yeah, we'll say Steve.

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Okay, uh now that we're this is like the Christina introduction where we haven't gotten

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past the name yet.

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But just like the Christina episode, this is a lovely episode.

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And it was a bit different in the sense of we actually are talking a lot about science

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and just sort of history and the ebbs and flows of one person's journey in

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science and how they view it and thinking about evolution and social psychology and

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reputations and old the old guard and the new guard and all those things.

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Yeah, very much about the sociology of science and how Steve has fit into this.

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I mean, he's done a great job of, you know, we mentioned this in the podcast about how he

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he has had some success in translating ideas and getting a lot of

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positive reception among people who have not been steeped in evolutionary ideas, and he's a

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very good translator and missionary for the evolutionary social sciences.

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And we got into, you know, how he pulled that off, where, you know, what barriers

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still remain, um, what problems still remain in in the social sciences and in

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psychology in particular, and and how whether scientific progress is is going in the right

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direction or not.

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Uh yeah, this was kind of a deep meta.

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It was kind of a I I loved it.

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Yeah.

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I think especially if you're a student um uh or a student at heart, Uh I

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don't know.

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It's just it's just sort of like a journey of how do you figure out what the heck we're

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doing?

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This was sort of an episode about that.

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And I think if you're interested in evpsych and social psychology, Steve Newberg is a

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really important person in the history of bringing those areas together.

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But if you're even just more interested in figuring out, well, how do I go to a conference

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where people don't assume what I'm doing makes sense?

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Um, this is also a helpful thing to hear.

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Um and I think we all struggle with that.

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Yeah, for sure.

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No, this was this was this is a great time.

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Steve's a great hang.

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So I think you'll you'll have a good time listening to this one.

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Yeah.

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Enjoy.

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Steve, thanks for being here.

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Um we have had we've had some social psychologists on.

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And some of them are people who grew up in evolutionary social

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psychology.

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We've only had a few people who found evolution after

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they were already in social psychology.

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To my mind, you are one of the key people who brought the two fields together.

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And I don't think I even know this.

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Can you tell us a little bit about either how you found integrating evolution with

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social psychology, either personally or sort of what was your thought process?

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Because I think a lot of students may take it for granted that the two go together, but

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that wasn't always true.

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Yeah, you know, it uh it it came to me late and it actually came to me it

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it came to me in in pieces, I think.

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Uh I actually, I mean, I had a tortured route to becoming a psych major, right?

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I wasn't gonna be a psych major.

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I started as a biomajor.

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I was gonna be uh I was gonna be Hawkeye Pierce.

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I was gonna be a smart ass cardiac surgeon.

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Uh and uh and so I was gonna I was gonna go to med school and when I was an was an

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undergrad uh uh I I hated the all the the

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early level bio courses and chemistry course.

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I mean, they were all memorizing.

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It was it was all sort of leadout for folks who wanted to go to med school.

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And it was really uninspiring and it was boring.

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I was I liked the labs.

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Uh I liked the labs, but I hated what you needed to do, and I just didn't want to do it

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enough, right?

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To uh to be just memorizing all the time and and grinding.

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Uh and so I wasn't I wasn't doing particularly well.

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Uh I wasn't liking it.

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I was exploring a lot.

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I was taking political philosophy classes and I was doing all sorts of things.

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I did take uh an animal behavior class in bio that I found really interesting.

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And uh one day one of my fraternity brothers said, Well, you like animal behavior?

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I'm taking this intro-cycle class.

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Uh I hear it's a great class.

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You know, why don't you why don't you take that?

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You know, people are animals, right?

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Yeah, okay, people are animals.

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And uh and so I took this class and it was uh it was held

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by uh it was held in the in the Cornell Performing Arts uh Auditorium, Bailey

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Hall, Bailey Auditorium, 1500 students.

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And I think I think it was probably the one of the first classes in any discipline that

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went big and went multimedia.

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And so you hit week twelve or whenever they get to social psychology in this.

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And what the instructor had was in addition to like the Milgram films and the Ash films,

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which were great, he had uh Cornell and Stanford were sharing the candid camera

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archives.

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And uh and so he was showing clips of these just funky little s you know social situations

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where essentially, you know, the guy that this is this is the old candle camera back like

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in the in the 60s or whatever.

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Uh they'd be doing like these little experiments, these little sort of demo experiments,

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right?

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And it all sudden occurred to me.

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I'm sitting in the class and I'm I'm hearing about ash and uh the studies there.

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And so, wait, you can do experiments on people, right?

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You can do you can do science on people's behavior way better than other animal behavior,

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you know, from my perspective.

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And I was hooked, you know, I was, you know, the the roof opened up and the sun started

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rays started coming in and doves started singing and angels were flying around.

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And I became a a sort of a social psychologist right at that moment.

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And at at Cornell at the time, if you weren't like in engineering or something, they didn't

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actually let you uh declare a major till the end of your sophomore year if you were in arts

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and sciences.

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And so I, you know, walked over to the psych building.

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This is before internet and online stuff.

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Walked over, you know, walked into the, you know, the secretary's office and said, I want

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to be, I want to, you know, be a psych major and I want to do social psychology research.

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And you know, she said, you know, we've got this brand new uh faculty member coming in in

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the fall from Stanford.

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Uh his name is Tom Gilovich.

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And you know, the back this is students uh we didn't have like professional advising,

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faculty advised students on things.

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He said he'll be your advisor.

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I said, Great, you know, he's social whatever.

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And I showed up and and right off the bat, you know, I was essentially Gilovich's very

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first student.

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Uh he didn't have grad students yet, he hadn't been able to, you know, recruit folks or

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whatever, and just sort of jumped right into stuff and uh and just got to play

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and started thinking and just started thinking about science and stuff but I had the bio

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background a little bit and it was always sort of it was hovering but I really wasn't

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really thinking and he really is he doesn't like I don't know if he'd say this now he he

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doesn't he doesn't really like evo psych he doesn't get it he doesn't understand the

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approaches uh to it Uh social psychologists ought to love

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evolutionary psychology, right?

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Because it's fundamentally about how environments and ecology sort of shape, you know, you

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know, what what our what our psychology is, right?

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I mean, it's it's just it's sort of social psychology writ large and deep, right?

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And and uh they oughta like it.

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But didn't really like it.

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But he was a great mentor and he let me explore and so uh through that I ended

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up, you know, I had another sort of early champion, John Barge, you might know of of John,

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because I was interested, I was I did an honors thesis, which I was only allowed to do

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because my grades weren't good enough.

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My grades weren't good enough to to do an honors thesis, right?

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And and Tom being a young guy and being naive, whatever, you know, pleaded for me or

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whatever.

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And I said, Okay, fine, fine, you're a young guy.

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We'll we'll we'll give you something here.

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And uh they let me do an honors thesis.

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And I met John through just doing a study that was sort of extending some of the work that

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he had and I just really got into it.

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And then uh you know, I did a I did a sexual, I mean my one of my other first studies, my

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first real not real, my first sort of semi-uh research study that wasn't

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with Tom was actually in Sandy Bem's sex rules class, where for an extra credit for a

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fourth credit, you could you could you could do a study.

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And I just did this observational study of who was holding doors open for whom at the

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campus bookstore.

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So here we are, you know, in at highly liberal Cornell University in 1981 or something.

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And you know, did the sex roles, the the the the norms of men holding girls doors open for

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women.

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Women, of course, would be wholly opposed to this, right?

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I mean, this is a highly liberal place.

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You know, we had you know anti-apartheid, you know, shanty towns in the middle of campus,

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right?

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This was a highly activist liberal uh place.

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And it turns out, yeah, yeah, that it turns out that men still open the door the doors for

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women, and women quite happily let them do that.

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And not only that, men open the door for men.

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Uh, and women don't open the door for other women.

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They open, they walk right on through.

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They anyway.

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And so I wrote up this paper on this.

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And the only response I got from Sandy Ben was on the cover of the paper, which said, uh,

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A, uh, this is a great paper.

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Can I put this on reserve in the library as an example for other students?

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And you know, so I got these like mentoring experience.

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I I was getting into the science, thinking about it a little bit, not deeply, but I got

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into it.

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Susan Fisk, uh so I ended up going I almost went to I almost went to UCSP to to work with

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David Hamilton.

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In the end it was between the two of them.

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And the reason, and of course David's never been a fan of uh Evo Psych.

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I I gave a talk before you ended up uh there.

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Actually you may have been a grad student there at the time.

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I gave a talk on on sort of some evo approach to some prejudice work I was doing at the

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time.

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And afterwards he said, Yeah, but why do you need evolution for this?

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I mean, you know, isn't this whatever?

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It's like, well, because you actually want to understand it, David.

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I took a graduate class with David uh Hamilton.

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He was lovely.

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He's always been he is lovely.

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I I think he's lovely.

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But yeah, we there was always a little bit of um uh not entirely meeting uh

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I would put it as yeah.

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You know the reason I didn't go to UCSP because David was a high I mean he was a really

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famous social cognition stereotyping person and that was really up the alley of uh of what

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I was w getting interested in.

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And uh as I was g as the as the days were getting closer to having to make a decision, it's

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probably you April 7th or something.

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I get this manila envelope in the mail.

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Again, there's like no internet.

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I mean, people aren't sending stuff to each other, right?

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I mean, everything's by mail.

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You're getting letters.

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And I get this middle envelope.

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And I open up the middle envelope.

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It's from David.

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I open up the middle envelope and I unfold this big poster of Santa Barbara on the beach,

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right?

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The little marsh there, whatever, right?

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And I look at this thing and say, I'm such a bad student.

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If I go to Santa Barbara, it's gonna be a backfire.

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Right.

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So I went to Pittsburgh and I to work with uh someone who worked with Susan uh Fisk, which

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turned out to be great.

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But I think what led me to, and so this was a really long ramble to get towards your

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answer.

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With Susan, we were sort of on the cutting edge in social cognition of trying to bring

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motivation into cognition.

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I mean the motivation had been in there a little bit, but the but the base model, the

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presumption was at that time was that we operate like a computer and

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emotion and motivation are adds on.

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In fact, Susan's early model actually was just adding tags, right, to c to cognitive

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representation, adding affect tags, plus minus, right, to concepts that we would have.

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I mean, this was sort of the model.

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And we were starting to push this idea that no, that the that the kind of processing you're

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going to engage in was going to differ depending on sort of what what goals were sort of

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important to you at the time.

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And you know, the work that we did uh that ended up I think being pretty important was, you

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know, when do people stereotype and when do they go beyond their stereotypes and

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individuate and what are the circumstances?

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What you know, I was focusing on what are the motivations.

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She was focusing on what are the informational circumstances that would lead you to give up

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your stereotypes.

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And I was really interested in what are the motivational circumstances and really thinking

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about, you what we would now think about in terms of interdependence.

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We were calling it outcome dependency at the time.

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But you know, what's the relationship with this person that would lead me to need to

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understand this person better so I could predict their uh behaviors, right?

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Because the aim uh from my perspective back then, it wasn't all social cognition, was that

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we think in order, we think about people because we want to understand what they're gonna

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do because we have to interact with them.

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And I didn't quite have that wasn't solid in my mind now then like it like it is now, but

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the but the foundations were were really there.

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And I left a I left Carnegie Mellon, I did a year postdoc in Waterloo and I came here and

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I had Kenrick here.

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So you think that Kenrick is the reason why I got into.

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And it actually isn't.

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We did a little bit of work after this, but the very first thing, uh, I presume you guys

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know the name Robin Fox, anthropologist from okay.

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Robin Fox wrote, I don't know if you've ever seen this paper.

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It's more of an essay in Psych Inquiry on stereotyping prejudice.

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And it and what was the title?

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The title of the paper is something like an unfinished mind.

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And so it's a target article.

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Uh it's a it's a it's a beautifully written article.

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It's a fun article uh to read.

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I still assign it to students.

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and uh uh in which he argued that prejudice and stereotyping is sort

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of lower my hand.

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Uh uh for those on on uh uh the acoustic format, Steve just raised his hand in

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Zoom.

00:14:05.950 --> 00:14:07.790
So if you have a question, Steve.

00:14:08.190 --> 00:14:10.430
I'm I'm Jewish, I talk with my hands and possible

00:14:14.430 --> 00:14:20.400
and uh he wrote this incredible paper where he argued for the fact that

00:14:20.560 --> 00:14:25.040
prejudice is sort of the default natural state and for good reason, right?

00:14:25.200 --> 00:14:30.800
That stereotyping and and and having and having affects towards people that can help drive

00:14:30.960 --> 00:14:33.680
drive behavior towards them, that that was sort of the base.

00:14:33.920 --> 00:14:38.480
And so, you know, it's uh the it's a targeted article with a bunch of invited commentaries.

00:14:38.560 --> 00:14:39.600
I don't I was just a kid then.

00:14:39.680 --> 00:14:43.200
I don't know why I was invited, but I was invited to to comment on it.

00:14:43.520 --> 00:14:47.650
And uh I loved the paper uh for a whole bunch of reasons.

00:14:47.730 --> 00:14:49.170
I mean it's a beautiful paper.

00:14:49.330 --> 00:14:55.170
Uh but it was uh the argument was that

00:14:55.490 --> 00:15:01.490
stereotyping was uh was was an evolved uh was was an adaptation for

00:15:01.490 --> 00:15:03.490
for dealing with certain kinds of challenges.

00:15:03.650 --> 00:15:07.010
And as I was thinking about it, I was realized, yeah, but the kind of individuation that I

00:15:07.010 --> 00:15:11.250
talk about and the circumstances under which it happens and for whom we're likely to

00:15:11.250 --> 00:15:13.410
individuate, that also has to be.

00:15:13.560 --> 00:15:18.760
And so what's also has to be an adaptation and part of the part of a well-designed system.

00:15:18.920 --> 00:15:22.600
And then what so now what are what are the factors that sort of switch you from one to the

00:15:22.600 --> 00:15:22.760
other?

00:15:22.920 --> 00:15:24.760
How do you need to think about this?

00:15:25.080 --> 00:15:31.000
And so my that my response was yes and right and uh

00:15:31.720 --> 00:15:37.480
and it was really the first time that I really started thinking about my work in a way that

00:15:37.560 --> 00:15:42.970
uh uh uh Might have had those kind of deeper

00:15:42.970 --> 00:15:44.810
foundations to it.

00:15:45.610 --> 00:15:46.650
And so that was one thing.

00:15:46.730 --> 00:15:51.450
And then Doug and I, and a couple of students, did some work on sort of contrast effects on

00:15:51.450 --> 00:15:55.370
attractiveness and dominance and men and women, and you know, who would kind of whatever.

00:15:55.450 --> 00:15:58.010
And that was sort of fun stuff, but it really I really wasn't into it.

00:15:58.090 --> 00:15:59.690
And then their second thing hit.

00:15:59.850 --> 00:16:05.060
And this uh is with uh uh another one of your colleagues emeritus now, uh

00:16:05.300 --> 00:16:07.620
Dave, uh Brenda Major.

00:16:07.860 --> 00:16:08.020
Yeah.

00:16:08.340 --> 00:16:08.820
I had been invited.

00:16:11.460 --> 00:16:16.180
Yes, and and Brenda's more open, and Brenda became more open to thinking about sort of

00:16:16.660 --> 00:16:21.140
Brenda actually so Rob Kurzman wrote this paper on on stigma.

00:16:21.220 --> 00:16:23.700
And he wrote it actually initially for Brenda's class.

00:16:23.860 --> 00:16:25.220
Brenda really didn't like the paper.

00:16:25.570 --> 00:16:30.610
Yeah, she told me because I took the same class and I was I was the second leadest student

00:16:30.610 --> 00:16:33.250
after Rob in that same class in a later class.

00:16:33.330 --> 00:16:33.570
Yeah.

00:16:33.650 --> 00:16:34.610
So she told me about that.

00:16:34.690 --> 00:16:34.770
Yeah.

00:16:35.090 --> 00:16:41.090
Yeah, she she likes the paper more now, but I ended up uh we ended up talking a

00:16:41.090 --> 00:16:43.010
lot about it, and she sort of came around on it.

00:16:43.170 --> 00:16:49.010
But I initially I was at a conference held by Dartmouth University uh up sort

00:16:49.010 --> 00:16:53.720
of at on on the estate, they had these small conferences that would turn into books where

00:16:53.720 --> 00:16:57.160
they'd invite like 15 people and around a topic.

00:16:57.400 --> 00:17:01.240
And so the topic was sort of the you know the social psychology of stigma.

00:17:01.480 --> 00:17:07.320
And so it's it was held on the on like the the estate that had been donated by the founder

00:17:07.320 --> 00:17:08.680
of CBS to Dartmouth.

00:17:08.920 --> 00:17:10.440
So it was literally on Golden Pond.

00:17:10.520 --> 00:17:14.360
You guys may not be old enough to know the movie on Golden Pond with Henry Fonda and Jane

00:17:14.360 --> 00:17:17.290
Fonda, but literally it was on this on this place.

00:17:17.370 --> 00:17:18.330
So it was a beautiful place.

00:17:18.410 --> 00:17:19.930
You're out in the middle of the woods.

00:17:20.090 --> 00:17:24.410
Uh and and the the way the little work conference thing was, is that you didn't talk about

00:17:24.410 --> 00:17:24.970
your own work.

00:17:25.130 --> 00:17:30.810
In fact, you only you had seven minutes after dinner, during drink time,

00:17:30.970 --> 00:17:32.010
to talk about your work.

00:17:32.090 --> 00:17:34.970
And we would do that like every night for four or five nights.

00:17:35.210 --> 00:17:41.180
And uh but what you do is that you sit around a big table and there'd be a question for the

00:17:41.180 --> 00:17:45.340
morning session, a question for the afternoon, and you got and we you'd argue about the

00:17:45.340 --> 00:17:48.780
question, you talk it through, and at the end people decide what do they want to write

00:17:48.780 --> 00:17:54.140
about to go into into this this edited volume on the social psychology stigma.

00:17:54.620 --> 00:17:58.620
And you know, it was interesting, it was fun, there were a lot of very cool people there.

00:17:58.860 --> 00:18:04.380
Schaller was was there, he'd probably be the other person who uh uh ended up

00:18:04.570 --> 00:18:05.850
being sort of ebo.

00:18:06.330 --> 00:18:09.610
And uh you know, I and you were rooming with people, right?

00:18:09.770 --> 00:18:10.730
So is that this right?

00:18:10.890 --> 00:18:14.010
Because it was and so I was rooming with Jack DeVideo, which was sort of cool.

00:18:14.090 --> 00:18:16.250
A very different kind of social psychologist, right?

00:18:16.410 --> 00:18:18.490
Very different view than than than mine.

00:18:18.730 --> 00:18:23.530
But I'm out on a boat during one of these breaks with Brenda Major and Jenny Crocker, who

00:18:23.690 --> 00:18:25.770
longtime friends, very, very close.

00:18:26.010 --> 00:18:31.840
And as they're talking about stigma, I realized that they viewed it as entirely everything

00:18:31.840 --> 00:18:33.040
was arbitrary, right?

00:18:33.200 --> 00:18:39.120
I mean, you know, the stigma of whether you wore Jordash or Wrangler or Levi's jeans was

00:18:39.120 --> 00:18:44.960
functionally the same as being sort of stigmatized because you uh you free ride

00:18:44.960 --> 00:18:49.520
uh on your community members or because you're walking around all diseasy or you're because

00:18:49.520 --> 00:18:52.160
you're from a different tribe or because right, whatever.

00:18:52.320 --> 00:18:57.390
Uh and for them it was all it was just all sort of deviance off of some kind of norm, and

00:18:57.390 --> 00:18:59.070
that norm could be entirely arbitrary.

00:18:59.230 --> 00:19:01.950
And I'm on the boat and I realize this makes no sense at all.

00:19:02.110 --> 00:19:03.630
Of course, this isn't the case.

00:19:03.790 --> 00:19:08.190
There has to be some kind of uh uh universality, some deeper function.

00:19:08.270 --> 00:19:12.350
And then I started thinking about well, what would be the things that we would stigmatize?

00:19:12.590 --> 00:19:17.310
And that really sort of got me into the whole perspective that I have, you know, thinking

00:19:17.310 --> 00:19:19.550
about okay, well, what is the nature of human groups?

00:19:19.710 --> 00:19:25.470
What do human groups need to be like in order to uh to be uh you

00:19:25.470 --> 00:19:30.480
know uh valuable that and you know add fitness value for its members, right?

00:19:30.640 --> 00:19:34.400
And then could we derive from that what those features needed to be?

00:19:34.640 --> 00:19:36.560
What are the things that then would be stigmatized?

00:19:36.640 --> 00:19:39.200
So stigma as a form of social control, right?

00:19:39.360 --> 00:19:45.120
To enable groups to be successful so that, you know, for so that individuals would be

00:19:45.120 --> 00:19:47.040
getting the fitness benefits out of it.

00:19:47.200 --> 00:19:49.760
And it was really that that was the big trigger.

00:19:49.930 --> 00:19:55.530
I mean, and and and and then Shaler and I were started talking about these kinds of things.

00:19:55.610 --> 00:20:00.250
And and he, you know, uh uh, I don't know if you've had him on yet.

00:20:00.330 --> 00:20:04.090
Uh he's just brilliant and a really creative thinker and really fun to play with.

00:20:04.170 --> 00:20:06.330
I mean really fun to play with over ideas.

00:20:06.490 --> 00:20:10.970
And we really started uh building some stuff together and then going in other directions

00:20:11.050 --> 00:20:12.810
and then pulling those directions back together.

00:20:12.970 --> 00:20:16.250
And uh that's really I think that's really it.

00:20:16.410 --> 00:20:20.500
So in some ways, you know, you know, Robin Fox, right?

00:20:20.820 --> 00:20:24.820
Uh you know, Brenda Major, right?

00:20:24.900 --> 00:20:30.260
Out of uh by being by saying by talking about things in ways that made no sense, right?

00:20:30.420 --> 00:20:32.340
I teased Brenda about this, right?

00:20:32.820 --> 00:20:36.180
Brenda, you know, your your ignorance turned me into what I am.

00:20:37.300 --> 00:20:42.660
Uh but then having really good mentors along the way that just led me to be open minded and

00:20:42.660 --> 00:20:43.700
to be thinking integrated.

00:20:43.940 --> 00:20:48.990
Susan Fisk is a very integrative thinker and and she views herself as sort of supportive of

00:20:49.070 --> 00:20:53.790
of evo stuff but she doesn't really get it uh in in in a lot of ways I say with great

00:20:53.790 --> 00:20:58.350
affection Susan if you hear this uh really really important and a and a an incredible

00:20:58.350 --> 00:21:02.910
mentor and you know Gilovich who's just you know go explore you know do your own thing you

00:21:02.910 --> 00:21:06.430
know you you you figure out an honors thesis right I'll I'll support you and if you want a

00:21:06.430 --> 00:21:10.110
project I'll help you at the end if you can't find something but you know just the just the

00:21:10.110 --> 00:21:13.700
notion of of being open to thinking about different ideas.

00:21:13.780 --> 00:21:16.180
And but that Robin Fox essay was really important.

00:21:16.260 --> 00:21:20.420
And then having dug around, right, to be talking about these things and to be building on

00:21:20.420 --> 00:21:26.180
them and and and having the the friendship with Shaler and uh we overlap one year

00:21:26.180 --> 00:21:26.820
here, right?

00:21:26.980 --> 00:21:32.420
I was a first year faculty member when he was finishing up uh uh here with uh with Chaldini

00:21:33.460 --> 00:21:35.810
uh and Kenrick and so all those.

00:21:36.050 --> 00:21:39.810
So that's a really long-winded answer to a very it's a very vivid picture.

00:21:39.970 --> 00:21:40.450
That's great.

00:21:41.250 --> 00:21:41.490
Yeah.

00:21:41.570 --> 00:21:47.090
No, it's one of it's it's great because I think you are um the first guest we've had who

00:21:47.090 --> 00:21:52.050
sort of came into evolutionary psychology indirectly, and that you had a successful career

00:21:52.050 --> 00:21:55.730
as a psychologist without um taking an evolutionary perspective, and then all of a sudden

00:21:55.810 --> 00:22:00.770
you were you just had various influences and you were persuaded about the value of these

00:22:00.770 --> 00:22:03.810
ideas, uh and then started running with it.

00:22:04.050 --> 00:22:08.860
Um I I think one of the key things here, and Kim Hill said something to me, uh that you

00:22:08.860 --> 00:22:13.820
know, another great colleague across campus, being at ASU was really great uh uh for this

00:22:13.820 --> 00:22:14.140
as well.

00:22:14.300 --> 00:22:20.220
I mean, there's so many people around around campus to talk to, but uh you know, I had an

00:22:20.220 --> 00:22:26.220
I had an idea and I tested that idea, and the data started coming back and and the data

00:22:26.220 --> 00:22:27.420
are the data, right?

00:22:27.740 --> 00:22:33.030
Uh and uh one of the things Kim told me once was that he thought that

00:22:33.030 --> 00:22:38.470
psychology was gonna become more substantially evolutionary before

00:22:38.470 --> 00:22:43.830
anthropology be accepted more by more traditional folks uh because

00:22:43.830 --> 00:22:49.270
psychologists care about data was was was was his uh line on this that the cultural

00:22:49.270 --> 00:22:55.120
anthropologists it's not really it's not fundamentally uh about about the data to

00:22:55.120 --> 00:22:55.360
them.

00:22:55.600 --> 00:23:01.040
And so to have for folks like him to have sway there, he was way more

00:23:01.040 --> 00:23:05.280
pessimistic about that than he was about, you know, folks like me and folks like you guys

00:23:05.280 --> 00:23:08.640
having sway within uh within uh psychology.

00:23:09.680 --> 00:23:10.400
Yeah, it's interesting.

00:23:10.480 --> 00:23:11.920
That may well be correct.

00:23:12.080 --> 00:23:18.010
Um and I and I feel like if psychology has been more receptive to evolutionary ideas,

00:23:18.090 --> 00:23:21.050
particularly social psychology, I think it is largely due to you.

00:23:21.210 --> 00:23:26.330
I I feel like you're one of the best people for um persuading other

00:23:26.490 --> 00:23:31.290
non-evolutionary psychologists about the value of these ideas, uh interfacing with social

00:23:31.290 --> 00:23:36.010
psychologists and persuading them that these ideas are relevant and valuable to them.

00:23:36.170 --> 00:23:40.400
Um you're one of the best people at at getting your students jobs in social psychology

00:23:40.400 --> 00:23:44.400
departments and you know teaching them how to frame their ideas in a way that will be

00:23:44.400 --> 00:23:49.360
receptive to people who uh are who didn't you know naturally come to these ideas or or or

00:23:49.440 --> 00:23:51.520
you know or weren't already steeped in them.

00:23:51.760 --> 00:23:56.720
Um I I feel like you're you're one of the best people who uh who does what I might half

00:23:56.720 --> 00:24:02.560
jokingly call missionary work of of of bringing people on board um uh to

00:24:02.560 --> 00:24:03.120
these ideas.

00:24:03.200 --> 00:24:08.590
And I'm and I kinda I'm curious about you know if you have any insight into um why you've

00:24:08.590 --> 00:24:10.190
been so successful at that?

00:24:10.350 --> 00:24:15.230
Um has it been because you know you yourself were persuaded about the value of these ideas

00:24:15.310 --> 00:24:19.470
and so you know what worked on you and and and you sort of use those same tools on other

00:24:19.470 --> 00:24:25.470
people, or what is it that allows you to um bring these ideas to other people in a way

00:24:25.470 --> 00:24:29.630
that doesn't turn them off, and a way that has you know had such an impact in making

00:24:29.630 --> 00:24:34.830
evolutionary ideas um more accepted and uh and more mainstream in psychology?

00:24:35.310 --> 00:24:37.280
Yeah, well, first of all, th thank you for that.

00:24:37.440 --> 00:24:40.400
Uh I'm I'm flattered uh by that.

00:24:40.880 --> 00:24:46.080
Uh I I think it's I think it's a few

00:24:46.400 --> 00:24:47.040
things.

00:24:47.360 --> 00:24:53.280
I th I think part of it is uh and and and this this

00:24:53.280 --> 00:24:58.960
may partially be based on my own inconfidence and insecurity, that I often

00:24:58.960 --> 00:25:04.850
don't lead with sort of the strict derivations from the the

00:25:04.850 --> 00:25:10.770
deep I I don't I don't so if if if we listen to a talk from a

00:25:10.770 --> 00:25:16.050
UCSB person, it'll often start with, okay, so now if we start with first principles and we

00:25:16.050 --> 00:25:19.090
start with this thing right here, which by the way is going to be foreign to all of you

00:25:19.090 --> 00:25:20.450
folks over right, or whatever.

00:25:20.690 --> 00:25:20.850
Right.

00:25:21.010 --> 00:25:24.210
And then we say and we sort of apply this and we sort of work our way through.

00:25:24.370 --> 00:25:29.900
Uh one of the benefits I have is that uh I I was never trained as an

00:25:29.900 --> 00:25:31.020
evolutionary biologist.

00:25:31.100 --> 00:25:37.020
I never got to take an Evo course from Lita and John or or any of

00:25:37.020 --> 00:25:37.580
those folks.

00:25:37.660 --> 00:25:39.420
So I have never taken an Evo course, right?

00:25:39.500 --> 00:25:44.780
I mean um it's it's it's it's self-taught and with costs, which I which I'll admit because

00:25:44.780 --> 00:25:48.860
I think I think there are times that uh I get loose and I appreciate folks when they say,

00:25:48.940 --> 00:25:51.500
you know, you're being a little bit loose uh loose here.

00:25:51.660 --> 00:25:52.540
Okay, help me.

00:25:52.700 --> 00:25:57.550
Uh figures out so I think I think part of it is that because if you because if you've if

00:25:57.550 --> 00:26:03.230
you start at a place where that feels really foreign to folks I think it's uh even even

00:26:03.390 --> 00:26:09.310
well intentioned it's it's it's it's it requires work and if the foreignness

00:26:09.470 --> 00:26:14.510
is associated with a lot of the stuff that evil psych has unfortunately been associated

00:26:14.510 --> 00:26:19.180
with right you know just just a lot of wrong inferences about what what our assumptions

00:26:19.180 --> 00:26:23.820
actually are, uh, then I then I think it's really easy for people just sort of to t turn

00:26:23.820 --> 00:26:24.060
off.

00:26:24.540 --> 00:26:28.380
I remember what so so Chris Crandall is a very traditional social psychologist.

00:26:28.460 --> 00:26:29.100
He's a very good friend.

00:26:29.180 --> 00:26:32.380
I've known him for I actually met him when he was interviewing for a faculty position at

00:26:32.380 --> 00:26:35.900
Carnegie Mellon when I was a grad student like a last year grad student there.

00:26:36.060 --> 00:26:39.740
So we've known each other for what coming up on 40 years now or something.

00:26:39.980 --> 00:26:45.950
Uh And he once came when I when I first presented some of the work that

00:26:45.950 --> 00:26:51.150
I've been doing with with Kathy Cottrell on there these, you know, prejudice isn't just

00:26:51.150 --> 00:26:51.550
valence.

00:26:51.710 --> 00:26:55.230
It's not just negative, negative affect towards groups, right?

00:26:55.310 --> 00:26:57.870
There are these different, you know, emotional flavors to them.

00:26:57.950 --> 00:27:02.990
And those are anger, you know, anger focused prejudices, disgust focused prejudices, and

00:27:02.990 --> 00:27:06.350
fear and and and uh and they're there for a reason, right?

00:27:06.430 --> 00:27:12.040
They're they they are they are you know those are those are uh effective adaptive

00:27:12.040 --> 00:27:15.640
responses to particular threats that these groups are perceived as po and when I started

00:27:15.640 --> 00:27:21.400
doing that research and I I was as with a talk I was at a conference on on prejudice, I

00:27:21.400 --> 00:27:27.240
think up in Madison, and uh I I gave I gave the talk on it, which was really foreign

00:27:27.480 --> 00:27:31.160
and and it and it was threatening uh to social because it meant that you have to measure

00:27:31.160 --> 00:27:31.930
prejudice different.

00:27:32.090 --> 00:27:34.570
It's not there's no prejudice, it's prejudices, right?

00:27:34.650 --> 00:27:36.730
And they're these qualitatively different things.

00:27:36.890 --> 00:27:40.730
Uh and those qual and those qualitative distinctions make a really big difference.

00:27:40.970 --> 00:27:46.090
You know, if you actually want to intervene, right, then intervening, presuming that these

00:27:46.090 --> 00:27:49.930
are all the same thing, you're you're you're really going to not be very effective.

00:27:50.090 --> 00:27:51.930
And in fact, we haven't been very effective.

00:27:52.090 --> 00:27:56.760
Uh and you know, so I gave this talk and it was threatening to a lot of folks, but you

00:27:56.760 --> 00:28:00.440
know, Chris came up to me afterwards and says, you know, you you this has to be right.

00:28:00.680 --> 00:28:01.160
Right.

00:28:01.400 --> 00:28:07.320
And and I think it was the combination of the data and then and the

00:28:07.320 --> 00:28:13.240
logic that goes to it and and a and a simpler logic, one

00:28:13.240 --> 00:28:19.050
that that doesn't need to did it come from first principle I think

00:28:19.050 --> 00:28:24.890
this is an interesting I should finish sentences right uh so

00:28:25.050 --> 00:28:30.970
I think this is maybe an interesting difference between sort of the model that we have here

00:28:31.050 --> 00:28:36.810
for example and the and the UCSB model and I and I see this with uh so Michael Barlow is a

00:28:36.810 --> 00:28:41.900
colleague of mine now uh and uh and and one of the reasons why I brought him in a long time

00:28:41.900 --> 00:28:47.180
ago as a as a postdoc, right, was because I wanted to to to put these two perspectives

00:28:47.180 --> 00:28:51.020
together and sort of see how uh see how they worked and how they were similar, how they

00:28:51.100 --> 00:28:56.220
different, and and and how they could build each each other, is that we'll sometimes start

00:28:56.220 --> 00:29:02.190
with a a phenomenon and then sort of work our way back a little

00:29:02.190 --> 00:29:04.990
bit and then and and and and cycle a little bit.

00:29:05.150 --> 00:29:07.470
Okay, here's the phenomena to be explained.

00:29:07.630 --> 00:29:10.670
What what are the possible explanations and then cycle back?

00:29:10.830 --> 00:29:16.190
Uh and and I think you know a UCSB model is some is is often starting with the first

00:29:16.190 --> 00:29:19.870
principles and then saying, okay, well what would now would we expect in working the way

00:29:20.190 --> 00:29:20.510
out.

00:29:20.910 --> 00:29:26.580
And I think uh I think it's the the model

00:29:26.740 --> 00:29:32.580
we have is just a naturally more uh comfortable one for social

00:29:32.660 --> 00:29:34.420
psychologists, I think.

00:29:34.580 --> 00:29:37.460
Uh it's it's it's one that they've been doing their whole career, right?

00:29:37.540 --> 00:29:41.780
I mean it's it's the one that you know I sort of start with and you know I wasn't trained

00:29:41.780 --> 00:29:45.620
as an evolutionary uh uh psychologist or or biologist.

00:29:45.860 --> 00:29:51.650
And and so I think I think that's part of it too, that uh that that people can maybe

00:29:51.650 --> 00:29:56.610
more quickly get the grasp on the phenomenon and the nuance in the phenomenon.

00:29:56.770 --> 00:30:01.970
And then if the nuance is a bit of a threat to their current beliefs, okay now maybe and if

00:30:01.970 --> 00:30:04.850
they're serious scientists, then they need to think about it.

00:30:05.010 --> 00:30:05.330
Right.

00:30:05.650 --> 00:30:11.570
Uh I I have I have serious scientists who who focus who do stereotyping and prejudice

00:30:11.810 --> 00:30:17.580
who still come up to me uh and uh including a former uh recently a former

00:30:17.580 --> 00:30:22.460
David Hamilton uh social cognition student who said you know you have to be right it's the

00:30:22.540 --> 00:30:27.980
it's the it's the like the evo packaging that has so many people uh sort of sort of

00:30:27.980 --> 00:30:32.060
uncomfortable uh with it and then thinking through what would the implications be.

00:30:32.220 --> 00:30:35.350
So Carlos Navarette, I don't know if you guys ever knew him.

00:30:35.670 --> 00:30:39.510
Yeah, I knew Carlos because he was a grad student when I was a grad student at UCLA.

00:30:39.830 --> 00:30:39.990
Okay.

00:30:40.150 --> 00:30:42.310
He was at UCLA when I was at UCSB, yeah.

00:30:42.710 --> 00:30:43.430
Right, right.

00:30:43.910 --> 00:30:48.870
And uh after we published this PAS paper on sort of uh

00:30:49.190 --> 00:30:53.750
ecology and stereotypes being confounded with race stereotypes, right?

00:30:53.910 --> 00:30:59.860
People from you know more harsh, more unpredictable environments that pull for certain kind

00:30:59.860 --> 00:31:03.060
of behaviors, certain kind of characteristics, certain kind of strategies.

00:31:03.220 --> 00:31:08.980
And it turns out that those are highly correlated with some stereotypes about

00:31:09.300 --> 00:31:12.500
African Americans in the United States, right?

00:31:12.660 --> 00:31:17.950
And so that that may be a lot of the stereotypes that that we see uh in the United States

00:31:18.110 --> 00:31:20.670
aren't really fundamentally stereotypes about race, right?

00:31:20.750 --> 00:31:25.870
But they're but they're maybe fundamentally stereotypes about uh you know uh about the

00:31:25.870 --> 00:31:29.790
ecology that pe people are are presumed to come from and of course that's very valuable

00:31:29.790 --> 00:31:33.230
information to have if in fact ecology shapes behavior, which it does.

00:31:33.390 --> 00:31:36.910
And uh he came after that paper got published, he came up to me at a conference and said,

00:31:37.070 --> 00:31:38.270
Wow, that was really brave.

00:31:38.590 --> 00:31:42.060
I said, Why what what was what was brave about that?

00:31:42.220 --> 00:31:46.460
Uh, you know, you know, psychologists, social psychologists in particular should should

00:31:46.460 --> 00:31:47.500
love the idea, right?

00:31:47.660 --> 00:31:53.180
That it's not fundamentally about race and that it's about uh it's about environments and

00:31:53.180 --> 00:31:53.900
things like that, right?

00:31:54.060 --> 00:31:55.260
He said, no, no, no, no.

00:31:55.340 --> 00:32:00.700
One of the implications of this is that maybe there's a kernel of truth to the stereotypes,

00:32:00.940 --> 00:32:01.260
right?

00:32:01.500 --> 00:32:07.190
And and the thing, right, because that the that the uh not that the behaviors being

00:32:07.190 --> 00:32:11.830
engaged in, they're being engaged in because of the environment, but but that pe people are

00:32:11.830 --> 00:32:15.270
sort of picking up on those behaviors and they're using them to make inferences and they're

00:32:15.270 --> 00:32:20.310
extending them out there to the group that there might be a kernel of truth to stereotypes.

00:32:20.390 --> 00:32:25.670
And I was talking with this former student at David Hamilton's about this a few months ago.

00:32:25.830 --> 00:32:27.830
And he said, yeah, but that's not a kernel of truth.

00:32:27.910 --> 00:32:31.640
What a kernel of truth means, it's not about predicting the it's about that there's an

00:32:31.640 --> 00:32:33.000
essence that is genetically based.

00:32:33.320 --> 00:32:34.200
No, no, no, no, no.

00:32:34.280 --> 00:32:39.480
And I think there's an inference that people make about evo stuff that what we're saying,

00:32:39.720 --> 00:32:45.640
because there may be these systems that exist that drive these things, that uh uh

00:32:45.800 --> 00:32:50.680
that they're inherent and that they're deterministic and whatever, and and they're and the

00:32:50.680 --> 00:32:53.560
ideology just doesn't let them go there, right?

00:32:53.790 --> 00:32:54.590
I'm not going there.

00:32:54.750 --> 00:32:56.030
None of us go there, right?

00:32:56.190 --> 00:32:57.950
They think they think we're going there with it.

00:32:58.030 --> 00:33:03.310
And so if they're if they adopt a perspective that they're going there or they'll be seen

00:33:03.310 --> 00:33:04.110
as going there.

00:33:04.190 --> 00:33:08.510
And I gave a talk once at at a conference down in Sydney.

00:33:08.670 --> 00:33:12.190
Uh again, one of these small conferences, they pull people together.

00:33:12.350 --> 00:33:18.030
Uh uh Kenrick had been to this conference a couple of years earlier, uh, and Wendy Wood had

00:33:18.030 --> 00:33:19.230
been there as well.

00:33:19.470 --> 00:33:25.420
And you know, they just just hated uh hated that stuff, hated all the all those ideas

00:33:25.500 --> 00:33:31.500
uh that Doug was talking about, uh, where he was talking about uh sex differences and and

00:33:31.500 --> 00:33:32.940
mating and things like that.

00:33:33.180 --> 00:33:37.340
And I gave a talk on sort of more social cognition-y things and in fact didn't talk about

00:33:37.340 --> 00:33:38.380
sex differences at all.

00:33:38.540 --> 00:33:41.740
But I was talking about different motivational systems and how it was shaping different

00:33:41.740 --> 00:33:43.820
aspects of of cognition about people.

00:33:43.980 --> 00:33:48.780
Uh and afterwards he came up to me said, now that's a kind of evolutionary psychology I can

00:33:48.780 --> 00:33:48.940
like.

00:33:49.170 --> 00:33:54.930
that I can right and that I that I can and why because it had nothing to do with sex

00:33:54.930 --> 00:34:00.930
differences and she had these commitments to what it meant what what it meant to be male

00:34:00.930 --> 00:34:04.690
and female and and what differences look like and where they must come from.

00:34:04.770 --> 00:34:08.770
And if they came from here then oh my God, if they came from there then that would be okay.

00:34:08.850 --> 00:34:12.930
And it would right and and and so it was it was sort of driven by commitments.

00:34:13.170 --> 00:34:14.530
I think we still have that problem.

00:34:14.690 --> 00:34:16.440
I think some of that problem is coming back.

00:34:16.600 --> 00:34:18.680
I think over the last five years ago.

00:34:18.840 --> 00:34:24.520
I think uh, you know, maybe since the murder of Geor George Floyd and a lot more uh sort of

00:34:24.760 --> 00:34:29.880
social justice activism uh within academia and now backlash and backlash for the backlash

00:34:29.960 --> 00:34:30.440
and all that.

00:34:30.600 --> 00:34:35.400
Uh I think there is more concern about how one comes across uh uh a little bit.

00:34:35.720 --> 00:34:41.510
Uh but in the end, you know, the the data are the data,

00:34:41.670 --> 00:34:42.870
yes, they need to be interpreted.

00:34:42.950 --> 00:34:47.110
And yes, when there are alternative interpretations, we ought to work really, really hard

00:34:47.110 --> 00:34:48.870
to sort of tease them apart.

00:34:49.110 --> 00:34:49.430
Right.

00:34:50.150 --> 00:34:55.670
But what's really clear is that in the areas that I focus on, you know, how people

00:34:55.910 --> 00:35:01.830
think is so much more nuanced and and and so much more based on trying to

00:35:01.830 --> 00:35:07.510
solve fundamental challenges of of social living than what our science has uh

00:35:07.640 --> 00:35:09.400
uh has presumed it to be.

00:35:09.560 --> 00:35:13.800
You know, if we measure things really simply, you don't you don't uh you don't you don't

00:35:13.800 --> 00:35:14.840
discover the complexity.

00:35:14.920 --> 00:35:18.600
And we've had very simple measures because our theories initially call for very simple

00:35:18.600 --> 00:35:19.240
measures.

00:35:19.320 --> 00:35:23.320
Uh and so we don't see the complexity and so people can keep moving on, but we're not

00:35:23.320 --> 00:35:26.920
making progress without uh diving in deeper, I don't think.

00:35:27.560 --> 00:35:27.800
Yeah.

00:35:27.960 --> 00:35:33.150
I kind of want to see if I can take a stab at summarizing your

00:35:33.790 --> 00:35:34.190
answer.

00:35:35.790 --> 00:35:41.630
What I hear you saying is that you know there are two approaches to um framing evolutionary

00:35:41.630 --> 00:35:44.830
ideas and their utility um to studying humans.

00:35:44.990 --> 00:35:48.910
Um and there's the the Santa Barbara I'm probably caricaturing, but um the Santa Barbara

00:35:49.390 --> 00:35:51.950
approach is very much we're gonna start with the Big Bang.

00:35:52.270 --> 00:35:54.030
And if you read the John Tubi talk.

00:35:54.270 --> 00:35:55.150
The John Tubi method.

00:35:55.230 --> 00:35:57.950
And if you read any Tubi papers, they tend to start with the Big Bang.

00:35:58.200 --> 00:36:04.040
They start with you know the thermodynamics and uh replicators and then you know work their

00:36:04.040 --> 00:36:06.760
way from first principles to the phenomenon that you're interested in.

00:36:07.000 --> 00:36:10.760
Yeah I did I didn't learn until listening to the the leader thing that he started off as

00:36:10.760 --> 00:36:11.640
like a physics major.

00:36:11.720 --> 00:36:13.640
So you can it makes sense in retrospect.

00:36:13.720 --> 00:36:19.080
Yeah there's not totally there's not in it a mental state anywhere in that story either

00:36:19.320 --> 00:36:24.120
which I love but but but yes exactly like it's it's uh physics and design.

00:36:24.200 --> 00:36:25.320
Yeah totally.

00:36:25.480 --> 00:36:25.640
Yeah.

00:36:25.950 --> 00:36:26.270
Yeah.

00:36:26.350 --> 00:36:28.670
Um, but you take a a very different approach.

00:36:28.750 --> 00:36:33.470
Uh rather than starting with the Big Bang or the law of thermodynamics, um, which could

00:36:33.470 --> 00:36:37.470
alienate people who uh don't really think about that or don't find it relevant.

00:36:37.630 --> 00:36:41.630
Um, you start with the thing that people actually care about, which is say prejudice.

00:36:41.870 --> 00:36:45.390
So we all it's just so immediately you get on the same page with the people you're talking

00:36:45.390 --> 00:36:45.550
to.

00:36:45.710 --> 00:36:49.310
We're both interested in prejudice, we're both interested in in what causes it and how we

00:36:49.310 --> 00:36:50.350
can change it, right?

00:36:50.560 --> 00:36:54.720
And when you start from there and then bring in the evolutionary ideas, well, here is how

00:36:54.720 --> 00:36:58.960
we can gain insight into prejudice and where it comes from and how to change it.

00:36:59.040 --> 00:37:02.480
Uh then people are going to be much more receptive because you're starting on a on a place

00:37:02.480 --> 00:37:06.320
of common ground, we share the same goals, and then here's how my approach can help you

00:37:06.320 --> 00:37:08.080
achieve these goals that we share.

00:37:08.400 --> 00:37:09.600
Yeah, I I think that's right.

00:37:09.760 --> 00:37:12.530
But I also think that both are absolutely necessary.

00:37:12.690 --> 00:37:17.730
And the notion of, you know, Cialdini talks about full cycle psychology in a different kind

00:37:17.730 --> 00:37:17.970
of way.

00:37:18.050 --> 00:37:24.050
But if we think about sort of, you know, just you know, observing uh phenomena and you

00:37:24.050 --> 00:37:28.610
know understanding the this isn't gonna come out right.

00:37:28.850 --> 00:37:34.770
Uh uh requiring ourselves to have sort of the the deep

00:37:34.770 --> 00:37:37.460
logic, Both of those things are true.

00:37:37.700 --> 00:37:43.460
And I th I think, you know, where I benefit from interacting with uh

00:37:44.180 --> 00:37:50.020
uh with folks that come out of the Lita and John uh tradition is that

00:37:50.020 --> 00:37:55.380
they sort of really force me to to think harder and deeper about those things.

00:37:55.540 --> 00:38:01.470
I think some of the value we add is that we're we're maybe seeing earlier a lot of

00:38:01.470 --> 00:38:04.750
the complexity that needs to be explained, right?

00:38:05.230 --> 00:38:07.470
And and those those have to meet, right?

00:38:07.550 --> 00:38:12.190
Those those those have to meet to have a really, really s strong science of what we're

00:38:12.190 --> 00:38:13.230
trying to do here, I think.

00:38:13.390 --> 00:38:15.470
So I I th I think they're entirely complementary.

00:38:15.550 --> 00:38:20.110
I don't I don't see them as being competing at all, but but maybe there's a little bit of a

00:38:20.430 --> 00:38:26.220
uh uh uh an aesthetic difference in sort of where one started or maybe like i said

00:38:26.300 --> 00:38:31.020
it may it may just be a practice difference right i mean it's i grew up in one place i

00:38:31.020 --> 00:38:35.260
didn't grow up in the other place and so it's a sort of where where where my mind goes

00:38:35.260 --> 00:38:35.500
first.

00:38:35.820 --> 00:38:39.100
Yeah and I like I did I did the a first graduate class.

00:38:39.180 --> 00:38:43.420
We've there had never been a graduate class in evolutionary psychology at UCSB, believe it

00:38:43.420 --> 00:38:43.820
or not.

00:38:44.300 --> 00:38:50.290
And I did I tra transform what was the undergrad class that Lita had been teaching, that I

00:38:50.290 --> 00:38:55.250
had been teaching since I was a graduate student, and that I taught when I left and taught

00:38:55.250 --> 00:38:55.890
elsewhere.

00:38:56.050 --> 00:39:01.090
I form reformatted that into a grad class and it was doing largely doing a task analysis.

00:39:01.330 --> 00:39:05.730
Uh and there is and this is also in the um David Lewis et al.

00:39:05.890 --> 00:39:10.930
bus lab paper, where you can go phenomenon first or adapt a problem first.

00:39:11.090 --> 00:39:16.760
And you can just sort of and and when you do phenomenon first, it's really, you know, is

00:39:16.760 --> 00:39:18.120
it, does it quack like a duck?

00:39:18.200 --> 00:39:19.080
Does it sound like a duck?

00:39:19.160 --> 00:39:20.040
Does it swim like a duck?

00:39:20.120 --> 00:39:23.560
You know, you're really just interrogating, well, what is the phenomenon you're talking

00:39:23.560 --> 00:39:23.800
about?

00:39:23.960 --> 00:39:29.960
But as you said, Steve, then you're translating that into the job of an evolutionary

00:39:29.960 --> 00:39:35.320
psychologist is to take an important phenomenon and then have this gambit or these

00:39:35.320 --> 00:39:40.350
guesses of what are the likely adaptations that are underlying this, you know?

00:39:40.430 --> 00:39:45.230
And I like both of you, you like David with humor or with like status games or Steve

00:39:45.390 --> 00:39:49.310
looking at and looking at prejudice or discrimination or stigma.

00:39:49.790 --> 00:39:55.630
The skill in the art is to look at a complicated real-world phenomena and

00:39:55.630 --> 00:40:01.080
pare it down to at least one or two really plausible sets of

00:40:01.080 --> 00:40:05.960
adaptive problems, which is not easy, but I think that's I think you're describing, Steve,

00:40:06.040 --> 00:40:10.520
exactly like what it is to be day to day an evolutionary psychologist is you're just

00:40:10.520 --> 00:40:11.800
looking at the world.

00:40:11.960 --> 00:40:16.760
Um, and this is even something John Tuby used to say like your job is to just sort of the

00:40:16.760 --> 00:40:22.680
news, history, day to day life, you're always translating that into what

00:40:22.680 --> 00:40:26.520
are the adaptations or likely sets of adaptations causing that.

00:40:28.520 --> 00:40:30.110
Yeah, no, I I think that's right.

00:40:30.270 --> 00:40:31.310
I think that's right.

00:40:31.550 --> 00:40:33.310
Uh it's fun.

00:40:33.470 --> 00:40:39.470
You know, I I like the fact that they're um that there's

00:40:39.470 --> 00:40:43.710
sort of these different flavors of approach to it.

00:40:43.870 --> 00:40:47.390
I mean I I find that uh I I find that enriching.

00:40:47.550 --> 00:40:53.520
And and I have to say, so uh this is this is the first sabbatical I think I've I've had

00:40:53.600 --> 00:40:54.800
I'm on tobacco right now.

00:40:54.960 --> 00:40:56.960
I can't tell that I'm on sabbac right now.

00:40:57.040 --> 00:40:59.120
I shouldn't be here in my office.

00:41:01.440 --> 00:41:07.200
That I haven't actually gone to UCSB for a week or so to hang out and to talk to

00:41:07.200 --> 00:41:12.880
Lita and and the social psychologists and and uh uh everyone

00:41:12.880 --> 00:41:18.800
else uh there about the idea that would that's like bouncing around in my head, right?

00:41:19.250 --> 00:41:23.410
And uh I I've done that of I've done that a few times and it's been incredible.

00:41:23.570 --> 00:41:27.250
I I probably need to find a way of showing when when is your semester over?

00:41:27.330 --> 00:41:28.290
So I can show you how to do it.

00:41:30.290 --> 00:41:30.770
You're not teaching.

00:41:31.890 --> 00:41:32.370
I have no idea.

00:41:32.450 --> 00:41:32.610
Yeah.

00:41:32.850 --> 00:41:38.130
You have to ask any kind of uh uh but yeah, I mean couple weeks.

00:41:38.530 --> 00:41:39.490
Couple weeks, okay.

00:41:39.650 --> 00:41:43.410
Yeah, I probably probably I probably missed the opportunity this this year for that.

00:41:43.650 --> 00:41:49.360
Uh but yeah, uh I've I've always benefited greatly from uh from going to Santa

00:41:49.360 --> 00:41:55.040
Barbara and uh and talking with folks and throwing the ideas out there and then you know

00:41:55.360 --> 00:42:01.280
having them uh gently of over a six hour period of time, three or four

00:42:01.280 --> 00:42:06.640
hours in the in the C E P meetings and then over dinner with Lita and John afterwards, uh

00:42:06.800 --> 00:42:10.400
you know, having them interrogated uh in really sort of fun ways.

00:42:13.750 --> 00:42:19.510
So you mentioned earlier um that you you work with Tom Gilovich and um he just

00:42:19.510 --> 00:42:21.590
didn't get it in in your words.

00:42:21.670 --> 00:42:24.070
And and there are still some people who who don't get it.

00:42:24.230 --> 00:42:27.430
Uh and I'm curious what you think is going on there.

00:42:27.510 --> 00:42:29.910
What is ex what explains the the holdouts?

00:42:30.150 --> 00:42:33.830
I mean you mentioned some of it, whether there's some political concerns about there being,

00:42:33.910 --> 00:42:37.670
you know, genetic determinism or uh or or stuff like that.

00:42:37.910 --> 00:42:39.910
Um that's probably part of it.

00:42:40.100 --> 00:42:43.620
Uh do you think that's all the i that's what's not all of it.

00:42:43.940 --> 00:42:44.180
Okay.

00:42:44.740 --> 00:42:48.580
Yeah, I I I think that another aspect of it is sort of the David Hamilton comment.

00:42:48.660 --> 00:42:49.700
Yeah, but why do we need it?

00:42:49.860 --> 00:42:50.100
Right.

00:42:50.260 --> 00:42:54.580
And I think this has to do uh I th I used this term in a little bit of a different sense a

00:42:54.580 --> 00:42:57.780
few minutes ago, of a sort of a scientific aesthetic.

00:42:57.940 --> 00:43:02.660
That is what what what are you really trying to accomplish with your sci I mean what sort

00:43:02.660 --> 00:43:06.970
of feels right or looks right for you at at at what level do you really want to explain?

00:43:07.050 --> 00:43:08.970
I mean, what counts as explanation for you?

00:43:09.130 --> 00:43:11.050
What counts as understanding for you?

00:43:11.290 --> 00:43:14.890
And I th I think that's actually probably the bigger thing.

00:43:15.130 --> 00:43:17.610
It's like, yeah, yeah, fine, but why do we need it?

00:43:17.690 --> 00:43:21.370
Let's just, you know, you know, you you got you got a long pathway of a model here.

00:43:21.450 --> 00:43:22.730
Why don't we just start right here?

00:43:22.810 --> 00:43:23.050
Right?

00:43:23.210 --> 00:43:28.840
You know, why why do we need to understand that stuff uh uh as well right

00:43:29.080 --> 00:43:34.440
and and i think that's and and that and the assumption there uh especially for those

00:43:34.440 --> 00:43:40.040
psychologists who are interested in at least having their work be relevant to intervention

00:43:40.280 --> 00:43:43.800
well geez you know the closer you can intervene to the thing that you want to change maybe

00:43:43.800 --> 00:43:47.880
the better off you are anyway so do you really need to understand this bigger frame that's

00:43:47.960 --> 00:43:53.160
that's deeper and and and sort of causally further back uh and

00:43:53.720 --> 00:43:58.850
I've always wanted to sort of dive in and to and to play with that idea a little bit more

00:43:58.930 --> 00:44:03.570
because, you know, my intuition on it is that no, it makes a huge difference because it it

00:44:03.650 --> 00:44:07.810
it it gives you it tells you what territory you need to be in, right?

00:44:08.050 --> 00:44:10.850
And I think we're missing huge territories, right?

00:44:11.010 --> 00:44:12.130
Because we're not asking.

00:44:12.290 --> 00:44:15.810
Uh that because because we're not understanding the adaptive problem.

00:44:15.970 --> 00:44:18.690
So we're not looking in the right places, right?

00:44:18.930 --> 00:44:23.640
And so we're we're, you know, uh yeah, we're blind that we're blind, right?

00:44:23.800 --> 00:44:29.800
We're sort of theory blind to where a lot of the gr the the the the stronger possibilities

00:44:29.800 --> 00:44:31.560
might might be, right?

00:44:31.960 --> 00:44:35.800
And sort of thinking that through and developing that uh a little more.

00:44:35.880 --> 00:44:40.920
I'll I'll never do it, but I I think that would be a useful thing, you know, in terms of

00:44:41.000 --> 00:44:46.870
uh, you know, help helping folks uh who who aren't as driven

00:44:46.870 --> 00:44:50.150
as much by the ideology but just still don't understand, yeah, but why do we need it?

00:44:50.390 --> 00:44:53.830
And I th and I think there's also this this this different level of curiosity, right?

00:44:53.910 --> 00:44:56.310
I mean so so Tubi was starting as a physicist.

00:44:56.390 --> 00:44:59.030
Everything starts it right I mean curious about a lot of things.

00:44:59.110 --> 00:44:59.990
Everything needs to connect.

00:45:00.150 --> 00:45:01.670
Everything needs to connect, right?

00:45:02.070 --> 00:45:05.990
And uh and I think for a lot of folks everything doesn't need to connect.

00:45:07.180 --> 00:45:07.980
That's really interesting.

00:45:08.140 --> 00:45:12.060
Yeah, it's almost like um there are different appetites for explanation.

00:45:12.220 --> 00:45:17.820
And we just have a really deep hunger to get as deep as possible in the explanatory uh uh

00:45:18.780 --> 00:45:21.100
depth of of what we're what we're looking at.

00:45:21.260 --> 00:45:24.620
Um and some people uh are not as hungry for explanatory depth.

00:45:24.700 --> 00:45:30.220
They're they're they're happy if they can just explain something at at a shallow level, and

00:45:30.220 --> 00:45:33.580
um that might be you know an individual difference variable.

00:45:33.900 --> 00:45:38.970
Yeah, I mean at a what I would say for a lot of them it would be at a

00:45:38.970 --> 00:45:44.650
mechanistic level, but not understanding, you know, why

00:45:44.730 --> 00:45:49.130
why those mechanisms and therefore maybe not understanding nuances that they don't see

00:45:49.130 --> 00:45:50.650
because they don't measure the right stuff.

00:45:50.810 --> 00:45:51.050
Right.

00:45:51.130 --> 00:45:54.890
Or they're not seeing alternative mechanisms as well because again they're not thinking

00:45:54.890 --> 00:45:59.290
about it in terms of the problem that the that this that this ultimate behavior is trying

00:45:59.290 --> 00:46:02.970
to uh or problems that that they're is trying to solve, right?

00:46:03.050 --> 00:46:08.940
And so uh I I think I think it's uh it's

00:46:08.940 --> 00:46:14.780
a blindness outside the particular uh mechanism

00:46:15.020 --> 00:46:17.100
sort of of current focus.

00:46:17.260 --> 00:46:21.900
Uh and they wanna they say, okay, there's something here, let's come in and let's and and

00:46:21.900 --> 00:46:23.900
let's really sort of understand that.

00:46:24.060 --> 00:46:28.300
Um again, not realizing that there's all this other stuff out there uh that they're not

00:46:28.300 --> 00:46:28.620
seeing.

00:46:32.210 --> 00:46:36.370
thought that came to me about like how these people might be persuaded.

00:46:36.530 --> 00:46:41.570
You know, it seems to me like what they're trying to do is they're trying to fix a machine.

00:46:41.810 --> 00:46:43.490
Let's say, let's say it's a car.

00:46:43.730 --> 00:46:48.370
But um they're ignoring what the machine is and what its function is and what the different

00:46:48.370 --> 00:46:50.370
parts of it are designed to do.

00:46:50.530 --> 00:46:54.850
And you're gonna have a much harder time fixing a car if you don't know that what you're

00:46:54.850 --> 00:46:59.090
fixing is a car and the part you're f if you don't know what part what the function of the

00:46:59.090 --> 00:47:00.920
part you're looking at is, right?

00:47:01.080 --> 00:47:02.600
You're gonna have a really hard time.

00:47:02.760 --> 00:47:06.840
Um it so it seems like if you want to fix the car, you have to understand number one, that

00:47:06.840 --> 00:47:11.480
it is a car, and number two, that it has a set of functionally specialized parts that are

00:47:11.480 --> 00:47:13.160
designed to do different things.

00:47:13.320 --> 00:47:17.320
And you're gonna have, you know, uh imagine a mechanic who doesn't know what he's fixing

00:47:17.400 --> 00:47:20.360
and doesn't know the function of the things he's looking at, right?

00:47:20.680 --> 00:47:23.080
So that might be one argument you could give.

00:47:23.390 --> 00:47:28.350
Right, or d or doesn't understand what the what the relate so you're going in and you you

00:47:28.430 --> 00:47:32.350
even even if you understand sort of part of the part of the machine and you're going in to

00:47:32.350 --> 00:47:37.150
like fix a piston or something like that, uh, or you're trying to make it better or

00:47:37.150 --> 00:47:40.590
whatever you're trying to do, but you don't realize what the relationship between that

00:47:40.590 --> 00:47:42.590
piston is and these other things.

00:47:42.670 --> 00:47:45.790
And if it turns out if it yeah, you can get it cranking faster.

00:47:45.950 --> 00:47:48.590
If you get it cranking faster, you know the suspension's not going to hold.

00:47:48.820 --> 00:47:50.020
I'm making stuff up I don't know.

00:47:50.340 --> 00:47:50.420
Sure.

00:47:50.900 --> 00:47:50.980
Right.

00:47:51.220 --> 00:47:51.460
Right.

00:47:51.540 --> 00:47:51.860
Yeah.

00:47:52.100 --> 00:47:56.020
And uh and and and a and a real system wouldn't work like that, right?

00:47:56.900 --> 00:48:02.820
Sort of a real sort of uh adaptive system wouldn't have pistons that work in the kind

00:48:02.820 --> 00:48:06.260
of way that its suspension couldn't uh couldn't hold together.

00:48:06.340 --> 00:48:06.580
Right.

00:48:07.060 --> 00:48:12.900
I I also think there's it's really one cannot overestimate

00:48:13.380 --> 00:48:18.730
the sociology of the moral landscape of academia.

00:48:18.810 --> 00:48:24.090
And I really think that also if you grow up in a world where you're focused on a mechanism

00:48:24.330 --> 00:48:29.930
and people who are appealing to evolution are using that to essentialize or justify

00:48:30.250 --> 00:48:36.090
social or gender discrepancies, then it's not only a lack of

00:48:36.090 --> 00:48:41.960
curiosity, it's also a marker of there's another group of people

00:48:41.960 --> 00:48:47.400
who have an agenda that's not to figure out the mechanism, but to just

00:48:47.400 --> 00:48:50.600
essentialize the existing status quo.

00:48:51.160 --> 00:48:53.080
And that did that that did happen.

00:48:53.160 --> 00:48:58.120
And that's not what some evolutionary psychologists or most evolutionary psychologists are

00:48:58.120 --> 00:49:03.290
doing, but it does make sense why people would have that um perspective.

00:49:03.450 --> 00:49:09.210
And it's very much uh probably implicit thing of part of theory is sort of a marking, it's

00:49:09.210 --> 00:49:13.450
like a coalitional or coordination marker of like, who's my moral circle?

00:49:13.690 --> 00:49:16.490
We're all good, but there's other people who are up to no good.

00:49:16.570 --> 00:49:18.250
And theory is part of marking that.

00:49:18.330 --> 00:49:24.170
And so not wanting to adopt another theory has this like loyalty and moral tinge to

00:49:24.170 --> 00:49:24.490
it.

00:49:25.050 --> 00:49:26.410
I I think I think that's true.

00:49:26.490 --> 00:49:31.300
And I and I was if you would have if we would have had this conversation, you know, seven

00:49:31.300 --> 00:49:37.300
or eight years ago, what I would have said is that

00:49:37.700 --> 00:49:42.100
younger people, and I still think this is the case, that that younger scholars are way more

00:49:42.100 --> 00:49:47.940
open to what we're doing than older scholars, than folks of my generation and and

00:49:48.100 --> 00:49:49.940
uh and and beyond.

00:49:50.100 --> 00:49:55.890
Uh because they didn't grow up in the in the in the uh in the

00:49:55.890 --> 00:50:01.890
social activism and social constructivism sort of days of the sixties and the

00:50:01.890 --> 00:50:07.330
seventies and and and and all of that and have that be sort of part core of of their

00:50:07.330 --> 00:50:11.330
identities and of their affiliations or coalitions and and the like.

00:50:11.970 --> 00:50:17.200
And then the world got easier and simpler and okay now you know we we we can we can look at

00:50:17.200 --> 00:50:19.120
the world and we don't need these particular lenses.

00:50:19.200 --> 00:50:24.240
And I think you know younger psychologists were becoming more open to the evolutionary

00:50:24.240 --> 00:50:24.800
approach.

00:50:25.040 --> 00:50:31.040
I do wonder now, like over the last five years or so, whether that's taken uh as

00:50:31.040 --> 00:50:32.480
taken a hit again.

00:50:32.720 --> 00:50:38.080
You know, younger younger scientists are different now than uh uh than they were.

00:50:38.240 --> 00:50:42.970
Uh they're more sensitive to a lot of things, I think they feel more vulnerable.

00:50:43.210 --> 00:50:49.210
Uh uh they are uh even more cynical of of

00:50:49.210 --> 00:50:55.050
what they view as power structures which are defined by things that are very

00:50:55.050 --> 00:50:58.570
much sort of extra sci extra scientific, right?

00:50:58.970 --> 00:51:04.840
Uh and uh yeah and and and part of so i i think

00:51:04.840 --> 00:51:10.760
it'll be interesting over these next five or ten years to see you know whether you know the

00:51:10.760 --> 00:51:15.880
sort of the growth in the acceptance of evolutionary psychology takes a little bit of a a

00:51:15.880 --> 00:51:21.480
dip a little bit of a of a hit uh i think i think eventually you know the

00:51:21.720 --> 00:51:27.690
uh uh the science is gonna win out but i'm an optimist uh Uh

00:51:27.930 --> 00:51:28.810
but yeah, we'll see.

00:51:28.970 --> 00:51:34.570
And and and and part of part of my my local pessimism about this might have been I was

00:51:34.570 --> 00:51:35.530
chair for six years.

00:51:35.690 --> 00:51:41.610
I was chair during, you know, sort of the COVID George Floyd times where uh young

00:51:41.610 --> 00:51:47.050
people especially, sort of grad students especially, right, uh just became very, very

00:51:47.050 --> 00:51:52.970
activated and uh very, very sensitive to things that could be seen as uh uh oppressive in

00:51:52.970 --> 00:51:54.010
one way or another.

00:51:54.360 --> 00:51:59.560
And so uh I wonder whether we're gonna we're gonna be fall back into being stereotyped in

00:51:59.640 --> 00:52:01.480
and in in those ways again.

00:52:01.800 --> 00:52:01.960
Yeah.

00:52:02.280 --> 00:52:07.800
Or or we're part of the uh anti oppression um articulation.

00:52:08.040 --> 00:52:13.800
So uh I I I I feel like the last five or six years, I feel like uh um

00:52:14.690 --> 00:52:18.690
I don't know if it's COVID or I don't know if it's the political climate, like not to get

00:52:18.690 --> 00:52:19.730
political about things.

00:52:19.970 --> 00:52:24.290
I do feel like as an academic, I'm sort of living through a dying institution.

00:52:24.690 --> 00:52:26.770
You know, like journals.

00:52:27.090 --> 00:52:31.570
Uh I mean, I don't know what how David feels about this, but you know, I'm old enough that

00:52:31.570 --> 00:52:37.330
I feel like I was at the tail end of the golden era of um you could

00:52:37.330 --> 00:52:41.330
publish an article that didn't have fancy, glossy figures in it.

00:52:41.620 --> 00:52:42.900
people would read the articles.

00:52:43.060 --> 00:52:46.900
Maybe I was a kid, and maybe this was all maybe this is just a thing of when you're a kid,

00:52:46.980 --> 00:52:49.860
the world is ideal, and when you grow up, you realize it's not.

00:52:50.020 --> 00:52:55.220
Um, but you know, like I'm I'm old enough that I didn't have like as much internet science,

00:52:55.300 --> 00:52:58.740
and it wasn't as much like glossy photos.

00:52:58.980 --> 00:53:04.980
Um, and now it just feels like, especially sped up with like AI and and these things where

00:53:04.980 --> 00:53:10.670
it's just sort of funding, publishing, um, teaching all of these things

00:53:10.830 --> 00:53:16.750
just feel like there's it's sort of a dying institution and so even myself like the last

00:53:16.750 --> 00:53:22.750
five or six years I feel like there is more um more extra scientific

00:53:22.750 --> 00:53:28.430
garbage um or you're sort of aware of um uh all the ways in which

00:53:28.430 --> 00:53:34.190
science is being harmed um from all these outside forces and I I feel um

00:53:34.350 --> 00:53:37.710
I feel more oppressed in the last five or six years.

00:53:39.160 --> 00:53:40.600
Yeah, that's interesting.

00:53:40.840 --> 00:53:43.480
Uh holding myself constant.

00:53:43.640 --> 00:53:47.480
I'm uh I'm uh it's a within participant, uh within subjects effect.

00:53:47.560 --> 00:53:48.040
Yeah.

00:53:48.600 --> 00:53:49.240
Right.

00:53:49.720 --> 00:53:55.160
Uh yeah, I I I I you know share that that vibe, I think.

00:53:55.320 --> 00:53:58.040
I th there is a sense that something is decaying.

00:53:58.280 --> 00:54:00.680
Um maybe it's it's just an illusion.

00:54:00.760 --> 00:54:01.960
And I'm and I don't know.

00:54:02.120 --> 00:54:04.570
But curious if you if you share that feeling, Steve.

00:54:04.810 --> 00:54:08.170
Yeah, I don't know if it's a co I don't know if it's just you get older as a scientist and

00:54:08.170 --> 00:54:13.770
you realize the ways you you were ideal idealizing the process and then you see the

00:54:13.770 --> 00:54:17.130
warts and sausage being made, and that's always true.

00:54:17.450 --> 00:54:23.290
Or if it's really that um, you know, there's there's just a very different

00:54:23.290 --> 00:54:29.240
experience um That older faculty in my department, for example, didn't have to deal

00:54:29.240 --> 00:54:34.440
with a lot of these things that now current faculty, especially young faculty, are dealing

00:54:34.440 --> 00:54:36.120
with that are really new problems.

00:54:36.280 --> 00:54:41.800
I mean, maybe they had other new problems back in the day, but I think there's a

00:54:45.080 --> 00:54:48.040
this may be sort of orthogonal to what you guys are talking about.

00:54:48.200 --> 00:54:54.170
I think uh Science

00:54:54.490 --> 00:55:00.410
among serious scientists is getting there's like a

00:55:00.410 --> 00:55:04.250
pressure to be safer in it, right?

00:55:04.570 --> 00:55:09.850
Uh and I think part of this came out of uh a lot of very legitimate criticisms, you know,

00:55:09.930 --> 00:55:15.850
having to do with reproducibility and uh and uh how we were doing, uh how we were analyzing

00:55:15.850 --> 00:55:18.970
data and and and all of that, you know.

00:55:19.130 --> 00:55:22.500
Uh and I so I think there's some really legitimate criticism.

00:55:22.740 --> 00:55:24.900
I think we're doing a lot of that better now, right?

00:55:25.300 --> 00:55:30.980
Uh but I think people are scientists are uh

00:55:31.460 --> 00:55:36.900
becoming more afraid of making mistakes and getting caught in mistakes.

00:55:37.140 --> 00:55:43.030
Uh we've become uh you know science by Arthur Anderson versus by

00:55:43.270 --> 00:55:44.470
Magellan, right?

00:55:44.550 --> 00:55:46.950
That we're so we're concerned with these type one errors, right?

00:55:47.030 --> 00:55:49.990
We don't want to we don't want to have any false positives.

00:55:50.070 --> 00:55:55.190
But in and and so we get safe and the science gets narrower and we get more specialized and

00:55:55.270 --> 00:55:58.470
you know we don't swing for the fences as much, right?

00:55:58.710 --> 00:56:02.630
Uh but I think there's a huge cost to that, right?

00:56:02.950 --> 00:56:07.110
Uh you know, you have to head out into the into the open seas.

00:56:07.190 --> 00:56:12.940
I mean, otherwise the the science gets uh it's what it gets

00:56:12.940 --> 00:56:13.900
small, right?

00:56:14.380 --> 00:56:20.380
And uh if you think about times when you don't need small science, I think now times

00:56:20.380 --> 00:56:22.620
you don't need small science, right?

00:56:22.700 --> 00:56:28.220
And I and I and I think uh there there have been a lot of concerns in terms of you know

00:56:28.620 --> 00:56:33.310
what people are willing to do and what people are willing to sort of put out there and what

00:56:33.310 --> 00:56:34.990
risks they're willing to take.

00:56:35.950 --> 00:56:40.910
And partially because the criticism can be so fierce and it can be so quick and it can be

00:56:40.910 --> 00:56:41.950
so ad hominem.

00:56:53.200 --> 00:56:57.200
I'm actually not gonna mention her name because this was a really horrible experience for

00:56:57.200 --> 00:56:57.360
her.

00:56:57.520 --> 00:57:00.960
But who who had some papers who got seriously criticized.

00:57:01.120 --> 00:57:07.040
Uh and and some might have been legitimate criticisms, but not based on the morality of the

00:57:07.040 --> 00:57:08.320
scientists, right?

00:57:08.720 --> 00:57:12.400
Uh and uh and you know, Susan's dad was Donald Fisk.

00:57:12.640 --> 00:57:16.000
I don't know if that name rings a bell to you guys, but Fisk and Campbell, he was a very,

00:57:16.160 --> 00:57:21.360
very sort of important methodologist way back when uh in the University of Chicago.

00:57:21.600 --> 00:57:27.530
Uh uh and you know, there was a person who like threw out there on social media, you know,

00:57:27.690 --> 00:57:32.090
uh Donald Fisk would be spinning in his grave looking at this stuff, right?

00:57:32.410 --> 00:57:34.890
And it just just cruel, right?

00:57:35.130 --> 00:57:40.410
And and so I I I think there's this environment out there that the world can see what you

00:57:40.410 --> 00:57:44.410
do, they can misinterpret what they do, they can label it how they want to.

00:57:44.650 --> 00:57:46.660
Recovering is way harder, right?

00:57:46.820 --> 00:57:51.940
Tearing something down right and recovering from accusations is really, really hard.

00:57:52.260 --> 00:57:55.380
And so I think we're getting a little bit safer.

00:57:55.780 --> 00:58:01.780
And uh and and I think for people who feel compelled

00:58:01.780 --> 00:58:04.260
to be safer, right?

00:58:04.660 --> 00:58:08.070
I think I think uh that has to feel lousy.

00:58:08.230 --> 00:58:13.030
I think it has to uh feel stifling, or maybe you just get used to it a while and then

00:58:13.110 --> 00:58:13.670
science changes.

00:58:13.750 --> 00:58:16.950
And if that's the case, that's you know, that's sort of heartbreaking.

00:58:17.190 --> 00:58:20.550
Uh you know, I have a I have a thing.

00:58:21.670 --> 00:58:26.310
I have I have I have a couple couple things that that you'll that you can see around my

00:58:26.310 --> 00:58:27.910
office if you wander in.

00:58:28.070 --> 00:58:33.190
You know, one is uh quote by Einstein, not all that relevant here, but really it's a it's a

00:58:33.270 --> 00:58:39.160
it's a little bit of a it's a it's a it's a critique of sort of over parsimony right uh

00:58:39.320 --> 00:58:43.320
that sometimes we way oversimplify things you still have to account for the data right and

00:58:43.320 --> 00:58:49.320
what and what nature uh says but I have this thing here that's a story about Enrico Fermi

00:58:49.560 --> 00:58:54.680
who's used who's taking a tour of uh of someone other physicist lab and he's asked

00:58:54.760 --> 00:58:59.000
afterwards essentially hey so what do you think and uh I

00:59:01.610 --> 00:59:06.890
Research appears to be technically impeccable, but theoretically unexciting.

00:59:07.130 --> 00:59:11.930
But maybe so, but these are like bricks, bricks in the wall of uh in the edifice of

00:59:11.930 --> 00:59:12.730
science, right?

00:59:12.890 --> 00:59:16.570
You know, the uh the person comes back to them and says, well, no, we know most of them are

00:59:16.570 --> 00:59:19.210
just bricks laying around in a in a brickyard.

00:59:19.370 --> 00:59:21.690
And and the message for that is like, no bricks.

00:59:21.770 --> 00:59:26.810
We shouldn't be, we shouldn't be, you know, just uh just making bricks, right?

00:59:26.890 --> 00:59:29.210
They they have to be about something.

00:59:29.520 --> 00:59:33.840
And uh you know, there's another metaphor I sort of like, especially with students as

00:59:33.840 --> 00:59:38.320
they're at the stage where it's now time for them to sort of think about an identity, think

00:59:38.320 --> 00:59:41.120
about what your thing is going to be, you know, start doing this.

00:59:41.200 --> 00:59:43.840
Uh and it's the metaphor of a shot across a bow.

00:59:44.000 --> 00:59:48.240
And that, you know, the very first piece of work you do and sort of in with a new question,

00:59:48.320 --> 00:59:53.520
a new area, it should be designed to be a shot across the bow.

00:59:53.600 --> 00:59:59.390
And that is in the sense that if you're right and if the data turn out that people have to

00:59:59.390 --> 01:00:02.990
say, whoa, huh, this uh this this would change things.

01:00:03.150 --> 01:00:07.550
If this is right, this sort of if and if I decide I'm gonna take this seriously, right, as

01:00:07.550 --> 01:00:10.670
a scientist, this has to change things, right?

01:00:10.910 --> 01:00:15.790
And I think we need to be doing more of that as opposed to I mean I think a lot of people

01:00:15.790 --> 01:00:17.310
add bricks to their own edifices.

01:00:17.390 --> 01:00:18.350
I guess that's okay.

01:00:18.590 --> 01:00:24.460
Adding bricks to someone else's edifice, okay, that that that's fine, but that that to me

01:00:24.620 --> 01:00:30.620
is uh that's minor league science that what we really need more people doing is and and I

01:00:30.620 --> 01:00:31.900
don't care if you're wrong, right?

01:00:31.980 --> 01:00:34.940
I mean here's the other thing about science that that's incredible, right?

01:00:35.020 --> 01:00:37.900
I mean, if it's about something important, right?

01:00:38.300 --> 01:00:42.220
Uh it's people are gonna try to replicate it, they're gonna try to build on it and we'll

01:00:42.220 --> 01:00:43.580
discover that it's wrong, right?

01:00:43.740 --> 01:00:49.530
That to me is such a lesser cost than not to go out there and to take the risks and

01:00:49.610 --> 01:00:54.570
and and and and try to generate something that that would make a difference, right?

01:00:54.650 --> 01:00:56.170
And how we understand things.

01:00:56.570 --> 01:00:56.810
Yeah.

01:00:57.130 --> 01:00:59.690
Derek Gigerenzer has a very similar thing.

01:00:59.770 --> 01:01:05.770
It's like an older theory and psychology paper where he's at a lunch with students and

01:01:05.770 --> 01:01:11.450
there's faculty and the young students are asking faculty for advice and the faculty are

01:01:11.450 --> 01:01:15.930
saying, well, you really want a safe topic that you know you're going to get about three or

01:01:15.930 --> 01:01:18.560
four papers worth of data from.

01:01:18.960 --> 01:01:23.280
Um and then you know you can have your sort of speculative idea you can pursue later when

01:01:23.280 --> 01:01:24.400
you're a faculty member.

01:01:24.480 --> 01:01:30.400
And then Gerton is uh Gert style honesty is like that's fine if you want to be mediocre but

01:01:30.400 --> 01:01:33.680
really you should so it's a similar similar sentiment.

01:01:33.920 --> 01:01:37.760
Um I hear that but yeah no David yeah go ahead.

01:01:38.320 --> 01:01:41.680
No no it was so but but but the thing is

01:01:44.870 --> 01:01:49.430
If if if it's an interesting question, the data are going to be valuable no matter what.

01:01:49.510 --> 01:01:54.710
You'll still get those three or four papers, you know, worth of you know uh data if you're

01:01:54.790 --> 01:01:57.510
if you're asking important questions, right?

01:01:57.590 --> 01:02:00.870
Yeah and uh and you're designing the studies well, right?

01:02:02.550 --> 01:02:02.870
Yeah.

01:02:03.110 --> 01:02:04.540
I mean I think that's an important thing.

01:02:04.700 --> 01:02:10.060
Yeah, we we we have to be asking questions that are interesting enough that no matter you

01:02:10.060 --> 01:02:12.540
know what the answer is, it's going to be interesting.

01:02:12.780 --> 01:02:13.260
Right?

01:02:13.580 --> 01:02:17.900
Where we uh it's bad when we get into a place where the questions we're asking, they only

01:02:17.900 --> 01:02:19.580
matter if the if the data come out one way.

01:02:19.660 --> 01:02:23.020
And if they don't come out that way, then whatever, we'll put it in the file drawer.

01:02:23.260 --> 01:02:25.020
Like that's a bad place to be for science.

01:02:25.260 --> 01:02:30.220
We want to be asking questions that really give you interesting data however they come out.

01:02:30.750 --> 01:02:30.990
Yeah.

01:02:31.150 --> 01:02:36.350
I I I also like, I mean, I everybody has their own sort of personal situation that they're

01:02:36.430 --> 01:02:40.510
and I think one's expression of sort of what's going on in science is a readout of that.

01:02:40.590 --> 01:02:43.790
And I'm aware that like what I'm about to say is largely my experience.

01:02:44.030 --> 01:02:49.790
But I also think uh, you know, I also grew up with the theory

01:02:49.790 --> 01:02:50.190
crisis.

01:02:50.270 --> 01:02:54.910
Like I actually was submitting, I had a paper out at JPSP under Chick Judd at the same time

01:02:55.070 --> 01:02:59.200
this the Daryl Bem, the infamous Daryl Bem paper came out.

01:02:59.440 --> 01:03:05.360
Um and uh I think one of the other problems

01:03:05.680 --> 01:03:11.120
is there's still we're still this is all a symptom still of the theory crisis

01:03:11.520 --> 01:03:17.120
because there from a young from a young pers from a younger person's perspective

01:03:17.360 --> 01:03:22.880
there was a view of the the older guard, which is probably

01:03:22.880 --> 01:03:28.670
unfair, was uh the currency was like, is it

01:03:28.670 --> 01:03:29.710
surprising?

01:03:30.190 --> 01:03:35.310
And if you wanted to do sort of slower science where you just publish like a dirt

01:03:35.310 --> 01:03:40.990
derivation of what we should be looking for in the mind, or a theory that isn't

01:03:40.990 --> 01:03:46.510
surprising but is true and hasn't been documented, that's sort of more incremental, but I

01:03:46.510 --> 01:03:52.030
would argue more profound because it's it's it's but it wasn't in the currency of

01:03:52.030 --> 01:03:53.070
surprising.

01:03:53.310 --> 01:03:58.840
Um that that was that was a generational

01:03:59.160 --> 01:04:00.040
conflict.

01:04:00.280 --> 01:04:06.280
And I think some of the I know who you're talking about, you know, the the the Susan Fix

01:04:06.600 --> 01:04:07.800
student, and it was horrible.

01:04:08.040 --> 01:04:10.360
I know, I know um her pretty well.

01:04:10.600 --> 01:04:16.440
Um uh I think some of those were the growing pains, and where I think we're still in the

01:04:16.440 --> 01:04:21.960
growing pains of as a science, psychology is still not figured out,

01:04:22.120 --> 01:04:28.090
sort of it hasn't figured out the division of labor of who's doing what and what are

01:04:28.090 --> 01:04:29.690
all the things that need to be done.

01:04:29.930 --> 01:04:35.130
And I think some a lot of people feel like victims be in that

01:04:35.450 --> 01:04:36.570
miscoordination.

01:04:36.650 --> 01:04:42.410
And then people feel justified to harm other people because they're like, I wasn't valued.

01:04:42.570 --> 01:04:45.690
I'm a statistician and I see how everybody's doing everything wrong.

01:04:45.770 --> 01:04:46.730
And I wasn't valued.

01:04:46.810 --> 01:04:51.880
So I'm gonna hurt somebody else, or I'm an evolutionary psychologist, and people don't

01:04:51.880 --> 01:04:53.080
value adaptationism.

01:04:53.320 --> 01:04:54.920
So I'm gonna hurt somebody else.

01:04:55.080 --> 01:05:00.200
Or I wanna be shoot for the fences in a phenomenon, but nobody cares about that anymore.

01:05:00.280 --> 01:05:02.680
So I'm gonna, I think everybody is correct.

01:05:02.840 --> 01:05:08.680
I think it's just we there that we we're not coordinated enough yet as a science.

01:05:10.680 --> 01:05:15.750
Yeah, that's I'm I'm trying to think about what coordinated science looks like.

01:05:15.910 --> 01:05:20.150
I mean so in physics they have you know, they make a distinction between sort of

01:05:20.150 --> 01:05:23.510
theoreticians and uh and empiricists, right?

01:05:23.990 --> 01:05:29.670
Uh and uh and and rarely do they do they do they meet, rarely do they do

01:05:29.670 --> 01:05:30.790
both things.

01:05:31.110 --> 01:05:36.640
Uh yeah, I d I d I do think the surprising thing was a was a big

01:05:37.120 --> 01:05:42.480
and and a and it was a it was a criterion in a lot of journals and and I think it was a big

01:05:42.480 --> 01:05:42.800
problem.

01:05:43.200 --> 01:05:48.800
Uh but I think it was a it was it was the version of

01:05:48.800 --> 01:05:51.360
surprising that was the big problem.

01:05:51.600 --> 01:05:56.800
That is that it had to surprise your your well evolved intuitions, right?

01:05:57.040 --> 01:05:59.760
Which also meant that that a lot of those things were gonna be wrong.

01:05:59.950 --> 01:06:00.270
Exactly.

01:06:00.510 --> 01:06:01.310
I mean right.

01:06:01.470 --> 01:06:02.350
Uh but there's a lot of things.

01:06:04.350 --> 01:06:09.710
It was like I think there's a c it's a Kurt Gray and uh Dan Gilbert paper.

01:06:09.790 --> 01:06:10.590
Uh how to do that.

01:06:10.750 --> 01:06:11.550
Dan Wagner, maybe.

01:06:11.710 --> 01:06:12.750
Dan Wagner, that's right.

01:06:12.910 --> 01:06:13.390
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

01:06:13.870 --> 01:06:14.190
Yeah.

01:06:14.590 --> 01:06:14.750
Yeah.

01:06:14.990 --> 01:06:17.150
And we forget that your grandmother knows a lot of things.

01:06:17.230 --> 01:06:17.950
She's pretty smart.

01:06:18.430 --> 01:06:18.910
Well, you know what?

01:06:19.230 --> 01:06:21.630
But she knows she knows everything.

01:06:21.790 --> 01:06:26.800
She knows she knows that absent makes the heart grow fonder and she knows that out of s she

01:06:26.800 --> 01:06:27.920
knows out of sight, out of mind.

01:06:28.080 --> 01:06:29.280
She actually knows both of those things.

01:06:29.600 --> 01:06:33.040
Does she know when when those are gonna be she can see but she doesn't know how she sees.

01:06:33.120 --> 01:06:38.880
That's also that there is a kind of surprising that I think

01:06:38.880 --> 01:06:39.840
is really important.

01:06:40.240 --> 01:06:45.600
And that is uh surprising relative to the dominant

01:06:45.600 --> 01:06:47.990
theoretical frames of the time.

01:06:48.070 --> 01:06:48.550
Yeah right.

01:06:48.630 --> 01:06:50.310
And the challenging of the frames.

01:06:50.470 --> 01:06:55.510
And so sometimes the response that I get to some of my research is uh

01:06:56.870 --> 01:06:58.070
this hindsight thing.

01:06:58.230 --> 01:07:01.270
Oh yeah of of of course there are these different kind of prejudices or whatever.

01:07:01.430 --> 01:07:04.230
And I and I and uh and so okay so what?

01:07:04.390 --> 01:07:04.630
Right?

01:07:04.790 --> 01:07:07.190
And I'd say okay well look at every one of your theories.

01:07:07.340 --> 01:07:10.700
Give me show me one theory that actually can generate this set of predictions.

01:07:10.940 --> 01:07:12.300
It's like, oh, right.

01:07:12.540 --> 01:07:15.900
That's the kind of that's that's sort of the shot across the bow.

01:07:15.980 --> 01:07:19.580
That's the kind of surprising thing that we that we do need, right?

01:07:19.820 --> 01:07:25.660
The things that challenge the standard frames that we have, uh and that's

01:07:25.820 --> 01:07:28.390
and that's where the advances that come from.

01:07:28.550 --> 01:07:32.790
The problem is that the kind of surprising that we were going after was was the you know

01:07:32.870 --> 01:07:36.390
grandma Bubba, you know, uh, you know, surprising.

01:07:36.710 --> 01:07:37.030
Yeah.

01:07:37.190 --> 01:07:37.430
Yeah.

01:07:37.510 --> 01:07:42.070
I think my my mean my opinion is that the journals are not adequately organized or

01:07:42.070 --> 01:07:47.030
articulate what I want um and where to send this kind of paper.

01:07:47.110 --> 01:07:52.560
Like I think the journal landscape is um is really bad right now.

01:07:52.720 --> 01:07:58.000
And I think there's I there's so many people I talk to who send papers out to different

01:07:58.000 --> 01:08:02.160
journals and they're just desk rejected because this is not the kind of paper we want, but

01:08:02.160 --> 01:08:03.680
there's no articulation of where.

01:08:03.840 --> 01:08:09.840
And if it's not the the the operationalization of sort of this is where you do

01:08:09.920 --> 01:08:12.880
this kind of paper is not articulated.

01:08:13.040 --> 01:08:18.830
And I think editors with no guile or malicious intent are

01:08:18.830 --> 01:08:21.950
nervous and they want their journal to look sciencey.

01:08:22.190 --> 01:08:27.470
And if something looks out of place or different than what is usual, then they'll just sort

01:08:27.470 --> 01:08:32.590
of say, Well, I don't want to be under the tutelage of this journal taking weird looking,

01:08:32.750 --> 01:08:34.670
less sciencey looking things.

01:08:34.990 --> 01:08:35.550
Right.

01:08:35.870 --> 01:08:41.700
So that I I think that I think that's right and again it it leads to safe

01:08:41.700 --> 01:08:46.420
science and I think you know the funding agencies, you know, NIH would I mean you pretty

01:08:46.420 --> 01:08:50.420
much have finished all the studies that you'd be proposing in an NIH proposal, you know,

01:08:50.500 --> 01:08:55.220
and and provide you know enough of that sort of pilot data on it uh you know before NIH

01:08:55.300 --> 01:08:57.540
would say, okay, we'll we'll we'll spend money on this now.

01:08:57.700 --> 01:08:57.940
Right?

01:08:58.100 --> 01:09:04.050
I mean it you know it it it you know just uh just very, very uh uh safe and

01:09:04.050 --> 01:09:07.170
i guess that's you know i think we can think about scarcity in different kinds of ways we

01:09:07.170 --> 01:09:11.810
can think about in terms of money you know i guess for the journal it's you know is it is

01:09:11.810 --> 01:09:17.170
it scarcity of sort of reputation or or just the concern of making a mistake and getting

01:09:17.170 --> 01:09:23.170
caught and when when I I was associate editor of JESP a long

01:09:23.170 --> 01:09:28.940
time ago uh, with with Russ Fazio as the editor, and and we instituted a thing at the

01:09:29.100 --> 01:09:32.620
it may have been one of the very first versions of this, which were short papers.

01:09:32.860 --> 01:09:38.300
So there'd be a long and and and I can see in some ways why this would be viewed as

01:09:38.300 --> 01:09:40.060
outrageous now, right?

01:09:40.140 --> 01:09:45.820
Uh, this is before the replication crisis and everything, where the notion was:

01:09:46.060 --> 01:09:49.530
no, we don't want to spend 30 pages on this, right?

01:09:50.010 --> 01:09:55.850
Uh you know, you got four studies and whatever, and yep, stuff, but it's a really cool

01:09:55.850 --> 01:09:56.330
idea.

01:09:56.970 --> 01:10:02.810
So let's pull out the the the study that's the best exemplar of the idea,

01:10:03.050 --> 01:10:08.410
and we'll give you seven pages or whatever, whatever the the number was, and uh

01:10:08.970 --> 01:10:11.760
and let's get that out there so the world can see it.

01:10:12.000 --> 01:10:12.640
Right.

01:10:12.880 --> 01:10:18.480
Now, what that sort of meant was okay, you were and this is before the the age of

01:10:18.480 --> 01:10:20.480
computer, you know, online supplements.

01:10:22.240 --> 01:10:25.200
So people wouldn't see all the other stuff that was out there, right?

01:10:25.440 --> 01:10:29.040
Uh and so yeah, I can see why that would get critiqued now.

01:10:29.440 --> 01:10:35.130
But the but the notion was again that it's an idea that's worth having out there.

01:10:35.290 --> 01:10:39.610
And if it's an important idea and it turns out to be wrong, we're gonna discover it.

01:10:39.850 --> 01:10:41.130
And that's okay.

01:10:41.290 --> 01:10:44.330
That's the way I mean we we should be thrilled by that.

01:10:44.490 --> 01:10:46.090
That's the way science works.

01:10:46.250 --> 01:10:48.970
I'd rather have an idea that turns out to be wrong.

01:10:49.130 --> 01:10:52.730
I'd rather generate an idea, have it out there for a while, and then have someone say, you

01:10:52.730 --> 01:10:57.460
know, it's really this, it's not that, and say, okay.

01:10:57.620 --> 01:11:01.140
I think I I think you know, under that circumstance, I will still have made a contribution

01:11:01.220 --> 01:11:05.060
because I would have had an idea out there that would have been significant enough that

01:11:05.060 --> 01:11:08.900
could have, and now, boom, we got we got people talking, we learned something.

01:11:09.060 --> 01:11:13.060
Uh yes, this is now off the table, and we're going, we're going here.

01:11:13.220 --> 01:11:14.980
That's that's science moving forward.

01:11:15.140 --> 01:11:18.340
I think that's a hard thing, and maybe that's easier because I'm old, right?

01:11:18.420 --> 01:11:24.210
And my my my career is set, you know, I'm a folk professor, I'm tenured, I make a

01:11:24.210 --> 01:11:26.930
good salary, I I'm not forced to retire at any age.

01:11:27.010 --> 01:11:29.890
I can sort of do this however uh however I want.

01:11:29.970 --> 01:11:33.410
And so that's that's easy for me to to I think to say that.

01:11:33.490 --> 01:11:38.370
I think for a young untenured person that's a way harder uh thing to say, uh especially

01:11:38.370 --> 01:11:43.970
these days and especially again how quickly one can get devastated by uh by the

01:11:44.130 --> 01:11:48.690
commentariat out there in the you know out there in the in the world.

01:11:48.850 --> 01:11:51.900
So yeah.

01:11:52.300 --> 01:11:53.420
That's this is very meta.

01:11:53.740 --> 01:11:54.220
This is good though.

01:11:54.540 --> 01:11:54.860
I know.

01:11:55.500 --> 01:11:56.140
Yeah.

01:11:56.460 --> 01:12:00.940
Maybe we should talk about what Steve Newberg, the evolutionary psychology you do.

01:12:01.660 --> 01:12:03.260
Uh no, but this is wonderful.

01:12:03.340 --> 01:12:08.220
I yeah, it but the last it reminds me there's a Jerry Fodor um when Jerry Fodor passed

01:12:08.220 --> 01:12:13.900
away, there was a um a memorial service and somebody talked about how uh they remembered

01:12:14.060 --> 01:12:19.330
um going up to Jerry Fodor and saying, you know, this one idea I think you have is actually

01:12:19.330 --> 01:12:20.450
pretty reasonable.

01:12:20.690 --> 01:12:24.050
And he looked shocked and he's like, but it's still pretty unreasonable, right?

01:12:24.130 --> 01:12:30.130
Like he wanted to he wanted to be the the the contrarian or to provoke people to get them

01:12:30.130 --> 01:12:30.450
to think.

01:12:30.610 --> 01:12:33.410
And I think that's you know, yeah, I think that's really important.

01:12:33.570 --> 01:12:36.840
And I I think a science that doesn't encourage that.

01:12:36.920 --> 01:12:42.120
I think it's a litmus test of we're probably incentivizing the wrong thing.

01:12:42.280 --> 01:12:47.560
Um, if we can't be like, hey, this is this, let's what what if this is true?

01:12:47.800 --> 01:12:48.920
Let's figure this out.

01:12:49.080 --> 01:12:49.880
Like, yeah.

01:12:50.600 --> 01:12:55.800
Or or we just need to be, is ecumenical the right term, in terms of the different kind of

01:12:55.880 --> 01:12:59.400
sciences and the different kind of scholarship that we're open to, right?

01:12:59.560 --> 01:12:59.720
Yeah.

01:12:59.880 --> 01:13:03.870
Uh I mean, I've got colleagues in in the department and and the work to me is totally

01:13:03.870 --> 01:13:08.190
uninspiring, but it's important in certain kind of ways because it helps people with mental

01:13:08.190 --> 01:13:09.150
illnesses, right?

01:13:09.310 --> 01:13:10.510
Deal with their challenges, right?

01:13:10.590 --> 01:13:14.590
It's not interesting to me, but it's it's really useful and there and there needs to be

01:13:14.590 --> 01:13:15.150
space for that.

01:13:15.310 --> 01:13:15.470
Yeah.

01:13:15.550 --> 01:13:20.990
You know, I also want them to be to to look at stuff that uh that I and some of my

01:13:20.990 --> 01:13:25.230
colleagues are doing where, you know, there this it's way further you know to to get to

01:13:25.230 --> 01:13:28.910
application, but it's about how the mind works and that's really an important thing, right?

01:13:29.150 --> 01:13:30.430
And let's understand that.

01:13:30.510 --> 01:13:36.380
And so, you know, and I I think if uh we're a little bit less sort of uh you know sort of

01:13:36.380 --> 01:13:42.300
intradisciplinarily tribal or whatever, uh that that's uh something that would be good

01:13:42.300 --> 01:13:42.780
for us.

01:13:43.020 --> 01:13:43.340
Yeah.

01:13:44.620 --> 01:13:44.940
Yeah.

01:13:45.180 --> 01:13:50.140
I mean I mean this goes to Dave's point, which I think is very well articulated that it's

01:13:50.140 --> 01:13:54.140
about, you know, coordination failures among you know, we're we're just not rowing in the

01:13:54.140 --> 01:13:54.780
same direction.

01:13:54.860 --> 01:13:56.860
It's more like every man for himself.

01:13:57.020 --> 01:13:59.730
Uh there's no cohesive paradigm.

01:13:59.810 --> 01:14:05.010
There's no shared goal or shared uh philosophy about what we're doing and why we're doing

01:14:05.010 --> 01:14:09.490
it and what we're looking for and how our science should be.

01:14:09.890 --> 01:14:15.890
Um, I mean, maybe the solution to that is to have more you know broad conferences where

01:14:15.890 --> 01:14:20.690
people from diverse parts of the social sciences come together and get on the same page,

01:14:20.850 --> 01:14:26.290
but you know, that has its own challenges, and and that's also hard in in in different

01:14:26.290 --> 01:14:26.770
ways.

01:14:27.010 --> 01:14:28.660
Um yeah, I don't know.

01:14:28.740 --> 01:14:29.860
I mean there's a great quote.

01:14:29.940 --> 01:14:34.820
I can't remember who said it that um the best interdisciplinary work is done within one's

01:14:34.820 --> 01:14:35.140
own mind.

01:14:35.460 --> 01:14:36.900
I think you said it was Jerry Fodor back in the middle.

01:14:36.980 --> 01:14:38.100
Yeah, I think it was Jerry Fodor, yeah.

01:14:38.180 --> 01:14:39.300
I could I could be wrong, but yeah.

01:14:39.700 --> 01:14:41.540
Sounds like something Jerry Fodor would say.

01:14:42.340 --> 01:14:44.420
You attribute it to Jerry Fodor early in an earlier.

01:14:45.140 --> 01:14:48.900
The best interdisciplinary work happens within one's own mind.

01:14:49.140 --> 01:14:54.810
Yeah, see, I yeah, I don't I don't I don't buy it.

01:14:54.970 --> 01:15:00.810
I th I think, you know, what you actually need are people who come at things

01:15:00.810 --> 01:15:06.330
from very different perspectives but have an ethos of of listening and learning from one

01:15:06.330 --> 01:15:06.810
another.

01:15:06.970 --> 01:15:08.250
And and and it's it's hard.

01:15:08.330 --> 01:15:14.170
It takes a I've I've done several interdisciplinary uh kinds of uh uh sort of

01:15:14.140 --> 01:15:15.580
bigger projects.

01:15:15.740 --> 01:15:18.380
And uh it's hard because it takes a while to get the language.

01:15:18.540 --> 01:15:23.180
And and you and I know I remember one instance doing this project on religion and conflict

01:15:23.340 --> 01:15:27.740
where it took a full year before I realized that two of us were using the same term in very

01:15:27.740 --> 01:15:28.380
different ways.

01:15:28.540 --> 01:15:28.780
Yeah.

01:15:28.940 --> 01:15:29.340
Right.

01:15:29.980 --> 01:15:32.860
You know, because you know the disciplines used them in different ways.

01:15:33.020 --> 01:15:36.300
And uh and that we didn't even realize that we had sort of been talking.

01:15:36.460 --> 01:15:39.130
We finally realized this is why we're talking past each other.

01:15:39.370 --> 01:15:39.610
Right.

01:15:39.770 --> 01:15:41.210
And it took a year, right?

01:15:41.370 --> 01:15:46.890
Uh and so so so doing doing that kind of work is hard, but no one can be an

01:15:46.890 --> 01:15:49.530
expert in in tons of things, right?

01:15:49.610 --> 01:15:54.730
And so you you you want you want folks who have the depth of expertise and then you want to

01:15:54.730 --> 01:16:00.490
be willing to listen and to let the ideas uh collide and converge and uh you know

01:16:00.730 --> 01:16:04.250
meld and uh and everything I think.

01:16:04.810 --> 01:16:05.130
Yeah.

01:16:05.450 --> 01:16:07.220
And it's hard to get the benefit of the doubt.

01:16:07.300 --> 01:16:11.780
I mean, I remember, I mean, Steve, I think you're doing exactly what David is describing

01:16:11.780 --> 01:16:14.420
here, which is you're helping coordinate, right?

01:16:14.660 --> 01:16:20.020
But it's it's hard because number one, and I think students really feel this, is that if

01:16:20.020 --> 01:16:25.220
you go, for example, to a social psychology pre-conference and you don't use the same

01:16:25.220 --> 01:16:30.260
terminology or you're you're coming from a different perspective, we all absorb these norms

01:16:30.340 --> 01:16:32.820
of this is the way I usually do this.

01:16:33.370 --> 01:16:38.010
And I think to their credit and detriment, social psychology is a very norm heavy

01:16:38.010 --> 01:16:38.730
discipline.

01:16:38.890 --> 01:16:42.570
I think there's there's lots of anecdotal data.

01:16:42.730 --> 01:16:46.890
You know, for a while you couldn't get a paper published without a path diagram, a path

01:16:47.050 --> 01:16:47.450
diagram.

01:16:47.530 --> 01:16:51.530
I mean, it was very, you know, they were like, I remember working with social

01:16:51.530 --> 01:16:54.730
psychologists, and they're like, no, you have to say this thing in this way.

01:16:54.890 --> 01:16:57.610
You have to have this kind of figure, you have to have this kind of statistic.

01:16:57.690 --> 01:16:59.340
I was like, but you don't even know what the study is about.

01:16:59.420 --> 01:17:00.460
It just doesn't matter.

01:17:00.540 --> 01:17:01.500
This is the norm.

01:17:01.820 --> 01:17:06.700
And you know, and so I think like going up in front of a group of people, violating the

01:17:06.700 --> 01:17:11.260
norm, knowing you're doing that by having a different approach, it's a vulnerability.

01:17:11.340 --> 01:17:15.260
It would be hard for a young student, especially if it's hard for young people and for

01:17:15.260 --> 01:17:20.140
women or anybody, like you know, for example, like if if you're not the kind of phenotype

01:17:20.300 --> 01:17:26.250
or the that is given the benefit of the doubt for for multiple reasons, then

01:17:26.250 --> 01:17:31.610
there's this additional problem of in order for me to even cr facilitate

01:17:31.850 --> 01:17:34.970
coordination, the people, the audience has to give me the benefit of the doubt.

01:17:35.130 --> 01:17:37.690
In a 15 minute talk, are they going to?

01:17:38.010 --> 01:17:42.570
So I think like it's very courageous for everybody to do it, but I think it's really good

01:17:42.570 --> 01:17:47.530
when people do it like you, Steve, because it opens the door for other people who may not

01:17:47.530 --> 01:17:48.970
even be able to do that.

01:17:49.700 --> 01:17:51.780
Well, I'd never thought about that, but thank you.

01:17:52.020 --> 01:17:57.940
Uh I I I do think that, you know, one of the this is this is not only,

01:17:58.020 --> 01:18:03.380
you know, part of the problem in in in doing the science, but maybe in our broader

01:18:03.380 --> 01:18:06.980
societies is that we've moved away from giving people the benefit of the doubt.

01:18:07.220 --> 01:18:07.700
Right.

01:18:07.940 --> 01:18:11.780
And uh and that has just humongous uh costs.

01:18:12.020 --> 01:18:17.970
Uh it it has costs, you know, for when that when that benefit isn't given, but it

01:18:17.970 --> 01:18:22.530
has huge costs in people knowing that that they're not going to be given it, and therefore

01:18:22.610 --> 01:18:28.050
they're spending all this time and all this effort to uh uh to

01:18:28.770 --> 01:18:34.690
overexplain is not quite the right word, but uh but to avoid the potential cost of of

01:18:34.690 --> 01:18:36.130
being misinterpreted.

01:18:36.290 --> 01:18:39.490
Uh and that's that's uh just a heavy weight, right?

01:18:39.820 --> 01:18:44.940
Uh to to know that I can't go and and have a five minute conversation with someone uh you

01:18:44.940 --> 01:18:49.580
know that that is that is that is just totally play right because I could be

01:18:49.580 --> 01:18:55.100
misinterpreted, I could do this, uh to have to, you know, think about exactly how I'm gonna

01:18:55.100 --> 01:19:00.700
say every single thing, that I don't leave this out, that I what be I mean that's that's a

01:19:00.700 --> 01:19:01.260
heavy weight.

01:19:01.340 --> 01:19:06.140
And that's a weight that takes away from uh doing uh a lot of creative good things.

01:19:06.300 --> 01:19:10.910
You know, I'd I'd rather, you know, if if you think uh and I see this actually in some

01:19:10.910 --> 01:19:14.590
communication, I've been talking to some colleagues about this, you know, you I see

01:19:14.590 --> 01:19:19.630
sometimes tensions arise where, you know, someone will write an email, right?

01:19:19.870 --> 01:19:24.590
Not even about so they'll write an email and someone will have an interpretation of that.

01:19:24.670 --> 01:19:29.310
And instead of asking a question, let me understand, are you saying this or are you saying

01:19:29.310 --> 01:19:29.630
this?

01:19:29.790 --> 01:19:32.580
They presume that they're saying that.

01:19:33.220 --> 01:19:37.540
And uh and now all of a sudden you have a conflict where there's never any need to have a

01:19:37.540 --> 01:19:37.940
conflict.

01:19:38.020 --> 01:19:40.500
And now people are going they're they're cycling on this.

01:19:40.820 --> 01:19:45.300
It's now the person who's been accused of something that they didn't do, now they're

01:19:45.300 --> 01:19:46.900
offended and everyone's offended.

01:19:47.060 --> 01:19:48.660
Uh yeah, I think those two things.

01:19:48.820 --> 01:19:51.220
We don't give people the benefit of the doubt and we're too easily offended.

01:19:51.300 --> 01:19:55.780
You put those two things together and it's hard to do it's hard to do really good science.

01:19:55.940 --> 01:20:01.690
Uh to it's hard it's hard to communicate uh really good uh uh science and uh

01:20:01.770 --> 01:20:02.810
and to take risks.

01:20:03.130 --> 01:20:03.370
Yeah.

01:20:03.610 --> 01:20:08.970
Yeah, or even if we're not more offended, there's uh the selection for

01:20:09.290 --> 01:20:10.810
attention, right?

01:20:10.970 --> 01:20:16.170
Like there's just new coordination devices like social media, or you know, I I if you're

01:20:16.250 --> 01:20:18.490
I'm just doing my science, nobody's paying attention to me.

01:20:18.650 --> 01:20:22.890
But boy, I just said something controversial, or that could be interpreted, or I just knock

01:20:22.970 --> 01:20:28.160
somebody down, all of a sudden I've got you know thousands of people looking at me.

01:20:28.240 --> 01:20:29.200
That felt good.

01:20:29.360 --> 01:20:30.720
I'm gonna do more of that, right?

01:20:30.800 --> 01:20:36.560
So even if people um individually are no different, there's now like a select uh

01:20:36.720 --> 01:20:41.120
institutional selection for for these things, yeah.

01:20:41.680 --> 01:20:47.440
Yeah, and I and I actually think that and the knocking down, I think we saw a lot of that

01:20:47.680 --> 01:20:51.920
uh for young people who are sort of trying to be on their way up.

01:20:52.080 --> 01:20:57.190
I mean, it's uh it's uh it's it's it's exciting, it's a drug, right?

01:20:57.350 --> 01:20:59.270
And it you know it can really be reinforcing.

01:20:59.350 --> 01:21:02.870
And and so I'll tell you something that I have a little bit of shame about.

01:21:03.190 --> 01:21:09.190
So uh not because I think I did the science wrong, but because of how I felt

01:21:09.590 --> 01:21:11.670
you know with the communication of it.

01:21:11.830 --> 01:21:15.750
So I was in a controversy uh I don't know if I should be even saying this.

01:21:15.910 --> 01:21:21.590
I was in a controversy with an article Kru Kruglanski uh in the mid nineteen eighties

01:21:21.830 --> 01:21:27.520
about this uh uh about this individual difference uh construct uh personal need for

01:21:27.520 --> 01:21:33.120
structure uh and need for cognitive uh closure that he was doing some work on

01:21:33.360 --> 01:21:39.200
and uh I don't need to go into the content of it but we ended up uh I

01:21:39.200 --> 01:21:45.010
I ended up learning around two months before we were

01:21:45.010 --> 01:21:50.130
both me and a student of his were gonna be on a panel together talking about sort of need

01:21:50.290 --> 01:21:55.010
for structure kind of ideas and and how they shape cognition and all sorts of other things.

01:21:55.170 --> 01:21:55.490
Okay.

01:21:55.890 --> 01:22:01.810
So uh what I dis what I discovered in the couple months before, because I got an email from

01:22:01.810 --> 01:22:05.890
a student at another place that says, you know, you this scale over here that that that you

01:22:06.050 --> 01:22:11.820
felt uh you know advanced done by other people, not by me, uh, but that I published on it.

01:22:11.900 --> 01:22:15.900
And this scale over here by Kruglanski and his colleagues, you know they're correlated like

01:22:15.900 --> 01:22:16.460
point eight.

01:22:16.700 --> 01:22:19.020
It's like no that and I I was a reviewer on that crew.

01:22:19.100 --> 01:22:21.660
I said, no, they couldn't be correlated.8, right?

01:22:21.900 --> 01:22:25.020
They uh you know they're correlated point two.

01:22:25.180 --> 01:22:26.940
It says, no no no look I here are my data.

01:22:27.100 --> 01:22:31.660
So we ran a thing here and yes it's point eight and attenuating for over whatever.

01:22:31.820 --> 01:22:35.580
Uh it's essentially they're essentially the same scales, but one's way longer and has a lot

01:22:35.580 --> 01:22:37.580
of bad items in it, and one is shorter.

01:22:37.830 --> 01:22:39.750
but all those items were overlap.

01:22:39.990 --> 01:22:41.430
And logically, of course, they were correlated.

01:22:41.590 --> 01:22:45.510
And we like I had like four colleagues around the country in your own sample.

01:22:45.670 --> 01:22:46.150
So go ahead.

01:22:46.230 --> 01:22:47.030
You know what is it?

01:22:47.750 --> 01:22:51.670
And then we dove deeper and we were looking at the structure of these, and and and we had a

01:22:51.670 --> 01:22:54.070
sort of a legitimate sort of critique.

01:22:54.310 --> 01:23:00.150
And the problem was from the science perspective, was that they were the

01:23:00.200 --> 01:23:04.440
way they were doing it, they were taking two independent constructs, but it was making it

01:23:04.440 --> 01:23:06.200
look like it was just one construct.

01:23:06.440 --> 01:23:08.840
And that was going to lead to a lot.

01:23:11.000 --> 01:23:17.000
I'm a splitter as opposed to a lumper, uh theoretically, and uh it was going to lead to

01:23:17.000 --> 01:23:21.240
a lot of wrong inferences about about really what was going on with with all these social

01:23:21.240 --> 01:23:23.240
cognitive processes it was being used for.

01:23:23.480 --> 01:23:29.130
And so at this conference, and this was uh it was I think the one time that S E S P and the

01:23:29.130 --> 01:23:32.810
European Association had a joint conflict, I think it was in DC.

01:23:33.210 --> 01:23:34.730
Uh, and we were on this panel together.

01:23:34.810 --> 01:23:37.850
So around a month before, I said, you know what, I'm gonna change the topic of my talk.

01:23:37.930 --> 01:23:38.970
I think this is really important.

01:23:39.130 --> 01:23:42.330
I'm gonna talk about this stuff because it's about the construct.

01:23:42.490 --> 01:23:44.090
But here's what I'm gonna say.

01:23:44.250 --> 01:23:46.330
I'm gonna uh everyone has a heads up.

01:23:46.490 --> 01:23:48.170
Here's what I'm gonna say beforehand.

01:23:48.330 --> 01:23:53.340
No one's gonna get, and you know if you want to put me at the end, right, so that you don't

01:23:53.340 --> 01:23:57.580
feel the need to sort of respond to what I'm gonna say in your own talks, absolutely fine.

01:23:57.740 --> 01:23:58.940
They put me at the end.

01:23:59.100 --> 01:24:02.540
They actually try to have me not be allowed to talk about that.

01:24:02.700 --> 01:24:05.900
And to their credit, the conference organizers said this is science.

01:24:05.980 --> 01:24:08.540
Conferences are about the cutting edge stuff at the front end.

01:24:08.700 --> 01:24:13.100
You know, yes, he can he can change his mind about what he's gonna uh talk about.

01:24:13.340 --> 01:24:19.070
Uh there was uh the sort of his

01:24:19.070 --> 01:24:23.310
allies on the panel sort of filibustered by the time it got to Schaller was also on the

01:24:23.310 --> 01:24:24.910
panel uh talking about other stuff.

01:24:25.070 --> 01:24:29.310
By the time it got to me, there were like seven minutes left for my you know 17-minute

01:24:29.550 --> 01:24:30.110
talk.

01:24:30.430 --> 01:24:33.550
And uh and and there was no time for nuance.

01:24:33.630 --> 01:24:35.870
And this is back in the days of overhead projectors.

01:24:36.190 --> 01:24:40.670
And so Shaler's like slapping the the things down on the thing, and I'm just going boom,

01:24:40.750 --> 01:24:41.310
boom, boom.

01:24:41.390 --> 01:24:44.580
No no nuance, no politically political sensitivity.

01:24:44.900 --> 01:24:50.340
And at the end of the talk, you know, RE is in the audience because a student had

01:24:50.340 --> 01:24:54.100
presented, and he said, I've got some I've got some things to say.

01:24:54.260 --> 01:24:56.180
So he says the one thing I start to answer.

01:24:56.260 --> 01:24:57.460
He says, No, no, no, no, no.

01:24:57.620 --> 01:25:00.260
You've had your chance to talk now, it's my turn.

01:25:00.500 --> 01:25:03.460
And and it's at the end of a session.

01:25:03.830 --> 01:25:05.270
people aren't leaving the room.

01:25:05.350 --> 01:25:06.710
We're going overtime, right?

01:25:06.790 --> 01:25:10.790
The rooms people are coming in, and instead of trying to kick us off, this is like the

01:25:10.790 --> 01:25:14.310
coolest thing they've ever seen at a conference because we're going back and forth.

01:25:14.630 --> 01:25:18.310
And uh and I got a buzz off of it.

01:25:18.470 --> 01:25:18.790
Yeah.

01:25:19.030 --> 01:25:19.670
Right.

01:25:19.990 --> 01:25:25.030
And uh and I feel some shame for the buzz I got off of it.

01:25:25.190 --> 01:25:27.030
A young guy, I was a young guy at the time.

01:25:27.110 --> 01:25:32.980
I in fact, uh before I went and I did that, I I was I had I was

01:25:33.140 --> 01:25:34.580
I had just gotten tenure.

01:25:34.740 --> 01:25:40.660
In fact I asked, you know, Bob and Doug, Taldini and and Kenrick, uh whether I

01:25:40.660 --> 01:25:41.540
should do this or not.

01:25:41.620 --> 01:25:43.700
And they said, you know, this is what tenure's for, right?

01:25:43.860 --> 01:25:45.060
This is this is what tenure's for.

01:25:45.140 --> 01:25:48.980
If you believe the data, if you believe then then you should do this.

01:25:49.220 --> 01:25:54.690
Uh so I I under but but I it it it got it went

01:25:54.690 --> 01:25:58.530
beyond the science uh at that point for me.

01:25:58.690 --> 01:25:59.410
And that was wrong.

01:25:59.570 --> 01:26:00.290
And that was wrong.

01:26:00.450 --> 01:26:04.050
He and I didn't chat for a long, we didn't talk, and we had been we hadn't known each other

01:26:04.050 --> 01:26:09.490
well, and he in fact been a supporter of me when I was very young uh for like 10-15 years.

01:26:09.730 --> 01:26:12.930
Uh to to put a bring a happy end to the story.

01:26:13.170 --> 01:26:16.820
Uh we're in a lobby at another conference.

01:26:16.900 --> 01:26:21.540
I'm sitting at I'm sort of standing chatting with someone and I see him walking down.

01:26:21.620 --> 01:26:23.780
He's gonna he's gonna pass right in front of me.

01:26:24.020 --> 01:26:25.620
And I don't know what it was.

01:26:25.780 --> 01:26:27.220
I grabbed him as he walked by.

01:26:27.300 --> 01:26:29.220
I said, you know, we should talk.

01:26:29.540 --> 01:26:31.540
He said, Yeah, we should talk.

01:26:31.780 --> 01:26:36.910
Happy hour later, down in the down in the poster session, whatever the thing was.

01:26:39.870 --> 01:26:42.030
We're there two minutes into the conversation.

01:26:42.910 --> 01:26:47.310
I sort of explained, you know, why I did what I did, and then we we publ we went back and

01:26:47.310 --> 01:26:48.270
forth in the literature too.

01:26:48.350 --> 01:26:50.990
I mean, it turned into a series of papers, uh, which was good.

01:26:51.070 --> 01:26:52.270
I think it was good for the field.

01:26:52.430 --> 01:26:57.070
Uh two minutes later he says, You know, I'm the new editor of this series on these on these

01:26:57.150 --> 01:26:59.310
uh on these monographs about stereotyping prejudice.

01:26:59.470 --> 01:27:00.030
You want to do one?

01:27:00.270 --> 01:27:01.550
It's like you know.

01:27:01.710 --> 01:27:07.280
So it's it's sort of, I mean, at that the space gave us the ability to take the the person

01:27:07.920 --> 01:27:10.800
the personal aspects out of it, right?

01:27:11.040 --> 01:27:12.960
But the personal aspects get in there.

01:27:13.200 --> 01:27:18.720
And I think as a young person, you know, there there there's there's a buzz to going after

01:27:18.720 --> 01:27:24.240
senior people and uh the f folks who are who have the power and stuff and it's uh

01:27:24.400 --> 01:27:26.640
it's natural uh and it's not good.

01:27:26.970 --> 01:27:27.210
Yeah.

01:27:27.370 --> 01:27:32.010
I mean I think to your credit, I don't think it wasn't like you were pursuing it.

01:27:32.090 --> 01:27:36.970
You felt experienced it and you know, it you didn't then go, Oh, this is great, I'm gonna

01:27:36.970 --> 01:27:37.850
keep doing it, you know.

01:27:37.930 --> 01:27:40.170
So I yeah, but I but we did write the papers.

01:27:40.330 --> 01:27:45.530
We did go back and forth in the journals and um which I thought w was was useful.

01:27:45.690 --> 01:27:46.010
Yeah.

01:27:46.250 --> 01:27:52.220
Um But but I I did I did get a buzz and I got a buzz off of young other young people coming

01:27:52.220 --> 01:27:54.940
up and saying that's the coolest thing we've ever seen at the conference, right?

01:27:55.100 --> 01:27:55.260
Yeah.

01:27:55.980 --> 01:27:56.940
Yeah, why wouldn't you?

01:27:57.020 --> 01:27:57.740
It makes sense.

01:27:57.820 --> 01:27:58.300
Yeah.

01:27:59.820 --> 01:28:00.220
Yeah.

01:28:00.460 --> 01:28:01.020
Yeah.

01:28:01.500 --> 01:28:01.820
Yeah.

01:28:01.980 --> 01:28:07.740
No, it reminds me of um uh one of my favorite Robert Trivers quotes, which is that uh the

01:28:07.740 --> 01:28:10.940
greater the social content of a discipline, the slower its progress.

01:28:11.180 --> 01:28:15.580
Um and that there are you know real challenges and difficulties to being, you know, a bunch

01:28:15.580 --> 01:28:20.990
of people studying people because we have all you know all the all the flaws of people.

01:28:21.310 --> 01:28:23.310
You know yeah.

01:28:24.190 --> 01:28:29.070
We're humans with you know Trivers having more than a healthy dose of those flaws for

01:28:30.190 --> 01:28:33.070
absolutely of people ness.

01:28:33.470 --> 01:28:38.350
As a side note, there's an entire no journalist I can't believe just as quick aside,

01:28:38.510 --> 01:28:40.030
Trivers passed away recently.

01:28:40.190 --> 01:28:43.790
I looked through all of these think pieces about Trivers.

01:28:44.460 --> 01:28:46.380
They're all by men, by the way.

01:28:46.620 --> 01:28:51.020
Um, which you should also think, why might that be?

01:28:51.260 --> 01:28:55.420
Uh there's an enormous story about Trivers that is not yet.

01:28:55.580 --> 01:29:01.180
Um there like all the all the all the reporters uh who did Trivers research did not do

01:29:01.180 --> 01:29:02.220
their homework.

01:29:03.580 --> 01:29:05.420
Yeah, not not a good not a good man.

01:29:05.580 --> 01:29:09.970
Very good scientist, very good thinker, uh brilliant contributions to the field, but yeah,

01:29:10.050 --> 01:29:11.010
not not a good person.

01:29:15.890 --> 01:29:20.450
This is something somebody said, I won't say who said it because I don't wanna I'm not sure

01:29:20.450 --> 01:29:21.250
if it's accurate.

01:29:21.410 --> 01:29:27.330
But what I heard was a lot of Trivers' papers were written in Irv Devore's um kitchen

01:29:27.410 --> 01:29:28.530
with Irv Devore.

01:29:29.010 --> 01:29:32.130
Um so that's also something to look into.

01:29:32.290 --> 01:29:34.130
I don't I don't know the full story there.

01:29:34.210 --> 01:29:34.690
Yeah.

01:29:35.730 --> 01:29:39.420
I've been I've been told uh, who have I heard this from?

01:29:39.660 --> 01:29:45.660
Uh that may maybe from Lita, that Irv Devour is probably

01:29:45.660 --> 01:29:51.500
the most significant uh mentor and grower of evolutionary

01:29:51.500 --> 01:29:52.620
psychologists.

01:29:52.780 --> 01:29:54.860
Uh evolutionists terms.

01:29:55.180 --> 01:29:55.500
Yeah.

01:29:55.900 --> 01:30:01.830
We we in in this my cohort of uh at least UCSB of psych people, we refer

01:30:01.830 --> 01:30:07.350
to like an Irv Devor as this sort of a puppet master person who's not sort of well known

01:30:07.350 --> 01:30:13.270
outside the area, but is the originator or the the salon keeper, maybe is

01:30:13.590 --> 01:30:17.110
the right way of sort of sort of like the the George Harrison of uh evolutionary

01:30:17.110 --> 01:30:21.910
psychology, the underrated compositional backbone.

01:30:23.270 --> 01:30:24.390
Very good, very good.

01:30:24.870 --> 01:30:28.310
Um Steve, um we've had Keila Williams on.

01:30:28.700 --> 01:30:31.580
And she talked a lot about the the work.

01:30:31.980 --> 01:30:37.740
Um, is there stuff that you're currently chewing on or thinking about that you

01:30:37.740 --> 01:30:39.020
find really exciting?

01:30:39.180 --> 01:30:43.980
Or is there something that if people are listening that don't know your work and you've

01:30:43.980 --> 01:30:49.740
done you've done so much and you know, like the the there's affordances or stereotypes are

01:30:49.740 --> 01:30:51.660
specific to these different groups?

01:30:51.900 --> 01:30:57.770
Um out of all of that, you know, set, is there something either that already

01:30:57.770 --> 01:31:03.770
exists or that is going to exist in the future that you feel like you know, if somebody

01:31:03.770 --> 01:31:09.370
had four minutes to spend with Steve Newberg, what science do you think they want should

01:31:09.370 --> 01:31:09.690
know?

01:31:11.530 --> 01:31:12.810
So wow.

01:31:13.050 --> 01:31:17.420
Uh you have three and a half minutes now, sorry.

01:31:17.660 --> 01:31:19.100
Yeah, no, I got three and a half minutes.

01:31:20.540 --> 01:31:26.220
So there's a line of stuff that comes out of the sort of the

01:31:26.220 --> 01:31:32.220
affordance management approach to stereotypes framework that I'm really excited about that

01:31:32.380 --> 01:31:38.380
that Oliver Sung is doing working on and that Becca Neal is

01:31:38.380 --> 01:31:44.250
working on in a in a at sort of a broader sort of pulling together other sort of sub

01:31:44.890 --> 01:31:47.530
sort of sub-phenomena as well.

01:31:47.850 --> 01:31:51.530
And that's the idea of directed stereotypes.

01:31:51.690 --> 01:31:55.530
And we we could think about this, and I don't know if you've seen this work by Oliver or

01:31:55.530 --> 01:31:55.690
not.

01:31:55.850 --> 01:32:00.890
There's a paper in JPSB this past year on it, with I think Becca in Kila.

01:32:02.120 --> 01:32:07.960
But the idea here is that we tend to think about, you know, when we think about

01:32:08.040 --> 01:32:12.040
you know making inferences about people that we make inferences about their traits or their

01:32:12.040 --> 01:32:13.800
capacities or something like that.

01:32:13.880 --> 01:32:19.240
And so and some of these traits are, you know, you know, someone is friendly, right?

01:32:19.400 --> 01:32:25.000
Or someone's competitive or whatever, caring, uh aggressive.

01:32:26.190 --> 01:32:31.470
As if we we presume that people have these uh these

01:32:31.630 --> 01:32:34.990
non-directed behavioral inclinations towards folks.

01:32:35.230 --> 01:32:36.990
But of course they don't, right?

01:32:37.150 --> 01:32:42.270
What I really care about, if I wanna if I wanna manage the potential affordances that you

01:32:42.270 --> 01:32:47.390
have for me or the or the people I'm invested in, is I want to know what you're gonna do to

01:32:47.400 --> 01:32:48.120
me, right?

01:32:48.200 --> 01:32:49.960
Or or to these other folks, right?

01:32:50.120 --> 01:32:54.200
I don't really care what you're gonna what whether this right, because I if I have to

01:32:54.200 --> 01:32:58.120
predict your behavior towards me, I need to predict your behavior towards me.

01:32:58.280 --> 01:33:03.640
And so it turns out that what people actually have in their minds, uh, which we don't

01:33:03.640 --> 01:33:05.960
discover because we never ask the questions, right?

01:33:06.040 --> 01:33:09.080
This is part of our measurement problem and because we don't have theory that sort of

01:33:09.080 --> 01:33:14.760
suggests this, is that uh we actually have these really uh nuanced

01:33:14.760 --> 01:33:20.470
notions of of uh you know people having inclinations towards other kinds of

01:33:20.470 --> 01:33:22.710
specific other kinds of people, right?

01:33:23.110 --> 01:33:28.950
So uh you know some of the stuff that came out of Oliver's uh uh work with his

01:33:28.950 --> 01:33:33.030
collaborators, you know, who's more competitive, you know, men or women.

01:33:33.190 --> 01:33:35.670
Well of course men are are more competitive.

01:33:35.830 --> 01:33:38.230
You know, who's more competitive towards young women?

01:33:38.390 --> 01:33:39.510
Young men or young women?

01:33:39.670 --> 01:33:42.550
It's like, well young women are more oh, right?

01:33:42.860 --> 01:33:44.460
Young women are more okay.

01:33:44.620 --> 01:33:44.940
Right.

01:33:45.100 --> 01:33:50.860
As soon as you add the towards whom, all of a sudden there's all these things that swap.

01:33:51.020 --> 01:33:52.060
They look very different.

01:33:52.140 --> 01:33:56.060
And of course, those are the that's the level of of representation that people need to have

01:33:56.060 --> 01:33:59.980
in their heads if they're in fact going to predict other people's behaviors.

01:34:00.140 --> 01:34:05.180
And so, you know, I I think, you know, Becca gave a a talk at uh

01:34:05.900 --> 01:34:08.430
uh was it SPSP?

01:34:09.150 --> 01:34:15.070
Uh yeah, I think it was at I think it was at SPSP uh uh where she sort of

01:34:15.070 --> 01:34:21.070
expanded on this toward whom notion of that there that they're classes of characteristics

01:34:21.070 --> 01:34:25.390
that really are fundamentally relational and they're about towards whom and we need to have

01:34:25.390 --> 01:34:29.470
those represent those that's the level of representation you need to have for those things.

01:34:29.630 --> 01:34:29.870
Right?

01:34:30.110 --> 01:34:34.920
Intelligence isn't uh isn't uh relational, right?

01:34:35.160 --> 01:34:38.680
You had to have just to know whether someone is has the ability to process information

01:34:38.680 --> 01:34:41.880
effectively and efficiently, whatever, that's that's good.

01:34:42.280 --> 01:34:43.720
But aggressive?

01:34:44.040 --> 01:34:44.360
No.

01:34:44.680 --> 01:34:47.400
Yeah, that that that that that that doesn't do the job.

01:34:47.560 --> 01:34:52.040
And so I think that's a really interesting sort of next implication that sort of falls

01:34:52.040 --> 01:34:55.400
right out of the logic of the affordance management.

01:34:55.560 --> 01:34:59.480
You know, so if we're doing first principles, then we start with the first principle of of

01:34:59.770 --> 01:35:05.370
of of of the basics of evolutionary uh of of affordance management then and you work that

01:35:05.370 --> 01:35:09.450
through you're gonna get to the idea that some of these things have to be directed and so

01:35:09.450 --> 01:35:14.090
i'm i'm i'm really excited to see what that's gonna pop out coming out of out of their work

01:35:14.330 --> 01:35:20.090
there's some work i'm doing with uh a student of mine tiffany chin uh where we're applying

01:35:20.090 --> 01:35:25.450
this this this broader uh uh affordance management perspective to prejudices uh

01:35:25.740 --> 01:35:30.780
against immigrants uh and you know to let me say towards immigrants because some are

01:35:30.780 --> 01:35:35.500
actually quite fair and and sort of again that you know if you if you look at gallup

01:35:35.500 --> 01:35:39.180
polling, if you look at politicians, you look at all the discussion, it's like there's

01:35:39.180 --> 01:35:40.060
immigrants, right?

01:35:40.220 --> 01:35:43.260
Well no, they're actually immigrants and they're here for they're different kinds of

01:35:43.580 --> 01:35:44.940
they're here for very different reasons.

01:35:45.020 --> 01:35:48.620
And depending on what your own vulnerabilities and goals are, those characteristics that

01:35:48.620 --> 01:35:51.100
you think that they're they bring different characteristics with them.

01:35:51.260 --> 01:35:56.410
The characteristics might have might pose opportunities for you, they may pose threats uh

01:35:56.410 --> 01:35:57.290
uh to you.

01:35:57.610 --> 01:36:03.610
Uh one of the interesting implications that we've never uh and so elabor using that

01:36:03.610 --> 01:36:09.130
as a case to sort of uh look again greater new people uh

01:36:09.290 --> 01:36:14.090
different kinds of groups, but one of the interesting things here is that uh

01:36:15.320 --> 01:36:20.360
most of our feelings towards people, most of our prejudices are are probably

01:36:20.680 --> 01:36:21.880
ambivalences.

01:36:22.040 --> 01:36:26.680
And I know ambivalence is a single dimension, and so ambivalence has to be positive and

01:36:26.680 --> 01:36:27.160
negative.

01:36:27.240 --> 01:36:30.760
But the fact is, we have these different kinds of negative negative ambivalences.

01:36:30.840 --> 01:36:32.280
We'll need a different word for it, right?

01:36:32.360 --> 01:36:36.600
There, folks that you're that they they both make you angry and they and they make you

01:36:36.600 --> 01:36:37.240
afraid.

01:36:37.480 --> 01:36:41.170
And uh, well, fear leads you to want to go away.

01:36:41.250 --> 01:36:46.770
And if, you know, uh and and angry makes you want to go forward and uh and to recalibrate

01:36:46.770 --> 01:36:49.090
their their their behaviors, right, and the like.

01:36:49.250 --> 01:36:52.050
Well, people they they they emerge.

01:36:52.130 --> 01:36:57.570
If if you if you believe that that that our impressions that are stereotypes about groups

01:36:57.570 --> 01:37:01.410
can be profiles of different kinds of threats, then you have to acknowledge that you've got

01:37:01.410 --> 01:37:05.620
profiles of emotional responses and there are all these ambivalences that again are getting

01:37:05.620 --> 01:37:11.060
masked by the typical ways in which we and you can have different kinds of sort of positive

01:37:11.220 --> 01:37:15.220
putting air quotes around positive and negative, because I think it's a really problematic

01:37:15.220 --> 01:37:16.980
word when we're thinking about affect.

01:37:17.220 --> 01:37:22.820
Uh to be thinking about some as positive and some as negative, it just it it it totally

01:37:22.820 --> 01:37:25.220
masks what what these affects are for.

01:37:25.460 --> 01:37:26.740
Uh uh.

01:37:27.850 --> 01:37:31.050
But there are all sorts of different flavors of these ambivalences.

01:37:31.130 --> 01:37:36.410
And I think uh there'll be a lot of traction as as we sort of as we sort of unpack that and

01:37:36.410 --> 01:37:39.050
demonstrate that and and show where the different ones come from.

01:37:39.210 --> 01:37:42.970
Again, if you're interested, if you're interested in fixing the car engine, you better

01:37:42.970 --> 01:37:46.570
understand what this actually what's actually going on inside this.

01:37:46.730 --> 01:37:51.370
You want to do interventions to reduce prejudices that you're that you're not uh uh that

01:37:51.450 --> 01:37:52.970
that you're opposed to, right?

01:37:53.130 --> 01:37:56.440
Well you better understand actually what these what these prejudices actually look like and

01:37:56.440 --> 01:37:57.000
what these feel.

01:37:57.160 --> 01:38:01.080
And so I I I think that that's I think there's some really interesting stuff in that.

01:38:01.160 --> 01:38:05.000
You know, so of the things that are coming out of sort of that perspective that I've taken,

01:38:05.160 --> 01:38:08.840
I think those are two of the things that uh that I'm sort of most interested in right now.

01:38:09.080 --> 01:38:14.520
We're also applying uh Barlev and I are applying this framework to be thinking about

01:38:14.520 --> 01:38:18.600
anti-Semitism because I think it's actually another one of these groups where there's a lot

01:38:18.600 --> 01:38:24.450
of ambivalence, there's a lot of uh competing uh uh uh sort of

01:38:24.450 --> 01:38:27.970
different kind of affordance stereotypes of opportunities threats and qualitatively

01:38:27.970 --> 01:38:29.090
different kind of threats.

01:38:29.250 --> 01:38:30.530
And I think that would benefit.

01:38:30.770 --> 01:38:35.010
So it's it's another it's both a case study and something that's uh that's of interest uh

01:38:35.170 --> 01:38:36.930
uh to me for other reasons.

01:38:37.090 --> 01:38:42.210
But I I think I think there might be some very nice leverage uh there as well.

01:38:42.530 --> 01:38:47.700
Uh uh David's doing very some interesting stuff on uh on on

01:38:47.700 --> 01:38:49.540
anti-semitism and coalitions.

01:38:49.700 --> 01:38:53.620
Uh and I'm I'm very interested to see what what what ends up coming out of all that.

01:38:54.260 --> 01:38:58.660
Yeah, and I've worked with uh Barlov and um and and Jamie and Sneezer.

01:38:58.740 --> 01:39:02.420
It's sort of a bit on the hiatus, but we have some really interesting data on anti-Semitism

01:39:02.500 --> 01:39:06.900
looking at the alliance structure and and who people think the allies of Jews are

01:39:06.900 --> 01:39:10.260
politically and who people think the enemies of Jews are politically.

01:39:12.450 --> 01:39:17.650
and we're looking at w if they're the ally of one of my enemies, is that gonna predict uh

01:39:17.730 --> 01:39:18.610
anti Semitism?

01:39:18.690 --> 01:39:22.370
Or if they're the enemy of one of my uh enemies, is that gonna predict more positive

01:39:22.370 --> 01:39:23.330
attitudes toward Jews?

01:39:23.490 --> 01:39:29.090
And it turns out that um just these indirect relationships of of of who you s view the

01:39:29.090 --> 01:39:32.610
allies of Jews and and the enemies of Jews and how you feel about those allies and enemies,

01:39:32.770 --> 01:39:36.130
just those indirect pathways are explaining something like forty percent of the variation

01:39:36.130 --> 01:39:39.890
in anti Semitism, and then it's all interact and like indirect in in terms of like where

01:39:39.890 --> 01:39:43.640
are Jews situated in the political alliance structure, And that is uh

01:39:48.040 --> 01:39:50.760
just who you where you think they're situated in the alliance structure.

01:39:51.000 --> 01:39:51.880
So I'm excited about that.

01:39:51.960 --> 01:39:55.640
And it's you know obviously inspired by a lot of Steve's work in terms of understanding

01:39:55.640 --> 01:39:58.200
prejudice in a more nuanced and and functional way.

01:39:58.360 --> 01:40:03.640
That um, you know, it's not just uh you know uh um a single continuum of positive and

01:40:03.640 --> 01:40:05.240
negative, it's much more complicated.

01:40:05.400 --> 01:40:10.680
Um and uh yeah, I I I I love this work because it it um

01:40:11.750 --> 01:40:15.510
It unearths the complexity that we didn't know was there.

01:40:15.670 --> 01:40:21.270
And it's it's interesting and functionally organized complexity that ought to be of of

01:40:21.270 --> 01:40:26.390
interest to evolutionary researchers and anyone who's interested in in prejudice itself.

01:40:27.110 --> 01:40:32.950
Yeah, you know, uh Oliver Sung has this uh uh great little line that he likes to use

01:40:33.030 --> 01:40:36.630
that we've been uh we've been stereotyping, right?

01:40:36.950 --> 01:40:42.080
That that that we that we pres we're presuming that this is all sort of really simple,

01:40:42.320 --> 01:40:42.640
right?

01:40:42.960 --> 01:40:48.960
And people are so much people are so much more complex and for and for and for really

01:40:48.960 --> 01:40:53.280
good reasons and way more interesting than than we've been giving them credit for.

01:40:53.440 --> 01:40:58.240
And you know, I understand you know you start your model simple and you start with uh but

01:40:58.320 --> 01:41:04.320
you know we're we're too mature of a of a of a behavioral science to be still living in

01:41:04.320 --> 01:41:05.680
those in those old models.

01:41:06.000 --> 01:41:06.160
Yeah.

01:41:06.240 --> 01:41:10.080
Do you think there's a little bit of wishful thinking that's probably like well intended

01:41:10.160 --> 01:41:15.970
which is that if prejudice or stereotyping is simple or unitary, then maybe there's like

01:41:15.970 --> 01:41:17.730
an intervention we can do.

01:41:17.970 --> 01:41:22.850
But if it turns out that it's multifaceted and more to the point, which I think a lot of

01:41:22.850 --> 01:41:28.610
your work is pointing towards, it's also largely rational to the extent that it's in

01:41:28.610 --> 01:41:30.050
response to structural issues.

01:41:30.210 --> 01:41:35.490
It's pointing towards the way you reduce prejudice or discrimination are largely structural

01:41:35.490 --> 01:41:35.730
things.

01:41:35.810 --> 01:41:39.090
They're not really things where you can just like have this pill or like, you know, you

01:41:39.200 --> 01:41:42.320
know, hit your head ten times against a board and now you're not prejudiced.

01:41:42.400 --> 01:41:46.080
I mean, I'm being f facetious, but I mean it's kind of in that category.

01:41:46.240 --> 01:41:52.080
Do you think that some of that is that there is a resistance because it when you get

01:41:52.080 --> 01:41:57.840
more truthful, uh it points to harder to fix or more structural things?

01:41:58.640 --> 01:42:03.830
I mean, I I think that I I suspect that that's not uh

01:42:05.750 --> 01:42:08.310
consciously what people would it would admit to themselves.

01:42:10.230 --> 01:42:13.270
I suspect that uh that that may be part of it.

01:42:13.350 --> 01:42:19.110
It also may be part of that it says something uh that well well maybe our field isn't

01:42:19.110 --> 01:42:20.950
the field to fix this.

01:42:21.270 --> 01:42:21.510
Right.

01:42:21.750 --> 01:42:27.580
So right so you know if the solutions are you know uh you know change changing the

01:42:27.580 --> 01:42:33.580
environments in which people are growing up and if they if they are uh uh other

01:42:33.580 --> 01:42:38.620
kinds of things you need to do to you know create opportunities and reduce threats and the

01:42:38.620 --> 01:42:44.620
like and that that moves the solutions then require politics and they require

01:42:44.620 --> 01:42:49.420
community organization and they require an investment of money and well that's not what's

01:42:49.580 --> 01:42:51.180
that's not what psychologists do, right?

01:42:52.460 --> 01:42:58.210
Yeah that that's uh and and so you know you know, and in some ways the the irony there is

01:42:58.210 --> 01:43:04.050
that, you know, psychologists, I think, you know, even way more than sociologists

01:43:04.290 --> 01:43:10.050
are the ones that sort of sort of uncovered and turned, you know, the explorations of

01:43:10.050 --> 01:43:14.930
prejudice and a group conflict into uh you know into into a science, right?

01:43:15.410 --> 01:43:20.960
Uh and in the end may not be, you know, the you know the largest

01:43:20.960 --> 01:43:23.920
contributor to uh uh to to the solutions.

01:43:24.160 --> 01:43:25.280
Um yeah.

01:43:25.520 --> 01:43:31.440
Or at least uh I mean the charitable t version is that you can't solve the world like

01:43:31.440 --> 01:43:32.800
you said by yourself.

01:43:32.960 --> 01:43:38.240
And so you it's it's like, oh we realize we need all this other stuff, like like you all

01:43:38.240 --> 01:43:40.000
the things you articulately listed.

01:43:40.240 --> 01:43:46.190
Um yeah, and until you you're just like a lowly PI in a lab, you know,

01:43:46.270 --> 01:43:48.030
and you're like, Well, how am I gonna do that?

01:43:48.110 --> 01:43:48.430
you know.

01:43:48.590 --> 01:43:49.790
So um right.

01:43:49.950 --> 01:43:52.030
Again, I think it comes back to a coronation problem.

01:43:52.110 --> 01:43:57.150
But I think to the credit, to your credit, I mean, I think like sticking to the guns of we

01:43:57.390 --> 01:44:02.030
we are being accurate about what the psychology is, and therefore if it is a structural

01:44:02.030 --> 01:44:07.940
problem, like maybe, maybe it will provoke um or you know, I like I think that's

01:44:07.940 --> 01:44:09.140
good to stick with, right?

01:44:09.220 --> 01:44:11.140
Even if even if we can't fix it.

01:44:11.540 --> 01:44:14.420
But by the way, I don't I don't I don't think it I don't think it's just a structural

01:44:14.420 --> 01:44:14.900
problem, right?

01:44:15.060 --> 01:44:20.820
I mean I think I think with with even within if we look within whatever sort of uh

01:44:21.220 --> 01:44:26.890
you know uh you know cells of interacting structural things, you

01:44:27.210 --> 01:44:31.370
still you still find a lot of variation uh with how people responding.

01:44:31.610 --> 01:44:36.330
So so I think I think that I think there's plenty of work uh to be done if if one has an

01:44:36.330 --> 01:44:40.810
aim of uh of addressing some of those uh uh some of those challenges.

01:44:40.970 --> 01:44:46.410
Uh I I think another part of it is uh is actually even uh

01:44:49.060 --> 01:44:54.580
simpler in the way in the sense of you know

01:44:55.940 --> 01:45:01.380
people most scientists get used to using certain tools you know and and they're they they

01:45:01.380 --> 01:45:05.300
may be methodological they may be conceptual and that's sort of what and they and they they

01:45:05.300 --> 01:45:09.220
have an identity around those tools this is what I do this is what I know I'm good at this

01:45:09.220 --> 01:45:15.060
is what I've been rewarded for and you know I think challenges like mine which sort of say

01:45:15.620 --> 01:45:17.470
you need, you know, the tools are wrong.

01:45:17.550 --> 01:45:21.150
You you keep using a tool that's too simple to understand your phenomenon that you're

01:45:21.150 --> 01:45:21.710
interested in.

01:45:21.870 --> 01:45:24.510
But now you gotta change, you gotta shift, right?

01:45:24.590 --> 01:45:27.550
You got you have to use different measures and they're more complicated.

01:45:27.710 --> 01:45:32.270
Uh, you know, you have to analyze your data uh uh differently.

01:45:32.430 --> 01:45:36.560
Uh, you know, the the stories sometimes aren't so simple, right?

01:45:36.640 --> 01:45:40.880
When you're when you're sort of trying to articulate something, it's not it's not as easy

01:45:40.960 --> 01:45:44.480
uh, you know, when you're getting from the eighth floor of the elevator down to the lobby

01:45:44.640 --> 01:45:49.120
to to explain what it is that you uh what it what it is that you're uh doing and what it

01:45:49.120 --> 01:45:52.800
what exactly it is that you're finding and so I mean that's pushing people out of their

01:45:52.800 --> 01:45:57.270
comfort zones, which is why, you know, who is it that said that, you know, you know science

01:45:57.270 --> 01:46:00.310
advances by the by the by the death of old scientists.

01:46:01.270 --> 01:46:02.470
It's a mox punc.

01:46:02.550 --> 01:46:04.790
It's uh science progresses one funeral at a time.

01:46:05.590 --> 01:46:06.310
Okay, that's right.

01:46:06.390 --> 01:46:11.910
Right and and so uh you know we we we're we're all uh you know somewhat

01:46:11.910 --> 01:46:15.350
constrained by what we know and what we're used to doing and what we think is good and what

01:46:15.350 --> 01:46:16.390
what our identities are.

01:46:16.550 --> 01:46:22.260
And so uh you know uh which which is why you know I think we

01:46:22.260 --> 01:46:28.100
always need to be looking I I'm way more interested in in uh in convincing

01:46:28.100 --> 01:46:33.540
and getting the it the attention and the interest uh of young people than I am of

01:46:33.860 --> 01:46:39.620
people of of my uh my generation right uh you know the people of my generation

01:46:39.780 --> 01:46:45.410
you know uh you know can give me uh what's

01:46:47.010 --> 01:46:52.930
uh it's uh benefits or status in a kind of way that young folks

01:46:52.930 --> 01:46:53.170
can.

01:46:53.410 --> 01:46:58.690
But in the long run, it's the it's it's it's it's the young folks that are actually gonna

01:46:58.770 --> 01:47:03.010
uh you know you know determine whether whether the ideas are right and where they can go

01:47:03.170 --> 01:47:05.570
and uh uh and the like.

01:47:05.730 --> 01:47:11.100
It's it's actually, you know, in my mind what the what sort of the biggest joy of mentoring

01:47:11.100 --> 01:47:11.260
is.

01:47:11.420 --> 01:47:13.100
I I I like mentoring.

01:47:13.180 --> 01:47:19.100
Uh it's an important part of my identity and the the idea of of young people going off

01:47:19.100 --> 01:47:23.420
and I mean and taking things in these incredibly cool different kind of directions that I

01:47:23.420 --> 01:47:24.860
never would have thought about.

01:47:24.940 --> 01:47:30.220
But but knowing that you were sort of a part of that, I think is uh is is is maybe the most

01:47:30.220 --> 01:47:30.780
rewarding.

01:47:31.010 --> 01:47:36.290
I I suspect that my impact on the field, whatever it ends up being, will be way greater as

01:47:36.290 --> 01:47:41.330
mediated by my students than anything that I end up uh that ends up having my name on it.

01:47:41.650 --> 01:47:44.930
I hope anyway, that's maybe maybe that's maybe that's just a hope.

01:47:45.250 --> 01:47:50.130
But it's almost like differential reproductive success you can have.

01:47:53.940 --> 01:47:56.660
No, I mean i if any I mean you have a good track record thus far.

01:47:56.740 --> 01:48:02.580
I think you know you've Jamie Oliver and Keela and there's just so many I can't

01:48:02.820 --> 01:48:08.660
Beck and forgetting so or not forgetting, but I I can't I'm not

01:48:08.660 --> 01:48:09.620
gonna list everybody.

01:48:09.860 --> 01:48:10.180
Yes.

01:48:10.340 --> 01:48:13.220
Um but yeah, it's like Tom Gilovich or Brenda Major too, right?

01:48:13.460 --> 01:48:18.100
Even you had your own st story um and the people that influenced you.

01:48:18.340 --> 01:48:24.170
Um yeah so so yeah if you feel like you're um being uh being

01:48:24.330 --> 01:48:28.490
your science is being ignored the people you should be worrying about are are what the

01:48:28.490 --> 01:48:29.530
young people think about you.

01:48:29.930 --> 01:48:30.410
That's right.

01:48:30.570 --> 01:48:31.210
That's right.

01:48:31.450 --> 01:48:36.090
Uh and and and just uh you know you know I I think their

01:48:36.650 --> 01:48:42.170
open-minded attention is probably the I th yeah so I'll throw this out there.

01:48:42.250 --> 01:48:43.130
I don't know if this is right or not.

01:48:43.210 --> 01:48:44.490
I've never really thought about this before.

01:48:44.650 --> 01:48:50.100
That the that the open-minded attention of young

01:48:50.580 --> 01:48:56.260
scientists is probably the most important resource uh uh that there is out there for the

01:48:56.260 --> 01:48:58.260
advancement of of science.

01:48:58.580 --> 01:49:00.900
Um I don't know.

01:49:01.060 --> 01:49:05.700
Does that does that sound Yeah I mean there is they're probably the closest thing we can

01:49:06.020 --> 01:49:09.990
get to a you know an impartial jury to evaluate these ideas.

01:49:19.670 --> 01:49:23.990
And they can just evaluate all these different ideas with with fresh eyes in a way that's

01:49:23.990 --> 01:49:29.190
less biased by, you know, years of building coalitions with different people.

01:49:30.950 --> 01:49:36.780
And then they have the capacity and the time to actually if if the if the ideas grab uh

01:49:37.020 --> 01:49:40.780
to actually make like you know important things happen with them yeah they have time to

01:49:40.780 --> 01:49:45.900
read the whole paper uh yeah um uh Lita I was thinking in terms of years

01:49:46.860 --> 01:49:49.420
not in terms of like no but they also have the time to read the whole paper.

01:49:49.580 --> 01:49:54.620
Uh Lita always said um you should be writing to young graduate students and I think it was

01:49:54.620 --> 01:49:59.730
exactly for this reason you described Steve is that when when they're and I think even I

01:49:59.730 --> 01:50:02.050
asked, like I was like, you know, who were you writing to?

01:50:02.130 --> 01:50:05.810
And it was like to young graduate students, and it was for all these reasons we're talking

01:50:05.810 --> 01:50:06.050
about.

01:50:06.210 --> 01:50:11.810
So I think that that's always been really helpful for me, too, is like you're and I think

01:50:11.810 --> 01:50:17.730
sometimes we over some graduate students really get uh to put it in a

01:50:17.730 --> 01:50:22.530
hokey way, a bee in their bonnet about like some theory, and they really go after it and

01:50:22.600 --> 01:50:24.760
they want to convince like the senior person.

01:50:24.840 --> 01:50:28.440
And I think sometimes that's a mistake, you know, like that's not the right way to write

01:50:28.440 --> 01:50:28.760
the paper.

01:50:28.920 --> 01:50:32.280
The right way to paper is as David just said, like it's you know, you're writing to the

01:50:32.280 --> 01:50:37.480
jury of young students, and and that should be the tone and the approach.

01:50:37.720 --> 01:50:43.400
And you don't have to convince this person who's who's living, as Steve put it,

01:50:43.640 --> 01:50:48.290
was you know, their salary depends on hanging on to this idea.

01:50:48.450 --> 01:50:53.730
They're probably not gonna let go unless they're very rare and special um

01:50:54.210 --> 01:50:54.530
people.

01:50:54.930 --> 01:50:55.250
Yeah.

01:50:55.650 --> 01:50:57.730
Yeah, you don't want to insult them if you don't have to.

01:50:57.970 --> 01:50:58.610
No, that's true.

01:50:59.410 --> 01:51:00.210
What what was it?

01:51:00.290 --> 01:51:06.290
Is it uh Dan Dennett, who's got this uh sort of philosophy of how to

01:51:06.290 --> 01:51:08.370
write a great review, right?

01:51:08.820 --> 01:51:14.100
Uh you know, and and and and what it's it starts with you know understanding the uh you

01:51:14.100 --> 01:51:19.300
know the position so well that they would just be overjoyed as you sort of explain it back

01:51:19.620 --> 01:51:20.660
uh to them.

01:51:20.740 --> 01:51:23.460
And that's sort of the the the the first thing.

01:51:23.940 --> 01:51:26.660
You know, not offended you're you're looking it up right now.

01:51:26.740 --> 01:51:31.700
Uh it says first and more important you should attempt to express your target's position so

01:51:31.700 --> 01:51:36.420
clearly, vividly, and fairly that your target says things like, I wish I had thought of

01:51:36.420 --> 01:51:37.380
putting it that way.

01:51:37.850 --> 01:51:38.010
Yeah.

01:51:38.170 --> 01:51:38.330
Yeah.

01:51:38.570 --> 01:51:38.890
Exactly.

01:51:39.210 --> 01:51:44.890
And and so and so that's uh you know so so beginning with uh beginning with respect and uh

01:51:45.130 --> 01:51:50.570
generosity right of care I mean it's like it's a cue of that you care right about doing

01:51:50.570 --> 01:51:56.410
this and I think that's uh a really useful uh thing so we don't want to

01:51:56.570 --> 01:51:58.410
we don't want to offend the old folks.

01:51:58.650 --> 01:52:04.380
Yeah but some some

01:52:04.540 --> 01:52:09.180
but sometimes, you know no one should get offended.

01:52:09.420 --> 01:52:09.580
Right.

01:52:09.740 --> 01:52:11.820
I mean, I I think this is again the thing.

01:52:11.980 --> 01:52:16.380
You know, some someone uh someone at attacks my perspective.

01:52:16.540 --> 01:52:20.700
Uh yes, I'm gonna get irritable about it, but what I should do is I should appreciate it as

01:52:20.700 --> 01:52:25.250
an opportun you first of all they paid attention so they gave me the gift of attention and

01:52:25.250 --> 01:52:31.010
then the the second thing is that they uh they've given me an opportunity uh you know uh

01:52:31.170 --> 01:52:37.090
to learn and and or and or defend right and to make my case better right if people

01:52:37.090 --> 01:52:42.050
don't understand you know what I'm writing that's on me right this is actually one of the

01:52:42.050 --> 01:52:46.130
really important lessons I think for grad students right you know if if they if they

01:52:46.130 --> 01:52:50.130
misinterpret that's that's on you that's your job right uh

01:52:51.920 --> 01:52:54.640
yeah, that's good good advice.

01:52:54.960 --> 01:53:00.240
Um Steve, is there anything um about you that people might not know, like

01:53:00.240 --> 01:53:03.680
hobbies or um hobbies.

01:53:04.480 --> 01:53:05.680
Hobbies, you know.

01:53:06.080 --> 01:53:09.680
I've I've had several people tell me recently that I need a hobby.

01:53:09.920 --> 01:53:15.920
Uh so uh like you know, way back when I used

01:53:15.920 --> 01:53:21.490
to be uh uh musician but stock while I was still too young to get really

01:53:21.490 --> 01:53:22.290
serious about it.

01:53:22.370 --> 01:53:28.290
But I I had talent way back when that that maybe that's uh a

01:53:28.290 --> 01:53:29.170
little bit interesting.

01:53:29.330 --> 01:53:34.290
I think uh well I'll I'll tell you really briefly something I'm doing right now that's very

01:53:34.290 --> 01:53:35.810
different than than this.

01:53:35.970 --> 01:53:41.520
And that is when I was chair of the Department of Psychology, uh We we

01:53:41.520 --> 01:53:44.080
started something that's now evolved.

01:53:44.320 --> 01:53:46.240
Uh we call it Psych for Life.

01:53:46.320 --> 01:53:52.320
And it's an attempt to sort of bring the the uh it's it started when when I was chair

01:53:52.320 --> 01:53:56.560
of the department, you know, you know, you know that 75% of psych majors don't do anything

01:53:56.560 --> 01:53:57.200
psych related.

01:53:57.360 --> 01:54:01.040
I mean they do everything is psych related, but they go into business or they go into

01:54:01.040 --> 01:54:05.360
health or they go into law, or they do they don't go into you know become therapists or to

01:54:05.440 --> 01:54:07.840
or to be or to be researchers or things like that.

01:54:08.080 --> 01:54:12.270
And so when I was chair, I thought, well, you know, how what how do how do we serve them

01:54:12.270 --> 01:54:12.510
well?

01:54:12.670 --> 01:54:15.390
Because the system isn't designed for for that really.

01:54:15.550 --> 01:54:18.990
And so uh we we started this thing, we were calling it psych for life.

01:54:19.070 --> 01:54:20.670
The psych department will be free for life.

01:54:20.910 --> 01:54:24.910
That if we played with the premise that we were going to be with you and add value to your

01:54:24.910 --> 01:54:26.830
life and for life, what would we do differently?

01:54:26.990 --> 01:54:31.310
So we started doing a bunch of things having to do with careers and mentorships and and

01:54:31.310 --> 01:54:31.870
whatever.

01:54:32.110 --> 01:54:36.120
Uh we then asked the question, well, what do we do for our alums after they're out.

01:54:36.520 --> 01:54:40.200
And the thing, and so here's the second meaning of Psych for Life, and that is we have an

01:54:40.200 --> 01:54:46.040
evidence-based psychology, uh science, right, that says that has useful uh

01:54:46.200 --> 01:54:51.800
useful lessons, useful insights about relationships and about, you know, raising your kids

01:54:51.880 --> 01:54:55.240
and about well-being and about career and about community.

01:54:55.400 --> 01:55:00.110
Can we figure out a way of really easily getting that into people's hands in ways that are

01:55:00.110 --> 01:55:03.790
actionable, that are engaging, that that that could be effective.

01:55:03.950 --> 01:55:07.950
And so, you know, we thought about this just in the terms of okay, can we can we send stuff

01:55:07.950 --> 01:55:08.910
out to our alums?

01:55:09.390 --> 01:55:14.190
Over time, it became clear that maybe there's sort of a broader value of this out there in

01:55:14.190 --> 01:55:19.070
the world and people encouraging us, raised a good amount of philanthropy uh to sort of

01:55:19.070 --> 01:55:20.030
start to build this.

01:55:20.270 --> 01:55:21.710
We've now shifted it.

01:55:21.820 --> 01:55:24.780
Uh, we're going to be rolling this out of ASU.

01:55:24.860 --> 01:55:30.380
Uh, the first instantiation will be sort of as an app, uh, covering a bunch of topics, but

01:55:30.380 --> 01:55:36.220
really helping people have skills, sort of life skills within these

01:55:36.220 --> 01:55:41.020
different kinds of domains that they might now be able to integrate into their everyday

01:55:41.020 --> 01:55:46.060
lives and uh and you know help solve you know little challenges before they become real

01:55:46.060 --> 01:55:46.620
problems.

01:55:46.860 --> 01:55:49.820
And so we're actually spinning this out as a startup.

01:55:49.980 --> 01:55:55.830
And I am now the CEO president of this of this uh new startup that I'm gonna be

01:55:55.830 --> 01:55:57.350
doing while I'm an academic.

01:55:57.750 --> 01:55:58.870
We'll see how well that goes.

01:55:58.950 --> 01:56:04.470
I should have a separate conversation with David uh about uh about being a about being a

01:56:04.470 --> 01:56:05.430
business guy.

01:56:05.670 --> 01:56:09.270
Uh but that's that's something that's sort of exciting to me.

01:56:09.350 --> 01:56:14.790
Uh the challenge right I'm I'm trying to you know marry everything together and do both of

01:56:14.790 --> 01:56:15.270
these things.

01:56:15.430 --> 01:56:21.160
And uh but that's uh that's it's a it's you know as scientists we're problem solvers and

01:56:21.240 --> 01:56:22.920
uh of of one sort.

01:56:23.160 --> 01:56:29.080
And you know, getting these tools out to people in ways uh and to a lot of people in

01:56:29.080 --> 01:56:34.200
ways that can be useful to them uh is uh is just another kind of problem to be solved, both

01:56:34.200 --> 01:56:38.360
how do you design the systems, but how do you how do you you know find what the right

01:56:38.360 --> 01:56:42.280
markets are and how do you engage in those markets and how do you how do you sell and all

01:56:42.280 --> 01:56:42.600
those things.

01:56:42.680 --> 01:56:47.130
So that's sort of been exciting uh uh to me as well and that's probably something that

01:56:47.130 --> 01:56:52.330
people don't know that it's a it's sort of a very different side more of an applied uh uh

01:56:52.330 --> 01:56:58.330
kind of side uh but uh trying to trying to uh you know have an impact in

01:56:58.330 --> 01:57:02.810
in that kind of way as well that's fantastic it does it exist yet or is this coming out

01:57:03.210 --> 01:57:07.610
it's so we we sort of have beta versions of it where we're in the midst of we we got some

01:57:07.770 --> 01:57:12.170
we've been getting some feedback we're in the midst of sort of this next sort of like beta

01:57:12.410 --> 01:57:18.300
plus version uh but we'll we we think we'll be ready to go out and to have

01:57:18.300 --> 01:57:23.260
like real people using it, you know, come uh sort of end of summer or so.

01:57:23.980 --> 01:57:29.580
We're sort of building some some new, I think, reasonably fundamental features into it that

01:57:29.740 --> 01:57:35.580
that significantly raise the value of it, that bring it beyond sort of just psychoeducation

01:57:35.580 --> 01:57:41.340
stuff, uh in in ways that uh people can integrate into their into their lives and uh make

01:57:41.340 --> 01:57:42.300
it really more usable.

01:57:42.380 --> 01:57:45.970
So and of course, you know, doing you know, doing the user research and all that.

01:57:46.050 --> 01:57:48.850
I mean, it's just it's been a bunch of different challenges and they're all interesting.

01:57:48.930 --> 01:57:50.450
So Yeah, that's fantastic.

01:57:50.530 --> 01:57:55.170
And I mean, that's wonderful for social things, like if we have the data, it's again this

01:57:55.170 --> 01:58:00.370
coordination problem and people want to know what do I do for my um uh what do I do with my

01:58:00.370 --> 01:58:06.370
kid here or myself or my spouse, uh, if there's data and getting that to them without ads

01:58:06.370 --> 01:58:09.570
or snake oil or some of them sell you selling something to them.

01:58:09.810 --> 01:58:10.130
That's right.

01:58:10.290 --> 01:58:10.930
That's fantastic.

01:58:11.010 --> 01:58:15.000
And it's gonna make the science better to the degree that there's a market outside of

01:58:15.000 --> 01:58:16.360
entertaining undergrads.

01:58:16.760 --> 01:58:17.800
No big lecture hall.

01:58:17.960 --> 01:58:18.120
Yeah.

01:58:18.600 --> 01:58:19.240
We hope so.

01:58:19.400 --> 01:58:19.800
We hope so.

01:58:20.040 --> 01:58:23.240
Yeah, David, I'll probably reach out to you actually to you know what's what's the license

01:58:23.320 --> 01:58:24.680
also to be run in a business.

01:58:25.080 --> 01:58:25.800
Yeah, please do.

01:58:25.960 --> 01:58:27.400
I wish I knew the answer to that question.

01:58:29.560 --> 01:58:32.280
At least how you solve some of the challenges.

01:58:33.160 --> 01:58:33.880
Business humor.

01:58:34.040 --> 01:58:37.160
So well, Steve, this was wonderful.

01:58:37.320 --> 01:58:39.080
Uh we really appreciate it.

01:58:39.160 --> 01:58:44.810
Um and uh Yeah, it's it's it went by quick and uh yeah, it's always fun.

01:58:44.890 --> 01:58:49.770
There's so much going on, uh so much throughput in your lab and your offspring, your

01:58:49.770 --> 01:58:50.730
academic offspring.

01:58:50.890 --> 01:58:52.650
It's uh thanks for being on.

01:58:52.730 --> 01:58:53.850
Um it was lovely.

01:58:54.170 --> 01:58:55.530
Well, well, thank you for having me.

01:58:55.610 --> 01:58:59.850
It's been a pleasure and um I'm flattered, and it's been a lot of fun.

01:59:04.490 --> 01:59:09.780
David, um Why do I always try to start the in the outros?

01:59:10.020 --> 01:59:11.540
I never stop.

01:59:13.140 --> 01:59:15.620
Well, we just we just had a conversation with Steve Newberg.

01:59:15.780 --> 01:59:18.100
We just had a Steve had a lovely conversation with Steve Newberg.

01:59:18.580 --> 01:59:19.380
Time flew.

01:59:19.460 --> 01:59:23.540
Um there was We're still figuring out what we're still figuring out what this outro even

01:59:23.540 --> 01:59:23.700
is.

01:59:31.860 --> 01:59:33.380
I think that's it said that.

01:59:33.690 --> 01:59:34.250
Oh yeah.

01:59:34.330 --> 01:59:34.570
Okay.

01:59:38.170 --> 01:59:41.290
Yeah, that fits in with like Bayesian models of cognition.

01:59:41.610 --> 01:59:46.970
John John Tuby famously had a post-it note on his computer that was a little more direct,

01:59:47.050 --> 01:59:50.250
and it said, Everything you think you know is wrong.

01:59:52.250 --> 01:59:52.570
Okay.

01:59:53.130 --> 01:59:53.930
I like that.

01:59:54.140 --> 01:59:54.460
Yeah.

01:59:54.700 --> 01:59:59.660
Um I mean I have a blog post coming up that's basically arguing that most of what you think

01:59:59.660 --> 02:00:01.340
you believe you don't actually believe.

02:00:01.660 --> 02:00:02.460
Awesome.

02:00:02.780 --> 02:00:04.460
I'm really excited about that one.

02:00:04.860 --> 02:00:05.660
I believe that.

02:00:05.820 --> 02:00:06.220
Does it be a good one?

02:00:06.380 --> 02:00:10.220
Yeah, I'm glad you that's a really, really good question.

02:00:10.460 --> 02:00:11.820
You might not deep down.

02:00:11.900 --> 02:00:12.460
Who knows?

02:00:13.820 --> 02:00:16.780
That's kind of I feel like that's very freeing though, because then if somebody's like I

02:00:16.780 --> 02:00:19.260
don't believe you, you can be like, well, okay.

02:00:19.770 --> 02:00:20.090
Yeah.

02:00:20.330 --> 02:00:24.970
No, I mean the thesis is that you you may believe you believe those things, but you don't

02:00:24.970 --> 02:00:26.090
actually believe those things.

02:00:26.170 --> 02:00:27.130
And there's a difference there.

02:00:27.290 --> 02:00:29.690
Just because you believe you believe it doesn't mean you actually believe it.

02:00:30.010 --> 02:00:30.250
Right.

02:00:30.410 --> 02:00:31.130
Yeah, yeah.

02:00:31.290 --> 02:00:31.690
Yeah.

02:00:32.010 --> 02:00:35.850
Like like we've talked about, like if you actually the way people believe act when there's

02:00:35.850 --> 02:00:39.850
a real conspiracy versus they say there's a conspiracy is very different.

02:00:40.010 --> 02:00:41.530
I think we talked about Hugo Mercier.

02:00:42.010 --> 02:00:43.210
Yeah, we talked about Hugo Mercier.

02:00:43.290 --> 02:00:46.650
We also talked about it with Dan Williams, and I talked about pseudo-beliefs.

02:00:46.730 --> 02:00:50.260
So I have a big post coming up on on pseudo beliefs.

02:00:50.500 --> 02:00:52.580
And uh I think it's a really interesting topic.

02:00:52.820 --> 02:00:56.020
Anyway, we I don't know how this fits in with anything.

02:00:57.300 --> 02:01:03.220
Well, uh if you believe, David, that um that was uh yeah, I didn't even I didn't

02:01:03.220 --> 02:01:04.660
even uh finish that.

02:01:04.820 --> 02:01:08.500
Um well if you believe you like this podcast, what can people do?

02:01:09.460 --> 02:01:14.990
Uh well, they can say nice things about us on social media, support us on Patreon, leave us

02:01:14.990 --> 02:01:16.030
a kind review.

02:01:16.270 --> 02:01:17.870
Those are the big three, right?

02:01:18.190 --> 02:01:19.310
Can't think of any other ones.

02:01:19.630 --> 02:01:20.750
Yeah, that's that's it.

02:01:20.990 --> 02:01:24.110
Yeah, and some journalists out there get on the Robert Trivers thing.

02:01:24.190 --> 02:01:24.750
My goodness.

02:01:24.830 --> 02:01:26.030
It's ridiculous.

02:01:26.350 --> 02:01:28.510
Yeah, I'm just beginning to hear some of the horror stories.

02:01:28.590 --> 02:01:28.910
Yikes.

02:01:29.310 --> 02:01:33.230
I met I'm I didn't meet him in personally, but I did I was for H best Rutgers.

02:01:33.620 --> 02:01:36.980
I stayed in the student dorms and he was staying in the same hallway.

02:01:37.060 --> 02:01:39.460
And he was, I just remember he was in the hallway.

02:01:39.540 --> 02:01:41.940
I think like the showers was a college dorms.

02:01:42.180 --> 02:01:45.140
So he just I just remember he was like peering out the wind, looking out the window with

02:01:45.140 --> 02:01:46.980
like a towel around his neck, just sort of peering.

02:01:47.300 --> 02:01:48.500
And I was like going into my room.

02:01:48.580 --> 02:01:50.100
I was like, Oh, there's Robert Trivers.

02:01:50.180 --> 02:01:52.100
And that was the only interaction I had with him.

02:01:52.260 --> 02:01:57.540
But yeah, I've had I've I've never heard so many stories from people having interactions

02:01:57.540 --> 02:02:02.180
with a human being that were so colorful, is the one way to put it.

02:02:02.510 --> 02:02:02.990
Yes.

02:02:03.150 --> 02:02:03.630
Yes.

02:02:04.110 --> 02:02:04.750
Yeah.

02:02:05.470 --> 02:02:09.390
Well anyway, on that note we can separate the ideas from the man, hopefully.

02:02:09.790 --> 02:02:10.030
Exactly.

02:02:10.190 --> 02:02:10.830
No, totally.

02:02:10.990 --> 02:02:11.390
Absolutely.

02:02:11.710 --> 02:02:12.590
Yes, exactly.

02:02:12.670 --> 02:02:12.910
Yes.

02:02:13.070 --> 02:02:17.070
Um but uh it was wonderful uh to uh to have Steve on.

02:02:17.150 --> 02:02:17.870
Thank you for listening.

02:02:17.950 --> 02:02:19.390
And David, I'll see you next week.

02:02:19.630 --> 02:02:19.790
Yep.

02:02:19.950 --> 02:02:20.270
See ya.

02:02:20.670 --> 02:02:20.990
Bye.