WEBVTT

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I'm David Petrozowski.

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And I'm David Pinsoff.

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And uh today, what what is the name of this podcast, David?

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Evolutionary psychology, the podcast.

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Um that makes sense.

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That checks out if you look at the logo and yeah, okay, good.

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Uh oh, no, no, I'm supposed to say uh actual,

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yeah, actual actual evolutionary psychology by Actual

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Evolutionary Psychologists.

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All right.

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Hey, we did that in tandem.

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That was great.

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David, uh who uh it sounded

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like I had something and I didn't.

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Uh David, uh uh, what are we doing today?

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Uh we are talking to a really awesome guest uh by the name of Pat Barclay,

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who is fantastic and I think a super underrated, I think if you did the ratio of

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how important their work is and sort of to what extent uh do other people who are sort of

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uh not doing the work but sort of foisting it onto us as their own.

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I would say, you know, this is this is a case of Pat just being the actual sort of person

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running the show.

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Pat is one of those people who I wish would be the poster child for what evolutionary

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psychology is.

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When people ask me for like good evolutionary psychology, Pat is one of the people I point

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people to uh just because he's doing such great work.

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Uh and he does work on on one of the most interesting and important topics, which is

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cooperation, altruism, um, how we choose our social partners, how we judge our

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social partners, uh uh based on their moral character.

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Uh this is just fascinating stuff.

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He has really insightful uh uh ways of thinking about it.

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Um I I think you're you're really gonna like this conversation.

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We had a blast uh having it and I'm sure you'll have a blast listening to it.

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Yeah and just he's a a gentleman and a scholar, a wonderful man, and uh we're really lucky

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to have him in evolutionary social sciences.

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And without further ado, here is Pat Barclay um and David and I

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uh today we have Pat Barclay uh University of Guelph which is southern Ontario is that

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right Pat Yeah yeah I grew up an hour west of Toronto.

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Oh great yeah um uh yeah southern Ontario is lovely especially the when it's not dark and

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snowy but I grew up outside of Baseball.

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I would say it's more lovely when it's dark and snowy.

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Oh, that's true.

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Snow is beautiful when you, you know, you get used to wearing the layers and it's it's a

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great time of year.

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There's no bad weather, just bad clothing.

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This is something the Germans said all the time.

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And the kids were out all year round.

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And I can attest that actually they're they're generally right.

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Um, although anyway, um, so Pat, really great to uh have you on.

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Um, and I'm just gonna go through a few things that you study.

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So one is biological markets, partner choice and competitive helping, uh,

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reputational benefits for cooperative behavior, costly punishment, scales of

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competition, uh, cognitive mechanisms underlying cooperative exchange, intergroup

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competition and group threats.

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Um I like this category miscellaneous cooperation.

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You have to explain that miscellaneous cooperation.

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Everything that doesn't fit under the table above.

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Yeah, and uh exactly um so whenever we have somebody on, I sort of like to

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think about, and and maybe people don't like this, but I'll I don't know.

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People can let us know.

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Um, but I like to think about sort of what I think about them.

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And I think for me, uh, I've been listening to you give talks about

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cooperation for years.

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And my impression is, and you can tell me if this is accurate or not, is that for me, at

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least growing up in the early 2000s of the evolutionary biology of cooperation, that was

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the really hot topic.

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And even though people knew that organisms and especially people are hyper cooperative,

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there was a mystery as to how do you solve the inherent

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fragility of cooperation.

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So there's this free rider problem, and we've talked about that on past episodes.

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David has sort of elaborated on what that means.

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and I think from my perspective, you have just sort of been doing a yeoman's

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work of just chugging along and steadily solving the

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problems of cooperation with colleagues like Nikolai Rahani, and we we should have her on

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too, although she's in New Zealand, which is gonna be a tricky time difference.

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Yeah.

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But um, but so number one, do you accept that that sort of would be an e the north star

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sort of of your research?

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And and you you you don't have to be I mean, I will say this for you.

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Like I I genuinely think that you are probably the person I can think of most that has sort

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of solved this this problem of what are the mechanisms, both from an ultimate and also

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approximate perspective in terms of sort of like how do you solve the problems inherent in

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cooperation?

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Ultimate meaning the Darwinian function and proximate the What are the selective

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pressures that result in a psychology that makes us want to ever cooperate with others?

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Exactly.

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Yeah, good point.

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Yeah, we actually haven't, we should just talk about that jargon exactly.

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And just a good example would be something like if you say, well, why do parents love their

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children?

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And you say oxytocin is a hormone that makes parents love their children.

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Right.

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But then why do parents have oxytocin?

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Why does it you know, fire in these certain situations?

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Exactly.

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And and I think the cooperation literature is one of these cases where we really need to

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distinguish between these different kinds of questions.

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People will say, like, you know, you see Johnny helping Sally, and you say, Well, why is

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Johnny helping Sally?

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And one person will say, Oh, it's because Johnny feels good about helping Sally.

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Somebody else will say, Oh, well, it's because Johnny learned to help others.

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And somebody else will say, Oh, it's because Johnny is engaging in reciprocity.

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He helps Sally and makes Sally more likely to help him in return.

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And people pit these against each other as if they're competing explanations.

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Whereas really, like all three of them could be right, or all three of them could be wrong,

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right?

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Johnny feels good about helping Sally.

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Why does he feel good?

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Well, because he learned to uh uh to do so.

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Well, why did he learn that?

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Well, because when he helped people in the past, they helped him in return.

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And so he learned, right?

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But though that last question would be the kind of question that I tend to focus on the

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ultimate function what are the selective pressures that result in that you know

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helping psychology being in the head in in the in the first place so really it

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interestingly that the ultimate proximate confusion or explanation it really what you're

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saying is it lies at the heart of what had been and I think it's getting better and you can

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tell me if you agree with this a pretty confused and confusing literature.

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Yeah, I think this mix up between what's going on in the head and

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how did it get there, I mean, I think that's been a confusion in a lot of literatures.

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Um, you know, I think it's a point that we need to start driving in right from first-year

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psychology.

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Um, it's it, but it definitely comes up in a lot of the evolutionary psychology, uh, psych

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um psychological discussions where people mistake what evolutionary psychologists are

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saying and will think that an evolutionary psychologist is talking about what is going on

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in the head, whereas really they might be talking about the selection pressures that got

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that stuff in the head there.

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And yeah, the cooperation literature has been particularly prone to this uh you know to

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to this this proximate and ultimate confusion.

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Or at least it has been from my vantage point, maybe because I'm more familiar with it, but

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perhaps it has come up just as much in other areas as well.

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Right.

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Do you think it it's because we care so deeply about what's going on in the head in

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terms of our personal and social lives?

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We want to know how generous and kind other people are.

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We want to know their moral character.

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We scrutinize each other's actions and behaviors and utterances to try to gain insights

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into what kind of person they are, and we care deeply about our own reputation and

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broadcasting to others that we have a good moral character and that the stuff in our head

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is noble and praiseworthy.

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And so might it be that because we're so obsessed with what's going on in the head, that

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this creates this confusion between proximate and ultimate levels that as soon as you start

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talking about how the stuff in the head got there, we instantly, you know, jump to this

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place that we're all too familiar with, which is judging other people and in showing off

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the our moral character.

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Do you do you buy that that might be that that's a really interesting idea?

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I'd never thought about it that way.

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I always had thought about it just more in terms of some people are naturally attracted to

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how questions.

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How does this thing work?

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Whereas other people are naturally attracted to why questions, like why are things this way

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as opposed to something else?

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right?

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And when I was going through high school, I always thought, oh, you know, the sciences are

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great for answering the how questions, but they're not good at answering the why questions.

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Why is it this way?

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And then when I found evolution, that just blew my mind because it was like, oh, wait a

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second.

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Now science can answer these why questions.

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Why is it this way as opposed to some other way?

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So that would make sense.

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So I had always thought about some people wanting to investigate the how, you know, how

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does the mind work?

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Um, And other people liking the why questions of well, why is the mind that way as opposed

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to some other way?

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And that just being the result, the cause of that confusion.

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People not realizing that people were asking a different question.

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But David, your uh your hypothesis is really intriguing that instead,

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because we yeah, we're trying to read each other's minds, their intentions, figuring out

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what their character is like, can we predict are is that person going to cooperate with me?

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Are they going to screw me over?

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Um, that you know, we're um that might be why uh people are looking at those kind of uh

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the why questions.

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There's a potential signaling uh argument here, too.

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People might be hesitant to accept these functional questions for altruism.

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Because if I say people are nice because niceness pays off, right,

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What are you going to interpret about my actions?

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Suddenly, if I'm nice to you, you're gonna be like, What's in it for you?

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Why are you helping me?

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Um, so there's a signaling element where people might want to you know

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not promote this functionalist logic.

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Or, you know, so I think maybe the same thing when it comes to aggression, right?

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You know, aggression sometimes brings benefits.

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You have resources, yoink, they're mine.

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Um, you know, but if you if you talk about, well, organisms will sometimes fight for

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resources because it's their main means of getting resources cheaper sometimes than

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gathering it themselves, people start being like, wait a second, are you that kind of

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person who's going to take my stuff?

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Uh so there may be a signaling aspect.

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And I mean maybe we should start testing this.

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Are people more likely to reject functionalist approaches when others are watching

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and potentially judging them for uh for espousing a functionalist view?

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No, that's and do, and do they actually have, do they get judged?

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So if I espouse a Darwinian functionalist explanation for altruism, are people going to

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judge me as a less altruistic and caring, compassionate person.

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That would also be really interesting to test empirically.

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I suspect, I mean, I I have a hunch that it's probably correct.

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Um but it's it's a question that I've been increasingly interested in is to is you know

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why um why is there this conflict between the functional Darwinian level of

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analysis and the uh the level of analysis that we use to judge each other and

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try to shape how others judge us.

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So why why couldn't I just say that the reason that I'm helping you is because

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uh I I want to you know be seen as a good cooperative partner, or I want you to

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reciprocate, or I have a stake in in your welfare and I want to make sure that you can

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cooperate with me in the future.

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Why, when I say those things, would that license the negative inference about me, as

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opposed to me just saying that I'm doing it, you know, just because it's it's intrinsically

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fulfilling or rewarding or something like that.

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I well, I I think it's because we're we're trying to predict others' likelihood of

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cooperation.

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But that includes how likely are you to cooperate with me when it's not

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in your immediate interest to do so.

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And so, like a lot of the work I do is on reputation and people gaining a reputation for

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cooper for cooperation.

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What we're ultimately trying to assess is how competent are you, uh like how able

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are you to produce benefits for me or for others, but also how willing are you to produce

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those benefits?

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And I think that's that's you know, with a there's signaling behind both of them.

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But when you're talking about um, you know, I am helping because I will get a good

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reputation for doing so, that indicates to you that I'm not doing it because I

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value you.

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I'm doing it just because I'm watched.

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And if I'm not watched, I'm not going to do it.

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Whereas if I genuinely value your welfare, I will

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help you whether people are watching or not.

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Right?

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The most common example in humans would be parents and their kids.

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You know, Dave, I'm I'm sure you can relate to this.

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The shit that you do for your kid is intense.

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It's David has a younger child.

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Yeah.

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So yeah, we've both true.

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David has also even a younger daughter than Oh wow.

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Okay.

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So yeah.

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So you're both more in this.

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You are even more investing.

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Yeah.

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And they won't even remember those first five years.

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Right?

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Um, you you will help your child, even if nobody is watching, because you love that little

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bastard.

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Yeah, I love it.

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It's the best thing ever.

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Just hook it to my veins.

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That is the best.

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Yeah.

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And that's you'll you that's a very powerful motivator to be so concerned for somebody's

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welfare that you'll help them even if it doesn't seem to pay off now, even if nobody is

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watching.

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Um, and it'd be the same with our friends.

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Like if you if you think for a second about your really close friends, is there a

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friend who you know if they were suddenly at risk of dying, you would

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help them even if you were sworn to secrecy and no one would ever know that you would help

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them.

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Is there anybody in your life where you would where you would do that for?

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And I think many of us would probably be like, yeah, there are some people where I would

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save them even if nobody would ever know.

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And it's because we genuinely value them as friends.

00:15:08.290 --> 00:15:11.400
And that's yeah, that's that's a powerful thing.

00:15:11.560 --> 00:15:15.160
That to care for somebody that deeply, that's what's going on in the brain.

00:15:15.320 --> 00:15:18.760
What I would want to know was why does that get into the brain in the first place?

00:15:19.160 --> 00:15:25.080
Um, and then, but then if you can communicate that, if you can somehow signal, hey man,

00:15:25.400 --> 00:15:28.680
I'll you know, I love your brother and I will get your back no matter what.

00:15:28.840 --> 00:15:34.520
Like that's a very powerful thing to communicate, makes one a valuable uh partner, but at

00:15:34.520 --> 00:15:38.520
the same time, you know, is you know, it's gonna be hard to fake.

00:15:38.910 --> 00:15:43.710
And if somebody is saying, Oh, I'm just doing this because I look good, what that tells me

00:15:43.710 --> 00:15:46.670
is they don't actually value my well-being.

00:15:46.830 --> 00:15:49.390
They don't really have a stake in my welfare.

00:15:49.470 --> 00:15:51.470
They just have a stake in appearing nice.

00:15:51.710 --> 00:15:51.870
Right.

00:15:52.030 --> 00:15:57.310
If I if I can sort of let me make sure I can sort of translate um or say it in a different

00:15:57.310 --> 00:16:02.750
way to make sure everyone's understanding, um, including myself, which is that um

00:16:03.420 --> 00:16:08.780
the our evolved psychology is by default interpreting

00:16:08.780 --> 00:16:14.060
explanations for cooperation as descriptions of underlying motivations.

00:16:14.700 --> 00:16:20.540
And so a scientist who comes along and who distinguishes between proximate

00:16:20.540 --> 00:16:26.300
and ultimate, when they start talking about the evolutionary

00:16:26.300 --> 00:16:32.150
reasons why something's happening, which requires talking about fitness benefits

00:16:32.150 --> 00:16:37.750
by definition, because that's all we're allowed to postulate in terms of like what we know

00:16:37.750 --> 00:16:43.750
about how biological complexity occurs, given the logic of differential reproductive

00:16:43.750 --> 00:16:44.150
success.

00:16:44.310 --> 00:16:50.260
So, given that, when that scientist starts talking about benefits, it's

00:16:50.260 --> 00:16:56.180
read by our intuitive evolved psychology as a motivation that

00:16:56.180 --> 00:17:02.100
detracts from quote unquote genuine uh cooperation

00:17:02.100 --> 00:17:02.980
or altruism.

00:17:03.060 --> 00:17:08.900
And it's misunderstood as indicating that this a person will be

00:17:08.900 --> 00:17:13.270
less likely to be altruistic in the in the sense in which

00:17:14.230 --> 00:17:19.910
they'll be uh less likely to provide benefits or cooperate or more likely to free ride

00:17:19.910 --> 00:17:21.510
under certain circumstances.

00:17:21.750 --> 00:17:24.070
So it was a really long, complicated sentence.

00:17:24.150 --> 00:17:28.870
So I'm not sure I did any translating, but um, but the bottom line thing is it would be

00:17:28.870 --> 00:17:34.390
sort of the example of an evolutionary expect uh explanation makes it sound like you're

00:17:34.390 --> 00:17:40.200
saying somebody has an ulterior motive as opposed to know

00:17:40.360 --> 00:17:45.880
their evolved psychology is going to do all the things you would expect them to do when

00:17:45.880 --> 00:17:49.640
they're genuinely feeling altruistic and cooperative.

00:17:49.800 --> 00:17:51.960
I'm not saying they're going to do any less.

00:17:52.120 --> 00:17:56.840
I'm just explaining why they have that intrinsic motivation.

00:17:57.320 --> 00:17:57.640
Yeah.

00:17:57.800 --> 00:18:01.960
I I think that's a good that's a good translation of all of that.

00:18:02.120 --> 00:18:06.520
So you have us, you know, wanting to detect other people's motivations and why they're

00:18:06.520 --> 00:18:07.400
doing stuff.

00:18:07.640 --> 00:18:13.410
Um and highlighting those uh selective benefits makes it

00:18:13.410 --> 00:18:15.250
sound like ulterior motives.

00:18:15.410 --> 00:18:17.170
And so you know you're right.

00:18:17.330 --> 00:18:23.250
Perhaps people who who say that, who highlight those will be viewed as more Machiavellian,

00:18:23.730 --> 00:18:26.210
more uh you know, likely to defect.

00:18:26.290 --> 00:18:30.210
That's a great hypothesis that hey, like let's let's let's go test this as soon as this

00:18:30.210 --> 00:18:31.010
podcast is over.

00:18:31.170 --> 00:18:34.850
We'll design some uh some studies to to test that hypothesis.

00:18:35.090 --> 00:18:38.480
Um But yeah, that's that that's I think a good summary.

00:18:38.800 --> 00:18:43.840
Could could I could I take a different, slightly different angle on what might be going on

00:18:43.840 --> 00:18:44.080
here?

00:18:44.480 --> 00:18:49.840
So uh uh Pat, you've done wonderful work trying to solve this this Darwinian problem of

00:18:49.840 --> 00:18:50.560
altruism.

00:18:50.720 --> 00:18:55.440
Why do do organisms ever help other uh organisms?

00:18:55.680 --> 00:19:00.720
Um and you know, one explanation is is what's known as kin selection, where organisms uh

00:19:00.720 --> 00:19:06.230
help their genetic relatives because the gene for helping uh is often in the organism that

00:19:06.230 --> 00:19:07.030
is helped.

00:19:07.190 --> 00:19:11.910
Um, and then other explanations involve reciprocity, the helper is is likely to get helped

00:19:11.910 --> 00:19:13.190
in return, reputation.

00:19:13.270 --> 00:19:17.510
If you're helped, you're seen as a good helper and you're more likely to be helped and to

00:19:17.510 --> 00:19:20.550
uh be chosen uh as a relationship partner.

00:19:21.190 --> 00:19:25.590
Um so there are all these beautiful uh explanations, and there's one more recent and more

00:19:25.590 --> 00:19:30.180
interesting explanation for altruism, which is what we might call stakeholder altruism,

00:19:30.580 --> 00:19:34.180
where you're not helping to because they're genetically related, you're not helping to get

00:19:34.180 --> 00:19:37.220
reciprocated, you're not helping for reputational benefits.

00:19:37.380 --> 00:19:42.500
You're helping because you have an intrinsic stake in the person's well-being, because

00:19:42.500 --> 00:19:47.940
their mere existence, their mere survival and flourishing uh is correlated with your

00:19:47.940 --> 00:19:49.060
biological fitness.

00:19:49.220 --> 00:19:53.350
So the healthier and the and the more well off they are, the better able they're they're

00:19:53.350 --> 00:19:57.270
going to uh the better able they'll be to help you and provide benefits to you and

00:19:57.270 --> 00:19:58.230
cooperate with you.

00:19:58.390 --> 00:20:02.150
Their their mere existence uh is a is a boost for your fitness.

00:20:02.310 --> 00:20:04.230
So you you have a genuine stake in them.

00:20:04.390 --> 00:20:09.030
So the best example of of stakeholder altruism would be helping uh you know your children,

00:20:09.110 --> 00:20:09.670
for example.

00:20:09.830 --> 00:20:14.580
Uh in that case the stake would be uh uh uh uh genetic Uh but there are other kinds of

00:20:14.580 --> 00:20:16.500
stakeholder uh altruism.

00:20:16.740 --> 00:20:21.700
Um if you have some talent that is irreplaceable and that nobody else has, if you're the

00:20:21.700 --> 00:20:26.180
only person who knows which mushrooms are poisonous or whatever, um if you die then all

00:20:26.260 --> 00:20:27.140
that knowledge is lost.

00:20:27.220 --> 00:20:31.700
And so I have a reason to keep you alive just to gain access to that that knowledge.

00:20:32.340 --> 00:20:34.180
So that's a different kind of stakeholder altruism.

00:20:34.340 --> 00:20:38.510
So that's a long winded way of getting to what I think might be going on, is that there are

00:20:38.510 --> 00:20:40.830
different candidate explanations for altruism.

00:20:41.230 --> 00:20:46.910
And uh we often have an interest in trying to paint our altruism or frame our

00:20:46.910 --> 00:20:50.830
altruism as stakeholder altruism, even when it might not be.

00:20:51.150 --> 00:20:55.950
And so uh and because because it it's it's in our interest to to describe it that way.

00:20:56.030 --> 00:21:00.240
It's it's better if you think that I have a stake in you, then that's then you're going to

00:21:00.240 --> 00:21:03.760
be more disposed to help me, you're going, and you're going to have a stake in my welfare

00:21:03.920 --> 00:21:04.400
in return.

00:21:04.640 --> 00:21:10.640
And so there might be an incentive to try to deceptively or strategically

00:21:11.040 --> 00:21:13.920
frame our motives as as as stakeholder motives.

00:21:14.480 --> 00:21:18.560
When in reality they might be motivated by say reputational concerns or reciprocity

00:21:18.560 --> 00:21:21.120
concerns or or or or something else.

00:21:21.840 --> 00:21:27.430
And so what might be going on is that when we give a

00:21:27.430 --> 00:21:31.830
Darwinian explanation of the fitness benefits in terms of reciprocity or reputation, uh

00:21:31.990 --> 00:21:36.150
we're giving a diff it seems like we're giving a different proximate explanation for the

00:21:36.150 --> 00:21:40.870
behavior that is that is less desirable than the the pure stakeholder reason.

00:21:41.110 --> 00:21:46.070
And so I I might expect that if we explain a person's behavior uh in Darwinian terms in

00:21:46.070 --> 00:21:50.230
terms of stakeholder altruism, that you actually might not get those those adverse

00:21:50.230 --> 00:21:52.500
inferences about the person's character.

00:21:52.660 --> 00:21:56.420
It's only those other kinds of Darwinian explanations relating to reciprocity and

00:21:56.420 --> 00:22:00.340
reputation that you might start to get uh those adverse inferences.

00:22:00.420 --> 00:22:01.300
What do you think about that?

00:22:01.620 --> 00:22:02.580
Uh that's really interesting.

00:22:02.740 --> 00:22:06.740
I I mean I'll have to uh I'll have to check whether people's reactions to when I speak

00:22:06.740 --> 00:22:10.980
about this start to change now that I'm looking more at this stakeholder altruism rather

00:22:10.980 --> 00:22:14.420
than the reputation base and whether people start looking, you know, stop looking at the at

00:22:14.420 --> 00:22:17.540
me skeptically, uh, you know, when I'm talking about stake.

00:22:17.700 --> 00:22:18.970
Um, but that's possibly it.

00:22:19.050 --> 00:22:24.970
I mean, I I I agree that there's this benefit to um framing one's interest in

00:22:24.970 --> 00:22:26.170
uh in terms of stake.

00:22:26.330 --> 00:22:30.490
And just you know, uh to back up for people who aren't uh as familiar with this with this

00:22:30.490 --> 00:22:35.210
idea of having a stake in somebody's welfare, uh you describe it as though it's a new

00:22:35.210 --> 00:22:36.810
thing, but it really isn't.

00:22:36.970 --> 00:22:40.170
Um I mean, people have been talking about this for almost forty years.

00:22:40.730 --> 00:22:41.770
Mutualisms mutualism.

00:22:41.930 --> 00:22:42.090
Sorry?

00:22:42.170 --> 00:22:44.570
Yeah, mutualism mutualisms.

00:22:44.810 --> 00:22:46.560
Um talking about it.

00:22:47.040 --> 00:22:48.400
Pseudo-reciprocity.

00:22:48.480 --> 00:22:48.720
Yeah.

00:22:49.120 --> 00:22:53.840
John Tube and Lita Cosmides had a great paper in 96 on irreplaceability.

00:22:54.320 --> 00:22:56.560
You know, where they call it solving the bankers' paradox.

00:22:56.640 --> 00:22:58.160
So people have been talking about this idea for a while.

00:22:58.480 --> 00:23:00.560
Banger paper Stevens says banger paper.

00:23:01.040 --> 00:23:01.520
Wonderful paper, yeah.

00:23:01.920 --> 00:23:02.320
Good paper.

00:23:02.880 --> 00:23:05.200
It calls good papers bangers, which I think is hilarious.

00:23:05.920 --> 00:23:06.880
This is one of my favorite words.

00:23:06.960 --> 00:23:07.840
Anyway, continuing.

00:23:08.080 --> 00:23:08.720
Sorry, Pat.

00:23:10.290 --> 00:23:15.330
Um, but yeah, like it there's there's at least five or six different names for this same

00:23:15.330 --> 00:23:19.410
phenomena that different people have come up with, but it hasn't really coalesced into it.

00:23:19.490 --> 00:23:23.810
I I prefer Gilbert Roberts' phrase of stake and and and stakeholder because I think that

00:23:23.810 --> 00:23:25.010
sums it up nicely.

00:23:25.410 --> 00:23:29.330
Um but yeah, the idea that you can have a vested interest in somebody else.

00:23:29.570 --> 00:23:35.570
The the example that I like to use best is imagine there is a tree that gives you

00:23:35.570 --> 00:23:36.210
shade.

00:23:37.380 --> 00:23:38.980
And you really need that shade.

00:23:39.140 --> 00:23:41.940
Well, you have an interest in watering that tree.

00:23:42.100 --> 00:23:46.980
You have an interest in protecting that tree from herbivores and from pests so that it can

00:23:46.980 --> 00:23:50.580
continue to in to produce the shade that you need.

00:23:57.140 --> 00:23:58.660
The tree is just doing its thing.

00:23:58.820 --> 00:23:59.140
Right.

00:23:59.540 --> 00:24:05.410
But because its thing benefits you, there should be selection on you to look out

00:24:05.410 --> 00:24:09.170
for that tree so it can continue to do things to benefit you.

00:24:09.330 --> 00:24:14.770
You know, selection for you to be altruistic towards that tree so that it can continue to

00:24:15.330 --> 00:24:15.650
exist.

00:24:16.130 --> 00:24:19.090
Um, and we can have all sorts of stake in other individuals.

00:24:19.250 --> 00:24:23.170
So if one person's a good hunter who tends to bring home a lot of food for the rest of the

00:24:23.170 --> 00:24:27.200
group, Well, everybody else has a vested interest in that person remaining healthy.

00:24:27.360 --> 00:24:31.440
If they get injured, everybody else has a vested interest in making sure they're fed so

00:24:31.440 --> 00:24:34.080
they can get back out there and keep producing food.

00:24:34.240 --> 00:24:39.120
Somebody has useful knowledge, again, yeah, you you benefit from them being around and in

00:24:39.120 --> 00:24:41.440
good enough condition to share that.

00:24:41.680 --> 00:24:45.200
If you and I have a reciprocal relationship, right?

00:24:45.440 --> 00:24:49.040
You are selling stuff to me that I am then selling elsewhere, right?

00:24:49.210 --> 00:24:51.450
You know, this is a purely economic exchange.

00:24:51.530 --> 00:24:54.410
But if something happens to you, there goes my business.

00:24:54.570 --> 00:25:00.410
Therefore, I have an incentive to help you and keep you well so that my business

00:25:00.410 --> 00:25:01.130
can continue.

00:25:01.290 --> 00:25:05.050
So, you know, I benefit from keeping you around.

00:25:05.290 --> 00:25:08.650
Um, and so you know that that's very beneficial.

00:25:08.890 --> 00:25:14.860
But I think, David, you're right with that I also have an interest in

00:25:14.860 --> 00:25:18.380
conveying to you, hey man, I do need you.

00:25:18.620 --> 00:25:20.060
I do benefit from you.

00:25:20.300 --> 00:25:23.660
And I am going to get your back if you need it.

00:25:24.140 --> 00:25:24.620
Why?

00:25:24.860 --> 00:25:30.460
Because then if you see that and you know that I'm going to get your back, now

00:25:30.700 --> 00:25:34.380
you have a have a higher interest in my well being.

00:25:34.700 --> 00:25:39.730
Because if I'm going to be there when you need it, you want to make sure that I'm around

00:25:39.730 --> 00:25:41.570
and able and willing to help.

00:25:41.970 --> 00:25:42.130
Right.

00:25:42.290 --> 00:25:42.770
That makes sense.

00:25:42.850 --> 00:25:44.850
And that's also why people are so sensitive.

00:25:45.010 --> 00:25:46.290
I mean, Pat, do you have data on this?

00:25:46.370 --> 00:25:50.210
Of like, I mean, especially for David and I, you know, we're interested in like polyaddic,

00:25:50.450 --> 00:25:51.730
like three or more.

00:25:51.970 --> 00:25:57.890
So it's one thing Pat to say this, but you know, if if you say that to David,

00:25:58.210 --> 00:26:01.660
um, what you just said, when we should just record that and play it back.

00:26:01.740 --> 00:26:02.460
I got your back.

00:26:02.540 --> 00:26:05.820
Like it's just like um uh it's lovely to hear.

00:26:05.900 --> 00:26:11.660
But um uh but if if you say that to David, but then you me and David get together

00:26:11.740 --> 00:26:17.420
and then you take my side because David and I are having a fight, you know, like that that

00:26:17.420 --> 00:26:21.260
should really be b that should be something that David should be really vigilant for.

00:26:21.340 --> 00:26:23.180
It should be really uncomfortable.

00:26:23.580 --> 00:26:25.180
Is is there data on that?

00:26:25.740 --> 00:26:31.670
So um let me just see I mean, what you would expect, it's hard to

00:26:31.670 --> 00:26:36.950
say if I am helping genuinely, is that because I value people in general?

00:26:37.190 --> 00:26:42.870
And so, to what extent does my helping towards David predict my helping

00:26:42.870 --> 00:26:43.750
towards Dave?

00:26:44.150 --> 00:26:45.190
You, the other day.

00:26:45.430 --> 00:26:50.950
Um, and if I just value other people really well, or I don't value myself that much,

00:26:51.270 --> 00:26:56.870
then yes, my helping of you will predict my helping of somebody else.

00:26:57.510 --> 00:27:03.440
But if there's a conflict scenario where the two of you are in conflict with each other,

00:27:04.080 --> 00:27:09.760
then my helping of one of you is not going to predict, is going to be a negative

00:27:09.760 --> 00:27:12.240
predictor of my willingness to help somebody else.

00:27:12.400 --> 00:27:18.080
So it's always hard to distinguish between is this a general helping or is this tailored

00:27:18.080 --> 00:27:19.790
towards a specific person.

00:27:20.190 --> 00:27:20.350
Right.

00:27:20.510 --> 00:27:24.670
Like just as an example, like I like every listener to imagine that like their political

00:27:24.670 --> 00:27:29.470
outgroup and then imagine like Pat helping somebody who's a member of that political

00:27:29.470 --> 00:27:34.110
outgroup versus Pat helping somebody who's just neutral or a member of your political

00:27:34.110 --> 00:27:34.590
in-group.

00:27:34.750 --> 00:27:39.070
The valent the the way that that colors that's colored emotionally is very different for

00:27:39.070 --> 00:27:40.830
exactly for the reason you just said.

00:27:42.200 --> 00:27:42.760
it's interesting.

00:27:42.920 --> 00:27:47.480
Um so there are basically two approaches to friendship that exist.

00:27:47.880 --> 00:27:51.800
Um one is is what you just talked about, the bankers' paradox, stakeholder altruism, that

00:27:51.800 --> 00:27:55.800
friends are people who have a a stake in each other's well being.

00:27:55.960 --> 00:28:00.520
Uh and the other approach is called the alliance hypothesis, uh pioneered by Peter Dioli,

00:28:00.680 --> 00:28:05.160
which he argues that friends are there to sort of take our side uh in conflicts and have

00:28:05.160 --> 00:28:08.550
our back uh against others should should conflict erupt.

00:28:08.710 --> 00:28:11.510
And it seems like what you're saying is that there might not actually be a difference

00:28:11.510 --> 00:28:12.870
between those two approaches.

00:28:12.950 --> 00:28:18.550
Um, because if I have a higher stake in Pat than Dave, uh, then I'm

00:28:18.550 --> 00:28:23.430
automatically going to take Pat's side if if if Pat gets into a conflict with Dave.

00:28:23.590 --> 00:28:29.030
Um, so this stakeholder idea, presum uh assuming that my stake and everyone isn't equal, uh

00:28:29.110 --> 00:28:33.190
which is it's you know, then then automatically it's it's the same thing as saying that the

00:28:33.190 --> 00:28:37.100
people for whom I have a stake in their welfare are going to be my allies, you know, by

00:28:37.100 --> 00:28:37.660
definition.

00:28:37.900 --> 00:28:38.140
Yeah.

00:28:38.300 --> 00:28:43.980
I I don't see these as as you know uh conflicting explanations and and never did.

00:28:44.060 --> 00:28:49.660
Even before we start we started talking about stakeholder, um, you know, you could describe

00:28:49.660 --> 00:28:51.660
some of this just in terms of reciprocity.

00:28:51.740 --> 00:28:56.860
Yeah right like you know I help you you help me I share food with you you share food with

00:28:56.860 --> 00:28:57.100
me.

00:28:57.260 --> 00:29:02.220
Well one of the other ways that we reciprocate help is I help you in you

00:29:02.590 --> 00:29:05.950
coalitional conflict, you help me in coalitional conflict.

00:29:06.190 --> 00:29:12.190
So we've long talked about this in terms of reciprocity and how much you scratch

00:29:12.190 --> 00:29:15.390
my back, I scratch your back is uh is important.

00:29:15.870 --> 00:29:21.630
And I think um, you know, I think that underlies this this coalitional support model too,

00:29:21.790 --> 00:29:23.550
is a lot about reciprocity.

00:29:23.710 --> 00:29:27.240
Um, you know, and I don't think Peter Dioli would disagree.

00:29:27.320 --> 00:29:31.880
I I suspect he would he would he would agree with this that it is based on reciprocity as

00:29:31.880 --> 00:29:34.600
opposed to some you know some other phenomenon.

00:29:34.920 --> 00:29:40.920
Um I think what's what's new is that we're looking at that it's not just

00:29:40.920 --> 00:29:46.920
about making sure that person sees that you help, but some helping you'd be willing

00:29:46.920 --> 00:29:51.630
to do even if they don't, even if they don't see because you benefit from their existence.

00:29:51.870 --> 00:29:57.550
But uh I I think this this is an exciting new direction to take this in is to look at

00:29:57.710 --> 00:30:03.630
well if I have a different differential stake in each of you to what extent does

00:30:03.630 --> 00:30:08.910
that predict which of you I'm going to support in a uh in a conflict?

00:30:09.070 --> 00:30:15.070
Um and it should depend not just on my stake in you but it may also depend upon

00:30:15.950 --> 00:30:17.550
your outside options.

00:30:18.040 --> 00:30:18.280
Right.

00:30:18.440 --> 00:30:20.040
And this gets into the market idea.

00:30:20.440 --> 00:30:21.880
This is where we get into the markets.

00:30:22.280 --> 00:30:22.440
Yeah.

00:30:22.760 --> 00:30:25.560
Is if I'm your only friend.

00:30:27.000 --> 00:30:31.560
Well, even if I if I get that other person's back against you, if you got no one else you

00:30:31.560 --> 00:30:37.400
can ask for for help, you might still, you know, value me just because

00:30:37.400 --> 00:30:38.520
you have no other options.

00:30:38.600 --> 00:30:42.200
And we we see stuff like this in other species.

00:30:42.280 --> 00:30:47.110
So there's some great work by Redwan Bashari among the clean uh cleaner fish.

00:30:47.270 --> 00:30:51.910
So you saw there's cleaner fish which go up and they clean the mucus off uh host fishes.

00:30:52.070 --> 00:30:55.670
Um they go inside the mouth, so they're right inside the mouth, yeah, yeah.

00:30:55.910 --> 00:30:59.190
They're like they can easily get eaten by this bigger fish because the bigger fish is have

00:30:59.190 --> 00:31:01.110
to close its mouth and even have a free punch.

00:31:01.590 --> 00:31:06.230
But but but the cleaner fish, they can also cheat because instead of eating the parasites

00:31:06.230 --> 00:31:11.400
from inside of the mouth, they can eat the host's mucus, which it doesn't like and the

00:31:11.400 --> 00:31:15.880
whole like jolts, and and you know doesn't like that and will sometimes chase the cleaner.

00:31:16.040 --> 00:31:16.360
Right.

00:31:16.520 --> 00:31:22.200
So um, but then you you can look at red ones looked at well, who are these

00:31:22.200 --> 00:31:25.000
cleaner fish giving good service to?

00:31:25.720 --> 00:31:30.280
Um, and not only are they giving better service when there's another fish, you know, client

00:31:30.360 --> 00:31:32.520
waiting, uh waiting in line, right?

00:31:32.680 --> 00:31:36.920
Because if they give bad service and their, you know, their client jolts, well, the

00:31:36.920 --> 00:31:40.090
observer might just say, all right, I'm getting bad service here.

00:31:40.170 --> 00:31:41.050
Let's go somewhere else.

00:31:41.210 --> 00:31:45.290
Um, but they'll also, um, depending on whether that, you know, the person, uh, the other

00:31:45.450 --> 00:31:48.170
sorry, the person, ha ha ha, anthropomorphism right there.

00:31:48.330 --> 00:31:53.530
Um, the the other fish who's watching, what are its outside options?

00:31:53.930 --> 00:31:58.650
If that's if that if that is of a species that is like that one is only on my territory,

00:31:58.810 --> 00:32:00.490
nah, you can wait.

00:32:00.720 --> 00:32:03.200
I'll make you wait and I'll service this other guy first.

00:32:03.360 --> 00:32:07.440
But if that other guy has lots of territories it could go to, oh, you know what?

00:32:07.520 --> 00:32:08.720
Yes, coming right up, sir.

00:32:08.800 --> 00:32:10.400
I will service you right away, sir.

00:32:10.560 --> 00:32:12.320
Uh they are much faster.

00:32:12.560 --> 00:32:18.560
So uh you know the extent to which somebody's gonna be nice is gonna depend not just on

00:32:18.560 --> 00:32:22.720
how much stake they have, but what that other individual's outside options are.

00:32:23.050 --> 00:32:23.610
It's so interesting.

00:32:23.690 --> 00:32:23.850
Yeah.

00:32:23.930 --> 00:32:24.490
And so this idea.

00:32:24.810 --> 00:32:27.370
If you want to talk about Machiavellianism, right there, holy crap, I sound

00:32:27.370 --> 00:32:29.130
Machiavellianism when I'm describing that.

00:32:29.210 --> 00:32:32.890
So anybody listening is to this is going to be like, wow, that Barkley dude, I don't trust

00:32:32.890 --> 00:32:34.330
him as far as I can throw him.

00:32:34.810 --> 00:32:37.690
Which is ironic because I would actually, well, I don't know.

00:32:37.770 --> 00:32:43.450
I I don't know if I want to go so far, but I think peeling back the layers of sort of the

00:32:43.450 --> 00:32:44.490
logic for this.

00:32:44.650 --> 00:32:47.530
I mean, with this, this came up, I think we were talking to Chris von Ruden.

00:32:47.930 --> 00:32:51.820
We were talking about, I think this is important to say again, because you can't

00:32:51.820 --> 00:32:53.260
overemphasize this.

00:32:53.500 --> 00:32:57.260
We want people to like, you know, give to kids who are dying around the world, right?

00:32:57.340 --> 00:33:01.580
Like we nobody thinks that like people who have more than enough shouldn't be giving to

00:33:01.580 --> 00:33:02.220
kids, right?

00:33:02.300 --> 00:33:02.780
Who are dying.

00:33:02.860 --> 00:33:04.220
And that's a horrible thing.

00:33:04.540 --> 00:33:09.340
But if we want to think, if we want to actually help as many kids as possible, we need to

00:33:09.340 --> 00:33:13.070
be accurate about why, what's the approximate motivation?

00:33:13.310 --> 00:33:13.550
Yes.

00:33:13.870 --> 00:33:18.510
And how do we how do we get that proximate motivation activated as much as possible?

00:33:18.670 --> 00:33:23.470
And it might feel good to just say, well, it's just altruistic for the reasons we already

00:33:23.470 --> 00:33:24.030
talked about.

00:33:24.190 --> 00:33:30.030
But if that, if if the science or ways that we try to get

00:33:30.350 --> 00:33:36.350
people to help other people assume that that's the motivation or the Q structure of the

00:33:36.350 --> 00:33:41.960
proximate psychology, and that's wrong, We're allowing wanting to feel good about

00:33:41.960 --> 00:33:47.240
ourselves and signal that we're all nice people, getting in the way of helping actual

00:33:47.240 --> 00:33:49.400
people, actual kids who are like dying.

00:33:49.480 --> 00:33:55.320
So I think it's really important to say that there is virtue in talking

00:33:55.320 --> 00:33:59.480
about what the logic is and why there's benefits.

00:33:59.720 --> 00:34:02.200
And I don't and I I totally yes, you're right.

00:34:02.280 --> 00:34:07.630
And it's it's a it's it's funny, but also like genuinely I do think that it's a really good

00:34:07.630 --> 00:34:08.110
habit.

00:34:08.270 --> 00:34:11.710
I mean, even for myself, like, why am I doing what I'm doing?

00:34:11.870 --> 00:34:15.310
As a sort of check on does it make sense or not?

00:34:15.390 --> 00:34:17.230
Like, you know, I know I'm helping my son.

00:34:17.390 --> 00:34:20.430
I love helping my son, even when it's a huge cost to me.

00:34:20.750 --> 00:34:23.070
I know why I'm doing it, and that's all cool, right?

00:34:23.230 --> 00:34:27.150
But there might be other situations where I think about why I'm doing something.

00:34:27.310 --> 00:34:28.190
It feels good.

00:34:28.270 --> 00:34:33.160
Like I always use the example of like, you know, like just like derogating an outgroup that

00:34:33.160 --> 00:34:38.360
may or may not even really exist, you know, like what consequence is that having on my on

00:34:38.360 --> 00:34:38.840
the world?

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:40.360
And is it a bet good consequence?

00:34:40.520 --> 00:34:43.640
So I think thinking about the actual costs and benefits is helpful.

00:34:43.960 --> 00:34:44.840
I I I agree.

00:34:44.920 --> 00:34:50.120
And I I that's I think one of the most useful perspective uh points about a functional

00:34:50.120 --> 00:34:55.430
perspective, and looking at, well, what would select for this behavior is to understand

00:34:55.590 --> 00:34:59.670
what are the the deep, you know, the I don't want to say motivations because it makes it

00:34:59.670 --> 00:35:00.950
sound like people are actually thinking about that.

00:35:01.190 --> 00:35:01.270
Right.

00:35:01.430 --> 00:35:02.470
But the relationships in the world.

00:35:02.550 --> 00:35:04.230
Like what outcomes does it cause in the world?

00:35:04.710 --> 00:35:07.270
What are the selective pressures that result in this behavior?

00:35:07.510 --> 00:35:13.270
It allows us to tailor any um any you know, any policies to

00:35:13.270 --> 00:35:17.910
actually hit the right, the the right thing as opposed to hitting the wrong thing.

00:35:18.100 --> 00:35:18.260
Right.

00:35:18.820 --> 00:35:18.900
Right.

00:35:19.060 --> 00:35:24.980
And I think your your example of loving your child is a is a great example of that.

00:35:25.220 --> 00:35:30.420
So say for example, you were to find evidence that

00:35:32.580 --> 00:35:36.020
I guess going back to some some of the work done by my PhD advisors, Martin Daly, Margot

00:35:36.100 --> 00:35:41.780
Wilson, then when they're when they're looking at parental love and step parents.

00:35:41.970 --> 00:35:42.210
Right.

00:35:42.370 --> 00:35:42.690
Right.

00:35:42.850 --> 00:35:47.890
And uh, you know, an evolutionary perspective would say that people are going to love their

00:35:47.890 --> 00:35:50.930
children more than other people's children.

00:35:51.010 --> 00:35:51.170
Right.

00:35:51.330 --> 00:35:51.490
Right.

00:35:51.570 --> 00:35:53.170
I have a genetic stake in this child.

00:35:53.330 --> 00:35:54.770
I don't have a genetic stake in that child.

00:35:54.850 --> 00:35:57.970
I'm going to love my child much more and do much more for them.

00:35:58.130 --> 00:36:02.500
As a consequence, you know, people are going to be not as careful about other people's

00:36:02.500 --> 00:36:08.340
kids, including stepchildren, not as careful and not as restrained and willing to put up

00:36:08.340 --> 00:36:11.700
with the bullshit that kids drive us through if it's somebody else's kid.

00:36:12.020 --> 00:36:17.380
So if you were to find different rates of neglect or abuse or something else towards

00:36:17.380 --> 00:36:23.290
stepchildren, um one perspective would be to say, oh, it's

00:36:23.290 --> 00:36:27.850
because the step parental script has not been correctly identified.

00:36:28.010 --> 00:36:33.930
And we need to like really define this social role a lot more so that step

00:36:33.930 --> 00:36:39.130
parents know that they sh that it's okay for them to invest deeply in

00:36:39.130 --> 00:36:44.330
stepchildren and to sacrifice just as much as a parent does.

00:36:44.880 --> 00:36:50.880
However, another perspective that views parental investment as very costly, and

00:36:50.880 --> 00:36:51.840
I love my children.

00:36:51.920 --> 00:36:52.560
And you know what?

00:36:52.720 --> 00:36:57.920
I'm sorry, your kid's nice, but I don't, you know, I'm not going to take a bullet for them

00:36:57.920 --> 00:36:59.280
like I would for my own kid.

00:36:59.760 --> 00:37:02.080
Um, that perspective might say, okay, yeah, you know what?

00:37:02.160 --> 00:37:08.080
If you start dumping too many expectations on somebody else, that might actually exacerbate

00:37:08.080 --> 00:37:08.560
the problem.

00:37:08.750 --> 00:37:08.910
Right.

00:37:09.150 --> 00:37:10.590
Because part of it is a conflict.

00:37:10.670 --> 00:37:13.870
I'm expected to invest so much in this kid who is not mine.

00:37:14.030 --> 00:37:19.070
And oh, now you're asking the social role, you're expecting me to do much more, that'll

00:37:19.070 --> 00:37:20.270
actually make the problem worse.

00:37:20.430 --> 00:37:20.750
Right.

00:37:21.470 --> 00:37:27.470
So it's an example of where instead, maybe instead of define redefining the role, we

00:37:27.470 --> 00:37:32.120
should be more like, okay, clarifying and say, okay, you know what, it's okay if I'm nice

00:37:32.120 --> 00:37:35.320
towards this kid, but I'm I'm not gonna I'm not gonna take a bullet for them.

00:37:35.400 --> 00:37:38.200
And I'm I'm sorry, but that's what heal.

00:37:38.440 --> 00:37:39.080
Yeah, it's a great example.

00:37:39.560 --> 00:37:42.840
That might help reduce the level of conflict within those relationships.

00:37:43.080 --> 00:37:43.240
Right.

00:37:43.320 --> 00:37:44.360
It's a great great example.

00:37:44.440 --> 00:37:46.440
I'm glad you brought up Martin and Margot too.

00:37:46.520 --> 00:37:50.440
We we should talk a little bit about them because I think you're the first person from that

00:37:50.520 --> 00:37:54.200
um uh f academic family we've had on so far.

00:37:54.360 --> 00:37:59.150
But um uh but it's a it's a really good example too because it sounds you could you could,

00:37:59.390 --> 00:38:04.350
I am sure this happened too, and I think it did, of people pushing back against this idea

00:38:04.510 --> 00:38:08.030
because it makes it sound like, well, all step parents are going to be abusive, which is of

00:38:08.030 --> 00:38:09.950
not at all what it's saying, right?

00:38:10.110 --> 00:38:11.070
Um correct.

00:38:11.230 --> 00:38:16.670
Yeah, that isn't it is not what it's saying, but that is how many people have interpreted

00:38:17.230 --> 00:38:18.030
what they have said.

00:38:18.270 --> 00:38:18.430
Right.

00:38:18.510 --> 00:38:22.750
And it's it's almost the opposite in the sense of it's sort of just being clear-eyed about,

00:38:23.040 --> 00:38:27.360
as you said, all kids, it's just a lot of uh it's a lot of cost.

00:38:27.440 --> 00:38:32.800
And so at the the the the threshold at which any human will lose their temper, it's just

00:38:32.800 --> 00:38:38.400
going to be a design feature that that threshold is going to be further back for if the

00:38:38.400 --> 00:38:41.680
psychology is getting a cue that this is your own kid versus someone else's.

00:38:42.160 --> 00:38:46.320
So it's just accepting that actually the people who are step parents are doing this

00:38:46.320 --> 00:38:47.200
incredible thing.

00:38:47.430 --> 00:38:47.670
Yes.

00:38:47.830 --> 00:38:52.310
They're actually taking on more cost and they're more likely to feel more frustrated at all

00:38:52.310 --> 00:38:52.950
else equal.

00:38:53.030 --> 00:38:57.270
And so number one, we should just be aware of that individually and also socially.

00:38:57.350 --> 00:39:00.630
Like maybe we should provide more support to step parents or like whatever you think, but

00:39:00.710 --> 00:39:06.630
like just being aware that like, you know, not not blaming step parents for being more

00:39:06.630 --> 00:39:09.830
frustrated, either themselves or structurally providing them something.

00:39:09.910 --> 00:39:14.180
So we're just aware and sober that it's hard to raise kids.

00:39:14.340 --> 00:39:19.780
And if you're not related to the kid, it's gonna feel harder and you're gonna um the the

00:39:19.860 --> 00:39:23.060
that threshold is gonna just get tripped quicker, um, for sure.

00:39:23.140 --> 00:39:23.380
Yeah.

00:39:23.620 --> 00:39:23.860
Yeah.

00:39:24.100 --> 00:39:29.860
I mean, we we will put up with more crap from our kin than we would from a you know

00:39:30.020 --> 00:39:34.100
any a non-family member with whom we have like an equivalent relationship.

00:39:34.260 --> 00:39:39.090
Like, yes, our siblings might frustrate us at times, but imagine you were stuck in the

00:39:39.090 --> 00:39:42.770
house with some other random person, you know, just like imagine a first year university.

00:39:42.930 --> 00:39:46.850
Sometimes you and you're thrown in a residence, sometimes you get along really well, but

00:39:46.850 --> 00:39:48.210
sometimes you really don't.

00:39:48.450 --> 00:39:51.890
Um, and you know, to what extent do you keep in touch with somebody?

00:39:52.050 --> 00:39:55.730
You know, we're uh given the level of contact, we're we're we're much you know more

00:39:55.730 --> 00:39:59.010
favorably uh disposed towards towards our our kin.

00:39:59.090 --> 00:40:03.570
And so we're gonna be more favorably disposed to our our our own children as well.

00:40:03.730 --> 00:40:05.650
So it's part of the same, part of the same phenomenon.

00:40:05.890 --> 00:40:07.170
Yeah, also equal, yeah.

00:40:07.420 --> 00:40:11.020
Actually, it's it's it's worth just a brief digression if you if you did want to hear more

00:40:11.020 --> 00:40:11.980
about Martin Amargo.

00:40:12.300 --> 00:40:12.860
Oh, we'd love to.

00:40:13.340 --> 00:40:18.780
This is one of these great cases of uh an evolutionary perspective sometimes

00:40:18.940 --> 00:40:20.140
being twisted.

00:40:20.300 --> 00:40:22.300
The story gets twisted as it goes along.

00:40:22.460 --> 00:40:26.380
You know, the perspective always being people are gonna love their own kids more than other

00:40:26.380 --> 00:40:27.420
people's kids.

00:40:28.290 --> 00:40:33.330
But then you hear how it gets talked about in the popular press, and you hear stories about

00:40:33.330 --> 00:40:35.810
like lions killing cubs and all this other stuff.

00:40:35.970 --> 00:40:40.690
You hear people saying, oh, well, human parents' stepparents have evolved to kill their

00:40:40.690 --> 00:40:41.250
stepkids.

00:40:41.410 --> 00:40:45.410
But when you go back and read the original Martin Daly Margot Wilson, not only have they

00:40:45.410 --> 00:40:49.700
never said that, but they have always explicitly argued against it.

00:40:49.860 --> 00:40:52.580
Like human beings are not like lions.

00:40:52.740 --> 00:40:58.420
Here's why we would not expect stepparents to kill their children uh you know

00:40:58.580 --> 00:40:59.300
habitually.

00:40:59.460 --> 00:41:04.340
And and most, you know, most times many step parent relationships are perfectly warm and

00:41:04.340 --> 00:41:04.660
lovely.

00:41:04.740 --> 00:41:05.780
And they point that out.

00:41:05.940 --> 00:41:11.060
But it's always twisted as though it's this adaptations for step parental homicide,

00:41:11.300 --> 00:41:16.430
sometimes even by members within the evolutionary psychology community who are, you know

00:41:16.670 --> 00:41:21.710
citing them, trying to do so favorably, but they're not always reading the original.

00:41:21.790 --> 00:41:26.830
And they're citing this research as saying something it's not, saying that there are

00:41:26.830 --> 00:41:32.670
adaptations to kill specific individuals that is just not supported by the

00:41:32.670 --> 00:41:32.910
data.

00:41:33.230 --> 00:41:33.470
Yeah.

00:41:33.550 --> 00:41:33.790
Yeah.

00:41:34.030 --> 00:41:38.190
I mean, that's there's yeah, and we we've talked a lot about on this so far that it's

00:41:38.190 --> 00:41:42.560
really, I mean, thinking about design, proximate design, and what we talked about, you

00:41:42.560 --> 00:41:45.040
know, like a setting on a threshold, all else equal, right?

00:41:45.120 --> 00:41:48.480
So it's not even just that like you love your siblings more than anyone else.

00:41:48.560 --> 00:41:53.440
It's just like if you imagine the way your tr siblings interact with you versus you imagine

00:41:53.440 --> 00:41:57.840
the same person interacting with you in the exact same way, but they're not your sibling,

00:41:58.000 --> 00:42:03.210
which is not possible, but like that's the theory, is that you're gonna like be cool with

00:42:03.210 --> 00:42:07.130
your sibling more than that random person, all else equal, right?

00:42:07.210 --> 00:42:08.090
Like that's that's the idea.

00:42:08.170 --> 00:42:11.930
And so like this idea of a threshold or like thinking about design, yeah, it's hard for

00:42:11.930 --> 00:42:12.170
people.

00:42:12.250 --> 00:42:17.370
I think one of the themes we're talking about is that um if you don't get some training and

00:42:17.370 --> 00:42:22.890
thinking about uh we're talking about design and aspects on the design, and this comes back

00:42:22.890 --> 00:42:25.370
to the cooperation thing, not about a behavior.

00:42:25.530 --> 00:42:29.930
Um, then it's hard for people to place sort of like, well, where do I put free rider?

00:42:30.170 --> 00:42:31.370
Where do I put a benefit?

00:42:31.620 --> 00:42:37.060
Where do I put the um that you're gonna like this threshold, you know, like

00:42:37.220 --> 00:42:38.900
non-kin a little bit less?

00:42:39.060 --> 00:42:43.620
And then it just gets put in one of the folk psychological entries, like, well, it's just

00:42:43.620 --> 00:42:46.340
gonna be behavior or it's an underlying ulterior motive.

00:42:46.500 --> 00:42:50.900
Um, so it's I'm not surprised people are confused about about these things.

00:43:09.710 --> 00:43:14.510
So let's let's let's take the um the example of you know donating to starving kids on the

00:43:14.510 --> 00:43:15.070
other side of the world.

00:43:15.150 --> 00:43:16.830
Let's say I'm you know donating to Oxfam.

00:43:17.230 --> 00:43:19.390
Um let's assume for Santa B.

00:43:19.550 --> 00:43:22.180
Oh no, uh uh sorry uh uh Oxfam.

00:43:22.420 --> 00:43:25.060
Uh I thought uh no we can cut that out.

00:43:25.220 --> 00:43:29.060
There's something that's in Santa Barbara, um but it's not Oxfam, it's something else.

00:43:29.140 --> 00:43:30.340
But yeah, it's a great example of the colour.

00:43:31.380 --> 00:43:32.740
Oxfam is a great charity, yes.

00:43:32.900 --> 00:43:32.980
Great.

00:43:33.460 --> 00:43:35.140
If you're listening, please donate to Oxfam.

00:43:35.300 --> 00:43:36.100
That's what it's commercial.

00:43:36.420 --> 00:43:37.140
We have no commercials.

00:43:38.660 --> 00:43:40.820
Maybe we should do a commercial for a charity every episode.

00:43:41.300 --> 00:43:46.580
Uh but let's let's assume for the sake of argument that I am donating to Oxfam um

00:43:46.900 --> 00:43:49.350
mostly uh for reputational reasons.

00:43:49.510 --> 00:43:53.670
That I want to show others that I'm a really kind and generous person.

00:43:53.830 --> 00:43:58.390
I want to try to signal that I have a stake in everyone's welfare, even people's welfare

00:43:58.550 --> 00:44:00.390
who are on the other side of the world who I don't know.

00:44:00.550 --> 00:44:04.870
That's just how big my heart is, that I just you know, I just have a stake in everyone.

00:44:04.950 --> 00:44:06.870
And that makes me a really attractive social partner.

00:44:06.950 --> 00:44:12.390
So let's assume for the sake of argument that that's my goal uh in in in donating to Oxfam.

00:44:12.920 --> 00:44:18.040
Well, if you come along and say, well, no, actually probably your motive is is uh mostly

00:44:18.040 --> 00:44:22.440
reputational, um, that you're trying to signal that you're that you're a good cooperative

00:44:22.440 --> 00:44:27.160
partner, well, all of a sudden I lose the benefits uh of of of my signal because people are

00:44:27.160 --> 00:44:31.320
no longer going to view that as a sign that I have a stake in in in those kids' welfare.

00:44:31.480 --> 00:44:33.800
They're gonna view it as me trying to look good.

00:44:33.960 --> 00:44:38.120
Um and so the the mere awareness that I'm trying to look good makes me not look good.

00:44:38.280 --> 00:44:42.150
And if I if you come all come along and point out the fact that actually I'm just trying to

00:44:42.150 --> 00:44:44.790
look good, well, you're gonna ruin my chances of looking good.

00:44:45.430 --> 00:44:50.310
Um and if we create common knowledge of of self interested motives, well that could that

00:44:50.310 --> 00:44:56.230
could uh destroy the social in incentives necessary to produce the the pro social behavior.

00:44:56.390 --> 00:45:01.030
And so that it it may be that the that the pushback against these kinds of explanations are

00:45:01.030 --> 00:45:03.110
coming from a strategic place.

00:45:03.660 --> 00:45:04.380
What do you think about that?

00:45:05.180 --> 00:45:06.220
I absolutely agree with that.

00:45:06.700 --> 00:45:11.580
So I I put this uh I wrote a paper uh a while back um looking at what are some of what are

00:45:11.580 --> 00:45:17.020
some of the limits um strengths and limits of harnessing uh you know a rep a reputation and

00:45:17.020 --> 00:45:21.340
one of them was that if you highlight what the reputational benefits are that might

00:45:21.340 --> 00:45:26.060
decrease the reputational benefits again saying exactly what what you just said and then um

00:45:26.300 --> 00:45:31.890
uh other other researchers have came at the same idea and showing that if you show that

00:45:31.890 --> 00:45:37.890
somebody benefits from their generosity, people will then judge that person not

00:45:37.890 --> 00:45:38.530
as well.

00:45:39.250 --> 00:45:45.090
So one person acts nicely and nothing particular happens, and another person

00:45:45.090 --> 00:45:47.330
acts nicely and gets rewarded for it.

00:45:47.490 --> 00:45:50.850
Okay, well, what do you think about that first person or that second person?

00:45:51.090 --> 00:45:54.820
You know, people they don't like the second one as much, the one who who got something out

00:45:54.820 --> 00:45:55.140
of it.

00:45:55.300 --> 00:45:59.220
We tend to infer um, you know, ulterior motives.

00:45:59.380 --> 00:46:04.580
Um, and so you know, whether this is because we uh infer our ulterior motives or you know,

00:46:04.740 --> 00:46:07.700
whether it's some like law of conservation of benefits or something.

00:46:07.860 --> 00:46:08.980
Oh, they've already benefited.

00:46:09.060 --> 00:46:13.140
Okay, in that case, you know, I'm not gonna uh I'm not gonna reward them more.

00:46:13.460 --> 00:46:19.090
Um either way, once we start highlighting that, you're absolutely right, that might

00:46:19.090 --> 00:46:24.930
decrease the benefits, which then gives an incentive to anybody who

00:46:24.930 --> 00:46:30.930
does do e you know the these the public uh you know publicly cooperative acts, it gives

00:46:30.930 --> 00:46:36.370
them an incentive to disavow such reputational benefits and saying, no, no, no, no,

00:46:36.530 --> 00:46:38.050
that's not what happens.

00:46:38.290 --> 00:46:38.530
Yeah.

00:46:38.770 --> 00:46:43.010
Whether they're doing it for signaling or whether they're genuine, it doesn't, it doesn't

00:46:43.010 --> 00:46:43.330
matter.

00:46:43.570 --> 00:46:43.730
Right.

00:46:44.360 --> 00:46:47.720
They have a vested interest in in saying that no, that's that's not the reason.

00:46:48.040 --> 00:46:48.200
Right.

00:46:48.360 --> 00:46:53.240
It also implies that if we want to increase the incentive for, say, giving to charity of

00:46:53.240 --> 00:46:57.160
charity, then we should disavow the reputational benefits of giving to charity, even if

00:46:57.160 --> 00:46:58.040
they truly exist.

00:46:58.280 --> 00:46:58.680
Yeah, yeah.

00:46:59.960 --> 00:47:05.960
Or educate everybody about this so that the the the there's not common knowledge that

00:47:05.960 --> 00:47:09.880
audiences will look poorly on it if everybody realizes that the reason why we're all doing

00:47:09.880 --> 00:47:15.590
it is for uh or uh the uh ultimate reason is reputational benefit and in fact if you give

00:47:15.590 --> 00:47:20.550
enough people that information they might say actually i'm disincentivizing giving if i

00:47:20.550 --> 00:47:24.870
criticize reputational benefits and it's a uh i mean i mean one of the things i like about

00:47:24.870 --> 00:47:28.310
an evolutionary approach is we're not allowed to say like we don't like ulterior motives

00:47:28.390 --> 00:47:33.350
like the reason why like that's approximate description the ultimate reason would be that

00:47:33.350 --> 00:47:37.300
if it is yoked to a particular benefit, it's exactly what Pat said earlier.

00:47:37.460 --> 00:47:42.260
It predicts in the future, unless that benefit is somehow baked into the structure of the

00:47:42.260 --> 00:47:46.820
world, which it kind of isn't, then it's not a good predictor of future benefits.

00:47:46.980 --> 00:47:52.500
So for example, the only reason Pat benefited me was because it was going to be a

00:47:52.500 --> 00:47:55.380
reputational benefit in this one particular thing.

00:47:55.620 --> 00:48:00.580
If that same benefit isn't going to hold for you, David, or somebody else, then it's just

00:48:00.660 --> 00:48:06.270
you're going to, Pat is, it's less likely that Pat is a uh in a locus of

00:48:06.270 --> 00:48:08.910
benefits to others, right?

00:48:08.990 --> 00:48:14.670
So like the prediction is that ulterior motive version of Pat who got a benefit

00:48:14.910 --> 00:48:19.950
is going to be less generous than intrinsically generous Pat.

00:48:20.350 --> 00:48:22.350
It's coming back to what we talked about earlier.

00:48:22.430 --> 00:48:26.510
And people don't like that second version as much, all else equal, right?

00:48:27.230 --> 00:48:33.060
Yeah, but if if the reputational benefit itself comes from the perception that Pat is

00:48:33.060 --> 00:48:34.100
intrinsically motivated.

00:48:34.340 --> 00:48:34.660
Exactly.

00:48:34.740 --> 00:48:35.300
No, I hear you.

00:48:35.940 --> 00:48:36.660
No, no, no.

00:48:36.740 --> 00:48:37.700
It's like we can either be able to do that.

00:48:43.060 --> 00:48:44.740
So no, I David, I totally agree.

00:48:44.900 --> 00:48:46.260
There's two stable equilibriums.

00:48:46.420 --> 00:48:50.340
Either everybody understands the ultimate proximate thing, or we don't talk about the

00:48:50.340 --> 00:48:51.380
ultimate thing.

00:48:51.540 --> 00:48:53.220
Is basically what we're saying.

00:48:54.190 --> 00:48:58.830
mean there's there's definitely I I I I'm aware of this irony of uh you know saying, hey,

00:48:58.910 --> 00:49:02.590
we need to make sure people are aware of the reputational benefits, but also, oh crap, that

00:49:02.590 --> 00:49:04.670
might undermine the whole the whole endeavor.

00:49:04.830 --> 00:49:09.790
Um, you know, maybe we uh get it out there, but that that idea out there, but uh at least

00:49:09.790 --> 00:49:14.990
so people start creating more opportunities um for people to others to benefit from

00:49:14.990 --> 00:49:20.830
reputation, but without really stressing that uh oh, everybody does does benefit from this.

00:49:21.070 --> 00:49:27.020
Because I mean, you know, I think we do want a lot to be you know more uh more public,

00:49:27.100 --> 00:49:27.260
right?

00:49:27.660 --> 00:49:31.020
You know, shed some light in order to decrease bad behavior.

00:49:31.180 --> 00:49:37.020
Um, you know, because people are much more assholes when they're anonymous, you know, and I

00:49:37.020 --> 00:49:40.060
think, you know, I think the internet is a fantastic example of that.

00:49:40.300 --> 00:49:45.430
Um, you know, uh, but but you know, because basically any domain we've looked at, people

00:49:45.430 --> 00:49:49.510
are nicer when others uh people are nicer when they're watched than when they're not.

00:49:49.590 --> 00:49:54.550
So we want to to create more uh opportunities for people to benefit from having a good

00:49:54.550 --> 00:49:55.350
reputation.

00:49:55.510 --> 00:50:00.470
And we want people to know that, hey, maybe we should create such opportunities, but

00:50:00.470 --> 00:50:05.750
perhaps we, you know, we don't want to highlight that uh, you know, oh, this person who's

00:50:05.750 --> 00:50:08.710
being nice is just doing so in order to be nice.

00:50:08.870 --> 00:50:08.950
Right.

00:50:09.260 --> 00:50:10.860
Because you're yeah, that would undermine it.

00:50:11.020 --> 00:50:11.100
Yeah.

00:50:11.180 --> 00:50:15.420
And I think there's also sort of structural issues that run up against the stakeholder

00:50:15.420 --> 00:50:16.940
evolved psychology too.

00:50:17.340 --> 00:50:22.860
So like this idea that sort of like your the the stakeholder idea that we had earlier is

00:50:22.860 --> 00:50:27.660
sort of, you know, like why I care about this tree because it's providing something to me.

00:50:27.820 --> 00:50:33.180
That also I think even runs within the exploitation uh like whatever whatever the the trade

00:50:33.260 --> 00:50:36.700
off is, it can be a benefit but can also be a reason for me to not be exploitative.

00:50:36.940 --> 00:50:42.290
So for example, yes, if we're all in a village, you know, people have this naive idea that

00:50:42.370 --> 00:50:46.450
um, you know, nature is sort of red tooth and claw in it, it is in some ways, but like, you

00:50:46.450 --> 00:50:50.610
know, why why wouldn't it be evolutionarily beneficial for me to just take all of Pat's

00:50:50.610 --> 00:50:50.930
stuff?

00:50:51.090 --> 00:50:51.330
Yeah.

00:50:51.410 --> 00:50:51.650
Right.

00:50:51.730 --> 00:50:53.170
Like every time he got something.

00:50:53.330 --> 00:50:56.930
And it's because Pat is evolved to to not like that.

00:50:57.090 --> 00:50:59.780
And so it's gonna make Pat belligerent, right?

00:51:00.020 --> 00:51:04.980
And so even if he doesn't know who took his stuff, he's gonna be grumpier more belligerent

00:51:05.060 --> 00:51:06.580
and might kind of come back to me.

00:51:06.740 --> 00:51:12.660
And so, sort of the idea that we're all gonna sort of like monitor and be okay

00:51:13.700 --> 00:51:19.540
with uh that people are sort of okay and not feeling really, really exploited would be

00:51:19.540 --> 00:51:21.060
something that would be selected for.

00:51:21.140 --> 00:51:26.430
I mean, there's other dynamics related to that, but I think that um a lot of sort of modern

00:51:26.430 --> 00:51:31.550
life and especially like advertising, like there's uh I've been looking recently um because

00:51:31.550 --> 00:51:36.830
I'm teaching intro psych and like the the effects of advertising, and there's sort of a lot

00:51:36.830 --> 00:51:42.750
of institutional selection pressures on advertising to sort of motivate people to sort

00:51:42.750 --> 00:51:43.950
of get resources.

00:51:44.190 --> 00:51:49.980
And so the one way to do that is to make people insecure, but it's also to hide like

00:51:50.220 --> 00:51:54.380
of the resources they do have, but it's also to sort of hide the costs that those getting

00:51:54.380 --> 00:51:56.860
those things um pose on other people.

00:51:57.020 --> 00:52:02.540
So for example, you know, my my iPhone, nobody's gonna sort of advertise the

00:52:02.540 --> 00:52:04.460
working conditions of the workers.

00:52:04.540 --> 00:52:06.780
I'm not I don't I don't know what those are recently.

00:52:06.940 --> 00:52:12.010
I I know there's been uh talk of that, but like that's an example of you know, the

00:52:12.010 --> 00:52:17.130
institutional structure is not going to be at all telling me about how my actions are going

00:52:17.130 --> 00:52:18.170
to exploit people.

00:52:18.330 --> 00:52:24.090
It's only going to tell me the things that are going to motivate me to do to get

00:52:24.090 --> 00:52:24.970
stuff, right?

00:52:25.370 --> 00:52:30.970
And so that's an example of our natural evolved psychology might worry about

00:52:30.970 --> 00:52:36.330
exploiting people and have this sort of stakeholder psychology, but that we have this

00:52:36.330 --> 00:52:42.180
institutional structure of like advertising that's sort of by design, and it's nobody's

00:52:42.260 --> 00:52:44.420
in nobody's pernicious motivation.

00:52:44.500 --> 00:52:47.380
It's just what kind of advertising gets selected for.

00:52:47.540 --> 00:52:51.220
Um is sort of filtering out a lot of stakeholder cues.

00:52:51.380 --> 00:52:54.980
So one example might be, and you know, I think charities do this is sort of the opposite,

00:52:55.060 --> 00:52:59.540
which is sort of say, look, there's this person, and you're better off if they're better

00:52:59.540 --> 00:53:00.020
off, right?

00:53:00.180 --> 00:53:02.820
Like they're not gonna um that's one idea.

00:53:02.980 --> 00:53:03.460
Yeah.

00:53:03.860 --> 00:53:04.180
Yeah.

00:53:04.340 --> 00:53:10.010
I I I mean, I think uh having an interest in somebody else's welfare, you're absolutely

00:53:10.010 --> 00:53:13.210
right, will will make people less e exploitative, right?

00:53:13.290 --> 00:53:18.410
I mean, one of the reasons you don't just come and take my stuff is not just because I

00:53:18.410 --> 00:53:23.770
might retaliate, but you know, if you benefit from my presence in in some way, even if it's

00:53:23.770 --> 00:53:27.690
just like I'm another set of eyes who's watching for predators and outgroups.

00:53:27.850 --> 00:53:28.090
Right.

00:53:28.250 --> 00:53:30.720
Um, you know, and you see this in other other species, right?

00:53:30.800 --> 00:53:35.040
Like where um, you know, you benefit from having an extra group member because that's

00:53:35.040 --> 00:53:40.240
somebody else who might find a bonanza of food, or somebody else who uh can can watch for

00:53:40.320 --> 00:53:40.960
for predators.

00:53:41.040 --> 00:53:45.840
And so you'll you'll show uh you know cooperation towards other group members simply

00:53:45.840 --> 00:53:50.000
because, hey, I benefit from you know uh being part of this larger herd.

00:53:50.570 --> 00:53:53.370
And so that could that can work in humans too.

00:53:54.170 --> 00:53:56.330
You benefit from having a group size of a certain amount.

00:53:56.410 --> 00:53:58.570
And so you have some stake in somebody else's welfare.

00:53:59.370 --> 00:54:05.210
Whether or not we can harness that in order to get people to feel more concerned

00:54:05.210 --> 00:54:08.730
about people in different political groups.

00:54:12.040 --> 00:54:17.000
our party and their party, it's all of us versus you know them, or all of humanity versus

00:54:17.000 --> 00:54:18.200
the Martians or whatever, right?

00:54:18.280 --> 00:54:21.400
You know, we all now have a stake in each other's well being.

00:54:21.640 --> 00:54:26.680
Um, some people have argued that this is one of the beneficial effects of trade.

00:54:26.840 --> 00:54:29.400
Um, you know, international trade.

00:54:29.640 --> 00:54:35.400
Uh now suddenly we have a vested interest in the people in that other country

00:54:35.640 --> 00:54:39.240
because they are producing the thing that we are trading for.

00:54:39.400 --> 00:54:45.270
Um, and so if we want our uh cheap, bountiful lifestyle, uh, you know, we've got to

00:54:45.270 --> 00:54:50.390
keep the people in that country uh in a good enough condition to continue to trade with

00:54:50.390 --> 00:54:50.550
them.

00:54:50.710 --> 00:54:56.710
And we have less incentive to exploit them and go to war against them if

00:54:56.790 --> 00:54:59.430
uh you know if we are trading with them.

00:54:59.670 --> 00:55:04.310
Because if we do, well, whatever it is we were getting from them, we ain't getting anymore.

00:55:04.550 --> 00:55:10.380
So uh yeah, the the these are ways to perhaps foster uh you know the the

00:55:10.460 --> 00:55:15.260
the the stakeholder idea and use it to get people to be more cooperative and less uh less

00:55:15.260 --> 00:55:20.460
exploitative towards others, even across traditional group boundaries, uh across countries

00:55:20.460 --> 00:55:21.100
or whatnot.

00:55:21.340 --> 00:55:21.580
Yeah.

00:55:21.740 --> 00:55:27.100
I think a good maybe bottom line thing is sort of be skeptical of anything that tries to

00:55:27.100 --> 00:55:30.300
suggest to you that like certain people aren't stakeholders, right?

00:55:30.540 --> 00:55:36.350
Like it suggests that they're maybe trying to um sell you something or there's

00:55:36.350 --> 00:55:37.870
exploitation going on.

00:55:38.350 --> 00:55:43.310
Yes, people may try to exploit you into helping them exploit somebody else.

00:55:43.710 --> 00:55:44.190
Exactly.

00:55:44.430 --> 00:55:44.670
Yeah.

00:55:44.830 --> 00:55:44.990
Yeah.

00:55:45.150 --> 00:55:50.190
There's a lot of um to sort of loop back to so at the beginning we talked about, although

00:55:50.270 --> 00:55:53.630
you've got all this work on evolution of cooperation.

00:55:54.270 --> 00:56:00.120
Um do you agree that I mean you're you're a humble person, I I would say, uh uh, but do

00:56:00.120 --> 00:56:04.520
you agree that sort of you've really um I don't know how to ask this question without it

00:56:04.520 --> 00:56:10.040
sounding like uh uh uh I I I won't know how to answer it without sounding yeah exactly.

00:56:10.360 --> 00:56:10.600
Exactly.

00:56:10.680 --> 00:56:14.920
So maybe well so I'll just say it like I think, you know, can you characterize for people

00:56:15.480 --> 00:56:19.480
how these solutions so like I'm sure p some people are wondering like, well, what's the

00:56:19.480 --> 00:56:20.760
problem with cooperation?

00:56:20.930 --> 00:56:21.250
right?

00:56:21.570 --> 00:56:24.370
And so what can you talk a little bit about?

00:56:24.530 --> 00:56:29.730
Because we're not going to go into all of the work you've done, but let's just assume that

00:56:29.730 --> 00:56:34.210
Pat Barclay has sort of single handedly, roughly solved the problems of cooperation with

00:56:34.210 --> 00:56:34.690
colleagues.

00:56:35.570 --> 00:56:37.410
I'm not even going to go too far off honestly.

00:56:37.730 --> 00:56:37.970
Exactly.

00:56:38.210 --> 00:56:38.530
Exactly.

00:56:38.770 --> 00:56:44.260
Uh okay, so so peep people have been looking at the problem of cooperation for uh, you

00:56:44.260 --> 00:56:49.700
know, I don't know what year to in 2025, let's say uh, you know, what a hundred and uh how

00:56:49.700 --> 00:56:51.780
long since origin of the species, 1859?

00:56:52.020 --> 00:56:55.940
So we're you know, we're talking you know, 165 years, uh 66 years.

00:56:56.180 --> 00:57:02.020
Um so the the idea uh like of why one organism might

00:57:02.020 --> 00:57:06.340
incur a cost on itself in order to confer a benefit on another organism.

00:57:06.500 --> 00:57:08.500
I mean, people have been studying this for ages.

00:57:08.580 --> 00:57:13.210
Like Darwin pointed out this idea when he's like, you know, these bees are frustrating me.

00:57:13.290 --> 00:57:16.970
Why are they helping, you know, sacrificing themselves for the hive?

00:57:17.050 --> 00:57:18.810
This, you know, this doesn't make sense.

00:57:18.890 --> 00:57:24.090
Uh he even said if one organ, you know, founded when an organism were to sacrifice itself

00:57:24.090 --> 00:57:27.850
solely for a member of another species, this would this would destroy my theory.

00:57:27.930 --> 00:57:30.010
Or I, you know, I think is something he he said, right?

00:57:30.090 --> 00:57:32.650
You know, great conditions for falsification right there.

00:57:32.890 --> 00:57:38.560
Um but um because you on the surface, this helping

00:57:38.560 --> 00:57:41.920
others would seem to be maladaptive.

00:57:42.080 --> 00:57:47.200
You are incurring a cost, which means, well, that's effort, time and effort and resources

00:57:47.200 --> 00:57:50.000
that you're not putting into your own survival.

00:57:50.080 --> 00:57:54.080
You're not putting into your reproduction and the proliferation of your genes.

00:57:54.240 --> 00:57:59.970
And so if there were somebody else who were not doing that, who were getting a free

00:57:59.970 --> 00:58:05.570
ride on your cooperation, who were defecting on this social contract, well, they would be

00:58:05.570 --> 00:58:06.450
saving the cost.

00:58:06.610 --> 00:58:08.690
Therefore, they would be having more offspring.

00:58:08.930 --> 00:58:14.370
Therefore, their genes for selfishness would proliferate at the expense of your cooperative

00:58:14.370 --> 00:58:14.770
genes.

00:58:14.850 --> 00:58:20.290
So that's the basic, uh, you know, the basic puzzle that everybody is trying to address.

00:58:20.920 --> 00:58:24.840
And different researchers over the decades have come up with different explanations.

00:58:25.000 --> 00:58:28.840
So, you know, David, you mentioned kin selection being a big one.

00:58:29.320 --> 00:58:35.160
You know, one of biologists William Hamilton's great insights is the idea that if there

00:58:35.160 --> 00:58:41.160
were a gene or set of genes that influenced altruistic behavior, well, towards

00:58:41.250 --> 00:58:46.690
relatives, those relatives are statistically likely to carry a copy of the same genes or

00:58:46.690 --> 00:58:47.090
set of genes.

00:58:47.170 --> 00:58:52.530
Okay, so we've got kin selection there, and that's how gene or set of genes for altruism

00:58:52.530 --> 00:58:53.810
could could proliferate.

00:58:53.970 --> 00:58:59.730
People came along a little bit later and started looking at reciprocity, where if you and I

00:58:59.730 --> 00:59:05.700
take turns helping each other, I help you, you help me, I

00:59:05.700 --> 00:59:10.260
scratch your back, I pick all the parasites off your back, and you pick all the parasites

00:59:10.260 --> 00:59:10.900
off my back.

00:59:11.060 --> 00:59:12.660
Well, we both benefit from that.

00:59:12.820 --> 00:59:16.100
We now have both of us have now have fewer parasites than anybody else.

00:59:16.500 --> 00:59:19.780
And so that can that can be selected for.

00:59:20.820 --> 00:59:26.500
And, you know, the idea put forward by Robert Trivers in 1971, some great early work on

00:59:26.500 --> 00:59:32.340
that using computer simulations to show that in a world where organisms can do that

00:59:32.340 --> 00:59:37.110
and can take turns of reciprocating, but at the same time

00:59:37.350 --> 00:59:41.590
discriminating against defectors, against those who don't cooperate.

00:59:41.750 --> 00:59:47.430
Well, those sort of cooperative strategies can do really, really well because they get into

00:59:47.510 --> 00:59:50.470
long-term mutually beneficial relationships.

00:59:50.550 --> 00:59:54.390
Um, and at the same time, they don't get taken advantage of for long.

00:59:54.550 --> 00:59:59.420
And so, you know, people who are familiar with uh with with um with this will recognize I'm

00:59:59.420 --> 01:00:04.140
talking about Robert Axel Sortrod's work on the prisoner's dilemma and the tit for tat

01:00:04.300 --> 01:00:08.860
strategy of I will cooperate and then I will just afterwards I'll do whatever you did.

01:00:08.940 --> 01:00:10.940
If you cooperate with me, I'll cooperate with you.

01:00:11.100 --> 01:00:13.340
If you defect on me, I'll defect on you.

01:00:13.500 --> 01:00:16.620
And that sort of behavior evolves by natural selection.

01:00:16.780 --> 01:00:19.340
And like that's what got me into this stuff in the first place.

01:00:19.420 --> 01:00:23.980
Like I was uh I was a psychology student, and you know, I uh this is somewhat interesting,

01:00:24.060 --> 01:00:26.690
but you know, you know, I was also taking biology.

01:00:26.930 --> 01:00:32.450
And then I, you know, I heard about this computer simulation where cooperation starts

01:00:32.450 --> 01:00:34.290
winning and starts evolving.

01:00:34.370 --> 01:00:37.250
And here we have like nice guys finishing first.

01:00:37.650 --> 01:00:42.290
And I heard that and just holy fuck, evolution is cool.

01:00:42.690 --> 01:00:45.330
Um, and put that on the t-shirt.

01:00:45.490 --> 01:00:46.930
Yeah, exactly.

01:00:47.170 --> 01:00:49.650
Holy fuck, evolution is cool.

01:00:51.160 --> 01:00:55.560
Yeah, I mean that's what got me uh it just blew my mind as an as an undergrad.

01:00:55.640 --> 01:01:00.600
And I was like, uh I love uh wow, I love evolution, but I also like psychology.

01:01:00.760 --> 01:01:05.800
Can I can I combine them into some sort of, I don't know, evolutionary psychology?

01:01:06.040 --> 01:01:08.040
Um, you know, turns out the field already existed.

01:01:08.120 --> 01:01:09.560
I'm like, all right, I might as well join then.

01:01:09.800 --> 01:01:13.960
How did you uh at the risk of uh doing an origin story, how did you discover?

01:01:14.170 --> 01:01:16.890
So you just said you you you came across the Axlrod.

01:01:17.130 --> 01:01:19.050
Did you already know about Martin Margo or Lita?

01:01:19.530 --> 01:01:22.810
No, like I I came across them afterwards when I was just looking through for graduate

01:01:22.810 --> 01:01:23.530
graduate school.

01:01:23.690 --> 01:01:24.010
Okay.

01:01:24.490 --> 01:01:30.090
Um, and uh their stuff you know seemed r really interested and their stuff came

01:01:30.090 --> 01:01:34.410
recommended, like you know, Richard Dawkins had like, you know, his interviews of five

01:01:34.410 --> 01:01:35.930
different, you know, evolutionists or whatever.

01:01:36.010 --> 01:01:38.970
Or no, so somebody else did an interview of five different evolutionists, one of which was

01:01:38.970 --> 01:01:41.480
Dawkins is like, what do you think of evolutionary psychology?

01:01:41.640 --> 01:01:45.160
It's like, I think it's got good promise, especially the stuff by Martin Daly and Margot

01:01:45.160 --> 01:01:45.400
Wilson.

01:01:45.480 --> 01:01:45.880
Oh, that's good.

01:01:45.960 --> 01:01:50.520
Oh, well, it's been recommended by the guy who created this video of Nice Guys Finish First

01:01:50.600 --> 01:01:52.040
that got me into this shit.

01:01:52.200 --> 01:01:56.520
And then I started reading their stuff and was getting frustrated because I couldn't poke

01:01:56.520 --> 01:01:56.920
holes in it.

01:01:57.000 --> 01:01:58.680
I'm like, aha, they didn't think about this.

01:01:58.760 --> 01:02:00.600
And oh wait, two paragraphs later they did.

01:02:00.760 --> 01:02:01.800
Aha, well, what about this?

01:02:01.880 --> 01:02:03.960
Oh, wait, two paragraphs later they resolved that.

01:02:04.120 --> 01:02:06.520
And I'm like, oh wow, this is actually really good.

01:02:06.680 --> 01:02:11.170
Like, I want to work with somebody who's really careful who deals with alternative

01:02:11.170 --> 01:02:11.650
explanations.

01:02:11.730 --> 01:02:12.930
So I went to went to work with them.

01:02:13.250 --> 01:02:15.490
So that's that's my origin story in a in a in a nutshell.

01:02:15.730 --> 01:02:17.170
Wow we I think we got that in three minutes.

01:02:17.650 --> 01:02:17.970
There we go.

01:02:18.050 --> 01:02:20.930
See it is we addressed Kiki's criticism.

01:02:21.570 --> 01:02:25.330
We we'll have to figure out a way to make it so people understand what that yeah we can

01:02:25.410 --> 01:02:25.970
we'll link to that.

01:02:26.050 --> 01:02:26.690
Yeah exactly.

01:02:26.770 --> 01:02:27.330
That was great.

01:02:27.490 --> 01:02:32.200
Um so but what what I'm hearing is that you had had um I'm gonna take it away because I'm

01:02:32.200 --> 01:02:37.720
gonna stay on this for a second, but you had had an experience of reading stuff where you

01:02:37.720 --> 01:02:42.440
felt like it was not thorough or whole there were you were finding holes in it.

01:02:42.600 --> 01:02:44.680
And and this was one of the first times where that wasn't.

01:02:44.920 --> 01:02:45.560
Is that true?

01:02:45.960 --> 01:02:46.520
Yeah, yeah.

01:02:46.600 --> 01:02:51.560
So I mean I as as an undergrad uh you know would be reading articles and be like, ah well

01:02:51.640 --> 01:02:54.760
they need to deal to do this next or you know here's a crucial control change.

01:02:55.240 --> 01:02:57.080
And I'm not talking within evolutionary psychology.

01:02:57.160 --> 01:02:59.710
I'm talking within psychology in general.

01:02:59.870 --> 01:03:04.590
And that's you know, not trying to slag psychology in general, you know, I mean, because

01:03:04.590 --> 01:03:08.030
there's there's great work and there's not so great work everywhere, right?

01:03:08.510 --> 01:03:13.550
Um, and so you know, I guess I was exposed to you know some stuff that I I thought you know

01:03:13.710 --> 01:03:15.310
could have gone a little bit deeper.

01:03:15.470 --> 01:03:18.590
And this was some of the first work that I thought I read that I thought was really

01:03:18.590 --> 01:03:19.630
careful, right?

01:03:19.710 --> 01:03:23.100
Um, and really addressed you know potential confounds.

01:03:23.180 --> 01:03:26.860
And you know, I couldn't think of uh any control conditions they had missed.

01:03:26.940 --> 01:03:27.180
Yeah.

01:03:27.340 --> 01:03:30.860
Um and that I I thought was very inspiring.

01:03:31.020 --> 01:03:36.460
Um and that, you know, realized that that's how to do good, solid science

01:03:37.020 --> 01:03:41.260
that's that that's going to make sure it addresses all that confound uh those confounds and

01:03:41.260 --> 01:03:42.220
has a meaningful impact.

01:03:42.510 --> 01:03:44.910
That's really cool because that, I mean, there's two things to say.

01:03:44.990 --> 01:03:49.230
One is that if you are listening and you're a scientist, you should do thorough control

01:03:49.230 --> 01:03:52.590
conditions because that will attract students like Pat who also do that.

01:03:52.670 --> 01:03:58.350
Um and uh and two, I mean, it makes sense that you really the the literature, I can't

01:03:58.350 --> 01:04:01.230
overemphasize how confusing it was.

01:04:01.790 --> 01:04:07.780
And I think people, you are a a group of people, um sort of bringing clarity

01:04:07.860 --> 01:04:13.700
um to that and i'm really glad that somebody who has this disposition to sort of see the

01:04:13.860 --> 01:04:18.500
to to think deeply and sort of see the problems or what control conditions are necessary

01:04:18.660 --> 01:04:24.420
that's super needed in the cooperation literature especially early 2000s yeah i would say

01:04:24.740 --> 01:04:29.830
yeah yeah there was definitely a lot of confusion in the early 2000s, a lot of confusion

01:04:29.830 --> 01:04:32.150
over proximate ultimate causes.

01:04:32.470 --> 01:04:37.590
Um, you know, led to some particular viewpoints coming around where people would see

01:04:38.150 --> 01:04:42.630
humans doing behaving cooperatively in anonymous situations.

01:04:42.950 --> 01:04:43.430
Right.

01:04:43.670 --> 01:04:48.870
And people would say, wait a second, people are behaving cooperatively when they're

01:04:48.870 --> 01:04:49.910
anonymous.

01:04:50.380 --> 01:04:55.980
Therefore, we can't explain that with traditional explanations like kin

01:04:55.980 --> 01:04:59.180
selection, reciprocity, or reputation.

01:04:59.500 --> 01:05:04.700
We need something big and new to explain this behavior because

01:05:05.340 --> 01:05:08.780
otherwise, why would people ever help when they're anonymous?

01:05:09.100 --> 01:05:09.340
Right.

01:05:09.740 --> 01:05:11.260
So there was a lot of confusion.

01:05:11.500 --> 01:05:17.470
In the end, I think a lot of that was confusion over levels of uh of analysis, where

01:05:17.630 --> 01:05:23.230
realizing that we have this psychology for cooperation that does make us value other

01:05:23.230 --> 01:05:26.350
people, that does make us value cooperation itself.

01:05:26.590 --> 01:05:32.030
Um, and then you know, you can create an artificial situation where that

01:05:32.270 --> 01:05:37.320
causes somebody to behave generously when it doesn't bring the benefit, you know, just like

01:05:37.320 --> 01:05:42.280
you can create an artificial sweetener that triggers our desire for sugar, but doesn't

01:05:42.280 --> 01:05:43.560
provide any calories.

01:05:43.880 --> 01:05:49.640
Um, you know, you can you can provide a new scenario

01:05:49.960 --> 01:05:55.640
where a normally adaptive mechanism won't be adaptive anymore because it's completely

01:05:55.640 --> 01:05:56.280
artificial.

01:05:56.520 --> 01:06:02.390
Our lungs are designed to extract oxygen from the air, but I can create an artificial

01:06:02.390 --> 01:06:07.110
situation where like an all-nitrogen environment where these lungs no longer function.

01:06:07.270 --> 01:06:09.430
And you can say, oh, it's maladaptive.

01:06:09.510 --> 01:06:11.190
Our lungs are clearly not evolved for air.

01:06:11.270 --> 01:06:13.670
If you know we're still trying to breathe when it's all nitrogen.

01:06:13.750 --> 01:06:17.910
It's like, well, no, we're just, you know, it's it's a new, it's a new environment.

01:06:18.070 --> 01:06:21.190
We wouldn't expect everything to be as adaptive there.

01:06:21.560 --> 01:06:21.640
Right.

01:06:21.720 --> 01:06:26.600
If somebody was oh, sorry, David, if somebody was running at you with an axe and you got

01:06:26.600 --> 01:06:31.720
scared and there was a big plexiglass wall that you hadn't seen and you reacted with fear,

01:06:31.960 --> 01:06:36.920
we wouldn't be like, boy, we have to explain, you know, that person can't hurt you.

01:06:37.160 --> 01:06:41.640
So the fact that you got afraid means that we have to come up with some other explanation

01:06:41.640 --> 01:06:43.720
for why that fear mechanism exists.

01:06:43.880 --> 01:06:44.520
It's not that.

01:06:44.600 --> 01:06:49.320
It's just that we've created this weird artificial situation where you can't get hurt, but

01:06:49.480 --> 01:06:53.810
but that's just the evolved psychology can't anticipate this weird thing we've created.

01:06:54.130 --> 01:06:54.290
Yeah.

01:06:55.010 --> 01:06:56.530
Roller coasters are exciting.

01:06:56.770 --> 01:07:01.970
Um even though they're you know pretty safe um just because they're triggering all those

01:07:01.970 --> 01:07:05.570
cues of you know m fast motion stuff's coming at us quick.

01:07:05.810 --> 01:07:06.050
Yeah.

01:07:06.210 --> 01:07:06.450
Okay.

01:07:06.530 --> 01:07:10.290
So I I I I love all these analogies, but I want to drill deeper.

01:07:10.450 --> 01:07:15.680
So uh when you bring someone into the lab and uh give them this scenario where here's a

01:07:15.680 --> 01:07:19.520
chance to co uh cooperate or give money to someone and you're totally anonymous.

01:07:19.840 --> 01:07:21.120
Or punish a free rider, right?

01:07:21.280 --> 01:07:22.560
Or punish a free rider, whatever.

01:07:23.200 --> 01:07:29.040
Um what in that scenario is analogous to the plexiglass, to the artificial sweetener, to

01:07:29.040 --> 01:07:29.920
the roller coaster?

01:07:30.080 --> 01:07:32.240
What about it is evolutionarily novel?

01:07:32.400 --> 01:07:34.320
How is it how does the trick work?

01:07:34.720 --> 01:07:35.040
Okay.

01:07:35.360 --> 01:07:41.270
Um so in in the real world, uh, you know, many of our actions have have consequences

01:07:41.350 --> 01:07:45.510
and we have social emotions that you know that that trigger behavior.

01:07:45.750 --> 01:07:51.350
Um, you know, we have things like guilt, uh, you know, if we cheat on somebody.

01:07:51.590 --> 01:07:57.590
We have emotions um, you know, like a a a warm glow when when we help somebody

01:07:57.590 --> 01:07:58.070
else.

01:07:58.310 --> 01:08:03.900
Um you know, all of these emotions are what triggers our actual

01:08:03.900 --> 01:08:04.780
behavior, right?

01:08:04.940 --> 01:08:06.780
Whatever those emotions happen to be.

01:08:06.940 --> 01:08:10.700
You know, I'm I'm a little agnostic about what they happen to be, but other people are

01:08:10.700 --> 01:08:13.260
doing some great work examining what they are.

01:08:13.420 --> 01:08:17.020
Like Daniel Snitzer does some great work examining what some of the what some of these uh

01:08:17.180 --> 01:08:18.220
emotions are.

01:08:18.460 --> 01:08:24.380
Um and so we have these emotions and they work really well in the

01:08:24.380 --> 01:08:25.100
real world.

01:08:25.370 --> 01:08:31.130
You know, somebody who would feel guilty about screwing over a

01:08:31.130 --> 01:08:34.890
cooperative partner tends to not screw over the cooperative partner.

01:08:34.970 --> 01:08:37.850
And they tend to stay in good relationships.

01:08:38.170 --> 01:08:44.090
Where somebody who is absolutely guilt-free, absolutely shame-free, you know,

01:08:44.250 --> 01:08:48.220
is more likely to get caught and disowned.

01:08:48.540 --> 01:08:53.500
You know, uh, you know, at least in any environment environment with repeat interactions

01:08:53.580 --> 01:08:58.860
where you repeatedly meet the same people, people eventually realize oh, that guy is really

01:08:58.860 --> 01:09:00.140
untrustworthy.

01:09:00.460 --> 01:09:04.460
So I'm not, I'm not gonna, I'm not gonna uh I'm not gonna trust them.

01:09:04.940 --> 01:09:07.900
So these emotions work really, really well.

01:09:09.670 --> 01:09:15.510
In a lab experiment, we just create we create a situation where we sever the

01:09:15.510 --> 01:09:19.590
link between action the action and the normal consequences.

01:09:19.750 --> 01:09:22.790
So people can come in and they can still experience the same emotions.

01:09:22.950 --> 01:09:27.270
I am feeling guilt about screwing over that other that stranger there.

01:09:27.670 --> 01:09:31.350
I am feeling good about helping that other person.

01:09:31.720 --> 01:09:36.040
The fairness that I value in the outside world, I value in here too.

01:09:36.280 --> 01:09:42.120
But because the researchers have made it so that no one knows what happens, and because the

01:09:42.120 --> 01:09:46.680
researchers have made it, that you know, they're reputation, they have no reputation, this

01:09:46.680 --> 01:09:52.200
behavior is towards complete strangers, there are no longer the social consequences that

01:09:52.200 --> 01:09:55.080
would normally occur outside the lab.

01:09:56.110 --> 01:10:02.110
And so as a result, you know, people are still following the same, you know,

01:10:02.350 --> 01:10:07.230
the same mechanisms, the same emotions that would normally happen in real life situations.

01:10:07.390 --> 01:10:12.750
But we've changed the situation such that these behaviors no longer have the

01:10:12.750 --> 01:10:14.990
consequences that they otherwise would.

01:10:15.150 --> 01:10:21.070
And then we're surprised that people still do them anyway, but we really shouldn't

01:10:21.070 --> 01:10:25.220
be surprised that that people will still do these behaviors anyway, because they're still

01:10:25.220 --> 01:10:26.980
acting on the same emotions.

01:10:27.380 --> 01:10:29.700
I I want to push back on that explanation a little bit.

01:10:29.780 --> 01:10:30.020
Okay.

01:10:30.260 --> 01:10:36.180
Um because wouldn't you so so uh you mention guilt um and how

01:10:36.180 --> 01:10:39.380
it's sensitive to the costs that we impose on cooperative partners.

01:10:39.700 --> 01:10:44.820
Wouldn't you expect guilt to have design features uh that involve

01:10:44.820 --> 01:10:49.750
recognizing the likelihood that the person is actually going to be a cooperative partner or

01:10:49.750 --> 01:10:53.430
actually is a cooperative partner, or that the person might actually know about the cost

01:10:53.510 --> 01:10:54.630
that you inflict on them.

01:10:54.790 --> 01:10:59.190
You'd think that a well-designed system of guilt would be sensitive to those variables, and

01:10:59.190 --> 01:11:03.990
introducing those variables in a lab context might um affect the person's psychology.

01:11:04.070 --> 01:11:07.430
The same thing goes with you know a sense of fairness, a sense of you know feeling good

01:11:07.430 --> 01:11:08.230
when you help someone.

01:11:08.420 --> 01:11:12.580
you would expect the psychological machinery to be sensitive to the likely costs and

01:11:12.580 --> 01:11:17.940
benefits, to be sensitive to the repu the potential reputational benefits uh or or costs.

01:11:18.100 --> 01:11:22.980
Uh so why why wouldn't we expect a well-designed system to be sensitive to the information

01:11:22.980 --> 01:11:25.940
that the psychology experimenter is giving to the participant?

01:11:26.340 --> 01:11:27.940
So this is a great question.

01:11:28.180 --> 01:11:33.450
Um and so part of the answer is it is somewhat responsive to the to these mechanisms.

01:11:33.530 --> 01:11:36.010
And this is some of the research that people are showing now.

01:11:36.250 --> 01:11:40.410
Um, you know, how much do we forgive somebody after a transgression?

01:11:40.570 --> 01:11:44.010
Well, it depends on how valuable a partner they are.

01:11:44.250 --> 01:11:48.730
You know, if they're a more valuable partner, we are more like we've experienced more

01:11:48.730 --> 01:11:50.580
forgiveness towards them.

01:11:50.740 --> 01:11:55.060
You know, how angry are we at somebody a violation of trust?

01:11:55.140 --> 01:12:00.020
Well, it depends on how much of a cost they imposed on us and what they get from it.

01:12:00.660 --> 01:12:04.980
So our emotions are responsive to a lot of that.

01:12:05.620 --> 01:12:07.700
But within boundaries, right?

01:12:07.860 --> 01:12:10.180
So a couple of concepts to introduce.

01:12:10.340 --> 01:12:15.860
One is the idea of error management, which is uh also goes by, you know, it's

01:12:16.150 --> 01:12:20.150
if people are familiar with signal detection, it's a similar sort of idea.

01:12:20.390 --> 01:12:23.510
Where um you know what is more costly?

01:12:24.230 --> 01:12:30.070
Uh is it more costly to miss an opportunity to cheat somebody, or is

01:12:30.070 --> 01:12:34.310
it more costly to get caught cheating somebody else?

01:12:34.790 --> 01:12:38.710
And in many cases, the latter is is is more expensive, right?

01:12:38.790 --> 01:12:44.200
It is all these expressions, it takes a lifetime to build a reputation, but it you know it

01:12:44.200 --> 01:12:46.280
takes just a second to destroy it.

01:12:47.080 --> 01:12:49.960
Um, and and this is often true, right?

01:12:50.120 --> 01:12:55.480
If you're caught cheating when you you know when you had an

01:12:55.480 --> 01:13:00.680
opportunity, people are going to distrust you, and you might never get an opportunity to

01:13:00.760 --> 01:13:02.120
you know to reclaim that.

01:13:02.280 --> 01:13:07.270
You know, if you get caught cheating on your spouse, they might never trust you again, um,

01:13:07.430 --> 01:13:11.110
you know, and uh you know, and and let you go out, you know, lay out late at night with

01:13:11.110 --> 01:13:12.150
your buddies, right?

01:13:12.310 --> 01:13:15.110
Because they will expect something, uh suspect something.

01:13:15.430 --> 01:13:21.270
So um as a result, because getting caught is so costly, we might err, you know, err

01:13:21.270 --> 01:13:24.870
on the side of, okay, I don't want to risk it.

01:13:25.100 --> 01:13:26.540
So it's kind of a risky decision.

01:13:26.620 --> 01:13:31.900
So that's that's part of it, is that there will be some, you know, yes, I'm gonna I, you

01:13:31.900 --> 01:13:37.740
know, I might be more likely to cheat in this anonymous situation, but you know,

01:13:37.900 --> 01:13:41.740
I might not be completely willing, just in case.

01:13:42.220 --> 01:13:45.020
And different people are going to differ, different people are gonna have a different

01:13:45.020 --> 01:13:50.220
threshold as to how certain do they need to be about their anonymity before they cheat.

01:13:50.380 --> 01:13:52.060
So that so that's part of it.

01:13:52.390 --> 01:13:56.470
Another part of it might be tying back to the stakeholder cooperation that we talked about

01:13:56.470 --> 01:14:02.150
earlier, where if you perceive that you have a stake in somebody's welfare, you

01:14:02.150 --> 01:14:07.750
might cooperate with them even if you know a hundred percent that that they cannot

01:14:07.750 --> 01:14:08.230
observe.

01:14:08.470 --> 01:14:13.750
Just like you watering that tree and protecting it, even though it cannot detect that you

01:14:13.750 --> 01:14:18.070
are you are helping it, you will still help because you have it, if you think you have an

01:14:18.070 --> 01:14:20.240
interest in them, then, then you'll help them.

01:14:20.320 --> 01:14:21.920
And this is some of the work that I've done.

01:14:22.240 --> 01:14:28.240
People are more likely to anonymously help somebody if doing

01:14:28.240 --> 01:14:34.160
so will keep that person around and available to cooperate with, than

01:14:34.400 --> 01:14:38.720
if it does not affect whether that person's going to be around and available to help.

01:14:38.800 --> 01:14:39.120
Right.

01:14:39.200 --> 01:14:44.960
So part of the anonymous cooperation might be some perception of um uh of

01:14:44.960 --> 01:14:46.320
stake going on there.

01:14:47.070 --> 01:14:52.670
But also, I would say we are also plastic about how

01:14:53.150 --> 01:14:56.110
we learn to deal with new situations.

01:14:56.590 --> 01:15:01.470
So if you chuck somebody in a lab environment for the first time, this is a bit of a new

01:15:01.470 --> 01:15:02.110
environment.

01:15:02.270 --> 01:15:06.990
Well, I'm going to follow the strategies that worked well for me out in the real world

01:15:07.150 --> 01:15:11.470
because I spend 99% of my time out there in the real world.

01:15:11.660 --> 01:15:16.940
Therefore, I'm going to apply all of the heuristics that work well in the real world in the

01:15:16.940 --> 01:15:20.300
lab, even though it happens to not be beneficial here.

01:15:21.020 --> 01:15:22.700
Especially the first time.

01:15:23.580 --> 01:15:28.140
But the second time, I might have learned a little bit.

01:15:28.300 --> 01:15:32.540
The third, the fourth, the fifth, the sixth time, I might have learned a little bit that,

01:15:32.620 --> 01:15:33.580
oh, wait a second.

01:15:33.820 --> 01:15:37.420
Cooperation doesn't pay off in this new environment.

01:15:37.660 --> 01:15:43.510
And research, some researches have shown that people do habituate

01:15:43.670 --> 01:15:45.910
a little bit to these artificial environments.

01:15:46.070 --> 01:15:51.750
And so if you have people giving in an online cooperative game, how much do you want of

01:15:51.750 --> 01:15:52.070
your money?

01:15:52.150 --> 01:15:53.910
Do you want to share with this other person?

01:15:54.470 --> 01:15:58.790
Um, well, you know, the first time they do it, they're they're pretty generous.

01:15:59.190 --> 01:16:03.270
Second time, maybe not quite as much on average, third time, not as even less on average,

01:16:03.510 --> 01:16:09.480
as they gradually get used to this artificial scenario as it comprises a larger portion

01:16:09.480 --> 01:16:10.920
of the interactions.

01:16:11.080 --> 01:16:16.680
They then start to learn these heuristics of oh, this is a new situation where the payoffs

01:16:16.680 --> 01:16:17.000
are different.

01:16:17.320 --> 01:16:17.560
Right.

01:16:17.720 --> 01:16:20.200
Cite citation internet 2025.

01:16:20.360 --> 01:16:21.000
See the internet.

01:16:21.480 --> 01:16:22.120
Yeah, yeah.

01:16:22.520 --> 01:16:22.840
Yeah.

01:16:23.000 --> 01:16:27.080
People get used to online environments and realize, oh, I can be an asshole here.

01:16:27.400 --> 01:16:28.280
And so they do.

01:16:28.630 --> 01:16:34.630
Um, so that's uh so I I think that's another component of their uh of this too, is that we

01:16:34.630 --> 01:16:38.390
are plastic, but plasticity takes time.

01:16:38.870 --> 01:16:44.710
And we we shouldn't interpret, like overinterpret what people do the

01:16:44.710 --> 01:16:48.150
first time you throw them into an artificial environment.

01:16:48.470 --> 01:16:53.590
Um, you know, you can the first if you take a person who has never swum before and you

01:16:53.590 --> 01:16:56.230
throw them in the water, they're not gonna do so well.

01:16:56.480 --> 01:17:00.560
If you take somebody who has learned how to deal with water, eventually you throw them in

01:17:00.640 --> 01:17:02.000
and they'll do the backstroke.

01:17:02.160 --> 01:17:05.920
Um, but you know, the first time is not necessarily indicative of anything.

01:17:06.160 --> 01:17:06.320
Right.

01:17:06.400 --> 01:17:11.440
I remember even like some of the first uh data coming out of this, like, oh, we need a

01:17:11.440 --> 01:17:15.680
whole new theory of cooperation, it would be something like, and Pat, you can correct me if

01:17:15.680 --> 01:17:20.830
I'm wrong, cooperation, they would say, like, look, it's gonna be some, there's gonna be um

01:17:20.990 --> 01:17:22.910
the end to this interaction.

01:17:23.070 --> 01:17:28.590
And so you would get cooperation on the on the y-axis, is the level of cooperation x-axis

01:17:28.830 --> 01:17:30.350
is what round it is.

01:17:30.590 --> 01:17:35.470
And what you would see is as you're going and it's further and further, or getting closer

01:17:35.470 --> 01:17:40.360
to the end of cooperation, uh, people are still cooperating, but then it starts like they

01:17:40.360 --> 01:17:43.480
know this is the last round, and then it goes down.

01:17:43.640 --> 01:17:47.000
And so people are cooperating less than the rest round, but it's not at zero.

01:17:47.240 --> 01:17:53.080
And what people would sort of emphasize was the residual cooperation, and

01:17:53.080 --> 01:17:58.120
kind of so so even in that original data, there was sensitivity to the thing ending, but

01:17:58.120 --> 01:18:01.720
they were really emphasizing the fact it just didn't go to zero right away, which I think

01:18:01.720 --> 01:18:07.010
is kind of um you can I mean people were getting money by emphasizing it because they were

01:18:07.010 --> 01:18:12.130
like we need to discover a brand new thing, um, which I think was sort of overselling the

01:18:12.130 --> 01:18:12.370
point.

01:18:12.450 --> 01:18:12.690
But yeah.

01:18:13.010 --> 01:18:16.130
There's there's always an incentive to discover a brand new thing.

01:18:16.290 --> 01:18:16.530
Yeah.

01:18:18.210 --> 01:18:18.930
Unfortunately.

01:18:19.090 --> 01:18:19.250
Yeah.

01:18:19.330 --> 01:18:23.490
Uh because sometimes people will discover things that aren't new or aren't, you know, it a

01:18:23.650 --> 01:18:24.770
repackaging of something old.

01:18:25.100 --> 01:18:25.260
Yeah.

01:18:25.340 --> 01:18:30.140
I mean, I think one one way to put it is Pat, you have been steadily doing the actual

01:18:30.140 --> 01:18:35.500
science of what a lot of very well known people who study cooperation, the evolution of

01:18:35.500 --> 01:18:38.220
cooperation, have sort of snake oiled into.

01:18:38.540 --> 01:18:41.900
We've discovered a whole new kind of selection.

01:18:42.380 --> 01:18:47.340
Um, and I won't name names, but like you're you're actually doing the science of that as

01:18:47.340 --> 01:18:49.500
opposed to the the flashy snake oil.

01:18:49.580 --> 01:18:49.820
Yeah.

01:18:50.220 --> 01:18:53.180
I'm I yeah, I I I'm trying to avoid the the the snake oil.

01:18:53.260 --> 01:18:57.030
So one of my friends and colleagues, uh Sandy Misher, has a great expression that uh

01:18:57.190 --> 01:18:59.910
scientists should be monks, not rock stars.

01:19:00.310 --> 01:19:00.470
Right.

01:19:00.630 --> 01:19:04.790
So you know, you know, it's like distrust the people who are super flashy and got all the

01:19:04.790 --> 01:19:09.670
stuff because you know, maybe they're overselling, you know, maybe they're you know cutting

01:19:09.670 --> 01:19:13.830
some corners, uh, you know, sort of like the that natural selection of bad science paper

01:19:13.910 --> 01:19:18.300
that uh uh which which is so good right people doing the really flashy stuff yes there's

01:19:18.380 --> 01:19:21.900
select you know it could be selection for that but a great paper by the way yeah Richard

01:19:21.900 --> 01:19:27.740
and Paul we need to have on and I know Willem and Karthic have another related one uh

01:19:27.900 --> 01:19:32.300
and Paul I think is on that too we should have all those all those folks on but you see you

01:19:32.300 --> 01:19:35.420
see Kiki this is this is why it's good to be boring sometimes.

01:19:36.540 --> 01:19:38.540
Yeah you should this is another PSA.

01:19:39.100 --> 01:19:44.850
Like really value we should well there's a pay like really there is huge value to boredom.

01:19:45.090 --> 01:19:50.130
And I really think this, like, um the idea that you should be

01:19:50.130 --> 01:19:55.810
entertained is a really dangerous idea from like a

01:19:55.810 --> 01:19:57.970
epistemic stance to take towards the world.

01:19:58.130 --> 01:20:03.010
If you're like, I insist that I need to be entertained by something and I'm gonna evaluate

01:20:03.010 --> 01:20:08.860
everything on according to the entertainment value it provides, like buckle up you're

01:20:08.860 --> 01:20:13.500
gonna you're that's gonna make a really rough uh social experiment.

01:20:14.220 --> 01:20:20.220
Yeah no absolutely I I have a uh a blog post on that very topic uh cool you

01:20:20.220 --> 01:20:24.780
know you will find this interesting oh cool I should sorry David uh yeah no basically

01:20:24.780 --> 01:20:30.060
arguing exactly what you just said that our sense of what is interesting is uh in many ways

01:20:30.140 --> 01:20:35.260
uh not to be trusted or it's not a reliable guide to what is true and useful um and it can

01:20:35.260 --> 01:20:38.290
often lead us toward bullshit in in various ways.

01:20:38.370 --> 01:20:43.730
And I think there's an overemphasis on uh on interestingness and being interesting uh in

01:20:43.730 --> 01:20:44.130
our culture.

01:20:44.450 --> 01:20:49.090
So we have just uh we have just explained why we're not interesting and boring and why it's

01:20:49.090 --> 01:20:49.650
a virtue.

01:20:49.810 --> 01:20:50.210
Yes.

01:20:50.930 --> 01:20:54.290
Yeah we we've given a a self-serving cynical explanation for it.

01:20:54.530 --> 01:20:55.010
Exactly.

01:20:59.410 --> 01:21:03.250
I think there's so much to say about cooperation in I mean so here I'm gonna give you two

01:21:03.250 --> 01:21:03.890
options Pat.

01:21:04.050 --> 01:21:09.440
One is is there a high-level sort of summary description of like the kinds of solutions to

01:21:09.440 --> 01:21:11.600
the problem of cooperation that you've discovered?

01:21:11.840 --> 01:21:17.760
And then option B is, and you can do both or one or the other, is uh

01:21:17.920 --> 01:21:22.320
uh Martin and Margot in talking a little bit about them and sort of how you found them or

01:21:22.320 --> 01:21:24.400
what who they are because we haven't really talked about them.

01:21:24.720 --> 01:21:30.590
Okay, let me let me deal with the uh the the the first one first um So one

01:21:30.590 --> 01:21:36.510
of the things that I try to do when not being a snake oil salesman is to try to

01:21:36.590 --> 01:21:39.150
like rather than coming up with a flashy title.

01:21:39.310 --> 01:21:43.710
A lot of people like to, I have this new theory and they have their acronym for it or

01:21:43.710 --> 01:21:44.270
whatever.

01:21:49.630 --> 01:21:51.550
And then really like dive dive into that.

01:21:51.710 --> 01:21:56.270
So so some of the stuff I'm known for, um, you know, com competitive helping, you know, is

01:21:56.350 --> 01:22:01.860
the the idea that we are only implicitly competing in a in a biological market over social

01:22:01.860 --> 01:22:02.900
partners, right?

01:22:03.060 --> 01:22:08.660
So it's beneficial to be selected as you know a friend, an ally, a mate, a business

01:22:08.660 --> 01:22:11.220
partner, coalitional ally, et cetera, right?

01:22:11.540 --> 01:22:16.500
Um and in that competition, you benefit from

01:22:17.060 --> 01:22:22.420
demonstrating your ability to provide benefits, but also your willingness to uh to

01:22:22.660 --> 01:22:23.780
provide benefits.

01:22:24.020 --> 01:22:29.950
One way to do so is to not just to be nice, but to be nicer than the other guy, right?

01:22:30.030 --> 01:22:34.030
To not just be competent, but be more competent than the other than than the other person,

01:22:34.110 --> 01:22:34.350
right?

01:22:34.510 --> 01:22:38.910
So you know we're we're very familiar with people competing to appear more competent,

01:22:39.070 --> 01:22:39.310
right?

01:22:39.470 --> 01:22:45.470
Athletics is all about that, um, you know, or intellectual competitions or or or

01:22:45.470 --> 01:22:50.180
whatnot, but there is also competition to to you know appear nicer, right?

01:22:50.340 --> 01:22:55.460
Or I am more devoted to uh you know to you than that other person would be.

01:22:55.620 --> 01:22:58.500
I'm a better friend than that other person would be.

01:22:58.660 --> 01:23:01.220
Therefore, you should spend more time with me.

01:23:01.540 --> 01:23:06.980
Um, and one of the best ways to you know to get a good partner is to be a good partner.

01:23:07.220 --> 01:23:13.060
And so, you know, competing subtly over uh how generous one is in

01:23:13.060 --> 01:23:18.990
order to demonstrate both your uh ability to give, but also your your willingness to give.

01:23:19.230 --> 01:23:25.070
Um, and so this is kind of a combination of ideas from a number of other people.

01:23:25.230 --> 01:23:29.470
Um, Gilbert Roberts first put out the idea of competitive altruism.

01:23:29.790 --> 01:23:34.830
Um, and uh you know, some a couple of biologists, Ronald Noe and Peter Hammerstein, came up

01:23:34.830 --> 01:23:38.350
with the idea of biological markets and organisms competing over partnerships.

01:23:38.510 --> 01:23:43.920
So it's taking those ideas along with the idea of costly signaling, of how can you

01:23:43.920 --> 01:23:49.200
communicate information about yourself in a way that's honest and guaranteed to be honest,

01:23:49.360 --> 01:23:53.600
um, as opposed to just being cheap talk, you know, hey, look at me, I'm cooperative, trust

01:23:53.600 --> 01:23:53.840
me.

01:23:54.000 --> 01:23:55.600
Okay, well, why should I trust you?

01:23:55.760 --> 01:23:57.360
How do I know that it's honest?

01:23:57.600 --> 01:24:02.640
Well, I'm doing something that would not be worth it if I weren't actually intending to

01:24:02.640 --> 01:24:03.600
follow through, right?

01:24:03.730 --> 01:24:09.410
So it's kind of combining these different ideas together into this

01:24:09.890 --> 01:24:15.490
framework of biological markets and competing over partnerships.

01:24:15.650 --> 01:24:21.170
So it's drawing from these other areas and trying also to give credit to all of the

01:24:21.330 --> 01:24:23.410
researchers that have come before.

01:24:31.560 --> 01:24:36.600
So, I mean, so that's one of the ideas that I'd like to be known for, this idea of a

01:24:36.600 --> 01:24:42.600
biological market for partnerships and how that shapes how we communicate our attributes,

01:24:42.840 --> 01:24:48.600
whom we choose, how we choose partners, we choose them based on their competence, their

01:24:48.920 --> 01:24:52.040
ability to provide benefits and their willingness to do so.

01:24:52.200 --> 01:24:57.970
That affects our skepticism towards them when we believe that somebody's

01:24:57.970 --> 01:24:59.890
honestly a good partner versus when they don't.

01:25:00.050 --> 01:25:02.290
So that that's a big chunk of it there.

01:25:02.530 --> 01:25:08.290
Um more recently I've started to get into this idea of uh stakeholder uh generosity.

01:25:08.450 --> 01:25:12.930
And again, you know, you know, there there's many people have come up with this before.

01:25:13.250 --> 01:25:18.210
Again, I seem to be using Gilbert Roberts's terminology of stake, um, you know, because I I

01:25:18.290 --> 01:25:23.570
I I think it it really nicely reflects the idea that one organism can have a vested

01:25:23.570 --> 01:25:24.930
interest in somebody else.

01:25:25.170 --> 01:25:31.000
And all of these other actions, like you know, reciprocity, can create a

01:25:31.000 --> 01:25:32.120
stake in a partner.

01:25:32.280 --> 01:25:38.040
If we're engaging in purely economic exchange, I come to have an interest in your

01:25:38.040 --> 01:25:41.160
well-being and I will help you because of that.

01:25:41.320 --> 01:25:46.600
If you just happen to be providing public goods, cooperative benefits, I have an interest

01:25:46.600 --> 01:25:47.240
in helping you.

01:25:47.320 --> 01:25:51.880
And so that provides an additional selective pressure for me to help you and for you to

01:25:51.880 --> 01:25:53.080
produce these goods.

01:25:53.670 --> 01:25:59.110
So it it it kind of nicely links many of these other causes of cooperation, including

01:25:59.110 --> 01:26:04.390
reciprocity, including uh signaling behavior, but also links to many of these other things

01:26:04.550 --> 01:26:05.910
like byproduct mutualism.

01:26:06.150 --> 01:26:06.310
Right.

01:26:06.390 --> 01:26:11.990
And I just want to say I love this market idea because it's really um it's dynamic.

01:26:12.230 --> 01:26:16.390
And I think one of the things and it was really influential for me when I worked on a paper

01:26:16.390 --> 01:26:21.220
about leadership and it was a similar idea of sort of like what what any outcome looks

01:26:21.220 --> 01:26:21.380
like.

01:26:21.460 --> 01:26:25.300
I think people have this idea sort of like, well, like things are static.

01:26:25.380 --> 01:26:27.620
And so why does cooperation look like this?

01:26:27.780 --> 01:26:30.660
Or why does this kind of cooperative relationship look like this?

01:26:30.900 --> 01:26:36.740
And you see a range of sort of like both parties do really well versus like one party sort

01:26:36.740 --> 01:26:39.860
of exploited and one isn't, but there's still cooperation.

01:26:40.100 --> 01:26:44.260
And I think without the idea of sort of this market idea, the what you talked about before,

01:26:44.340 --> 01:26:47.010
you know, if your outside Yeah, what's your other option?

01:26:47.090 --> 01:26:49.250
And I think that is a really powerful idea.

01:26:49.330 --> 01:26:50.370
It's a complicating idea.

01:26:50.530 --> 01:26:55.730
I think people don't like, you know, the sort of snake oil people don't like complicating

01:26:55.730 --> 01:26:56.210
ideas.

01:26:56.370 --> 01:27:00.450
But I think it's really important for realism, which is that, and I think it's such a

01:27:00.450 --> 01:27:01.010
profound insight.

01:27:01.090 --> 01:27:03.970
And I think you're you you really, your work inspired me.

01:27:04.130 --> 01:27:09.970
And I think it's worth saying out loud that this idea of what uh what a relationship looks

01:27:09.970 --> 01:27:15.940
like is not just a function of the sort of like kind

01:27:15.940 --> 01:27:16.900
of relationship it is.

01:27:16.980 --> 01:27:18.500
Like, is it a cooperative relationship?

01:27:18.580 --> 01:27:20.820
It just looks like this automatically.

01:27:20.980 --> 01:27:26.900
It's cooperation combined with the market forces of what are the other partners' options.

01:27:27.060 --> 01:27:28.740
And I think that's such a profound idea.

01:27:28.900 --> 01:27:32.020
It sounds simple when you say it, but I think it's such a profound idea.

01:27:32.180 --> 01:27:35.060
Um, so thank you for for in interjecting that.

01:27:35.140 --> 01:27:39.220
I think it's you're welcome, but I mean it's not just what are their options, but also what

01:27:39.220 --> 01:27:40.500
are their needs, right?

01:27:40.580 --> 01:27:46.090
I mean, because this is where supply and demand come in and how these can vary from

01:27:46.090 --> 01:27:48.330
environments to from environment to environment.

01:27:48.570 --> 01:27:54.570
So in one environment where there might be not a lot of food, right,

01:27:54.730 --> 01:27:56.170
food is in high demand.

01:27:56.330 --> 01:28:01.930
So somebody who's particularly effective at producing food becomes a very high value

01:28:01.930 --> 01:28:04.970
partner because that's what you need in that location.

01:28:05.130 --> 01:28:10.250
And that's going to affect somebody's market value and what you value in a friend or a mate

01:28:10.330 --> 01:28:11.610
or in any relationship.

01:28:11.850 --> 01:28:17.140
In other environments, um, food might be plentiful, but maybe there is conflict with uh,

01:28:17.220 --> 01:28:22.580
you know, with outgroups or this conflict over resources, in which case, um, there, you

01:28:22.580 --> 01:28:28.180
know, coalitional aid is very important, is in high demand and low

01:28:28.180 --> 01:28:28.660
supply.

01:28:28.820 --> 01:28:33.060
And so you might become a more valuable partner by demonstrating, you know, your your

01:28:33.060 --> 01:28:37.790
toughness and your you know, your loyalty uh to partners and willing to

01:28:39.070 --> 01:28:41.150
help them fight off exploiters.

01:28:41.390 --> 01:28:47.390
So what gets valued in a partner can vary from environment to environment, depending on the

01:28:47.390 --> 01:28:50.830
local supply and demand, what is needed in that location.

01:28:51.150 --> 01:28:55.950
And I think that's something where this perspective can also lead into cultural

01:28:55.950 --> 01:28:56.750
differences, right?

01:28:57.150 --> 01:29:02.880
In different um physical environments, different traits can be more valuable.

01:29:03.040 --> 01:29:08.400
In different sociological environments, different traits can be more valuable, either

01:29:08.400 --> 01:29:11.840
because they are more needed or because they are in shorter supply.

01:29:12.000 --> 01:29:16.080
And that affects what people are going to do to signal their traits.

01:29:16.240 --> 01:29:22.000
It affects what people are going to want in a social partner, um and how exactly

01:29:22.000 --> 01:29:23.520
they're going to compete over them.

01:29:23.890 --> 01:29:24.610
That's really interesting.

01:29:24.690 --> 01:29:26.130
And maybe even individual differences.

01:29:26.210 --> 01:29:30.930
Like I think one of the tropes of life is sort of like people, I think all of us sort of

01:29:31.010 --> 01:29:33.810
sometimes we look at people and we're like, why is that person with that person?

01:29:33.970 --> 01:29:39.570
Whether it's romantic or socially or just or social identities, like why would this

01:29:39.570 --> 01:29:42.130
political party support this political candidate?

01:29:42.290 --> 01:29:48.050
And I think the idea of sort of being humble about or thinking about that they might

01:29:48.050 --> 01:29:53.880
have needs or becoming from a place that we don't have an understanding or being

01:29:53.880 --> 01:29:57.560
open to hearing about or learning about what their needs are, whether they're real or

01:29:57.560 --> 01:30:01.800
perceived, it might go a long way to understanding why people are doing or choosing the

01:30:01.800 --> 01:30:03.160
partners they're choosing.

01:30:03.560 --> 01:30:03.800
Yeah.

01:30:03.960 --> 01:30:04.200
Yeah.

01:30:04.280 --> 01:30:09.080
So some individuals will have different needs depending on the their phase in life, right?

01:30:09.160 --> 01:30:13.320
Where they are, how old they are, uh, you know, what their profession is, uh, their

01:30:13.320 --> 01:30:13.720
environment.

01:30:13.800 --> 01:30:17.850
So yeah, there's going to be individual differences both in needs, what they can pursue.

01:30:18.090 --> 01:30:22.890
It also means some individuals maybe higher market value and are able to pursue different

01:30:22.890 --> 01:30:23.530
strategies.

01:30:23.850 --> 01:30:28.810
Um, you know, because the, you know, the you know, somebody who's very competent might

01:30:28.810 --> 01:30:31.450
spend more of their time demonstrating their competence.

01:30:31.610 --> 01:30:37.210
Somebody who doesn't have that might instead need to focus more on demonstrating their

01:30:37.210 --> 01:30:38.250
loyalty, right?

01:30:38.650 --> 01:30:42.960
I might not be as awesome, but I value you way more.

01:30:43.120 --> 01:30:43.360
Right.

01:30:43.440 --> 01:30:47.920
So there are all sorts of compensatory strategies that different individuals are going to

01:30:47.920 --> 01:30:52.640
follow as a result of their own position within the market.

01:30:53.280 --> 01:30:57.680
So it's a very rich perspective in order to be able to predict individual differences,

01:30:57.840 --> 01:31:02.080
cultural differences, ecological differences in what people desire.

01:31:02.160 --> 01:31:07.390
And it's you know it's a very pl you know we would expect a lot of plasticity in terms of

01:31:07.550 --> 01:31:13.470
um you know how people respond to these different social environments uh you know that they

01:31:13.470 --> 01:31:18.430
have grown up in um yeah and uh and how you know the the past environments are going to

01:31:18.430 --> 01:31:21.870
affect them today because it has affected the market they have grown up in.

01:31:22.190 --> 01:31:22.830
Right.

01:31:24.220 --> 01:31:27.820
Well, I I want to float an idea by you, Pat.

01:31:28.140 --> 01:31:30.860
It's an idea that we that Dave and I discussed on the on the first episode.

01:31:30.940 --> 01:31:34.140
Uh it's a a working paper that I'm I'm continuing to think about.

01:31:34.300 --> 01:31:40.300
Um, and that's between uh or that's it's it's about a conflict between what we might call

01:31:40.300 --> 01:31:46.010
competitive altruism or partner choice psychology and intergroup competition and

01:31:46.010 --> 01:31:47.130
intergroup conflict.

01:31:47.530 --> 01:31:53.290
Um, and it may be that uh, you know, we have this rich partner choice psychology where we

01:31:53.290 --> 01:31:59.290
want to uh signal how kind and generous and fair we are, um, how humble we are, and

01:31:59.290 --> 01:32:03.690
we're evaluating other people based on you know whether they're gonna really provide help

01:32:03.770 --> 01:32:06.730
us help for us, whether they're not gonna you know stab us on the back.

01:32:06.810 --> 01:32:12.410
We were we're looking for um you know uh peaceful collaborative partners who divide

01:32:12.410 --> 01:32:13.690
resources fairly.

01:32:13.850 --> 01:32:18.760
Um and so there's all that stuff that we that we've gotten into uh in a variety of ways

01:32:18.760 --> 01:32:22.280
throughout uh the past hour and a half or so.

01:32:22.600 --> 01:32:28.520
Um and then there's this psychology of intergroup conflict, where in that case, um you

01:32:28.520 --> 01:32:30.440
don't want to divide resources fairly.

01:32:30.520 --> 01:32:35.160
It's in your Darwinian interest to divide resources in a lopsided way that benefit your

01:32:35.160 --> 01:32:37.080
group and exploit the outgroup.

01:32:37.160 --> 01:32:41.070
Uh in that context, you want to actually dominate and coerce the outgroup.

01:32:41.710 --> 01:32:46.030
You want to if you uh aggress against them, attack them violently and take their stuff

01:32:46.110 --> 01:32:50.910
whenever you can do so safely and at low risk when when you have a numerical advantage.

01:32:51.230 --> 01:32:54.910
It's in your interest to do that from a cold Darwinian perspective.

01:32:56.110 --> 01:32:59.390
Definitely need to bring in the cold Darwinian perspective so that people know that you're

01:32:59.390 --> 01:33:00.590
not personally advocating this.

01:33:00.670 --> 01:33:03.150
Yes but you're just outlining the Darwinian logic.

01:33:03.380 --> 01:33:04.820
Yes, outlining the Darwinian logic.

01:33:05.220 --> 01:33:09.700
But there's a fundamental conflict here, and that it's hard to say violently attack an

01:33:09.700 --> 01:33:14.740
outgroup uh uh when you have a numerical advantage just for the sake of dominating them or

01:33:14.740 --> 01:33:16.100
exploiting them or taking their stuff.

01:33:16.260 --> 01:33:20.260
It's hard to do that when you live in a partner choice psychology where people are

01:33:20.260 --> 01:33:25.140
constantly evaluating your moral character uh and scrutinizing everything you do from that

01:33:25.140 --> 01:33:25.540
lens.

01:33:25.780 --> 01:33:31.130
So if I look like a mean bully uh when I behave in that way toward an outgroup, or if I'm a

01:33:31.130 --> 01:33:35.850
leader and I'm proposing a coalitional project where we go out and we attack the rival

01:33:35.850 --> 01:33:40.010
group just just for no other reason than just you know self-interest or or dominance.

01:33:40.170 --> 01:33:40.330
Yeah.

01:33:40.490 --> 01:33:44.650
Um, well, that's gonna make me look like a really mean, ruthless, bad social partner.

01:33:45.850 --> 01:33:46.730
Turn on their next social partner.

01:33:47.770 --> 01:33:48.250
Yeah, exactly.

01:33:48.410 --> 01:33:54.040
And so the idea is that um this might be one of the functions of what we might

01:33:54.040 --> 01:33:56.840
call ideologies uh or political narratives.

01:33:57.720 --> 01:34:02.600
They function to reconcile this conflict between partner choice psychology on the one hand

01:34:02.760 --> 01:34:05.320
and the needs of intergroup competition on the other.

01:34:05.480 --> 01:34:10.600
That we need to create these pretexts that um aggressing against the outgroup is morally

01:34:10.600 --> 01:34:12.870
justified, they're evil, they're going to attack us.

01:34:12.950 --> 01:34:17.270
Um, we need we're doing it in retaliation, we're it's a preemptive strike, or maybe the

01:34:17.270 --> 01:34:18.390
gods said that we had to do this.

01:34:18.470 --> 01:34:22.310
There are there are you know the history books are littered with these kinds of pretexts.

01:34:22.470 --> 01:34:27.350
But the argument is that we actually need these pretexts to be able to mobilize effectively

01:34:27.430 --> 01:34:32.550
uh in in a group competition, because if we can't have a pretext that is compatible with

01:34:32.550 --> 01:34:37.270
our partner choice psychology, uh then our collective action is doomed to failure.

01:34:37.440 --> 01:34:41.840
Um and so what do you think about uh this idea that that one of the reasons why we need

01:34:41.840 --> 01:34:47.280
these moral pretexts is to uh um reconcile the conflict between partner choice psychology

01:34:47.280 --> 01:34:48.400
and intergroup competition?

01:34:48.800 --> 01:34:50.880
Yeah, uh it's a great it's a great idea.

01:34:50.960 --> 01:34:56.800
I I'd been thinking along similar lines where some of this is signaling to ones in

01:34:56.880 --> 01:34:59.200
group that you're not next.

01:34:59.440 --> 01:34:59.760
Right.

01:35:00.080 --> 01:35:05.430
Um so it's uh it it's signaling we are attacking them.

01:35:06.710 --> 01:35:12.710
Uh and you know uh so I I can't just turn around and suddenly do the same to you.

01:35:12.950 --> 01:35:18.710
Um so it's uh I I think a lot of it is reassuring uh other coalition members

01:35:19.030 --> 01:35:24.630
that you know you will you know benefit from the spoils as opposed to become the the next

01:35:24.630 --> 01:35:25.110
victim.

01:35:25.830 --> 01:35:29.670
You know, um you know I'm I'm always you know surprised that people aren't a little more

01:35:29.640 --> 01:35:30.520
skeptical of that.

01:35:30.680 --> 01:35:35.240
You know, I I love the line, you know, an appeaser is someone who feeds a crocodile in the

01:35:35.240 --> 01:35:36.840
hopes of being eaten last.

01:35:37.240 --> 01:35:41.240
Um, you know, so I so I'm very you know surprised that people don't kind of see through

01:35:41.240 --> 01:35:42.360
that more than they do.

01:35:42.600 --> 01:35:47.560
Um, but but I do think that the a a lot of it is along the same lines of exactly what you

01:35:47.560 --> 01:35:53.400
said, um, um, about trying to still maintain value towards your uh your

01:35:53.640 --> 01:35:57.560
your desired partners, people with whom you could cooperate.

01:35:57.850 --> 01:36:03.850
um, but uh you know assure them that they will benefit from this action as opposed to,

01:36:03.930 --> 01:36:08.410
you know, I'm just a mean bastard who tends to, you know, uh take from anybody and you're

01:36:08.410 --> 01:36:09.050
next.

01:36:10.170 --> 01:36:10.490
Cool.

01:36:10.650 --> 01:36:11.690
So you buy it?

01:36:12.090 --> 01:36:12.970
Yeah, I buy it.

01:36:13.050 --> 01:36:13.770
Uh you know, okay.

01:36:13.850 --> 01:36:16.170
I'd like to see I'd like to see the mathematical model of it first.

01:36:16.250 --> 01:36:17.290
And uh Oh damn.

01:36:17.530 --> 01:36:18.730
Park, you're always doing this.

01:36:19.770 --> 01:36:22.600
You did you did this to me with humor and now you're doing it to me with this.

01:36:23.560 --> 01:36:26.840
But I've heard you've got a uh you know, for for some of the other questions, you you've

01:36:26.840 --> 01:36:27.480
got some good stuff on there.

01:36:27.560 --> 01:36:28.760
So he's got math now.

01:36:28.840 --> 01:36:30.520
So so yeah, we're keeping each other honest.

01:36:30.600 --> 01:36:31.160
That's how this works.

01:36:31.400 --> 01:36:31.720
Yeah, we are.

01:36:31.800 --> 01:36:32.120
It's true.

01:36:32.360 --> 01:36:32.840
It's great.

01:36:33.080 --> 01:36:35.560
Um, and then uh Martin and Marg.

01:36:35.960 --> 01:36:40.760
Um wonderful human beings, uh, and and great, great researchers.

01:36:41.000 --> 01:36:44.520
Um, yeah, I I I trying to think where where where to start.

01:36:44.600 --> 01:36:47.720
Uh, you know, I mean, if you want to talk about origin stories, I mean somebody could

01:36:47.720 --> 01:36:51.160
easily give their 40-minute origin story on on on each of them.

01:36:51.430 --> 01:36:57.350
Um, but uh they so Martin Daly and Margot Wilson are uh two of the founders of the field

01:36:57.350 --> 01:36:59.270
of uh evolutionary psychology.

01:36:59.510 --> 01:37:05.270
Um they both came from an animal behavior uh background so those trained as uh animal

01:37:05.270 --> 01:37:11.270
behavior uh and getting I think which gives gives people a really, really strong basis

01:37:11.350 --> 01:37:12.630
in the biology.

01:37:12.790 --> 01:37:17.910
Um so for anybody out there who's like interested uh in in in evolutionary psychology, you

01:37:18.070 --> 01:37:23.440
I'd recommend like brush up on some of the the non-human literature is is is really useful

01:37:23.760 --> 01:37:28.880
because um it really helps strip away any preconcept uh preconceptions we have about what

01:37:28.880 --> 01:37:33.600
what humans are like um you know and you know cultural differences and all this other stuff

01:37:33.760 --> 01:37:37.520
like you know look at the the you know that the the non-humans to really get at the

01:37:37.520 --> 01:37:39.200
underlying logic is is is useful.

01:37:39.360 --> 01:37:45.350
So they both came from that uh that tradition and then they started working on uh

01:37:45.510 --> 01:37:46.470
on humans.

01:37:46.630 --> 01:37:51.110
Um, funny enough, they were reading uh or reading group working uh on uh you know

01:37:51.190 --> 01:37:56.870
sociobiology, and you know, they uh they were reading about Sarah Hurdy's work about

01:37:57.110 --> 01:38:02.950
um uh lions uh you know killing uh male lions killing cubs in order to cause the

01:38:02.950 --> 01:38:05.750
females to come into estrus earlier or killing cubs that weren't their own.

01:38:05.910 --> 01:38:05.990
Right.

01:38:06.150 --> 01:38:08.630
And then somebody's like, ha, what about the wicked step parent myths?

01:38:08.710 --> 01:38:10.150
So they said, all right, well, let's look into this.

01:38:10.230 --> 01:38:12.710
And they start collecting, they realized nobody had looked at this.

01:38:12.900 --> 01:38:18.900
So they started comparing data using um rates of like step-parental abuse to try and test

01:38:18.900 --> 01:38:24.580
this idea that, well, if parents love their own kids more than other people's kids, we

01:38:24.580 --> 01:38:30.580
should expect to see less abuse, less homicide in

01:38:30.740 --> 01:38:32.900
biological parent parentheses in step-parent families.

01:38:32.980 --> 01:38:37.060
And they found that they ran all these other things, uh, controls for it, and they started

01:38:37.060 --> 01:38:43.010
using homicide data to test all sorts of other uh other hypotheses in in many other uh many

01:38:43.010 --> 01:38:43.810
other domains.

01:38:44.050 --> 01:38:46.370
So other questions about uh about parenting.

01:38:46.530 --> 01:38:51.890
Okay, well, which children are people going to uh going to uh to love more?

01:38:52.050 --> 01:38:53.810
Like, you know, there's an awkward question.

01:38:53.890 --> 01:38:56.530
You know, which of your two kids do you love more?

01:38:56.690 --> 01:39:00.770
Um, you know, no parent wants to answer that, but uh they started asking those kinds of

01:39:00.770 --> 01:39:06.220
questions and using you know homicide data to to test that, using it to test uh hypotheses

01:39:06.220 --> 01:39:11.020
about uh about mating, um, you know, and and jealousy to start testing hypotheses about

01:39:11.020 --> 01:39:16.860
risk taking, um, looking at like male-male homicide and the effects of inequality on um on

01:39:16.860 --> 01:39:22.220
risk taking and and homicide, um, and uh using very, very careful

01:39:22.220 --> 01:39:27.430
analyses and started uh pushing evolutionary

01:39:27.430 --> 01:39:29.750
psychology into other domains.

01:39:29.830 --> 01:39:33.910
So starting, you know, criminologists started to become interested in their findings,

01:39:33.990 --> 01:39:35.590
saying, oh, this is cool, right?

01:39:35.670 --> 01:39:38.150
Uh these are these are very convincing data.

01:39:38.230 --> 01:39:43.350
Um, you know, to psychologists using these data very, very carefully controlled uh in order

01:39:43.350 --> 01:39:44.950
to say, oh, okay, this makes sense.

01:39:45.270 --> 01:39:51.100
Also very cautious about their conclusions, um, which I think also helped

01:39:51.260 --> 01:39:55.900
because you know it's it's very easy for people to make big flashy statements and and and

01:39:55.980 --> 01:40:01.820
you know sell their snake oil, which you know attracts some people but will push away other

01:40:02.140 --> 01:40:02.460
people.

01:40:02.940 --> 01:40:08.060
Um and you know, certainly evolutionary psychology has attracted its share of

01:40:08.060 --> 01:40:13.910
controversy, um, but the their good careful research did help to bring

01:40:13.910 --> 01:40:18.870
a lot of people on board, including many, many biologists, were like, oh yes, okay, this is

01:40:18.870 --> 01:40:19.030
cool.

01:40:19.110 --> 01:40:23.830
We're treating humans like another animal, albeit a very smart social and cultural one.

01:40:24.070 --> 01:40:26.630
Um and those being Pat Barclay.

01:40:27.110 --> 01:40:27.830
Uh yeah.

01:40:28.470 --> 01:40:29.590
One of those being you, yeah.

01:40:29.910 --> 01:40:30.710
Uh sure, I guess.

01:40:30.790 --> 01:40:30.950
Yeah.

01:40:31.030 --> 01:40:35.030
Uh but but they also they they trained a number of other uh a number of other researchers

01:40:35.030 --> 01:40:37.110
who you who carried uh you know who carried this on.

01:40:37.270 --> 01:40:43.180
They trained uh people within animal behavior um And uh, you know, they within human

01:40:43.180 --> 01:40:48.540
stuff, you know, like uh uh Lisa DeBrian, uh Nick Pound, uh Andrew Clark, Danny Krupp, a

01:40:48.540 --> 01:40:52.380
few, a few other people uh that they trained in this uh, you know, the same sort of idea,

01:40:52.540 --> 01:40:58.220
Catherine Salmon, um, so a number of other uh researchers to kind of uh carry on

01:40:58.460 --> 01:40:59.500
this perspective.

01:40:59.740 --> 01:41:03.420
And you know, coming up with some of the same ideas that some of the other schools of

01:41:03.420 --> 01:41:08.610
thought, um you know like with the the the uh Lita Cosmides John Tuby group also coming up

01:41:08.610 --> 01:41:13.170
with so there's a lot of back and forth between between those groups a lot of sharing of

01:41:13.170 --> 01:41:18.930
ideas also focusing on like what's what's the underlying psychology and always looking at

01:41:19.010 --> 01:41:24.850
well what you know what what is the what is the mind doing in this so rather than looking

01:41:24.850 --> 01:41:30.840
at you know the behavior itself being selected for instead the selection for a

01:41:30.840 --> 01:41:31.320
brain.

01:41:31.560 --> 01:41:34.360
And that brain is doing stuff.

01:41:35.000 --> 01:41:40.040
And so I think those perspectives fit very well together.

01:41:41.160 --> 01:41:46.360
Both of them served as president of the Human Behavior and Revolution Society at one point.

01:41:48.440 --> 01:41:52.510
From what I heard, Margot Wilson was the one who actually it was really pushing for

01:41:52.510 --> 01:41:56.270
evolutionary psychology to be the the name as opposed to Darwinian psychology.

01:41:56.430 --> 01:42:00.830
Yes, I uh Lita, yeah, Lita and John would tell so I uh because you know, I was a student of

01:42:00.830 --> 01:42:06.270
Lita and John's and uh the my understanding is that Martin and Margot and John and Lita,

01:42:06.590 --> 01:42:09.870
they went down to because I think John and Lita were in Santa Barbara at this point, they

01:42:09.950 --> 01:42:15.390
went down to like um Palm Springs because Martin and Margot had a desert kangaroo site

01:42:15.390 --> 01:42:15.790
somewhere.

01:42:16.190 --> 01:42:16.990
Kangaroo rats.

01:42:17.220 --> 01:42:17.380
Yeah.

01:42:17.460 --> 01:42:20.740
And they had this meeting uh about what we should call this thing.

01:42:20.820 --> 01:42:25.300
And there was exactly this discussion about do we call it Darwinian psychology or

01:42:25.300 --> 01:42:26.100
evolutionary psychology?

01:42:26.180 --> 01:42:29.220
So Pat, you know more about do you know a little bit.

01:42:29.300 --> 01:42:35.060
I think Margot's uh logic was like just in uh just in case in the future,

01:42:35.220 --> 01:42:40.580
maybe you know, Darwin's we we decide that Darwin's version of of evolution is maybe not

01:42:40.580 --> 01:42:41.940
exactly the way that it works.

01:42:42.100 --> 01:42:45.380
We don't want to be tied to one particular name.

01:42:45.620 --> 01:42:51.590
And I think you know, maybe this is this is wise to not be focused on individuals,

01:42:51.670 --> 01:42:53.190
but to be focused on ideas.

01:42:53.510 --> 01:42:59.030
There's a great quote that the strength of a field is measured by how quickly it

01:42:59.030 --> 01:43:00.870
forgets its founders.

01:43:02.150 --> 01:43:05.670
And it means that that field is moving on, right?

01:43:05.750 --> 01:43:06.870
And coming up with new ideas.

01:43:06.950 --> 01:43:10.150
Like Darwin's ideas aren't right because Darwin said them.

01:43:10.310 --> 01:43:12.870
They're right because there's a crap ton of evidence for it.

01:43:13.670 --> 01:43:19.480
And so you could do great evolutionary psychology or evolutionary biology without ever

01:43:19.480 --> 01:43:20.680
reading Darwin.

01:43:20.920 --> 01:43:21.160
Right.

01:43:21.320 --> 01:43:21.880
That's interesting.

01:43:21.960 --> 01:43:25.800
I even when I hear people talk about Darwin and they talk about Darwinian, actually it kind

01:43:25.800 --> 01:43:27.400
of always rub me the wrong way.

01:43:27.640 --> 01:43:29.320
And I think this might be part of it.

01:43:29.480 --> 01:43:33.960
Like that that like I kind of hear like I like I'd rather people talk about like selection

01:43:33.960 --> 01:43:36.760
pressures, like the principles and not the source of the idea.

01:43:36.920 --> 01:43:38.520
Like I uh that's interesting, yeah.

01:43:38.840 --> 01:43:39.160
Yeah.

01:43:39.320 --> 01:43:43.240
It's it we should be good based on you know the the ideas, not not the people.

01:43:43.480 --> 01:43:43.640
Right.

01:43:43.880 --> 01:43:48.130
Um I mean it it ties into your partner choice work.

01:43:48.210 --> 01:43:52.290
You know, you if you're competing to display your your competence, you want to be known as

01:43:52.290 --> 01:43:57.090
the person who had the awesome idea, and we want to all participate in that um uh

01:43:57.250 --> 01:43:59.570
competitive uh altruism dynamic.

01:43:59.650 --> 01:44:04.530
It it suggests you know a reason why we're so interested to uh you know tie things to names

01:44:04.530 --> 01:44:09.730
rather than just the ideas themselves, because it ultimately the the idea was produced by a

01:44:09.730 --> 01:44:14.370
uh status seeking primate who wants credit for it, uh and it's hard to step out of that to

01:44:14.370 --> 01:44:15.330
do good science.

01:44:15.820 --> 01:44:19.900
Yeah, it it will affect the the incentives for uh for for science.

01:44:19.980 --> 01:44:23.020
So yeah, we gotta we do gotta be cautious of that.

01:44:23.180 --> 01:44:23.820
Yeah.

01:44:24.220 --> 01:44:28.620
Um but yeah I I I don't know what else you want me to say about Martin uh Martin Margot.

01:44:28.780 --> 01:44:33.740
Margot unfortunately died of of cancer in 2009, which was a I think a great loss to the

01:44:33.740 --> 01:44:39.590
field, not only for her um her science, but because um, you know,

01:44:39.750 --> 01:44:41.030
her her humanity.

01:44:41.190 --> 01:44:45.430
So she was always big on bringing different groups on board, right?

01:44:45.510 --> 01:44:50.470
People who might not normally have have had a voice and and and bringing them and making

01:44:50.470 --> 01:44:55.270
sure that they had a seat at the table, um, you know, reaching out to people in uh in other

01:44:55.270 --> 01:45:00.720
countries, you know, to help uh facilitate the the developing evolutionary communities in

01:45:00.720 --> 01:45:02.400
those uh in those countries.

01:45:02.640 --> 01:45:07.920
Um they were some of the people who got um the human behavior and evolution society going.

01:45:08.080 --> 01:45:12.720
So it was kind of a collection of people from um McMaster University, which is where they

01:45:12.720 --> 01:45:18.720
were at the time, and uh University of Michigan and I believe North uh Northwestern, um,

01:45:18.880 --> 01:45:20.400
you know, kind of all meeting up.

01:45:20.480 --> 01:45:25.360
And so those three universities was kind of foring, forming the core of uh of HBAS.

01:45:26.210 --> 01:45:28.850
So, you know, and it took off from there.

01:45:29.650 --> 01:45:34.290
But also, I think their uh fostering of good science.

01:45:34.450 --> 01:45:39.570
And I I this is one of these stories about Martin of about uh Margot Wilson that I love, is

01:45:39.810 --> 01:45:42.290
uh I was giving a job talk.

01:45:42.450 --> 01:45:47.810
Uh and I had prepared this talk and I was giving it to the lab, and I could kind of see

01:45:47.900 --> 01:45:49.820
that it was not going so well.

01:45:49.980 --> 01:45:54.940
And I have to preface this by saying Margot Wilson was one of the loveliest human beings

01:45:54.940 --> 01:46:00.300
ever, just very warm, very generous just a person.

01:46:00.620 --> 01:46:03.660
And so at the end of the talk, and I can see you know it wasn't going so great.

01:46:03.820 --> 01:46:09.020
And I finish the talk, and she just looks at me and she's just like, that was shit.

01:46:11.660 --> 01:46:17.090
And she's like, but we're gonna work with you to make sure that you get it to where it

01:46:17.090 --> 01:46:17.490
needs to be.

01:46:17.650 --> 01:46:20.770
And so for the next week, every night they work with me on it.

01:46:20.850 --> 01:46:24.610
And like it only works because Margo was the sweetest human being ever.

01:46:24.770 --> 01:46:29.330
So, like, when you're talking about intentions, you know that her intentions were really

01:46:29.330 --> 01:46:35.330
good because they uh you know, you know, and it was not this this self seeking, like,

01:46:35.490 --> 01:46:37.250
I'm better than you kind of thing.

01:46:37.410 --> 01:46:42.860
No, it was this warmth being like, you are not meeting your full potential.

01:46:43.100 --> 01:46:43.580
Right.

01:46:43.820 --> 01:46:47.740
Let us help you to reach your full potential.

01:46:48.060 --> 01:46:53.820
And you know, I love that, I I love that attitude of, you know what, as a field,

01:46:53.980 --> 01:46:56.860
I think we would benefit from saying, you know what?

01:46:57.420 --> 01:46:58.860
We can do better.

01:46:59.020 --> 01:46:59.900
This is good.

01:46:59.980 --> 01:47:01.340
Let's take it and do better.

01:47:01.420 --> 01:47:07.050
I and I mean, I wouldn't advocate you know that sort of language in in general because you

01:47:07.050 --> 01:47:08.170
don't know the intention.

01:47:08.330 --> 01:47:08.410
Right.

01:47:08.570 --> 01:47:12.170
You know, if if if I were if I were to say to some random person that was shit, they'd be

01:47:12.170 --> 01:47:13.930
like, wow, Pat's a real asshole.

01:47:14.330 --> 01:47:18.170
Um there's some petter, there's some people on Twitter that could use that advice, Pat,

01:47:18.250 --> 01:47:18.570
actually.

01:47:18.810 --> 01:47:19.210
Yeah.

01:47:19.530 --> 01:47:25.050
Um, but but I think the general attitude of, you know what, let's let's police ourselves to

01:47:25.050 --> 01:47:30.180
make sure that it is all good quality, that we don't have those

01:47:30.740 --> 01:47:32.820
control conditions left unrun.

01:47:33.220 --> 01:47:37.940
To make sure that we plug the holes, to make sure that we deal with the alternative

01:47:37.940 --> 01:47:41.540
explanations, and that it's all communicated well.

01:47:42.100 --> 01:47:48.100
I love that attitude of combining very strong scientific rigor, but also with the

01:47:48.100 --> 01:47:53.110
warmth to be like, okay, let us let's bring up everybody, you know, we'll bring up

01:47:53.110 --> 01:47:57.750
everybody and help everybody to do good stuff, but also making sure that we don't, you

01:47:57.750 --> 01:48:03.270
know, accept substandard stuff to make sure that we uh you know we we have

01:48:03.590 --> 01:48:09.350
demandingness in our work in order so that it it ends up being cited in another 50 years as

01:48:09.350 --> 01:48:13.110
good, solid stuff that survived the replication crisis.

01:48:13.270 --> 01:48:16.150
Um, you know, and that ends up having a lasting impact.

01:48:16.480 --> 01:48:22.240
Yeah, kind and competence so the kind, unkind, competent, incompetent is a two by two

01:48:22.240 --> 01:48:26.320
cell, and you can occupy the kind, competent cell of that.

01:48:26.720 --> 01:48:30.240
That's I think a good goal so good goal for everybody.

01:48:30.560 --> 01:48:32.960
And a kind of altruistic criticism.

01:48:33.120 --> 01:48:37.830
Because oftentimes criticism is interpreted as competitive and aggressive.

01:48:38.390 --> 01:48:39.190
Because often it is.

01:48:39.910 --> 01:48:40.710
Because it often is.

01:48:40.870 --> 01:48:41.030
Yes.

01:48:41.270 --> 01:48:43.590
Uh but often it it is altruistic.

01:48:43.670 --> 01:48:46.550
And it is the the intent is is to help rather than to hurt.

01:48:47.190 --> 01:48:47.670
Exactly.

01:48:47.830 --> 01:48:48.070
Yeah.

01:48:48.230 --> 01:48:48.550
Yeah.

01:48:48.790 --> 01:48:54.710
And I I think well well meaning um you know and this is maybe the you know the the private

01:48:54.710 --> 01:48:57.430
comments versus the public Twitter comments, right?

01:48:57.590 --> 01:48:59.670
Those are just self aggrandizing.

01:48:59.910 --> 01:49:03.510
But you know the private like, hey this is good, but you know here's you know here's some

01:49:03.510 --> 01:49:06.220
ways you can make it better uh, I think is is good.

01:49:06.300 --> 01:49:11.420
And I think that's a good model, you know, to uh to to aim for, you know, the monk model of

01:49:11.420 --> 01:49:15.020
doing good work rather than the flashiness and doing and doing it well.

01:49:15.180 --> 01:49:21.020
And providing the provide private criticism to uh you know to bring everybody's work up.

01:49:21.180 --> 01:49:23.260
So I'm sure you have criticisms of my own stuff.

01:49:23.420 --> 01:49:26.060
And please, I'd love to hear them so I can make it better.

01:49:26.140 --> 01:49:28.700
You know, but we'll maybe do this uh do that off camera.

01:49:28.940 --> 01:49:31.470
Uh no, no, Bar Barclay, your stuff is spotless.

01:49:31.550 --> 01:49:35.230
I couldn't find a a thing to criticize in there if if I if I my life depended on it.

01:49:35.550 --> 01:49:37.070
Keep shoveling there, Pins off.

01:49:38.590 --> 01:49:44.270
Well, I mean, I think uh in that respect, I think Pat you have done uh a wonderful

01:49:44.270 --> 01:49:50.180
job sort of continuing Mar uh We should have Martin on, but Margot We

01:49:50.180 --> 01:49:51.700
need to have Lita on as well.

01:49:52.100 --> 01:49:53.780
It'd be fun to have them on together.

01:49:54.260 --> 01:49:58.580
I do remember John, who also we lost more recently than Margot.

01:49:59.220 --> 01:50:00.980
He talked about Margot.

01:50:01.460 --> 01:50:02.660
I think it was at HBus.

01:50:02.820 --> 01:50:04.820
He was sort of like a memorial.

01:50:05.060 --> 01:50:07.860
And he talked about, he showed a picture of where she grew up.

01:50:07.940 --> 01:50:11.910
And I remember the one thing that stuck with me was he said, and you might know about this

01:50:12.070 --> 01:50:17.190
too, Pat, where he said she sort of had a difficult childhood, like it was sort of a rough

01:50:17.270 --> 01:50:22.310
physically, like I mean, I think she like grew up in like kind of a physically challenging,

01:50:22.390 --> 01:50:25.190
like kind of in the woods in Canada's north, yeah.

01:50:25.350 --> 01:50:31.030
Um, and John's take on that was sort of it opened her eyes to sort of um

01:50:31.510 --> 01:50:37.430
that life can be difficult, and it's important to sort of be sober about

01:50:37.720 --> 01:50:43.320
what exists and to sort of I I don't know how to put it, but he sort of argued that he

01:50:43.320 --> 01:50:49.240
thinks it sort of allowed her to sort of operate and look at things that other

01:50:49.240 --> 01:50:52.040
people might look away from, like homicide.

01:50:52.520 --> 01:50:58.200
Not because it was salacious or to sort of be statusy about it, but to sort of say

01:50:58.360 --> 01:51:03.690
this is really insightful because, you know, as they argued, you know, most homicides

01:51:03.930 --> 01:51:05.930
people are motivated to figure out why it happened.

01:51:06.090 --> 01:51:07.930
It's a really rich data source.

01:51:08.090 --> 01:51:12.730
It's really clearly showing the output of strong motivations, you know, like it's not a

01:51:13.530 --> 01:51:14.810
strong passions involved.

01:51:15.050 --> 01:51:15.450
Exactly.

01:51:15.610 --> 01:51:18.170
So you're really getting at a big part of human nature.

01:51:18.250 --> 01:51:24.100
Um but it's it's also a data set that um, you know you don't have like

01:51:24.100 --> 01:51:25.940
self-you know self-reporting bias, right?

01:51:26.340 --> 01:51:29.300
People self-presenting themselves in a in a particular way.

01:51:29.540 --> 01:51:29.780
Yes.

01:51:30.020 --> 01:51:35.140
Um they initially you know got into that because with the you know child abuse data, people

01:51:35.540 --> 01:51:37.940
could always say, Well, maybe there's a reporting bias.

01:51:38.100 --> 01:51:38.260
Right.

01:51:38.420 --> 01:51:42.660
Okay, well, let's look at homicide because you know the vast majority of those get

01:51:42.660 --> 01:51:43.830
reported, right?

01:51:43.910 --> 01:51:47.590
So it's and it's just it's just a better data set and they found even stronger effects.

01:51:47.910 --> 01:51:48.070
Right.

01:51:48.310 --> 01:51:51.990
It's not like the people, it's not like homicides are found up by self-report of just the

01:51:51.990 --> 01:51:53.830
people who admit to killing people, right?

01:51:53.990 --> 01:51:54.150
Right.

01:51:54.230 --> 01:51:54.870
It's that yeah.

01:51:55.030 --> 01:51:59.430
When when when we discover a body, there's an independent, disinterested group that are

01:51:59.430 --> 01:52:00.790
trying to figure out what happened.

01:52:01.190 --> 01:52:01.430
Yeah.

01:52:01.750 --> 01:52:06.630
There was a paper a while back about calling psychology is the science of self-report and

01:52:06.630 --> 01:52:07.990
finger pressing, right?

01:52:08.070 --> 01:52:11.910
You know, your you know experiment, you know, dink, dink, dink, dink, dink, or self-report.

01:52:12.280 --> 01:52:14.200
um, you know, what happened to behavior?

01:52:14.280 --> 01:52:18.040
And I, you know, I think looking at things like you know, homicide data is a great example

01:52:18.200 --> 01:52:20.440
of there's there's real behavior involved here.

01:52:20.760 --> 01:52:21.320
Yeah.

01:52:22.360 --> 01:52:26.360
Well, um, but yeah, thank you for uh for being with us today.

01:52:26.440 --> 01:52:32.280
And yeah, really um I can't over emphasize that uh if people haven't looked up Pat

01:52:32.600 --> 01:52:38.170
your work, um they should look you up and um uh yeah, and just thank you for for

01:52:38.170 --> 01:52:43.210
helping solve this this problem of cooperation uh and doing it in a way that is not snake

01:52:43.290 --> 01:52:48.970
oily and that very much is in keeping with Margot's spirit of sort of doing

01:52:48.970 --> 01:52:54.730
things carefully um and and not in a uh flashy status-seeky

01:52:54.730 --> 01:52:55.050
way.

01:52:55.450 --> 01:52:55.770
Thank you.

01:52:55.930 --> 01:52:56.170
Thank you.

01:52:56.250 --> 01:52:57.370
And thank you for having me on here.

01:52:57.450 --> 01:52:58.010
It's been great.

01:52:58.090 --> 01:53:03.530
And, you know, thank you for hosting this this podcast and getting uh ideas out to uh to

01:53:03.530 --> 01:53:03.930
everybody.

01:53:04.010 --> 01:53:08.420
You know, you're doing a great job of uh yeah uh exposing people to some uh great

01:53:08.420 --> 01:53:11.940
researchers I've you know listened to some of the other people you've had on here and

01:53:11.940 --> 01:53:12.660
they're fantastic.

01:53:12.820 --> 01:53:15.700
So I'm I'm honored to be in that category.

01:53:16.180 --> 01:53:16.580
Thank you.

01:53:16.740 --> 01:53:20.820
And we're gonna honored that that you spent some time chatting with us and we and we'd love

01:53:20.820 --> 01:53:22.660
to have you back sometime, of course.

01:53:22.820 --> 01:53:27.540
Um this was a wonderful conversation and uh yeah we have to have you back and we love the

01:53:27.540 --> 01:53:32.260
idea of sort of getting return people uh just talking about other stuff now, you know, once

01:53:32.260 --> 01:53:37.810
we get under the uh under what what you do um so to pick our brains uh as a as a group but

01:53:37.970 --> 01:53:43.250
thank you so much pat uh it was wonderful um yeah yeah thank you thank you very much

01:53:47.650 --> 01:53:53.650
so uh you have spent another couple hours with uh david and myself congratulations or i'm

01:53:53.650 --> 01:53:59.580
sorry depending on how you feel about it Uh, if you enjoyed the

01:53:59.580 --> 01:54:03.740
time you spent listening to us, uh please say so.

01:54:03.980 --> 01:54:05.260
Tell people about it.

01:54:05.420 --> 01:54:11.260
Um, you know, write us a kind review, uh, write about us on social media, uh,

01:54:11.420 --> 01:54:13.260
anything to help spread the word.

01:54:13.420 --> 01:54:18.140
Um, we we we do this uh with with the hope of actually reaching people, and the only way we

01:54:18.140 --> 01:54:22.070
can reach people is if is if you help us out uh by spreading the word.

01:54:22.470 --> 01:54:22.870
That's right.

01:54:22.950 --> 01:54:23.990
We have such wonderful guests.

01:54:24.070 --> 01:54:27.190
And I mean one of the reasons we're doing it too is because we have the wonderful guests we

01:54:27.190 --> 01:54:29.910
have on are uh not all of one reached.

01:54:29.990 --> 01:54:35.110
Um so yeah, to whatever extent it feels like weird to um uh

01:54:35.990 --> 01:54:41.750
click on something to broaden the reach, just remember that there's all kinds of uh

01:54:41.910 --> 01:54:45.510
someone else will do it for someone else who isn't as deserving.

01:54:45.670 --> 01:54:47.110
Let's let's put it that way.

01:54:47.400 --> 01:54:48.920
Yes, absolutely.

01:54:49.160 --> 01:54:51.080
So uh please do your part.

01:54:51.160 --> 01:54:55.240
And uh yeah, we'll see you next time with another awesome guest.

01:54:55.560 --> 01:54:56.360
Sounds good, David.

01:54:56.440 --> 01:54:57.720
I'll see you in about a week.

01:54:57.960 --> 01:54:58.600
Sounds good.

01:54:58.760 --> 01:54:59.080
All right.

01:54:59.320 --> 01:54:59.720
Bye.

01:54:59.960 --> 01:55:00.440
Bye.