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I'm David Pinsoff.

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I'm David Petrozowski.

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And this is Evolutionary Psychology, the podcast where actual evolutionary psychologists

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are actually evolutionary psychology.

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Yeah, they they do it and they talk about it.

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Enjoy.

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It's great.

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David, today we have a very special guest.

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Uh who is that guest?

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It's me, David.

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It's me.

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Wow.

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So I'm really not a guest.

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No, you're one of the co-hosts, but you're also a guest in this episode.

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Uh and it is our first uh solo episode with just the two of us in a long time.

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And I really uh I was missing having those because uh I always have a blast just doing

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one-on-one convos with you.

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And I think this one uh was no exception to that rule of those conversations being a blast.

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Uh and what what do we what do we talk about in this one?

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We had no choice but to talk about oh, that's a bad joke, free will.

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Yeah, that's right.

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All the implications, the philosophy, the psychology, the ethics,

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uh everything there is that revolves around this topic of free will.

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It really it it's a topic that energizes people in kind of an unexpected way for how

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abstruse and technical it is.

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Like people get really fired up about it and engaged in this question of whether or not we

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have free will.

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And so we get into why uh we as humans are.

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Yeah, yeah.

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Anybody whose sort of eyes are rolling back in the back of their head and they're like, oh

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my god, I don't want to listen to this.

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Um it this I think this is a very different conversation.

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It really like it cuts to an adaptationist approach to free will.

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And as David said, it there's a theory of why people feel strongly or

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feel anything about this, and that's part of the theory, too.

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So um, if you if you have any if you think you hate free will as an enterprise of

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sort of human inquiry, this episode might also be for you.

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Exactly.

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I think it's for people who love the free will debate and hate the free will debate in

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equal measure.

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Yeah.

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Um so yeah this was a this was a really fun one.

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Um you will have no choice but to enjoy it.

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Thanks David.

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All right David, I hit record.

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All right, we did it.

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It's our first solo episode in a long time.

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A long time yeah yeah I'm I'm I'm already pre pre uh exhausted from

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talking about what we're going to talk about today.

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Yeah, the the the pre-podcast discussion already uh yeah no but well but no but

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specifically free will so there's like a quote from I think it's Rumi who's like a Persian

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poet I mean um if people know I'm sure whatever century he was twelfth century or something

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I don't know um and it said it's basically like this is a disputation that will you know uh

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occupy mankind until like the sun explodes.

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Uh and that and that is against the partisans and necessitarians of uh free will or

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something like that.

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Oh man.

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So it's been millennia.

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I guess we're fulfilling uh Rumi's prophecy um against our own free will.

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It's fate.

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We're doomed to justn't we couldn't do otherwise, yeah.

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So, David, I have been I have been foolishly tackling free will.

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There's two parts to it.

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One is theoretical, conceptual, the other one is empirical.

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Um and I'm just gonna let you ask questions because there's so much to talk about.

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And I'm I only want to take about five minutes.

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So yeah, we're honestly I'm excited to learn things about this um because I'm I find this

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topic inherently interesting.

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I also find your your research and your perspective uh interesting.

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And so I'm happy to marry these two things.

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And I didn't I wasn't even aware there was empirical stuff, so I'm excited to learn about

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it.

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Yeah, we're in the middle.

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We're about to run it.

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Um in fact we actually just started highlighting it, but we have a enormous bank of studies

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planned.

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Yeah.

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Fantastic.

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All right.

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So I guess the first thing I I want to ask is like it's kind of an unusual topic for an

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evolutionary psychologist.

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You know, when people think about free will, they think about uh philosophy.

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Um, it's not usually the type of thing that an evolutionary psychologist would study.

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So, what business do you have uh uh nosing your way into this uh millennia-long

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debate?

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Yeah, no one none.

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None no.

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Uh I mean, yeah, that is the actual answer.

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Um, but it but it in some sense, this is always this goes in the category too of um

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somebody commented in one of our uh recent um yeah about how many times I say um on

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YouTube.

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So I really have to cut out my ums.

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I don't I don't usually uh say um when I'm teaching, but I think there's something about

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the zoom.

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We all have our ticks.

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Yeah.

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I my my favorite is uh.

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So you know maybe maybe I'll start saying um and you can say uh great.

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Yeah.

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So I have no business, is the short answer.

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The long answer is that as an adaptationist, I have business uh inquirying and inquiring

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into any aspect of human existence that is caused by adaptations, and

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specifically any concept that a human being is appealing to

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ultimately is a product of some constellation of adaptations.

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So when we talk about, you know, my mother or

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a chair or free will, part of being an adaptationist is saying,

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look, there's an organism that has a representation of something.

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And as an adaptationist, my job, if I want to be responsible for explaining

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this slice of reality, is to figure out what slap what slice of

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all of the adaptations in this organism are causing them to be able to represent the mother

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or the chair, or in this case, free will.

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And that's that third one is one I just picked off.

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So in that sense, I I am allowed as an adaptationist in the sense that all human

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activity, which includes scientific and philosophical inquiry, is up for grabs when

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you're an adaptationist.

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I I love that perspective.

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Um I I uh I wish it were more common.

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Um, you know, humans are animals.

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Uh philosophy and philosophizing is one of the things that we as animals do.

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Uh animals are bundles of adaptations and their byproducts.

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Uh and if we want to understand something like philosophy or philosophizing, we need to

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understand how it emerges from the adaptations and their byproducts.

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Uh and I see no alternative to understanding philosophical discourse except in

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those terms.

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It it kind of um would be unsettling for the participants in the philosophical discourse to

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see their own philosophizing explained in those terms.

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Um I I would suspect.

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Uh I don't know, do do people get uncomfortable?

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Do philosophers get uncomfortable with this approach?

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I mean, you know, psychology is a slow moving boat.

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Um, you know, it's like I the I think it was some politician used the metaphor of, you

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know, changing the government is like a steering a cruise ship.

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Uh, you know, and so if psychology is a cruise ship, you know, philosophy is, I don't know,

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a continent or something, I think it's a lot more slow going.

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I the I I do think, number one, I've only had a little bit of

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interaction with professional philosophers, like about this free will project.

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I talked to Christian Liszt, he's been very positive.

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Um, but the so that's the short answer is because

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I'm not one of them, there hasn't been too much reaction.

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But my reading of philosophy is this is sort of the logical consequence of what philosophy

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has already been doing.

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So at least since um sounds like really pretentious.

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Well, I would say like Wittgenstein or even oh yeah, like even um Kant, Emmanuel

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Kant, I think was an evolutionary psychologist.

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If you actually look at him, his point is: look, we're you can't there's no perspective

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independence in philosophy, and you can't understand what philosophy is

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unless you understand sort of the psychology that we're bringing to bear.

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I mean that's sort of his point indifferent.

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And so I do think that uh this is an inevitable part of adaptationism

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solidifying itself into human inquiry, is that um the there will

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be the the additional part of adaptationism entering into

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philosophy and and yeah, so I so I I I whether or not

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the individualist analysis is whether or not the philosopher

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the individual philosophers themselves um would agree or disagree just because you know

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they're humans and they want they they've had their own they've committed to their own

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status schemes in your language.

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Um I think that you can see a line of

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psychology generally becoming integrated into philosophy, um,

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at least in the sense of like Kant and these other folks thinking the we

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are using our own minds to do this enterprise.

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Um and and so um so I don't think that it's contrary to

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philosophy or even revolutionary.

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I think the philosophers got there first of being like this whole philosophy thing is sort

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of BS to the extent that we're actually just using our psychology to do it,

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and antipationism is just the next um part of pushing on that.

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Yeah, it's the next step of using psychological analysis to uh yield

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philosophical insight.

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Right.

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Um and I I want to actually bolster your point that this is a topic that should be of

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interest to evolutionary psychologists.

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Um and this occurred to me when I was looking at Donald Brown's list of human universals.

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So we talked about this on our very first episode, I believe, or maybe it was our second

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episode.

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Um, how this was inspiring for both of us, seeing a list of things that uh this

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anthropologist, Donald Brown, uh cataloged uh as as being universal across human cultures,

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or at least uh uh across the ethnographic record that he looked at uh in his book, Human

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Universals.

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And so I happened to be looking at this list uh for a different project.

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Uh and while I was looking at it, a few items jumped out at me uh, and I had the thought,

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oh, Dave should know about this.

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This is relevant to what Dave's working on.

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Uh and I started looking through it and I found all these things that make a pretty good

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case that the conceptual machinery underlying free will may well be a part of human nature,

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may be a part of the human cognitive phenotype.

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So here are all the things that I found in Don Brown's list that are relevant to the free

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will debate.

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You did your homework.

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I did my homework.

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So uh the first one is intention, The concept of intention or intending to do something

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is universal across cultures, at least according to Donald Brown.

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Choice making or choosing alternatives, universal.

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Decision making.

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This one's really interesting.

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Actions under self-control, distinguished from those not under control.

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That I find incredibly fascinating.

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That that distinction is made uh in so many cultures.

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Culture slash nature distinction.

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The distinction between something caused by culture or nature.

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Discrepancies between speech, thought, and action.

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So doing something that is contrary to one's uh words or thoughts.

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Uh self-distinguished from other.

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That one's pretty obvious, but it's I think relevant.

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Uh sanctions for crimes against the collectivity and redress of wrongs.

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So this is suggestive that there's some notion of deserts in the way we hold people

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responsible and punish them.

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Self as neither wholly passive nor wholly autonomous.

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Self as subject and object.

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And this one I find incredibly fascinating.

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Self is responsible.

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Yeah.

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So all those things I think are part and parcel of the discourse on free will.

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Yeah.

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Uh and I think this this at least we have a very strong uh prima facie case that uh

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the way we think about and talk about free will uh is rooted in fundamental aspects of the

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human cognitive phenotype, or at least the conceptual machinery that we bring to bear, this

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this is a pretty good candidate for being a part of human nature.

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So I think you're hitting on something that ought to be of interest to evolutionary social

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scientists.

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Yeah, I love that.

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And there's been a few people who I've talked to who are very dyed in the wool

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adaptationists who are sort of like, why are you doing free will at all?

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And in some sense, I say to them, just snip out free will and just say, look, there's a

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class of adaptations that are really important that you've just covered really nicely, that

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there hasn't been enough conceptual work, task analyses of empirical inquiry

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into that are really fundamental straightforward things that you would expect to be in an

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organism like us.

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Um so, yes, that um uh I would argue there's a

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large swath of the evolved phenotype that hasn't been looked at really.

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Um, and uh free will is a way into it.

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So free will has been a point of contention for millennia.

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You think, correct me if I'm wrong, you have a solution to this age-old quandary.

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Or at least some kind of solution.

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I think we have a new idea that moves our understanding of it forward.

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Um, and I do think there is a solution to it, but it's sort of the the Douglas Adams,

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you know, the the um what is the Douglas Adams book?

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The um maybe it's Hitchhiker's Guide or Life, the Universe, the something like that.

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But then they in one of the they said this is science fiction, Douglas Adams, where do you

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do you know Douglas Adams, David?

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Yes, I'm a fan.

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Yeah, Um so they make this giant supercomputer and it calculates the answer to life, the

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universe, and everything, and it spits out the answer.

242
00:14:23,190 --> 00:14:24,310
Do you remember what the answer is?

243
00:14:24,550 --> 00:14:25,270
Yes, 42.

244
00:14:25,590 --> 00:14:26,310
42, right?

245
00:14:26,390 --> 00:14:26,630
Exactly.

246
00:14:26,710 --> 00:14:26,870
Yeah.

247
00:14:27,350 --> 00:14:28,310
Wonderful, wonderful moment.

248
00:14:28,470 --> 00:14:29,030
Yeah, exactly.

249
00:14:29,190 --> 00:14:33,430
And in in this, the answer to the problem of free will is sort of like that.

250
00:14:33,590 --> 00:14:37,830
Um but but we do think there's an answer, and I do think there's a way to sort of look past

251
00:14:37,830 --> 00:14:38,150
it.

252
00:14:38,390 --> 00:14:40,390
Um and I uh yeah.

253
00:14:40,470 --> 00:14:42,470
So I I think we have something new to say about it.

254
00:14:42,550 --> 00:14:42,870
Yeah.

255
00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:06,200
So how do what is mismatch doing here?

256
00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:07,400
How what role is it playing?

257
00:15:07,480 --> 00:15:07,560
Yeah.

258
00:15:08,730 --> 00:15:09,210
so this is true.

259
00:15:09,370 --> 00:15:11,130
So there's been two parts to this.

260
00:15:11,210 --> 00:15:14,810
So since this has been something people have been worked working on for a really long time,

261
00:15:14,970 --> 00:15:16,490
it took some time to do.

262
00:15:16,650 --> 00:15:18,570
So there were two parts to this.

263
00:15:18,730 --> 00:15:24,170
The first part was um an adaptationist approach to the

264
00:15:24,330 --> 00:15:28,730
adaptations that are underlying what people are talking about when they talk about free

265
00:15:28,730 --> 00:15:28,970
will.

266
00:15:29,290 --> 00:15:35,210
And I have a our there's a and so this is basically a psychological explanation of

267
00:15:35,210 --> 00:15:37,850
what people are talking about.

268
00:15:38,940 --> 00:15:44,780
and then a psychological explanation of why there have been a there's been

269
00:15:44,780 --> 00:15:50,220
a debate about why science is maybe

270
00:15:50,220 --> 00:15:55,180
threatening the existence of free will for some people and not for other people.

271
00:15:55,500 --> 00:16:00,060
So it was the psychology of what are people talking about when they talk about free will.

272
00:16:00,140 --> 00:16:05,270
And then what's the psychology of the people who are debating the one side or the other,

273
00:16:05,510 --> 00:16:11,430
saying there is or isn't free will, or saying that science uh conflicts with free will or

274
00:16:11,430 --> 00:16:11,590
not.

275
00:16:11,750 --> 00:16:17,750
And then that was that was sort of the main first part um of the project, and that's

276
00:16:17,750 --> 00:16:20,950
the one that I've talked about, presented on.

277
00:16:21,270 --> 00:16:27,190
But as we were talking before we started recording, what I realized was sort of implicit

278
00:16:27,190 --> 00:16:32,980
in that thing was the idea of evolutionary mismatch, And

279
00:16:33,140 --> 00:16:38,900
I think the second part of evolutionary mismatch is sort of hitting the nail on the head.

280
00:16:38,980 --> 00:16:40,340
And I didn't realize it at first.

281
00:16:40,420 --> 00:16:45,780
And it's so it's taken me some time to sort of come around to the big picture

282
00:16:46,100 --> 00:16:52,100
idea where you get close to the language of sort of solving the problem of

283
00:16:52,100 --> 00:16:52,660
free will.

284
00:16:52,740 --> 00:16:57,300
And I think it's with this idea of sort of evolutionary mismatch combined with the other

285
00:16:57,300 --> 00:16:59,700
stuff of what's the underlying psychology.

286
00:17:00,310 --> 00:17:05,750
So for those who are unfamiliar, evolutionary mismatch is when the adaptations of an

287
00:17:05,750 --> 00:17:09,990
organism is mismatched with the current environment in which the organism finds itself.

288
00:17:10,390 --> 00:17:14,390
So because humans evolved in a very different environment than the one we now inhabit

289
00:17:14,470 --> 00:17:18,550
because of rapid technological and cultural change, many of our adaptations have failed to

290
00:17:18,550 --> 00:17:20,070
catch up to the current environment.

291
00:17:20,470 --> 00:17:26,310
The examples that are usually given are, you know, our uh craving for junk food and fast

292
00:17:26,310 --> 00:17:28,230
food that you know gives us heart disease.

293
00:17:28,390 --> 00:17:32,480
You know, we talked about this, how it's a bit simplistic in our conversation with Daniel

294
00:17:32,480 --> 00:17:36,000
Nettle, but that's uh an example that people uh bring up.

295
00:17:36,400 --> 00:17:40,000
Um another example is uh birth control and contraception.

296
00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:45,120
Uh I remember Stephen Pinker in his book How the Mind Works said that, you know, maybe give

297
00:17:45,120 --> 00:17:50,530
us another uh thousand generations and we'll evolve to um fear uh

298
00:17:50,530 --> 00:17:54,370
contraception the same way we fear snakes and heights and predators.

299
00:17:54,610 --> 00:17:54,770
Right.

300
00:17:54,930 --> 00:18:00,770
Um but to our credit, I think even the Karen Kramer episode and the um Brooks

301
00:18:00,850 --> 00:18:04,210
Shelza also sort of made added sophistication to that.

302
00:18:04,290 --> 00:18:09,330
That some of the decision making is about investment in the social world competition of

303
00:18:09,330 --> 00:18:15,170
your offspring, such that uh humans are not just maxing max maximizing their offspring

304
00:18:15,330 --> 00:18:15,650
numbers.

305
00:18:15,730 --> 00:18:16,050
Yeah.

306
00:18:16,700 --> 00:18:17,020
That's right.

307
00:18:17,180 --> 00:18:17,420
Yeah.

308
00:18:17,500 --> 00:18:21,900
And so in some ways I think mismatch, the idea of evolutionary mismatch has been a bit

309
00:18:21,900 --> 00:18:24,300
oversold, a bit overstated in evolutionary psychology.

310
00:18:24,380 --> 00:18:30,220
It's it's continuing to be revised by um new insights into the variability of uh human

311
00:18:30,220 --> 00:18:31,500
ancestral environments.

312
00:18:31,740 --> 00:18:35,980
Um Man Vier Singh has done some work on this, that the idea of the small scale uh

313
00:18:35,980 --> 00:18:39,580
egalitarian hunter gatherer society is something of a myth, that there is actually

314
00:18:39,580 --> 00:18:45,230
widespread variation in terms of the degree of of size of hunter-gatherer groups, their uh

315
00:18:45,230 --> 00:18:48,270
hierarchical nature, their centralization.

316
00:18:48,430 --> 00:18:53,390
Um, and so I I'm um continuing to be of the opinion that mismatch is has been a bit

317
00:18:53,390 --> 00:18:55,390
overrated in evolutionary psychology.

318
00:18:56,190 --> 00:19:00,270
But convince me that I'm wrong in the case of well, I'll say I'll say a really short one,

319
00:19:00,350 --> 00:19:05,390
which is also uh sodium sodium vapor lights from Roger Shepherd is a very good example.

320
00:19:05,630 --> 00:19:10,860
So these are lights that you know are different than terrestrial sun illumination in your

321
00:19:10,860 --> 00:19:15,500
car under a sodium vapor light, they become less prevalent because LEDs now.

322
00:19:15,660 --> 00:19:19,020
Um, but your car would look you know purple, but it was red, you know, and it's just

323
00:19:19,020 --> 00:19:24,300
because your visual system just sort of makes assumptions about the the the way the light

324
00:19:24,300 --> 00:19:24,860
works, right?

325
00:19:24,940 --> 00:19:25,980
It's just a mismatch.

326
00:19:26,060 --> 00:19:27,420
Um, so anyway.

327
00:19:27,740 --> 00:19:31,870
Um so this is right.

328
00:19:32,350 --> 00:19:38,190
In order to explain the mismatch part, I think it will be helpful to talk first about

329
00:19:38,830 --> 00:19:43,630
what people are worrying about or talking about when they're talking about free will.

330
00:19:45,070 --> 00:19:46,110
What are we worrying about?

331
00:19:46,270 --> 00:19:46,510
Yeah.

332
00:19:46,590 --> 00:19:48,030
So what is really at stake here?

333
00:19:48,270 --> 00:19:48,510
Yeah.

334
00:19:48,590 --> 00:19:53,710
So if you look back, so sit down, take it, pull up a chair, kids.

335
00:19:53,870 --> 00:19:57,150
Um, so this guy Epicurius, right, from like a long time ago.

336
00:19:57,230 --> 00:20:02,540
Um, but basically what happened was people started doing science and philosophy and they

337
00:20:02,540 --> 00:20:08,460
started realizing okay look sort of the world is understandable and knowable and

338
00:20:08,460 --> 00:20:13,740
the way that um we work ultimately is sort of um

339
00:20:15,020 --> 00:20:21,010
predictable maybe mechanical whether or not it's sort of probabilistic

340
00:20:21,010 --> 00:20:24,050
or deterministic, you know, that's sort of we can have that.

341
00:20:24,210 --> 00:20:25,330
We can talk about that later.

342
00:20:25,490 --> 00:20:31,410
But basically as people started talking about the scientific and conceptual analysis

343
00:20:31,410 --> 00:20:36,610
of like philosophy, people started to realize, well, maybe the way that we work is

344
00:20:36,610 --> 00:20:37,250
knowable.

345
00:20:37,490 --> 00:20:42,400
And then as soon as people started realizing that that might be true, then they realize,

346
00:20:42,560 --> 00:20:46,480
well, that might mean we don't have freedom to choose things.

347
00:20:46,640 --> 00:20:52,640
So, in other words, I walk around making decisions and I'm free to like

348
00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:53,760
do whatever I want to do.

349
00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:58,720
So, like right now, I could like close my computer and get up and go get a cup of coffee if

350
00:20:58,720 --> 00:21:01,200
I wanted to, you know, like that's something I could do.

351
00:21:01,520 --> 00:21:07,330
Um, and so you know, and when I can't do something, like if I got trapped

352
00:21:07,330 --> 00:21:12,130
in this office, it would be pretty distressing, you know, like I care about having my

353
00:21:12,130 --> 00:21:16,530
freedom, and my freedom is real, and uh that's that's a really important thing.

354
00:21:16,850 --> 00:21:22,850
And so we so we all walk around feeling like I can make decisions, I can do what I want to

355
00:21:22,850 --> 00:21:28,690
do, and um and then then comes along this idea, well, actually

356
00:21:28,850 --> 00:21:33,620
the way that you work is with a lunch a bunch of different little systems.

357
00:21:34,340 --> 00:21:38,100
And even in early days, before they even knew what the systems were, you know, the

358
00:21:38,100 --> 00:21:44,100
philosophers sort of decided in principle, somebody someday is going to figure

359
00:21:44,100 --> 00:21:47,780
out all the little mechanical doohickeys that make us up.

360
00:21:48,100 --> 00:21:52,500
And what they realized, and I think anybody who's sort of thinking clearly arrives at this

361
00:21:52,500 --> 00:21:57,540
conclusion is that those little doohickeys don't have free will.

362
00:21:58,050 --> 00:21:58,450
Right.

363
00:21:58,770 --> 00:22:04,370
So if you look inside any part of my

364
00:22:04,370 --> 00:22:10,210
body, there's nothing that corresponds to sort of freedom or decision or whatever.

365
00:22:10,370 --> 00:22:10,690
Yeah.

366
00:22:11,090 --> 00:22:11,250
Yeah.

367
00:22:11,410 --> 00:22:13,970
Your liver is not making decisions.

368
00:22:15,090 --> 00:22:16,930
Your lungs don't have free will.

369
00:22:17,170 --> 00:22:18,210
Uh your pancreas.

370
00:22:18,290 --> 00:22:18,530
Yeah.

371
00:22:18,610 --> 00:22:21,250
These are just mechanical systems that are with inputs and outputs.

372
00:22:21,490 --> 00:22:23,250
And the brain in theory should be no different.

373
00:22:23,570 --> 00:22:23,650
Yeah.

374
00:22:23,730 --> 00:22:28,220
So unlike me, so for me, you know, like I can I can look around.

375
00:22:28,380 --> 00:22:33,020
There's a bunch of inputs to me, but I ultimately at some point I make a decision, you

376
00:22:33,020 --> 00:22:33,180
know.

377
00:22:33,580 --> 00:22:35,100
But there's nothing like that.

378
00:22:35,340 --> 00:22:40,940
If you reduce me or cut me open or break me up conceptually or literally, you don't find

379
00:22:40,940 --> 00:22:41,580
anything like that.

380
00:22:41,820 --> 00:22:47,260
And this is then this fundamentally is the problem of free will, which is that is free will

381
00:22:47,260 --> 00:22:52,730
real given that either in principle or in practice,

382
00:22:53,050 --> 00:22:58,650
if you look into how we work, we don't see anything like

383
00:22:59,290 --> 00:23:03,210
freedom at the level of how we actually work.

384
00:23:03,530 --> 00:23:09,210
And so then people were saying, Well, look, if you if we don't

385
00:23:09,210 --> 00:23:15,180
find freedom down here, then maybe there's no such thing as free will.

386
00:23:15,340 --> 00:23:21,260
And pretty early on, it actually ended up being that some people really felt like that

387
00:23:21,260 --> 00:23:21,980
was true.

388
00:23:22,140 --> 00:23:25,980
And then other people were sort of like, well, that's okay, but we still have freedom.

389
00:23:26,300 --> 00:23:30,620
And this sort of became to be very to gloss over a lot.

390
00:23:31,820 --> 00:23:37,130
This became the free will debate, which is that and the free will debate's complicated

391
00:23:37,130 --> 00:23:41,370
because So I just I want to make sure that we get the three positions that you've just

392
00:23:41,370 --> 00:23:43,370
sketched in the So there are three camps.

393
00:23:43,450 --> 00:23:44,570
It correct me if I'm wrong.

394
00:23:44,970 --> 00:23:47,050
One is that we have no free will.

395
00:23:47,130 --> 00:23:48,170
This is determinism.

396
00:23:48,330 --> 00:23:52,330
We live in a clockwork universe with cause and effect where you can perfectly predict

397
00:23:52,330 --> 00:23:53,290
everything that's going to happen.

398
00:23:53,370 --> 00:23:56,730
If you have perfect knowledge of each state of the universe, you can predict the next

399
00:23:56,730 --> 00:23:56,970
state.

400
00:23:57,130 --> 00:23:58,010
That's determinism.

401
00:23:58,170 --> 00:24:00,570
Free will is an illusion uh F you.

402
00:24:01,580 --> 00:24:06,060
And uh the second camp is uh yes, we do have free will.

403
00:24:06,300 --> 00:24:06,780
F you.

404
00:24:07,260 --> 00:24:11,260
Uh uh, even though there's clockwork stuff in the universe, we are different.

405
00:24:11,420 --> 00:24:17,100
We have souls, we have uh consciousness, we have freedom, and we transcend all that stuff.

406
00:24:17,260 --> 00:24:18,380
That's the second position.

407
00:24:18,620 --> 00:24:22,380
The third position is sort of somewhere in the middle where it's like, yes, we're part of a

408
00:24:22,380 --> 00:24:27,180
clockwork cause-effect universe, and yeah, in theory you could break me down into all my

409
00:24:27,180 --> 00:24:32,230
components, but um that stuff is still compatible with me choosing and me having free will.

410
00:24:32,390 --> 00:24:37,830
So that is the compatibilist uh camp where yes, things are deterministic, but we still have

411
00:24:37,830 --> 00:24:39,990
freedom, and freedom is compatible with determinism.

412
00:24:40,310 --> 00:24:40,630
Yeah.

413
00:24:40,790 --> 00:24:43,590
I yes, it's this is why I was gonna, yeah, exactly.

414
00:24:43,750 --> 00:24:45,270
And I it it's complicated.

415
00:24:45,430 --> 00:24:51,300
So I think for me at least one way to clarify The the sides in the

416
00:24:51,300 --> 00:24:57,220
debate are there are some people who who are incompatibilists who think that

417
00:24:57,860 --> 00:25:02,980
understanding the world, the mechanical world, quote unquote deterministic world.

418
00:25:03,060 --> 00:25:04,900
We'll we'll just glump all these together.

419
00:25:05,060 --> 00:25:08,260
We'll we can always it's worth noting that even some people even think that an

420
00:25:08,260 --> 00:25:10,740
indeterministic world is also incompatible with free will.

421
00:25:10,980 --> 00:25:15,330
Like if stuff was random, like just like quantum fluctuations or whatever, like that's not

422
00:25:15,330 --> 00:25:16,450
really compatible with free will either.

423
00:25:16,530 --> 00:25:21,010
I'm just behaving randomly as a result of like you know random quantum fluctuations.

424
00:25:21,170 --> 00:25:22,530
That doesn't make me any more free, right?

425
00:25:22,770 --> 00:25:22,850
Yeah.

426
00:25:22,930 --> 00:25:23,410
So anyway.

427
00:25:23,650 --> 00:25:29,410
So there's incom so people who are um who think that there's a conflict, we'll just call it

428
00:25:29,410 --> 00:25:32,850
between like m be a mechanical view of the world and free will.

429
00:25:33,170 --> 00:25:33,650
Yeah.

430
00:25:34,180 --> 00:25:36,420
That that's a whole category people.

431
00:25:36,500 --> 00:25:39,220
And you can actually end up on two different places with that.

432
00:25:39,300 --> 00:25:39,460
Right.

433
00:25:39,620 --> 00:25:42,820
So you accept the premise that they're incompatible.

434
00:25:43,460 --> 00:25:48,180
But then you can say, Well, I don't think there's free will.

435
00:25:48,420 --> 00:25:50,740
And you go with the world is mechanical.

436
00:25:50,980 --> 00:25:51,140
Right.

437
00:25:51,380 --> 00:25:52,020
Right.

438
00:25:52,500 --> 00:25:57,380
And um, and those are sometimes called like it's uh it's called will illusionism, where

439
00:25:57,380 --> 00:26:02,020
it's just you just you just you say it's an illusion, and this would be like Sam Harris or

440
00:26:04,030 --> 00:26:05,710
uh why can't I think of his name?

441
00:26:05,790 --> 00:26:08,110
The zebras don't get all Robert Sapolsky, yeah.

442
00:26:08,190 --> 00:26:08,750
Uh that's right.

443
00:26:09,390 --> 00:26:14,270
So these are people who say, look, you guys who are not hard, we're hard-nosed scientists

444
00:26:14,270 --> 00:26:20,110
in FU to everyone who's wishfully thinking out there that food exists,

445
00:26:20,270 --> 00:26:22,350
nope it doesn't, grow up.

446
00:26:22,510 --> 00:26:24,910
That's their yeah.

447
00:26:25,380 --> 00:26:26,900
I don't agree with those people.

448
00:26:27,060 --> 00:26:29,780
Um or or the I'm not as as the Aussies would say.

449
00:26:30,020 --> 00:26:30,500
Yeah, exactly.

450
00:26:30,660 --> 00:26:31,060
Exactly.

451
00:26:31,220 --> 00:26:36,340
So so those are Willusionists and they they accept that the the conflict, right?

452
00:26:36,420 --> 00:26:37,860
The premise that there's a conflict.

453
00:26:38,100 --> 00:26:40,660
There's other people who believe in free will.

454
00:26:40,820 --> 00:26:42,100
They're called libertarians.

455
00:26:42,180 --> 00:26:46,810
It has nothing to do with the political party, but it's that they believe that, yeah, a

456
00:26:46,810 --> 00:26:51,130
mechanical view of the world is incompatible with free will, but they believe free will

457
00:26:51,130 --> 00:26:51,610
exists.

458
00:26:51,770 --> 00:26:55,530
And so they sort of believe, like kind of, I mean, if you really push on it, it's like sort

459
00:26:55,530 --> 00:27:00,810
of almost spiritualist, where it's sort of yeah, there's some uh invisible essence that

460
00:27:00,890 --> 00:27:05,290
that is transcendent over the gooey meat stuff.

461
00:27:05,370 --> 00:27:05,530
Right.

462
00:27:05,690 --> 00:27:05,850
Yeah.

463
00:27:05,930 --> 00:27:06,090
Yeah.

464
00:27:06,250 --> 00:27:06,490
Yeah.

465
00:27:07,210 --> 00:27:13,160
So those are two different uh results of this of the same accepted

466
00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:17,480
premise that the meat and the freedom are incompatible.

467
00:27:17,880 --> 00:27:18,120
Yes.

468
00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:19,160
That's a really interesting point.

469
00:27:19,240 --> 00:27:22,440
That in some sense they uh their disagreement stems from a deeper agreement.

470
00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:22,760
Yeah.

471
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:26,680
They both are seeing the world the same way, that there is this fundamental conflict, and

472
00:27:26,680 --> 00:27:28,520
they just resolve that conflict in different ways.

473
00:27:29,000 --> 00:27:29,240
Completely.

474
00:27:29,320 --> 00:27:29,720
Yep, exactly.

475
00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:30,520
Okay, cool.

476
00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:33,960
Um and then and as you put it, then there's sort of a third category which is

477
00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:39,630
compatibleists, which who reject the that that meat and freedom are are not

478
00:27:39,630 --> 00:27:44,030
compatible, or or I don't know too many negatives, but basically they say that look, meat

479
00:27:44,030 --> 00:27:50,030
and freedom are compatible, and that everything, you know, like you know, going

480
00:27:50,430 --> 00:27:56,190
going to the store, listening to music, um, you know, seeing things, this is all made

481
00:27:56,190 --> 00:27:57,310
possible by meat.

482
00:27:57,550 --> 00:27:59,870
So why wouldn't my freedom be any different?

483
00:28:00,140 --> 00:28:00,380
right?

484
00:28:00,700 --> 00:28:02,540
The ability to choose is just made possible.

485
00:28:02,700 --> 00:28:07,180
I mean, and so this is somebody like Dan Dennett or Dina Roskies, or like me.

486
00:28:07,260 --> 00:28:09,500
I mean, I'm I'm I am a compatibilist.

487
00:28:09,660 --> 00:28:15,420
Although, again, upon in doing this project, I also realized, in some sense, what

488
00:28:15,420 --> 00:28:20,380
we're saying in this project about the up psych of free will

489
00:28:20,930 --> 00:28:24,850
argues that the compatibilists aren't entirely right either and that the incompatibilists

490
00:28:24,930 --> 00:28:25,570
do have a point.

491
00:28:25,650 --> 00:28:27,650
So I sort of even transcended my own.

492
00:28:27,730 --> 00:28:32,850
But like coming into this, and still to this day, if you if you had to put me in one of

493
00:28:32,850 --> 00:28:35,090
these categories, I would be a compatibilist.

494
00:28:35,970 --> 00:28:36,210
Cool.

495
00:28:36,290 --> 00:28:36,850
It's interesting.

496
00:28:36,930 --> 00:28:39,810
I I used to be uh an incompatibilist.

497
00:28:39,890 --> 00:28:43,090
I used to be uh in the Sam Harris camp.

498
00:28:43,170 --> 00:28:46,520
Uh and I think for bad reasons, it was more for vibes-based reasons.

499
00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:48,840
Like I liked the vibe of being like a hard headed thing.

500
00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:50,840
Yeah, you're a scientist, you're a rationalist.

501
00:28:51,000 --> 00:28:51,560
Yeah, no, no, no.

502
00:28:51,960 --> 00:28:52,680
There's a lot of trap.

503
00:28:52,760 --> 00:28:53,320
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

504
00:28:53,800 --> 00:28:55,160
And so I fell into that trap.

505
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:57,080
I and I also liked the edginess of it.

506
00:28:57,160 --> 00:28:58,200
It was it was kind of cool.

507
00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:00,280
It was politically congenial too.

508
00:29:00,360 --> 00:29:03,640
Like, oh yeah, nobody pulls themselves up by their own bootstraps.

509
00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:03,880
Yeah.

510
00:29:03,960 --> 00:29:06,280
You know, we're all just, you know, deterministic things.

511
00:29:06,440 --> 00:29:06,600
Yeah.

512
00:29:06,760 --> 00:29:11,450
Um, you know, it it was it was, you know, fit with my like, you know, views on the criminal

513
00:29:11,450 --> 00:29:14,170
justice system that we should focus more on rehabilitation and not just desserts.

514
00:29:14,330 --> 00:29:19,690
Like it was all just uh uh it was a total vibes-based um decision that I that I regret in

515
00:29:19,850 --> 00:29:20,490
in hindsight.

516
00:29:20,570 --> 00:29:24,490
But uh I remember at some point I was just just persuaded, I was listening to a bait uh

517
00:29:24,570 --> 00:29:26,250
with Dan Dennett and some other philosopher.

518
00:29:26,410 --> 00:29:27,290
I think it was Greg Caruso.

519
00:29:27,450 --> 00:29:31,610
Yeah, Greg Caruso, yeah, because Greg Cruso is exactly uh well, I don't want to I don't

520
00:29:31,610 --> 00:29:35,770
want to paint him too hard, but he is he is very much in what you just said, which is he's

521
00:29:35,770 --> 00:29:41,740
arguing that uh a really strong uh retributive punishing view of

522
00:29:41,740 --> 00:29:45,180
criminal justice is sort of foolish in light of what we know.

523
00:29:45,420 --> 00:29:45,820
Yeah.

524
00:29:46,460 --> 00:29:46,780
Yes.

525
00:29:46,940 --> 00:29:49,740
And I remember listening to a debate, or maybe I was reading a debate.

526
00:29:49,820 --> 00:29:50,460
I I can't remember.

527
00:29:50,540 --> 00:29:52,060
It was a debate between Dan Dennett and him.

528
00:29:52,300 --> 00:29:55,900
Yeah, they have a book called Just Just Deserts is is the book of their debate.

529
00:29:56,940 --> 00:29:57,020
Yeah.

530
00:29:57,260 --> 00:29:58,060
Maybe I was reading that book.

531
00:29:58,140 --> 00:29:58,300
Yeah.

532
00:29:58,540 --> 00:30:00,790
Um and um it was interesting.

533
00:30:00,950 --> 00:30:04,630
I was reading the book, and while I was reading it, I was convinced by Greg Cruz.

534
00:30:04,710 --> 00:30:05,830
I'm like, oh, Greg's Greg's right.

535
00:30:05,990 --> 00:30:06,550
That's a great Danny.

536
00:30:06,630 --> 00:30:07,910
And then like points, yeah.

537
00:30:08,230 --> 00:30:13,110
As and then, but like gradually, as I continued to reflect on it, after I had read it, like

538
00:30:13,190 --> 00:30:17,030
weeks after, I ended up thinking, wait a second, no, uh, he's actually wrong.

539
00:30:17,110 --> 00:30:18,150
Dan Dan Dennett is right.

540
00:30:18,310 --> 00:30:18,630
Yeah, yeah.

541
00:30:18,870 --> 00:30:23,440
And I just like it just it was this kind of sleeper effect, or like uh something about Dan

542
00:30:23,600 --> 00:30:27,520
Dennett's points just kinda sunk in with me and then I realized, no, no, it it uh he's

543
00:30:27,520 --> 00:30:28,080
actually right.

544
00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:28,480
Yeah.

545
00:30:28,640 --> 00:30:31,840
That uh I and I I remember it was it was something about I was just thinking about like

546
00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:34,640
well what do they actually disagree about?

547
00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:35,680
Like Yeah, yeah, yeah.

548
00:30:36,560 --> 00:30:41,440
Like both sides agree that we should have punishment and we should hold people accountable

549
00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:43,520
for crimes and we should have a criminal justice system.

550
00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:47,070
So like wha is actually at stake here?

551
00:30:47,230 --> 00:30:47,470
Yeah, yeah.

552
00:30:47,550 --> 00:30:48,830
And I realize that there's nothing at stake.

553
00:30:48,910 --> 00:30:49,070
Yeah.

554
00:30:49,310 --> 00:30:52,350
They both have the same opinions about criminal justice policy.

555
00:30:52,430 --> 00:30:53,950
They're both liberal progressives.

556
00:30:54,030 --> 00:30:58,510
Like they both, when it when the rubber meets the road, like they're both gonna behave in

557
00:30:58,510 --> 00:30:59,790
the world in the same way.

558
00:30:59,950 --> 00:31:01,390
So what are they really arguing about?

559
00:31:01,550 --> 00:31:05,870
When I realized that, I realized that um of course it's compatible.

560
00:31:06,030 --> 00:31:06,190
Yeah.

561
00:31:06,430 --> 00:31:11,760
Like uh when when when Greg is talking about, you know, you know, retributivism doesn't

562
00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:17,600
make sense, um, well, he uh it's just we can reframe retributivism in the

563
00:31:17,600 --> 00:31:23,440
terms of determinism, where what what punishment is is holding a uh a an incentive

564
00:31:23,520 --> 00:31:25,040
sensitive being accountable.

565
00:31:25,280 --> 00:31:25,360
Yeah.

566
00:31:25,520 --> 00:31:28,560
You know, when Sam Harris says, of course we should hold people responsible for what they

567
00:31:28,560 --> 00:31:28,800
do.

568
00:31:28,930 --> 00:31:30,370
Well, that's that's what the whole debate is.

569
00:31:30,530 --> 00:31:30,610
Yeah.

570
00:31:30,850 --> 00:31:31,010
Right?

571
00:31:31,170 --> 00:31:33,890
You can't just say that, well, of course we should hold people responsible because then

572
00:31:33,890 --> 00:31:34,370
there's no debate.

573
00:31:34,450 --> 00:31:34,530
Yeah.

574
00:31:34,610 --> 00:31:34,930
I don't know.

575
00:31:35,010 --> 00:31:39,170
So I ended up realizing that there's a way to reconcile our language with you know

576
00:31:39,650 --> 00:31:45,090
hard-headed facts about us as incentive-sensitive beings, being sensitive to our

577
00:31:45,090 --> 00:31:50,850
incentives, and uh distinguishing between um us when we're uh

578
00:31:50,850 --> 00:31:54,880
sensitive to our incentives and rewards and punishments, and us when we're not sensitive to

579
00:31:54,880 --> 00:31:56,000
rewards and punishments.

580
00:31:56,160 --> 00:31:59,840
And obviously it makes more sense to reward us and punish us when we're sensitive to

581
00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:02,160
rewards and punishments, that is, when we're freely choosing.

582
00:32:02,480 --> 00:32:06,240
And it makes no sense to reward and punish us when we're not sensitive to rewards and

583
00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:06,720
punishments.

584
00:32:06,960 --> 00:32:10,080
That's that just dissolves the whole debate, I think.

585
00:32:10,400 --> 00:32:11,920
That's just that's what we're talking about.

586
00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:13,760
And there's no incompatibility there.

587
00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:17,040
So it eventually dawned on me and I changed my mind and I became a compatibilist.

588
00:32:17,280 --> 00:32:17,840
Yeah, but anyway.

589
00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:18,960
Yeah, but no, no, that's great.

590
00:32:19,040 --> 00:32:20,560
And I like what you said there too.

591
00:32:20,750 --> 00:32:22,750
it's sort of a rabbit duck illusion.

592
00:32:22,830 --> 00:32:26,750
And if you've never the listeners haven't looked at the rabbit duck m uh illusion, you

593
00:32:26,750 --> 00:32:29,630
know, go take a look at it and it flips back and forth between a rabbit and duck.

594
00:32:29,710 --> 00:32:34,110
And I think free will is like that, where I think all of us at some point, when you start

595
00:32:34,110 --> 00:32:39,070
thinking about the Caruso point or the incompatibilist point, some part of us is sort of

596
00:32:39,070 --> 00:32:39,870
like, Yeah, I get that.

597
00:32:39,950 --> 00:32:40,430
That makes sense.

598
00:32:40,590 --> 00:32:45,390
Like if I if you think if you hear it, you're like, Yeah, no, like I'm mechanical, it

599
00:32:45,390 --> 00:32:46,190
doesn't make sense.

600
00:32:46,350 --> 00:32:47,630
How could I be free?

601
00:32:47,710 --> 00:32:48,030
Right?

602
00:32:48,110 --> 00:32:49,460
Like yeah, that's that's real.

603
00:32:49,540 --> 00:32:51,620
And like I think everybody feels that.

604
00:32:51,860 --> 00:32:57,460
But then you you can also think, well, but yeah, but everything I do is made possible by

605
00:32:57,460 --> 00:33:02,100
mechanical stuff, so it must not be incompatible, must be compatible, right?

606
00:33:02,180 --> 00:33:08,180
And I think and I think that ability to see both ways and it is part of the paradox

607
00:33:08,180 --> 00:33:09,140
of free will.

608
00:33:09,380 --> 00:33:15,170
And I think some people um uh lean more strongly towards one side

609
00:33:15,170 --> 00:33:15,730
versus the other.

610
00:33:15,810 --> 00:33:19,330
There's starting to be empirical work on this where people ask people, you know, do you

611
00:33:19,330 --> 00:33:24,850
think uh that uh that you know a mechanical view of the world is compatible with free will?

612
00:33:24,930 --> 00:33:25,570
What do you think?

613
00:33:25,810 --> 00:33:30,930
And actually, like if you experimental philosophers, when they ask people, most people are

614
00:33:31,940 --> 00:33:35,300
pretty compatibilist, which sort of surprises philosophers.

615
00:33:35,460 --> 00:33:38,820
And a lot of philosophers sort of think, well, people don't understand what we mean by free

616
00:33:38,820 --> 00:33:39,060
will.

617
00:33:39,220 --> 00:33:41,780
And if they actually understood what we meant by free will, they wouldn't be

618
00:33:42,100 --> 00:33:43,140
compatibilists.

619
00:33:43,540 --> 00:33:48,740
And there, and there's, you know, if you change circumstances, so like if people do

620
00:33:48,740 --> 00:33:54,500
something morally wrong, they'll they'll say the person had more free will

621
00:33:54,990 --> 00:33:56,030
um than not.

622
00:33:56,110 --> 00:33:59,470
So like it's colored by moral evaluation and things like that.

623
00:33:59,630 --> 00:34:01,470
But anyway, I don't I don't want to get too far into that.

624
00:34:01,550 --> 00:34:06,830
But basically, yeah, uh what you just described of you can sort of sort of see it both

625
00:34:06,830 --> 00:34:08,270
ways, but you land on one side.

626
00:34:08,430 --> 00:34:10,190
I think that's a very common thing.

627
00:34:10,430 --> 00:34:12,750
And that's part of the explanation.

628
00:34:12,830 --> 00:34:16,510
We will explain why that sort of you can see it both ways sort of thing.

629
00:34:16,980 --> 00:34:21,140
And I do think this account, which you know, we're gonna like stop in 10 minutes and we're

630
00:34:21,140 --> 00:34:25,300
gonna just kind of tease people for for the solution, but not not not really as a joke.

631
00:34:25,460 --> 00:34:30,180
But um but I think even the Caruso Dennett thing, I think this account explains what

632
00:34:30,180 --> 00:34:31,700
they're arguing about, actually.

633
00:34:31,860 --> 00:34:32,020
Yeah.

634
00:34:32,340 --> 00:34:32,580
Okay.

635
00:34:32,660 --> 00:34:34,180
So let's get into the meat of it.

636
00:34:34,340 --> 00:34:35,220
What are they arguing about?

637
00:34:35,380 --> 00:34:36,100
What is the account?

638
00:34:36,180 --> 00:34:36,820
What are you proposing?

639
00:34:37,220 --> 00:34:37,700
Sure, sure, sure.

640
00:34:37,780 --> 00:34:37,940
Okay.

641
00:34:38,020 --> 00:34:40,820
So let's start with let's start with a concrete example.

642
00:34:41,620 --> 00:34:46,260
So um and I sort of alluded to it already, but like like there's just certain things that

643
00:34:46,340 --> 00:34:50,990
like I can do as an agent, and then there's just certain things I can't, right?

644
00:34:51,310 --> 00:34:57,150
So, like a good example, I like using this example, is that um, you know, if I

645
00:34:57,150 --> 00:35:02,590
wanted to, I could start waking up earlier than I do currently, right?

646
00:35:02,910 --> 00:35:07,630
Like I could I could just like set my alarm earlier and I could start waking up earlier.

647
00:35:07,870 --> 00:35:10,110
Let's suppose that I broke a bone.

648
00:35:10,270 --> 00:35:16,260
Um okay now let's assume I'm already doing everything I possibly can in terms of like

649
00:35:16,260 --> 00:35:17,860
allowing it to heal.

650
00:35:18,420 --> 00:35:24,420
Um what I can't do unlike the wake up early thing is

651
00:35:24,420 --> 00:35:30,260
just sort of convince myself to heal my broken bone right like it's not in

652
00:35:30,260 --> 00:35:36,260
my purview or ken or whatever verb you want to use to um to actually like

653
00:35:36,420 --> 00:35:37,540
heal my broken bone.

654
00:35:37,620 --> 00:35:38,900
Like I can't do that.

655
00:35:39,190 --> 00:35:40,950
It's just going to be time, right?

656
00:35:41,270 --> 00:35:43,110
I can't convince myself to do it.

657
00:35:43,270 --> 00:35:44,390
You can't convince me.

658
00:35:44,550 --> 00:35:46,310
You could hold a gun to my head.

659
00:35:46,550 --> 00:35:49,990
It's not going to affect the healing of my broken bone.

660
00:35:50,230 --> 00:35:53,830
Unlike the waking up earlier in the morning, right?

661
00:35:54,070 --> 00:35:59,110
So I represent, I can uh I can choose to wake up earlier in the morning.

662
00:35:59,190 --> 00:36:01,590
If you held a gun to my head, I could wake up earlier in the morning.

663
00:36:01,670 --> 00:36:02,950
You wouldn't even have to do that.

664
00:36:03,190 --> 00:36:06,150
Um, so that that is a meaningful difference.

665
00:36:06,310 --> 00:36:10,860
That's an intuitive difference, But but that's a meaningful difference.

666
00:36:11,260 --> 00:36:11,500
Yeah.

667
00:36:11,580 --> 00:36:17,100
And certainly I I would add a very adaptively relevant difference that the mind should have

668
00:36:17,100 --> 00:36:17,820
evolved to make.

669
00:36:17,900 --> 00:36:20,540
It would be disastrous if you got that question wrong.

670
00:36:20,700 --> 00:36:25,260
If I tried to like cajole you into healing more quickly and punish you if you didn't heal

671
00:36:25,260 --> 00:36:28,060
fast enough, like that would be dis it would destroy our relationship.

672
00:36:28,140 --> 00:36:29,420
It would be absolutely disastrous for me.

673
00:36:29,580 --> 00:36:29,740
Correct.

674
00:36:29,900 --> 00:36:33,740
Uh on the other hand, if I thought that you couldn't control how early you you you woke up

675
00:36:33,740 --> 00:36:36,770
when you actually could, and I could incentivize you with rewards and punishment to change

676
00:36:36,770 --> 00:36:38,930
your behavior, and I miss that out, that would also be disastrous.

677
00:36:39,090 --> 00:36:41,250
So there are huge costs to getting this distinction wrong.

678
00:36:41,330 --> 00:36:45,570
This is of huge adaptive significance of detecting this difference, to use your

679
00:36:45,730 --> 00:36:46,210
terminology.

680
00:36:46,530 --> 00:36:47,090
That's right.

681
00:36:47,330 --> 00:36:49,650
And that's exactly right.

682
00:36:49,810 --> 00:36:54,770
It's it's sort of the more subtle version of it would be a disaster

683
00:36:55,730 --> 00:36:59,890
for an organism that couldn't fly to think it could, right?

684
00:37:00,130 --> 00:37:00,370
Yes.

685
00:37:00,530 --> 00:37:05,090
Um, or it just like part of organism design should be like, what can I do?

686
00:37:05,340 --> 00:37:08,940
What are the things, what are the outcomes that I can affect in the world?

687
00:37:09,180 --> 00:37:14,780
And whether it's within my body envelope or can I convince you to do that's a strong

688
00:37:14,780 --> 00:37:15,820
selection pressure.

689
00:37:15,980 --> 00:37:20,540
And if I get that wrong, that's a big cost, right?

690
00:37:20,780 --> 00:37:21,020
Yeah.

691
00:37:21,260 --> 00:37:24,300
So I think that's like at a deep level, that's what this is all about.

692
00:37:24,540 --> 00:37:29,420
So let's take the example of waking up in the broken bone and let's unpack it a little more

693
00:37:29,420 --> 00:37:32,060
carefully, okay, and be adaptationist about it.

694
00:37:32,220 --> 00:37:37,830
So We we started at a very sort of folk psychological, like I can convince

695
00:37:37,830 --> 00:37:39,030
myself, right?

696
00:37:39,430 --> 00:37:45,350
Let's make it a little more mechanisms described at more of a functional software level.

697
00:37:45,510 --> 00:37:45,830
Okay.

698
00:37:46,390 --> 00:37:51,190
So here's what, and this is also work I'm doing with my graduate student, Michael Oswald.

699
00:37:51,750 --> 00:37:53,830
Um, here's how we're thinking about it.

700
00:37:53,910 --> 00:37:59,830
So the intuitive idea with the waking up in the morning, the idea that I can sort of I can

701
00:37:59,830 --> 00:38:05,800
convince myself to do this, what that means is that there

702
00:38:06,120 --> 00:38:11,400
is one of the systems inside of us is is sort of

703
00:38:11,960 --> 00:38:16,840
representing it's almost like a meta representation it's sort of

704
00:38:16,840 --> 00:38:20,920
representing what outcomes in the world

705
00:38:23,050 --> 00:38:27,530
Vary depending upon settings inside the organism.

706
00:38:28,090 --> 00:38:30,010
Okay, I'll unpack that a little bit.

707
00:38:30,170 --> 00:38:36,090
So just concretely, if so, I have planning and

708
00:38:36,090 --> 00:38:41,690
motivational systems inside of me, the state of those planning and

709
00:38:41,690 --> 00:38:46,010
motivational systems, if they're in different states,

710
00:38:48,010 --> 00:38:52,020
will change whether or not I wake up early or not.

711
00:38:52,340 --> 00:38:52,740
Right?

712
00:38:53,220 --> 00:38:59,140
So if the planning and motivational systems are in one setting, I will get up

713
00:38:59,140 --> 00:38:59,940
at 4 a.m.

714
00:39:00,260 --> 00:39:03,940
If they're in another setting, I'll get up at 8 a.m.

715
00:39:05,220 --> 00:39:10,980
So what time I wake up in the morning depends on the state of systems within

716
00:39:10,980 --> 00:39:11,300
me.

717
00:39:12,980 --> 00:39:15,990
There's another more specifically in your in your brain.

718
00:39:16,550 --> 00:39:17,990
So with the bone, like that also determines the same thing.

719
00:39:18,230 --> 00:39:18,390
Exactly.

720
00:39:18,470 --> 00:39:18,870
No, no, no.

721
00:39:18,950 --> 00:39:19,750
That's a really good point.

722
00:39:19,830 --> 00:39:19,990
Yes.

723
00:39:20,390 --> 00:39:20,630
Yes.

724
00:39:21,110 --> 00:39:23,110
So I don't know.

725
00:39:23,670 --> 00:39:28,790
I still haven't thought through all of this, but the roughest way I can think about it is

726
00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:33,590
that there is a system that is representing

727
00:39:34,630 --> 00:39:40,150
can the planning and motivation systems within this body envelope.

728
00:39:41,360 --> 00:39:47,200
What outcomes can they affect, or which outcomes are affected by them?

729
00:39:48,720 --> 00:39:54,320
And so that system would say, Yes, waking up early in the morning

730
00:39:55,280 --> 00:39:57,920
is affected by those systems.

731
00:39:58,320 --> 00:39:58,960
Right.

732
00:39:59,440 --> 00:40:00,720
The state of those systems.

733
00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:02,400
Healing the broken bone, no.

734
00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:08,370
It doesn't matter if the the the state of those systems are we really want to

735
00:40:08,370 --> 00:40:13,250
to put it in like folk psychological terms, we really want to heal this broken bone.

736
00:40:13,570 --> 00:40:15,890
The bone's not gonna be any different.

737
00:40:16,370 --> 00:40:16,610
Right.

738
00:40:16,770 --> 00:40:16,930
Right.

739
00:40:17,090 --> 00:40:19,330
And so okay, so we can make it even more specific.

740
00:40:19,890 --> 00:40:25,570
So it's not so much that the decision depends on something inside you or that it depends on

741
00:40:25,570 --> 00:40:29,650
something inside your brain, as that it depends on something it depends on a very specific

742
00:40:29,650 --> 00:40:30,130
part of your brain.

743
00:40:30,530 --> 00:40:30,690
Correct.

744
00:40:30,930 --> 00:40:32,770
And in particular, the planning and motivational systems.

745
00:40:33,010 --> 00:40:38,080
Yeah, it might even I and I don't know if that's exactly right, But this is better than

746
00:40:38,080 --> 00:40:42,800
what the theory th this is a theory where there hasn't even been a theory.

747
00:40:43,120 --> 00:40:48,320
And what w as I will explain, or maybe I don't know, or in a paper if we don't get to it, I

748
00:40:48,320 --> 00:40:51,200
don't know if that's exactly right, but I think this is roughly right.

749
00:40:51,280 --> 00:40:51,600
Yes.

750
00:40:51,760 --> 00:40:52,000
Mm-hmm.

751
00:40:52,080 --> 00:40:52,240
Yeah.

752
00:40:52,560 --> 00:40:52,720
Okay.

753
00:40:52,880 --> 00:40:53,200
Interesting.

754
00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:58,320
It's almost like if I think you're free to do something, I see a lever sticking out of your

755
00:40:58,320 --> 00:41:01,440
head that's connected to your planning and motivational systems that I can pull.

756
00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:02,080
Exactly.

757
00:41:02,990 --> 00:41:05,310
And if you're not free, then there's no lever that I can pull.

758
00:41:05,470 --> 00:41:05,630
Yeah.

759
00:41:05,710 --> 00:41:09,150
And this is, I mean, just to go concrete, like another example of this would be something

760
00:41:09,150 --> 00:41:12,350
like, why do we think addiction or habit, right?

761
00:41:12,430 --> 00:41:18,270
So like free will, people have I mean I don't know people have this point,

762
00:41:18,510 --> 00:41:22,670
have the have these intuitions about different situations involve more or less free will.

763
00:41:22,910 --> 00:41:23,070
Yeah.

764
00:41:23,230 --> 00:41:24,750
And there's almost no theory of it.

765
00:41:24,900 --> 00:41:27,220
Like, this is one of the weird things about the debate.

766
00:41:27,380 --> 00:41:32,740
As much as like theorists do the debate, they often just invoke context that they appeal to

767
00:41:32,740 --> 00:41:37,700
intuition, but there's no theory of why that's an intuitive idea or why the situation has

768
00:41:37,700 --> 00:41:38,820
more or less free will.

769
00:41:39,060 --> 00:41:40,420
This is such a theory.

770
00:41:40,580 --> 00:41:46,550
So, for example, one idea is that um the maximum amount of free

771
00:41:46,550 --> 00:41:50,470
will, and I'm not gonna cite everybody who says all this, this just know that like um this

772
00:41:50,470 --> 00:41:51,590
is stuff other people have said.

773
00:41:51,750 --> 00:41:55,110
I'm just not gonna like include citations because this is a podcast, so you know.

774
00:41:55,190 --> 00:41:56,230
Uh but anyway.

775
00:41:56,390 --> 00:42:00,230
So, like an idea would be like if the you if you're facing a decision where you're really

776
00:42:00,230 --> 00:42:06,070
roughly indifferent about the choices, that's really a free will situation, right?

777
00:42:07,190 --> 00:42:10,060
And the idea is that well, why would people have that intuition?

778
00:42:10,140 --> 00:42:15,820
Well, it's because it's completely dependent on the settings of like the planning, um, uh

779
00:42:15,980 --> 00:42:17,420
the planning system, right?

780
00:42:17,660 --> 00:42:23,420
Because the um there's well, let's contrast that to

781
00:42:23,660 --> 00:42:27,660
the situation where you're addicted to nicotine, right?

782
00:42:28,380 --> 00:42:32,780
Um, so the situation where you're addicted to nicotine, or worse, like I don't know, um

783
00:42:34,370 --> 00:42:36,290
what did Kurt Cobain do?

784
00:42:36,450 --> 00:42:38,930
Um it wasn't cocaine.

785
00:42:39,250 --> 00:42:40,530
It was oh heroin or something?

786
00:42:40,610 --> 00:42:40,850
I don't know.

787
00:42:41,010 --> 00:42:42,850
Yeah, so let's say you're addicted to heroin, right?

788
00:42:43,010 --> 00:42:43,170
Yeah.

789
00:42:43,570 --> 00:42:49,490
Um uh the planning and motivation system, whatever those states are,

790
00:42:49,730 --> 00:42:50,050
right?

791
00:42:50,290 --> 00:42:55,380
It doesn't, it doesn't matter because there's some other system in your head that is

792
00:42:55,380 --> 00:43:00,740
overriding the planning and the planning or the goal planning and goal-based systems

793
00:43:00,820 --> 00:43:05,940
actually I think is probably more so I have a goal of like not taking my um

794
00:43:06,660 --> 00:43:12,420
um my heroin but there's another system that's just taking over right so it's it's it's a

795
00:43:12,420 --> 00:43:16,340
planning and means and reasoning yeah so how maybe that's a better way to put it yeah what

796
00:43:16,420 --> 00:43:21,860
means can I use to achieve this this end exactly um and uh that system of you know how can

797
00:43:21,860 --> 00:43:24,790
I achieve this goal what states of the world are going to affect this goal?

798
00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:27,670
That system is disconnected from the thing you're interested in.

799
00:43:27,750 --> 00:43:29,590
It's it's disconnected from the heroine behavior.

800
00:43:29,670 --> 00:43:33,030
It's disconnected from the bone healing or exactly that's yeah yeah that's the claim that

801
00:43:33,030 --> 00:43:33,990
we're not free to choose it.

802
00:43:34,230 --> 00:43:34,630
Exactly.

803
00:43:34,710 --> 00:43:40,390
And that's and so that's why there's the intuition that the means end system is

804
00:43:40,550 --> 00:43:45,750
fully operational in what I where I go to lunch today.

805
00:43:45,990 --> 00:43:51,420
Or if I have two indifferent choices in a experimental game and I'm like, well, yellow

806
00:43:51,420 --> 00:43:52,060
versus blue.

807
00:43:52,140 --> 00:43:52,460
I don't know.

808
00:43:52,540 --> 00:43:53,260
I'll choose blue.

809
00:43:53,340 --> 00:43:56,780
Like that's just means end or the the the choosing system, right?

810
00:43:56,860 --> 00:43:59,180
The system that just sort of it's fully operative.

811
00:43:59,340 --> 00:44:01,500
Whereas for the hero I wan I want to push back a bit.

812
00:44:01,580 --> 00:44:04,220
I don't I don't think that indifference really matters.

813
00:44:04,620 --> 00:44:05,100
I don't either.

814
00:44:05,260 --> 00:44:09,420
So I yeah but so I I I I have the intuition that even if I'm not indifferent, let's let's

815
00:44:09,420 --> 00:44:12,860
say I'm considering whether or not to to rob a bank.

816
00:44:13,020 --> 00:44:16,540
Like let's say I'm I'm low on on cash and I really need the money and and the thought

817
00:44:16,540 --> 00:44:19,190
occurs, oh I could just rob this this cash register.

818
00:44:20,310 --> 00:44:21,430
Is this hypothetical, David?

819
00:44:21,670 --> 00:44:23,030
Yeah, this is an autobiography, actually.

820
00:44:23,270 --> 00:44:25,110
Um we can we can edit this out later.

821
00:44:25,750 --> 00:44:30,150
So I'm um so you know, I I uh you know I happen to be, let's say I happen to be carrying a

822
00:44:30,150 --> 00:44:33,110
gun with me, and I see you know there's a cash register, there's lots of cash in it.

823
00:44:33,350 --> 00:44:35,830
I think you know, I could just I could just rob this cash register.

824
00:44:36,070 --> 00:44:37,990
And I think to myself, no, that would be terrible.

825
00:44:38,070 --> 00:44:39,430
That would make me a bad person.

826
00:44:39,910 --> 00:44:42,150
Um things could go terribly awry.

827
00:44:42,390 --> 00:44:45,030
There are better ways to make money than stealing it.

828
00:44:45,320 --> 00:44:46,520
bad David, don't do that.

829
00:44:46,600 --> 00:44:47,880
And let's say I'm not indifferent at all.

830
00:44:47,960 --> 00:44:52,440
Like it's I really have a clear moral revulsion at the thought, and I instantly reject it.

831
00:44:52,520 --> 00:44:52,680
Yeah.

832
00:44:52,840 --> 00:44:56,520
And I think that's a that's a really bad decision, and I continue living an upstanding

833
00:44:56,520 --> 00:44:56,680
life.

834
00:44:56,840 --> 00:44:57,160
Yeah.

835
00:44:57,480 --> 00:45:02,440
Even if I'm not indifferent at all, and the decision is clear that I should not rob the

836
00:45:02,440 --> 00:45:04,840
person, I still have the intuition that that was a free choice.

837
00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:05,160
Yeah.

838
00:45:05,320 --> 00:45:06,920
You know, that that I freely made that decision.

839
00:45:07,000 --> 00:45:10,520
So it's not so even if I, you know, if I was indifferent, I was like torn between one thing

840
00:45:10,520 --> 00:45:15,170
or the other, I I it doesn't it doesn't seem like I would be that makes me more free.

841
00:45:15,250 --> 00:45:15,410
Yeah.

842
00:45:15,490 --> 00:45:17,650
You know, I I don't think it's the indifference itself.

843
00:45:17,730 --> 00:45:22,210
I think it's it's the it's the mere fact that you have the options available, not how much

844
00:45:22,210 --> 00:45:23,250
you weight either option.

845
00:45:23,570 --> 00:45:25,170
I I I actually agree with that.

846
00:45:25,330 --> 00:45:25,570
Yeah.

847
00:45:25,650 --> 00:45:30,690
I I I think that people have made the argument that it's even indifference is sort of the

848
00:45:30,770 --> 00:45:33,490
the maximum thing, but I I agree you don't really need that.

849
00:45:33,730 --> 00:45:39,700
And I I and just to make this concrete, um yeah, just to review though, that's the

850
00:45:39,700 --> 00:45:42,660
argument, is that it's the means end or goal-based system.

851
00:45:42,820 --> 00:45:45,540
I and again, I don't really know how to roughly characterize this.

852
00:45:45,700 --> 00:45:48,020
It's not, you know, but but yeah, that's the idea.

853
00:45:48,100 --> 00:45:54,100
Is why do we have the intuition that the heroin addict is less free than you

854
00:45:54,260 --> 00:45:55,940
not choosing to rob the bank?

855
00:45:56,100 --> 00:46:01,460
Or if you don't like the heroin example, you know, if you're um if you're really just in a

856
00:46:01,460 --> 00:46:07,230
habit, like let's say you um you you mean to tie your shoes in a new way but you're in just

857
00:46:07,230 --> 00:46:13,070
such of a habit that you to tie them the old way but you meant to tie them the the the new

858
00:46:13,070 --> 00:46:18,910
way right you you you would be less like um you kind of

859
00:46:18,910 --> 00:46:20,510
didn't do it on purpose but you did it anyway.

860
00:46:20,590 --> 00:46:21,790
Yeah it was sort of automatic.

861
00:46:21,870 --> 00:46:27,070
Yeah right and so that's that would be less free will like in in that context.

862
00:46:27,230 --> 00:46:30,030
Like it's just sort of you were on auto drive, quote unquote.

863
00:46:30,110 --> 00:46:34,440
You were on autopilot, you know like you were just sort of it was an automatic thing.

864
00:46:34,680 --> 00:46:37,720
Um that's less free will.

865
00:46:37,800 --> 00:46:43,320
And again, it's because there's this theory of what it is, what free will is, is this

866
00:46:43,320 --> 00:46:49,160
representation of sort of what's within this um the purview of this planning or

867
00:46:49,160 --> 00:46:52,440
means ends system or set of systems.

868
00:46:52,760 --> 00:46:53,080
Right.

869
00:46:53,320 --> 00:46:56,520
And it's sort of the the rewardability and punishability.

870
00:46:56,760 --> 00:47:01,290
Like if if you know, if you you tied your shoes, you know, just out of habit and you you

871
00:47:01,290 --> 00:47:06,010
can't really control it, then no matter what I promise to reward you with or punish you

872
00:47:06,010 --> 00:47:08,330
with, if you do or don't tie your shoes, it's not gonna change you.

873
00:47:08,410 --> 00:47:12,490
Exactly or it's gonna have little effect on you because you're just so uh ingrained to be

874
00:47:12,490 --> 00:47:12,810
doing this.

875
00:47:13,050 --> 00:47:13,290
Exactly.

876
00:47:13,450 --> 00:47:17,930
And so it if for me, it it tells me this is the type of thing that I can reward or punish

877
00:47:18,220 --> 00:47:18,780
and change.

878
00:47:18,940 --> 00:47:21,820
And this is the type of thing that I shouldn't bother trying to reward or punish.

879
00:47:22,060 --> 00:47:22,380
Exactly.

880
00:47:22,460 --> 00:47:23,980
And that we we have a term for that.

881
00:47:24,060 --> 00:47:28,700
It might be a bad term, but we call it the efficacy of intentional intervention.

882
00:47:28,780 --> 00:47:34,700
Where sort of it's the idea that um the and again, the the the precise thing is what

883
00:47:34,700 --> 00:47:39,580
we've already said, but the the the kind of intuitive idea is that you're treating the

884
00:47:39,580 --> 00:47:43,020
person intentionally, like you're just giving them your convince.

885
00:47:43,180 --> 00:47:47,790
If I want to change your behavior, David, I'm treating you like a person saying, Look, I

886
00:47:47,790 --> 00:47:51,870
want to convince you, I want to incentivize you or disincentive, like convince you, give

887
00:47:51,870 --> 00:47:54,350
you reasons why you should or shouldn't do something.

888
00:47:54,670 --> 00:47:58,430
If that's effective, yeah, then you have free will.

889
00:47:58,510 --> 00:48:00,270
But if it's not, then you don't.

890
00:48:00,510 --> 00:48:06,190
So I might be able to convince you to choose red over green, but maybe not to not take

891
00:48:06,190 --> 00:48:06,990
heroin.

892
00:48:07,230 --> 00:48:10,350
And yeah, and that's the difference between free will and not.

893
00:48:10,430 --> 00:48:15,520
So basically, what free will is, is the efficacy of intentional intervention for third

894
00:48:15,520 --> 00:48:15,920
parties.

895
00:48:16,000 --> 00:48:19,200
So it's that I can convince you.

896
00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:24,800
Um, but more importantly and primarily, it's also first person.

897
00:48:25,120 --> 00:48:28,000
It's this: is it can I convince myself?

898
00:48:28,160 --> 00:48:29,760
Can I force myself to do something?

899
00:48:29,920 --> 00:48:33,280
Can I convince myself to not take heroin?

900
00:48:33,520 --> 00:48:33,840
Right.

901
00:48:34,240 --> 00:48:40,160
And if the answer is no, like no matter what my planning or means-ends

902
00:48:40,320 --> 00:48:46,130
reasoning delivers, I'm still taking heroin, then that means I don't have free will.

903
00:48:46,290 --> 00:48:51,810
There's sort of no way I can convince myself, even and so that that confuses me.

904
00:48:51,970 --> 00:48:55,010
So what does it even mean to convince myself?

905
00:48:55,410 --> 00:48:56,930
Yes, and that's an intentional language thing.

906
00:48:57,010 --> 00:49:00,770
And then I think it goes back to then we can make it a functional level claim where it's a

907
00:49:00,770 --> 00:49:06,050
representation of no matter the states of the means and planning

908
00:49:07,020 --> 00:49:08,300
or the goal-based system.

909
00:49:08,460 --> 00:49:13,900
So we can say, look, even if the goal-based system says stop taking heroin, and even if the

910
00:49:13,900 --> 00:49:19,580
means and planning is all we're gonna stop taking heroin, and that doesn't work, and that

911
00:49:19,580 --> 00:49:24,700
system registers we're still taking heroin, then then it's then that's it.

912
00:49:24,860 --> 00:49:27,340
So that's the it's yeah, that's interesting.

913
00:49:27,420 --> 00:49:30,890
It's almost like um counterfactual reasoning.

914
00:49:31,050 --> 00:49:35,850
For the self, for the for the first person, it's like uh can reasoning about the potential

915
00:49:35,850 --> 00:49:38,490
implications or consequences of this change my behavior?

916
00:49:38,970 --> 00:49:42,410
If so, I should think through all the different downstream consequences and that's going to

917
00:49:42,410 --> 00:49:42,970
change my behavior.

918
00:49:43,450 --> 00:49:47,290
But if entertaining all the downstream consequences is going to be useless, then it's just

919
00:49:47,290 --> 00:49:50,010
a waste of energy for me to entertain those consequences because not going to do anything.

920
00:49:50,090 --> 00:49:51,050
It's not going to shape my behavior.

921
00:49:51,290 --> 00:49:54,010
And so that's a useful distinction to make at the first person level.

922
00:49:54,410 --> 00:49:58,170
Where is it worth it for me to entertain all the implications and to consider all the

923
00:49:58,170 --> 00:50:03,360
effects of of one uh decision versus another, or should I just not even entertain them and

924
00:50:03,360 --> 00:50:05,120
just, you know, do whatever I was gonna do anyway.

925
00:50:05,280 --> 00:50:07,040
That's and that should save me a lot of time.

926
00:50:07,120 --> 00:50:12,000
Like if if if no matter what I think about or um what my reasoning process is like, it's

927
00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:15,520
not gonna change my decision one way or the other, then it's pointless for me to entertain

928
00:50:15,520 --> 00:50:16,720
all these different factors.

929
00:50:16,800 --> 00:50:16,960
Yeah.

930
00:50:17,120 --> 00:50:17,360
Right.

931
00:50:17,520 --> 00:50:20,960
And so it's useful for the the individual as well to not waste time going, you know,

932
00:50:21,120 --> 00:50:23,040
entertaining all these fanciful scenarios.

933
00:50:23,360 --> 00:50:24,560
Uh and and so that's interesting.

934
00:50:24,640 --> 00:50:24,960
I like that.

935
00:50:25,040 --> 00:50:28,090
So um Yeah, and counterfactual is the first thing that's a good thing.

936
00:50:29,370 --> 00:50:29,530
Yeah.

937
00:50:29,690 --> 00:50:30,890
Well, go ahead and then I'll yeah.

938
00:50:31,210 --> 00:50:34,890
So like at the third person level, it's more about like what can I do to reward or punish

939
00:50:34,890 --> 00:50:35,290
this person?

940
00:50:35,450 --> 00:50:38,170
Uh if there if the answer is nothing, then the person isn't free.

941
00:50:38,330 --> 00:50:42,250
At the first person level, it's what can I think about, or what consequences or

942
00:50:42,250 --> 00:50:44,890
implications can I consider to change my behavior.

943
00:50:45,050 --> 00:50:45,130
Yeah.

944
00:50:45,370 --> 00:50:49,050
Uh and if the answer is nothing, then I at the first person level don't have free will.

945
00:50:49,290 --> 00:50:49,450
Yeah.

946
00:50:49,530 --> 00:50:53,690
And this is why and again, there's no there's no there had been no theory about this.

947
00:50:53,930 --> 00:50:58,740
But in the literature, one of the the definitions people landed on for free will is reasons

948
00:50:58,900 --> 00:51:00,020
responsiveness.

949
00:51:00,580 --> 00:51:00,820
Okay.

950
00:51:01,220 --> 00:51:03,780
And that is that is a result.

951
00:51:04,180 --> 00:51:05,380
Like that's all people talk about.

952
00:51:05,460 --> 00:51:09,140
Like if a person has reasons for what they're doing and they're responsive to reasons, then

953
00:51:09,140 --> 00:51:09,780
they have free will.

954
00:51:09,860 --> 00:51:11,860
But if they're not, then they don't.

955
00:51:12,100 --> 00:51:12,420
Yeah.

956
00:51:12,580 --> 00:51:12,820
Right.

957
00:51:12,900 --> 00:51:16,340
So like in a and I think a good example would be something like let's say you have like

958
00:51:16,340 --> 00:51:18,420
strong political convictions, right?

959
00:51:18,900 --> 00:51:23,990
Now, from the third person perspective, like you, I might not be able to convince you that

960
00:51:24,150 --> 00:51:26,630
to change your political convictions, right?

961
00:51:27,110 --> 00:51:30,790
But you should be able to convince yourself at least of your political convictions, right?

962
00:51:30,870 --> 00:51:36,470
Like if the reasons why you support a political party, right, are such that

963
00:51:36,710 --> 00:51:42,630
uh you know what they are, and those reasons no longer hold, and you still

964
00:51:42,630 --> 00:51:48,580
can't help but support the political party, then the political party has implanted a chip

965
00:51:48,580 --> 00:51:49,140
in your head, right?

966
00:51:49,220 --> 00:51:52,340
Like if you're like the reason why I support this party is because I think it's good for my

967
00:51:52,340 --> 00:51:52,660
family.

968
00:51:52,820 --> 00:51:55,780
And then you learn information of like it's not good for my family.

969
00:51:56,020 --> 00:52:00,740
And if you if that's really the reason why you support them, then you should be able to

970
00:52:00,820 --> 00:52:02,100
like not support them anymore, right?

971
00:52:02,180 --> 00:52:03,380
Like if that's the correct reason.

972
00:52:03,540 --> 00:52:07,380
This again, this is this theory is an intentional level, but it's reasons responsiveness,

973
00:52:07,540 --> 00:52:13,470
which is that um, and And so I think what we have just been describing earlier explains why

974
00:52:13,470 --> 00:52:18,350
reasons responsiveness was a definition of free will people came up with.

975
00:52:19,630 --> 00:52:25,630
It's interesting that uh uh being able to say switch

976
00:52:25,630 --> 00:52:29,710
political parties if I'm persuaded that the other policies are are gonna make the country

977
00:52:29,710 --> 00:52:35,080
better, it seems to me like that might be a good strategy for me personally, but it also

978
00:52:35,080 --> 00:52:36,520
makes me look like a bad ally.

979
00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:42,680
Like if I can capriciously change parties at the slightest whiff of an argument that

980
00:52:42,680 --> 00:52:45,880
maybe my party is wrong, then I'm a bad ally.

981
00:52:46,040 --> 00:52:47,240
I'm a bad political ally.

982
00:52:47,640 --> 00:52:51,720
Whereas if nothing is going to get me to change to the other side, then I'm a really loyal

983
00:52:51,720 --> 00:52:52,120
ally.

984
00:52:52,390 --> 00:52:56,550
And so it's almost like you want to uh destroy your free will to signal that you're a good

985
00:52:56,550 --> 00:52:59,510
ally and you're never gonna in the same way that you might want to signal that for a

986
00:52:59,670 --> 00:53:00,790
romantic relationship.

987
00:53:00,950 --> 00:53:05,350
Like if there's no way that I could ever even possibly consider uh someone else other than

988
00:53:05,350 --> 00:53:08,310
you, uh then that makes me a really good, committed romantic partner.

989
00:53:08,390 --> 00:53:08,550
Yeah.

990
00:53:08,710 --> 00:53:08,870
Right.

991
00:53:09,030 --> 00:53:13,030
And so and there are some cases where we might want to burn our bridges and signal that we

992
00:53:13,030 --> 00:53:17,110
don't have free will, uh to to signal that we're gonna be a good romantic partner, a good

993
00:53:17,110 --> 00:53:18,550
ally, uh whatever.

994
00:53:18,840 --> 00:53:19,000
Yeah.

995
00:53:19,160 --> 00:53:23,080
No, I think certain religions sort of have that metaphor of like there's a thing in you

996
00:53:23,080 --> 00:53:28,040
that's like constant separate from, and it's either like the bad part of you or it's God or

997
00:53:28,040 --> 00:53:28,520
whatever.

998
00:53:28,680 --> 00:53:34,600
But this idea sort of that um yeah, and you're getting into the other part of this,

999
00:53:34,840 --> 00:53:38,600
which is this is not a neutral thing.

1000
00:53:39,240 --> 00:53:44,920
So what we've been talking about is ways to intervene upon the world.

1001
00:53:45,230 --> 00:53:48,750
So it's ways to change my future behavior with respect to myself.

1002
00:53:48,910 --> 00:53:54,430
So what is it that um if I if if the settings within my

1003
00:53:54,750 --> 00:53:58,830
planning and reason based or whatever, however I want to talk about it, systems are in

1004
00:53:58,830 --> 00:54:03,630
different states, then these are different outcomes that are all within my purview, right?

1005
00:54:04,430 --> 00:54:10,120
And so for example, like maybe I haven't I haven't gone through the um the systems

1006
00:54:10,200 --> 00:54:12,280
haven't gone through their operations yet.

1007
00:54:12,360 --> 00:54:17,720
So it would be reasonable for me to say, well, you know, 10 minutes from now I can do a

1008
00:54:17,720 --> 00:54:22,440
number of different things because those systems haven't calculated what they're gonna do

1009
00:54:22,440 --> 00:54:23,160
10 minutes from now.

1010
00:54:23,320 --> 00:54:26,200
So it'd be very reasonable and meaningful for me to say that.

1011
00:54:26,680 --> 00:54:30,910
It's also then what are the things I can do to convince you of to do, right?

1012
00:54:30,990 --> 00:54:32,990
Can I change the state of those systems?

1013
00:54:33,230 --> 00:54:35,950
Is it is it something I can effectively intervene upon?

1014
00:54:36,110 --> 00:54:39,150
It's getting back to the wake up in the morning versus the broken bone.

1015
00:54:39,390 --> 00:54:43,950
An organism should not be value neutral with respect to this.

1016
00:54:44,270 --> 00:54:49,550
And this is where compatibilism or incompatibilism in the problem of free will comes in the

1017
00:54:49,550 --> 00:54:49,870
first place.

1018
00:54:50,030 --> 00:54:55,420
So what you have is you have a bunch of people who are saying, look,

1019
00:54:56,620 --> 00:55:02,540
up until we started doing philosophy, you had this idea that you were free to do

1020
00:55:02,540 --> 00:55:04,860
certain things, like wake up early in the morning.

1021
00:55:05,100 --> 00:55:08,620
You already knew you weren't free to like heal your broken bone, but whatever.

1022
00:55:08,940 --> 00:55:11,980
But even the stuff you were free about, guess what?

1023
00:55:12,460 --> 00:55:17,580
That stuff, if you look under the hood, is all mechanical.

1024
00:55:19,890 --> 00:55:25,650
And for an organism that cares about not being

1025
00:55:25,650 --> 00:55:31,410
manipulated by others, that's a problem.

1026
00:55:31,570 --> 00:55:37,090
And I think the concern about manipulation is central to the problem of free will.

1027
00:55:37,810 --> 00:55:43,010
And it's there everywhere in the literature, but it's not really talked about explicitly.

1028
00:55:43,170 --> 00:55:48,530
And it's exactly what would fall out from what we've just talked about, which is,

1029
00:55:49,900 --> 00:55:55,500
For example, if David, your decision making, your goals and outcomes,

1030
00:55:55,740 --> 00:56:01,500
I could sort of poke on or predict ahead of time or influence directly without trying to

1031
00:56:01,500 --> 00:56:07,340
convince you, that would be an enormous boon to me, and it would be a horrible problem for

1032
00:56:07,340 --> 00:56:07,500
you.

1033
00:56:07,660 --> 00:56:09,980
So think about like a tell and poker, right?

1034
00:56:10,220 --> 00:56:10,380
Yeah.

1035
00:56:10,620 --> 00:56:16,310
So if every time you were about to make a decision, I could anticipate your decision

1036
00:56:16,310 --> 00:56:20,630
ahead of time because I could see, like you just always, I don't know, tugged your ear.

1037
00:56:21,110 --> 00:56:26,070
Um then, and you don't know that that's true of you, um, and you feel like you're still

1038
00:56:26,070 --> 00:56:30,230
making a decision, but I already know what you're gonna do, I can use that to my strategic

1039
00:56:30,230 --> 00:56:30,870
advantage.

1040
00:56:31,030 --> 00:56:36,790
If I know how you make a decision, like the extreme version and philosophers rely on this,

1041
00:56:37,040 --> 00:56:41,200
If I know how your brain makes a decision, then I can go into your brain and I can poke on

1042
00:56:41,200 --> 00:56:42,640
the right place at the right time.

1043
00:56:42,800 --> 00:56:44,880
You think you've made a decision, but guess what?

1044
00:56:45,200 --> 00:56:47,920
I influenced your decision for you.

1045
00:56:48,320 --> 00:56:52,640
I should that's something in the in the social strategy.

1046
00:56:52,800 --> 00:56:54,320
Is that a word stra strategy?

1047
00:56:54,640 --> 00:56:55,280
I believe George W.

1048
00:56:55,360 --> 00:56:55,920
Bush called it.

1049
00:56:56,240 --> 00:56:56,480
Exactly.

1050
00:56:56,560 --> 00:56:58,720
Yeah, no, it's like a it's like it's a joke word.

1051
00:56:58,800 --> 00:56:58,960
Yeah.

1052
00:56:59,040 --> 00:57:02,880
Um perfectly cromulent for all the Simpsons uh listeners or watchers.

1053
00:57:03,040 --> 00:57:07,830
Um That strategic concern,

1054
00:57:09,350 --> 00:57:15,350
even at a very evolved prosaic level of like tells and poker, or sort of like every

1055
00:57:15,350 --> 00:57:18,310
time, I don't I don't know, like you could just think of a mundane example, like not

1056
00:57:18,310 --> 00:57:19,110
neuroscience, right?

1057
00:57:19,190 --> 00:57:25,060
But just like a prosaic example, like every time you get upset because you you don't

1058
00:57:25,060 --> 00:57:28,820
get uh when you hunt and you miss something, you get angry, you know, and I can just

1059
00:57:28,820 --> 00:57:30,500
predict that ahead or something like that.

1060
00:57:30,740 --> 00:57:36,420
There's always strategic advantage to understanding or being able to manipulate somebody

1061
00:57:36,420 --> 00:57:41,780
below the level of an intentional intervention, below the level of

1062
00:57:42,340 --> 00:57:46,630
goals and means and systems.

1063
00:57:47,510 --> 00:57:49,110
So this should not be neutral.

1064
00:57:49,190 --> 00:57:54,630
And the idea is that a large part of what the like if an alien came and was like, what is

1065
00:57:54,630 --> 00:57:56,950
this free will debate about?

1066
00:57:57,110 --> 00:57:58,550
What is this concern?

1067
00:57:59,350 --> 00:58:04,550
One one thing sort of baked in from the beginning is this concern that

1068
00:58:05,510 --> 00:58:09,510
if we are mechanical, we don't have freedom.

1069
00:58:09,910 --> 00:58:14,390
And what that means is that if there's a way to know how

1070
00:58:15,760 --> 00:58:21,440
I'm free in a mechanical fashion, it

1071
00:58:21,440 --> 00:58:25,200
means that somebody could poke on it or manipulate it.

1072
00:58:25,440 --> 00:58:27,760
And that should be a concern for me.

1073
00:58:29,920 --> 00:58:30,640
Interesting.

1074
00:58:30,800 --> 00:58:36,750
So is it is the fear that I'm going to out fox you, say in poker,

1075
00:58:36,830 --> 00:58:40,430
like if I know what you're gonna do then I can predict then I can exploit you in some way?

1076
00:58:40,670 --> 00:58:46,510
Or is it the fear that if it's mechanical uh then I can manipulate uh

1077
00:58:46,750 --> 00:58:50,190
the mechanical aspects of it in some way? 'Cause those seem different.

1078
00:58:50,270 --> 00:58:54,350
Is it is it merely that the the fear of being out foxed or is it the fear of of someone,

1079
00:58:54,510 --> 00:58:59,950
say an evil neuroscientist changing the the neurons in my brain uh to make me do something

1080
00:59:00,030 --> 00:59:00,510
or is it both?

1081
00:59:00,750 --> 00:59:01,550
I think it's both.

1082
00:59:01,870 --> 00:59:02,030
Okay.

1083
00:59:02,270 --> 00:59:03,390
Yeah, I think it's both.

1084
00:59:03,470 --> 00:59:03,630
Yeah.

1085
00:59:04,040 --> 00:59:04,360
Interesting.

1086
00:59:04,520 --> 00:59:04,600
Yeah.

1087
00:59:04,840 --> 00:59:05,000
Yeah.

1088
00:59:05,080 --> 00:59:11,080
No, I I think the the point about the fear of being outfoxed or predicted, I

1089
00:59:11,080 --> 00:59:13,240
think, is a really insightful one.

1090
00:59:13,480 --> 00:59:18,440
We often like kind of take pride about being unpredictable or doing things that other

1091
00:59:18,440 --> 00:59:22,920
people didn't anticipate, being unique, not conforming, or mindlessly conforming.

1092
00:59:23,000 --> 00:59:26,280
Like we almost kind of feel embarrassed if we behave in a way that's too predictable.

1093
00:59:26,680 --> 00:59:31,320
Like you know, uh if all of my political views can be predicted and advanced based on the

1094
00:59:31,320 --> 00:59:33,470
uh Democratic Party's political platform.

1095
00:59:33,550 --> 00:59:34,350
That's kind of embarrassing.

1096
00:59:34,590 --> 00:59:37,470
It means that like I don't think for myself like you can just easily predict everything I'm

1097
00:59:37,470 --> 00:59:37,790
gonna say.

1098
00:59:37,950 --> 00:59:39,710
Like you know all the talking points I'm gonna go down.

1099
00:59:39,790 --> 00:59:41,950
Like I I I'm kind of like embarrassed about that sometimes.

1100
00:59:42,030 --> 00:59:42,190
Yeah.

1101
00:59:42,350 --> 00:59:46,030
And we're often kind of ashamed or embarrassed about being too predictable.

1102
00:59:46,190 --> 00:59:50,510
Because it it's it it elicits this fear that we can be easily exploited or manipulated if

1103
00:59:50,510 --> 00:59:53,710
if people can just see through to the underlying mechanics of everything we do.

1104
00:59:53,790 --> 00:59:58,100
And I think this fear is often elicited by evolutionary psychology itself.

1105
00:59:58,260 --> 00:59:58,420
Yeah.

1106
00:59:58,580 --> 01:00:02,420
Like when we start to get into the underlying mechanics of our decision making and start

1107
01:00:02,420 --> 01:00:06,900
trying to actually predict how we're gonna do or predict what we're gonna do or like which

1108
01:00:06,900 --> 01:00:10,820
mates we're gonna be attracted to in you know which you know uh which stage of the

1109
01:00:10,820 --> 01:00:13,700
menstrual cycle or you know which life stage or whatever.

1110
01:00:13,780 --> 01:00:16,660
We can, you know, based on like their facial symmetry or whatever, we can predict all these

1111
01:00:16,660 --> 01:00:16,820
things.

1112
01:00:16,900 --> 01:00:17,940
That's kind of uncomfortable.

1113
01:00:18,020 --> 01:00:18,100
Yeah.

1114
01:00:18,340 --> 01:00:22,020
It suggests that that that someone could manipulate us or exploit us.

1115
01:00:22,260 --> 01:00:28,090
Uh so do you think so I it's interesting, it it it almost explains why people uh

1116
01:00:28,490 --> 01:00:30,810
are uncomfortable by evolutionary psychology.

1117
01:00:31,610 --> 01:00:35,850
Um so you know, Stephen Pinker in his book The Blank Slate goes through all the reasons why

1118
01:00:35,850 --> 01:00:39,450
people are uncomfortable with this idea of an evolved human nature.

1119
01:00:39,610 --> 01:00:41,850
Uh and one of them is the fear of determinism.

1120
01:00:41,930 --> 01:00:43,210
He has a whole chapter on this.

1121
01:00:43,450 --> 01:00:47,610
Um that if we understand all the mechanics, the nuts and bolts of you know our brains and

1122
01:00:47,610 --> 01:00:51,610
who we are as animals, uh that there's something uncomfy and scary about that.

1123
01:00:51,770 --> 01:00:51,930
Yeah.

1124
01:00:52,090 --> 01:00:57,980
Uh and I think what you're saying uh explains why we're so uncomfortable about

1125
01:00:57,980 --> 01:00:58,140
that.

1126
01:00:58,540 --> 01:00:59,340
Do you do you buy that?

1127
01:00:59,500 --> 01:00:59,900
Yeah, yeah.

1128
01:00:59,980 --> 01:01:04,300
And it actually, but I mean, one of the things, and we might cut, I mean, so Michael Osfeld

1129
01:01:04,380 --> 01:01:10,300
and I, we have an empirical project plan because we believe that there's this idea

1130
01:01:10,300 --> 01:01:13,180
that people are incompatibilists or compatibilists about free will.

1131
01:01:13,340 --> 01:01:18,300
And we actually think that there's a more precise way to carve people up as into individual

1132
01:01:18,300 --> 01:01:20,380
differences, and it might even be stable.

1133
01:01:20,670 --> 01:01:26,350
And we think that it's actually related to this issue of um uh

1134
01:01:26,670 --> 01:01:28,590
when do people have free will?

1135
01:01:28,750 --> 01:01:33,390
Um, and we we we almost use the metaphor of like when do they get off the station on like

1136
01:01:33,470 --> 01:01:34,990
or when do they get off the train?

1137
01:01:35,070 --> 01:01:36,990
Um and there's three different stops.

1138
01:01:37,310 --> 01:01:42,030
One is there's a group of people who the fact that the

1139
01:01:42,030 --> 01:01:47,000
manipulatability, the knowledge itself, even in principle,

1140
01:01:47,480 --> 01:01:51,160
exists, means that there's no free will, right?

1141
01:01:51,560 --> 01:01:57,400
So these would be people I suspect who are very vigilant about manipulation or

1142
01:01:57,400 --> 01:01:58,280
manipulatability.

1143
01:01:58,360 --> 01:02:02,760
And so there's just certain people who I think, I think like what it is is there, I don't

1144
01:02:02,760 --> 01:02:06,360
know, there's a probably lots of ways to get to this individual difference.

1145
01:02:06,520 --> 01:02:11,880
But there's some people who have the conviction that even if in principle

1146
01:02:12,670 --> 01:02:16,990
people could be manipulated, even if we don't have the knowledge yet, even if we don't have

1147
01:02:16,990 --> 01:02:17,390
the means.

1148
01:02:17,470 --> 01:02:23,470
The fact that it's in principle possible means there's no means we need to be worried

1149
01:02:23,470 --> 01:02:24,350
about manipulation.

1150
01:02:24,510 --> 01:02:29,950
So that some some that is one that's so that gets you're getting off the free will

1151
01:02:30,190 --> 01:02:31,550
train early.

1152
01:02:31,630 --> 01:02:32,830
That's step one.

1153
01:02:33,180 --> 01:02:33,740
Yeah.

1154
01:02:34,060 --> 01:02:39,980
Step two is um you get off the free will train

1155
01:02:40,300 --> 01:02:45,660
not when um it's just in principle possible, but when

1156
01:02:45,900 --> 01:02:49,180
something um specifically is known, right?

1157
01:02:49,340 --> 01:02:55,310
So it might be that like you know something about um the so you do learn

1158
01:02:55,390 --> 01:02:59,470
like people actually know something about this particular thing or maybe there's even like

1159
01:02:59,470 --> 01:03:04,830
technology available to manipulate that and then some people like have this idea that then

1160
01:03:05,150 --> 01:03:10,590
um then we don't have free will at least for this particular thing um

1161
01:03:11,550 --> 01:03:17,480
those people um well uh I'm gonna skip that

1162
01:03:17,480 --> 01:03:19,960
because there's another part to it, but I'm gonna it's gonna be too complicated.

1163
01:03:20,120 --> 01:03:25,480
There's a third stop, which I think I am, and I suspect you are too, and I think most

1164
01:03:25,480 --> 01:03:30,200
evolutionary psychologists are, which is the third stop, which is in your stay on the free

1165
01:03:30,360 --> 01:03:31,640
will train longest.

1166
01:03:31,880 --> 01:03:36,360
And this is just because in principle something's knowable,

1167
01:03:37,830 --> 01:03:40,070
it doesn't mean that you don't have free will.

1168
01:03:40,950 --> 01:03:45,750
And even if we know a lot about the system and how it works, it doesn't mean we don't have

1169
01:03:45,750 --> 01:03:46,550
free will.

1170
01:03:46,790 --> 01:03:52,630
But if we know how the system works, and in this particular case,

1171
01:03:52,710 --> 01:03:58,550
a bunch of neuroscientists actually intervened against somebody's knowledge or will

1172
01:03:58,710 --> 01:04:01,030
in this case, then the question is: do they have free will?

1173
01:04:01,110 --> 01:04:02,140
Well, no, right?

1174
01:04:02,300 --> 01:04:02,380
Yeah.

1175
01:04:02,780 --> 01:04:03,980
They were manipulated.

1176
01:04:04,300 --> 01:04:10,220
So it's sort of like the three stops are sort of is manipulation in principle um

1177
01:04:10,540 --> 01:04:14,540
possible, in practice possible, or did it happen?

1178
01:04:14,860 --> 01:04:20,220
And I think most compatibilists get off at stop three.

1179
01:04:20,620 --> 01:04:25,020
And it's because you say, look, free will is just compatible.

1180
01:04:25,180 --> 01:04:27,740
So like you know how the system works.

1181
01:04:28,090 --> 01:04:28,410
Yeah.

1182
01:04:28,570 --> 01:04:33,610
But unless you manipulate the system, you have free will.

1183
01:04:34,010 --> 01:04:34,410
Yes.

1184
01:04:34,650 --> 01:04:40,490
And so I think most compatibilism is an expression of getting off at step

1185
01:04:40,490 --> 01:04:41,050
three.

1186
01:04:41,210 --> 01:04:46,170
And that's actually like the evolved, the the the evolved concern is that are you being

1187
01:04:46,170 --> 01:04:46,810
manipulated?

1188
01:04:46,970 --> 01:04:47,290
Right.

1189
01:04:47,530 --> 01:04:47,770
Right.

1190
01:04:47,930 --> 01:04:51,000
And here manip manipulation is a really precise definition.

1191
01:04:51,080 --> 01:04:56,440
So if I threaten you with a punishment or entice you with the promise of a reward, that's

1192
01:04:56,440 --> 01:05:00,440
not manipulation in your sense, because I'm speaking directly to your means and reasoning

1193
01:05:00,680 --> 01:05:02,040
planning systems, right?

1194
01:05:02,120 --> 01:05:05,720
And if I change your behavior by offering those rewards or threatening those punishments

1195
01:05:05,800 --> 01:05:08,680
and you change your behavior, you freely made that choice and you were affected by the

1196
01:05:08,680 --> 01:05:09,960
incentives that I were giving you.

1197
01:05:10,200 --> 01:05:13,990
But if I bypass that and I don't offer you anything, or if I don't threaten you with

1198
01:05:13,990 --> 01:05:18,950
anything, and I just slip you a pill or you know sneak into your bedroom at night and you

1199
01:05:18,950 --> 01:05:24,310
know give you uh do some brain surgery on you, then I've manipulated you in the sense that

1200
01:05:24,310 --> 01:05:28,390
that is that is scarier uh because uh you're not getting anything out of it.

1201
01:05:28,550 --> 01:05:34,230
I'm just contorting you to my desires, um, and you're not getting anything out of the deal.

1202
01:05:34,310 --> 01:05:38,040
Whereas if I offer to pay you money and I give you the money, like we're mutually

1203
01:05:38,040 --> 01:05:39,000
benefiting in that case.

1204
01:05:39,160 --> 01:05:43,320
But if I'm just slipping you a pill uh without your knowledge, then you're not benefiting.

1205
01:05:43,640 --> 01:05:44,760
It's purely in my interest.

1206
01:05:44,840 --> 01:05:49,880
It's exploitation, uh in the sense that we discussed in our our our previous uh episode uh

1207
01:05:49,960 --> 01:05:50,920
with Hannes.

1208
01:05:51,080 --> 01:05:55,560
Um so uh do you buy that that way of thinking I do.

1209
01:05:55,720 --> 01:05:57,800
I think the system you're exactly right.

1210
01:05:57,880 --> 01:06:02,360
I think the system is smarter than that though, in the following sense of if if I hold a

1211
01:06:02,360 --> 01:06:03,400
gun to your head.

1212
01:06:04,330 --> 01:06:07,450
um, that is still a cost-benefit calculation.

1213
01:06:07,690 --> 01:06:10,730
And I think most people would say, like, you're you don't have free will.

1214
01:06:10,810 --> 01:06:15,050
And I think that's because ultimately this is still about interventionism, like it's causal

1215
01:06:15,050 --> 01:06:19,690
interventionism, which is just a jargony way of saying that all of these systems are for

1216
01:06:19,690 --> 01:06:21,850
intervening upon the world and changing the world.

1217
01:06:22,090 --> 01:06:26,760
So in the case of holding a gun to your head, What's the most effective intervention?

1218
01:06:26,840 --> 01:06:29,720
It's not saying, David, you don't need to worry about your head, you don't need to care

1219
01:06:29,720 --> 01:06:30,280
about your head.

1220
01:06:30,440 --> 01:06:32,440
It would be to like remove the gun, right?

1221
01:06:32,680 --> 01:06:32,840
Yeah.

1222
01:06:33,080 --> 01:06:37,880
So in that sense, that's why we think it's about the efficacy of intentional intervention.

1223
01:06:38,120 --> 01:06:43,480
In that case, it's that the most effective intervention isn't um

1224
01:06:43,960 --> 01:06:49,880
uh convincing you to not worry about the gun, it's to just remove

1225
01:06:49,880 --> 01:06:51,000
the gun, right?

1226
01:06:51,320 --> 01:06:51,720
Right.

1227
01:06:51,960 --> 01:06:56,730
Um, but uh so every so it's a little bit more of a continuum.

1228
01:06:56,810 --> 01:06:59,450
This sort of complicates this this a little bit, yeah.

1229
01:06:59,610 --> 01:07:04,810
Um, in the sense of, and and I think this is why people have this intuition that the

1230
01:07:04,810 --> 01:07:10,010
indifferent choice is the maximum free will, because to the extent that you feel compelled,

1231
01:07:10,090 --> 01:07:15,370
like, oh man, I really have to get this birthday gift for my or Christmas gift or Hanukkah

1232
01:07:15,370 --> 01:07:20,220
gift or whatever for my kid, it's because like the ambient culture has convinced my child

1233
01:07:20,220 --> 01:07:24,300
that it's like a thing, you know, like I'm not making that decision, but I feel compelled

1234
01:07:24,300 --> 01:07:26,060
by the cost benefit structure of the world.

1235
01:07:26,220 --> 01:07:27,900
It's not sort of up to me, you know?

1236
01:07:28,060 --> 01:07:31,660
And I think like I'm not free to just choose whatever gift I would want for my kid.

1237
01:07:31,740 --> 01:07:31,900
Yeah.

1238
01:07:31,980 --> 01:07:36,940
And I think it does, I think it I think it's still it's still consistent with the

1239
01:07:36,940 --> 01:07:42,300
underlying thing, which is like to the extent it is up to the means and system,

1240
01:07:43,020 --> 01:07:43,340
yeah.

1241
01:07:43,660 --> 01:07:49,650
Sort of it imbuing its own sort of costs and benefits or like I mean this is

1242
01:07:49,650 --> 01:07:51,090
where the mismatch will get in.

1243
01:07:51,170 --> 01:07:56,610
Um but basically to the extent that the valuation is

1244
01:07:57,570 --> 01:08:03,250
internal or endogenous and not exogenous um to the planning and

1245
01:08:03,250 --> 01:08:07,810
motivation or goal-based systems or the means and systems, I think it's more free will.

1246
01:08:08,130 --> 01:08:09,810
So um okay yeah.

1247
01:08:09,970 --> 01:08:15,580
So I think you're right broadly speaking, but I think it's even more subtle, such that the

1248
01:08:15,580 --> 01:08:20,220
cost-benefit thing, like if somebody is holding your family hostage, yeah, and that made

1249
01:08:20,220 --> 01:08:25,820
you rob a bank, you would have less free will than a situation in which you just decided it

1250
01:08:25,820 --> 01:08:27,980
was be in your interest to rob the bank.

1251
01:08:28,220 --> 01:08:28,540
Right.

1252
01:08:29,020 --> 01:08:31,980
But it's still a cost-benefit calculation on your part.

1253
01:08:32,570 --> 01:08:32,810
Right.

1254
01:08:33,450 --> 01:08:38,810
Maybe the way to think about it is that there are some situations that are so extreme in

1255
01:08:38,810 --> 01:08:42,970
their valuation that they bypass the means-end reasoning system altogether.

1256
01:08:43,210 --> 01:08:47,210
Like if your survival is at stake, then your fight or flight system kicks in.

1257
01:08:47,290 --> 01:08:50,170
You're just going to do whatever you need to get out of that situation and survive.

1258
01:08:50,410 --> 01:08:55,450
And means end reasoning, um, except for the narrow goal of of surviving, is just going to

1259
01:08:55,450 --> 01:08:56,010
be irrelevant.

1260
01:08:56,090 --> 01:08:56,250
Yeah.

1261
01:08:56,650 --> 01:09:01,450
And so it's sort of analogous to slipping you a pill, uh, you know, uh, because um, you

1262
01:09:01,450 --> 01:09:05,280
know, thinking about the implications of getting your head blown off is just not going to

1263
01:09:05,280 --> 01:09:06,240
shape your behavior in any way.

1264
01:09:06,480 --> 01:09:06,720
That's right.

1265
01:09:07,040 --> 01:09:09,360
That's just a it's just a non-negotiable thing.

1266
01:09:09,680 --> 01:09:12,000
Like you have no choice but to get out of that situation.

1267
01:09:12,240 --> 01:09:12,400
Yeah.

1268
01:09:12,480 --> 01:09:12,560
Right.

1269
01:09:12,880 --> 01:09:17,120
And this is also why, I mean, one of the reasons why I think the free will debate has been

1270
01:09:17,120 --> 01:09:22,480
so difficult is that if you start to unpack it, there are some strong,

1271
01:09:22,640 --> 01:09:27,040
straightforward answers, and we can get to them about is free will real or what is it?

1272
01:09:27,360 --> 01:09:33,270
But one uh one part of the questions that have all been lumped together is a value

1273
01:09:33,270 --> 01:09:34,070
judgment.

1274
01:09:34,310 --> 01:09:35,590
Like it's a value judgment.

1275
01:09:35,670 --> 01:09:40,950
So there's no fact in the matter, which is what's the efficacy of intentional interventions

1276
01:09:41,030 --> 01:09:41,910
or should you care?

1277
01:09:42,070 --> 01:09:47,110
So for example, uh, let's say somebody's holding a gun to your head, right?

1278
01:09:47,190 --> 01:09:47,590
Yeah.

1279
01:09:47,830 --> 01:09:53,030
Maybe what they're asking you to do is so terrible that you shouldn't care about your head.

1280
01:09:53,190 --> 01:09:58,310
And if somebody has that evaluation, then they would argue you do have free will.

1281
01:09:58,520 --> 01:09:58,920
Yes.

1282
01:09:59,240 --> 01:10:04,120
Because they're actually saying no, this is a situation where actually it should be up to

1283
01:10:04,120 --> 01:10:09,800
David's means and valuation systems to to choose a different

1284
01:10:09,800 --> 01:10:10,440
outcome.

1285
01:10:10,840 --> 01:10:16,280
And so so there's actually no fact of the matter about whether or not it's because it's

1286
01:10:16,440 --> 01:10:22,200
there's there's strategic reasons why people might say or argue

1287
01:10:22,360 --> 01:10:27,530
like, you know, the the this you it should be up to the state of your planning and

1288
01:10:27,530 --> 01:10:30,170
goal-based systems, and other people would say it's not.

1289
01:10:30,650 --> 01:10:36,410
And so this is this is especially why um there's a one of the findings in the

1290
01:10:36,410 --> 01:10:41,770
literature is that when you detect somebody has imposed a cost, like they've robbed a bank,

1291
01:10:41,850 --> 01:10:47,370
they've done something morally bad, automatically there's sort of more free will.

1292
01:10:47,900 --> 01:10:48,220
Yeah.

1293
01:10:48,380 --> 01:10:53,740
And the idea is that that would be what you would expect from like an error management

1294
01:10:53,740 --> 01:10:59,660
perspective, from the sense of David, if you've done something wrong to the community or

1295
01:10:59,660 --> 01:11:05,660
to me, I want to make sure that it's not a result of your planning means and

1296
01:11:05,660 --> 01:11:06,220
systems.

1297
01:11:06,700 --> 01:11:12,220
So I'm going to err on the side of attributing it to those to make sure that it's not.

1298
01:11:12,570 --> 01:11:15,850
If you tell me something like, well, somebody was holding a gun to my head, then it'd be

1299
01:11:15,850 --> 01:11:16,730
like, oh, okay, cool.

1300
01:11:16,810 --> 01:11:19,210
And let's get the guy who was holding the gun to your head, right?

1301
01:11:19,450 --> 01:11:19,770
Right.

1302
01:11:20,490 --> 01:11:22,970
But um, but that's the general idea.

1303
01:11:23,050 --> 01:11:28,890
And this explains why um that there's if you just hold everything

1304
01:11:28,890 --> 01:11:34,890
constant, when there's a negative, morally bad outcome, people ascribe more free

1305
01:11:34,890 --> 01:11:36,330
will to that outcome.

1306
01:11:36,620 --> 01:11:42,140
This explains why that would be because there's a bias in the evolved system to sort of

1307
01:11:42,140 --> 01:11:48,060
target whether or not this was originating out of the thing in the

1308
01:11:48,060 --> 01:11:50,620
organism that I can change in principle.

1309
01:11:51,260 --> 01:11:51,660
Yeah.

1310
01:11:51,900 --> 01:11:56,540
I want to get your thought on an idea that occurred to me a few minutes ago, on a on a

1311
01:11:56,540 --> 01:11:59,590
possible direction you could take this line of work.

1312
01:12:00,070 --> 01:12:05,270
So there are certain strategic situations where being predicted or out foxed by your

1313
01:12:05,270 --> 01:12:06,390
opponent is gonna be really bad for you.

1314
01:12:06,630 --> 01:12:10,950
So if you're playing rock, paper, scissors, it it's really bad for me if you can anticipate

1315
01:12:11,030 --> 01:12:12,230
uh what move I'm gonna make.

1316
01:12:12,310 --> 01:12:12,390
Yeah.

1317
01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:12,550
Right?

1318
01:12:12,710 --> 01:12:14,710
Because then you can take advantage of that and win the game.

1319
01:12:14,870 --> 01:12:15,190
Right?

1320
01:12:15,350 --> 01:12:19,270
But if we're playing a coordination game, let's say we're communicating, and it really

1321
01:12:19,270 --> 01:12:23,140
benefits you to predict uh in advance, you know, what I'm gonna say or what I what I'm

1322
01:12:23,140 --> 01:12:26,660
gonna intend when I say something, because that's gonna allow us to uh communicate more

1323
01:12:26,660 --> 01:12:27,060
effectively.

1324
01:12:27,140 --> 01:12:30,500
If we're working together as a team, it it really benefits me for you to be able to predict

1325
01:12:30,500 --> 01:12:30,980
what I'm gonna do.

1326
01:12:31,060 --> 01:12:34,340
If you predict that I'm gonna pass you the ball in a basketball game, then that's gonna

1327
01:12:34,340 --> 01:12:36,020
help you catch the ball and it's gonna help us win the game.

1328
01:12:36,420 --> 01:12:39,220
And so there are certain strategic situations where being predictable is bad.

1329
01:12:39,460 --> 01:12:42,340
And there are certain strategic situations where being predictable is good.

1330
01:12:42,570 --> 01:12:47,930
And so you might expect this to be a relevant variable that's affecting people's free will

1331
01:12:48,170 --> 01:12:49,210
uh uh intuitions.

1332
01:12:49,290 --> 01:12:49,450
Yeah.

1333
01:12:49,770 --> 01:12:54,570
Such that in situations where uh it's more of a rock, paper, scissors situation, they're

1334
01:12:54,570 --> 01:12:58,410
gonna be more threatened and scared of the possibility that we're just predictable meat

1335
01:12:58,410 --> 01:12:58,810
sacks.

1336
01:12:58,890 --> 01:12:59,130
Yeah.

1337
01:12:59,290 --> 01:12:59,530
Right.

1338
01:12:59,690 --> 01:13:03,370
But if we're in a coordination teamwork situation, the fact that we're predictable meat

1339
01:13:03,370 --> 01:13:04,570
sacks isn't gonna be as threatening.

1340
01:13:04,730 --> 01:13:04,890
Yeah.

1341
01:13:04,970 --> 01:13:05,700
Yeah, I like that a lot.

1342
01:13:05,860 --> 01:13:07,700
So is that is what is that is that prediction you might make.

1343
01:13:08,100 --> 01:13:08,340
I love that.

1344
01:13:08,420 --> 01:13:08,900
Yeah, that's great.

1345
01:13:09,300 --> 01:13:11,940
I also this also that's fantastic, and I love that.

1346
01:13:12,020 --> 01:13:13,380
And that's not something we'd thought about.

1347
01:13:13,460 --> 01:13:14,100
We should do that.

1348
01:13:14,260 --> 01:13:19,060
Um this also explains like every time we're talking and there's like four things to talk

1349
01:13:19,060 --> 01:13:19,300
about.

1350
01:13:19,460 --> 01:13:24,340
Um this thing about predictability also explains what has been a huge mystery since the

1351
01:13:24,340 --> 01:13:29,850
beginning of the free will debate, which is that people have focused on

1352
01:13:29,850 --> 01:13:33,370
determinism, predictability as the problem.

1353
01:13:34,090 --> 01:13:39,530
And so even the first person, Epicurius, he was he basically came up with this idea of like

1354
01:13:39,530 --> 01:13:44,490
quantum sur swerve, as people sort of c jokingly kind of talk about it, which is the idea

1355
01:13:44,490 --> 01:13:50,330
that somewhere in the microscopic or you know really small level, there's

1356
01:13:50,330 --> 01:13:51,690
some indeterminism.

1357
01:13:51,940 --> 01:13:56,580
It's like randomness or it's like quantum indeterminacy or something.

1358
01:13:57,140 --> 01:14:00,420
And that is preventing the predictability.

1359
01:14:00,500 --> 01:14:02,340
Or like that, that's they don't even say that.

1360
01:14:02,660 --> 01:14:06,980
I mean, maybe they do, but it's often somehow that's saving you free will.

1361
01:14:07,060 --> 01:14:09,060
That's keeping free will alive.

1362
01:14:10,500 --> 01:14:16,210
And people have that intuition, but again, there's no theory of why would quantum

1363
01:14:16,210 --> 01:14:18,290
indeterminism for free will?

1364
01:14:18,530 --> 01:14:24,130
In fact, people have made the observation that why are these people even

1365
01:14:24,130 --> 01:14:24,850
arguing this?

1366
01:14:24,930 --> 01:14:26,450
Because it doesn't buy you free will.

1367
01:14:26,610 --> 01:14:30,930
A random number generator, if I have a random number generator in my computer, which I do,

1368
01:14:31,090 --> 01:14:33,090
nobody thinks my computer has free will.

1369
01:14:33,410 --> 01:14:33,570
Right.

1370
01:14:33,970 --> 01:14:35,090
So here's what I think is going on.

1371
01:14:35,490 --> 01:14:37,010
This is an idea that just occurred to me.

1372
01:14:37,170 --> 01:14:42,200
Um, what if the quantum indeterminacy thing it buys you free will from the third person.

1373
01:14:42,520 --> 01:14:42,760
Exactly.

1374
01:14:43,400 --> 01:14:43,880
That's right, exactly.

1375
01:14:44,040 --> 01:14:46,200
Because that's exactly but not the first person perspective.

1376
01:14:46,280 --> 01:14:46,440
Yeah.

1377
01:14:46,680 --> 01:14:51,640
So if if people if people's actions are, you know, unpredictable, then I'm less capable of

1378
01:14:51,640 --> 01:14:55,960
exploiting them or you know manipulating their their neurons or whatever.

1379
01:14:56,200 --> 01:15:02,070
But um i if we live in a quantum indeterminate world, then it no longer benefits me

1380
01:15:02,070 --> 01:15:06,630
to ponder the implications and the consequences of my actions because the it was my actions

1381
01:15:06,630 --> 01:15:10,710
were already determined by the random quantum die rolls, right?

1382
01:15:10,950 --> 01:15:12,470
I yeah, I think I understand what you're saying.

1383
01:15:12,550 --> 01:15:17,190
I mean, I think uh from my the way I think about it is that that's an expression, that is

1384
01:15:17,190 --> 01:15:22,230
the correct expression of the concern about predictability, but that it's all about

1385
01:15:22,230 --> 01:15:27,360
microscopic stuff as sort of confabulation, where it's just like evolved organisms are sort

1386
01:15:27,360 --> 01:15:32,640
of like if I'm predictable, like a talent poker, yeah, then that's a problem.

1387
01:15:33,040 --> 01:15:33,360
Yeah.

1388
01:15:33,600 --> 01:15:37,760
And like even for the first person, like if you already know what I'm gonna do and I know

1389
01:15:37,920 --> 01:15:42,800
my system inside of me knows I haven't even run through the calculation, then you know,

1390
01:15:42,960 --> 01:15:46,560
fuck, like I'm in trouble because you already know what I'm gonna do.

1391
01:15:46,810 --> 01:15:47,050
Yeah.

1392
01:15:47,210 --> 01:15:52,650
So I don't if it's bad if I'm predictable to you and and it's bad if if uh um

1393
01:15:53,290 --> 01:15:57,290
uh and it's and it's a concern to you if I can predict you, right?

1394
01:15:57,450 --> 01:16:03,290
Like so predictability just generally on the victim end is a bad

1395
01:16:03,290 --> 01:16:04,090
thing, right?

1396
01:16:04,330 --> 01:16:04,650
Right.

1397
01:16:04,890 --> 01:16:06,330
So so that's what I think.

1398
01:16:06,490 --> 01:16:10,970
So I think all in in so this has literally been like from the beginning people are talking

1399
01:16:10,970 --> 01:16:12,330
about indeterminism.

1400
01:16:12,960 --> 01:16:18,240
And people are like, well, why are we even talking about indeterminism or determinism at

1401
01:16:18,240 --> 01:16:18,400
all?

1402
01:16:18,640 --> 01:16:21,680
Because indeterminism doesn't get you free will.

1403
01:16:21,840 --> 01:16:27,360
And the argument is that this theory explains this evolutionary account explains why it's

1404
01:16:27,360 --> 01:16:31,840
coming up all in free will, because it's actually the evolved system is concerned about

1405
01:16:32,160 --> 01:16:37,990
predictability and the scientific content about quantum states and blah, blah, blah,

1406
01:16:38,150 --> 01:16:43,190
is all just confabulation running off of the system that's just worried about being

1407
01:16:43,190 --> 01:16:44,150
predictable.

1408
01:16:44,950 --> 01:16:46,390
That's fascinating.

1409
01:16:46,630 --> 01:16:50,230
Um we haven't gotten to mismatch yet, but yeah, the mismatch.

1410
01:16:50,310 --> 01:16:51,030
I was just gonna bring that up.

1411
01:16:51,190 --> 01:16:51,350
Okay.

1412
01:16:51,510 --> 01:16:51,670
Okay.

1413
01:16:51,910 --> 01:16:55,670
So let me start with uh um um uh analogy.

1414
01:16:57,120 --> 01:17:01,440
Okay, so let's say there's a fish.

1415
01:17:01,600 --> 01:17:01,920
Okay.

1416
01:17:02,320 --> 01:17:07,840
And a fish that um it has an evolved design such that in its

1417
01:17:07,840 --> 01:17:11,440
gills is an oxygen detector.

1418
01:17:12,400 --> 01:17:18,350
And when that oxygen detector doesn't get oxygen, it triggers

1419
01:17:18,350 --> 01:17:20,430
a suffocation response that it's suffocating.

1420
01:17:20,510 --> 01:17:22,430
It wriggles, it's like in distress, right?

1421
01:17:22,590 --> 01:17:22,910
Okay.

1422
01:17:24,030 --> 01:17:28,270
So let's say that we take this fish that has this evolved design.

1423
01:17:28,350 --> 01:17:34,190
And let's say we're sort of weird, um, sadistic or just whatever researchers,

1424
01:17:34,270 --> 01:17:39,870
and we take this fish and we inject oxygen into its bloodstream

1425
01:17:40,190 --> 01:17:44,040
just downstream from its gills.

1426
01:17:44,200 --> 01:17:49,720
So the gills are not getting oxygen, but we're injecting oxygen or oxygen

1427
01:17:49,960 --> 01:17:53,320
blood into the fish right after the gills.

1428
01:17:53,480 --> 01:17:53,800
Okay.

1429
01:17:54,840 --> 01:17:57,080
I will explain why I'm gonna get into this in a second.

1430
01:17:57,160 --> 01:17:57,400
Okay.

1431
01:17:57,560 --> 01:17:59,560
So um, why am I talking about this?

1432
01:18:00,120 --> 01:18:04,920
So the fish is fine, the fish is not suffocating, okay?

1433
01:18:05,160 --> 01:18:05,720
Right.

1434
01:18:06,120 --> 01:18:12,010
But its evolved psychology is triggering its it's having a suffocation

1435
01:18:12,010 --> 01:18:12,650
response.

1436
01:18:12,890 --> 01:18:13,050
Right.

1437
01:18:13,450 --> 01:18:15,370
Fish is in distress, right?

1438
01:18:15,690 --> 01:18:16,010
Okay.

1439
01:18:16,490 --> 01:18:20,010
And um, but it's actually completely fine.

1440
01:18:20,810 --> 01:18:25,850
It would be like if I put an electrode in the pain regions of your brain and turned on the

1441
01:18:25,850 --> 01:18:26,170
electrode.

1442
01:18:26,250 --> 01:18:29,690
You're you're not actually in pain, your body is not actually uh being damaged, but you

1443
01:18:29,690 --> 01:18:30,170
think that you are.

1444
01:18:30,410 --> 01:18:31,130
Exactly, exactly.

1445
01:18:31,450 --> 01:18:33,130
So now so now I can ask you the question.

1446
01:18:33,290 --> 01:18:36,730
So, what we've done as experimenters is we've violated

1447
01:18:39,520 --> 01:18:45,280
The way that the world worked up until the we took the we we changed the

1448
01:18:45,280 --> 01:18:46,640
state of the world for the fish.

1449
01:18:46,800 --> 01:18:51,840
We've dissociated the cue and the concern, right?

1450
01:18:52,000 --> 01:18:54,240
The situation from the response to it.

1451
01:18:54,400 --> 01:18:59,440
So in the fish's natural ecology, when the gills lacked oxygen, that meant the fish was

1452
01:18:59,440 --> 01:19:01,280
going to be in distress and might die.

1453
01:19:01,440 --> 01:19:03,200
And that's why it has that response.

1454
01:19:03,440 --> 01:19:07,430
We have teased those two apart in an evolutionarily novel way.

1455
01:19:07,590 --> 01:19:13,430
It's an evolutionary mismatch where we're keeping the fish alive, the reason for the

1456
01:19:13,430 --> 01:19:19,110
distress response we've addressed, but yet the fish is still registering the

1457
01:19:19,110 --> 01:19:20,790
suffocation response.

1458
01:19:22,070 --> 01:19:26,550
So now you could have a debate about: is the fish suffocating?

1459
01:19:27,980 --> 01:19:30,460
Now there's this good sense in which it is.

1460
01:19:30,700 --> 01:19:33,500
It is having the experience of suffocating.

1461
01:19:33,660 --> 01:19:38,300
It might be if we if we grant what it would be like for us, it would be it would be

1462
01:19:38,300 --> 01:19:39,260
torture, right?

1463
01:19:39,420 --> 01:19:39,580
Right.

1464
01:19:39,740 --> 01:19:40,860
The fish is in distress.

1465
01:19:40,940 --> 01:19:43,020
It feels like it's suffocating.

1466
01:19:43,900 --> 01:19:46,700
But there's another sense in which it's not suffocating.

1467
01:19:46,940 --> 01:19:51,020
Because the reason why it's having that experience and the reason why that system even

1468
01:19:51,020 --> 01:19:56,950
exists is for a particular outcome in the world, and we're not letting that outcome happen.

1469
01:19:57,190 --> 01:19:59,670
Whoops, we as sorry, I knocked over my bottle here.

1470
01:19:59,830 --> 01:20:05,190
We as scientists have dissociated the normal

1471
01:20:05,430 --> 01:20:09,110
conflation of the two, of the cue and the situation.

1472
01:20:09,190 --> 01:20:10,550
We've teased them apart.

1473
01:20:10,710 --> 01:20:11,030
Okay.

1474
01:20:11,990 --> 01:20:16,630
So you could have a meaningless debate, or maybe, I mean, if if you just ask, is the fish

1475
01:20:16,630 --> 01:20:17,270
suffocating?

1476
01:20:17,590 --> 01:20:23,340
Period, then you could just have an endless debate when in fact what

1477
01:20:23,340 --> 01:20:29,340
you're debating is do you mean is it having the experience based on the evolve input, or

1478
01:20:29,340 --> 01:20:30,940
is it in fact possible?

1479
01:20:31,260 --> 01:20:31,580
Right?

1480
01:20:31,820 --> 01:20:33,180
Yeah, okay.

1481
01:20:33,580 --> 01:20:37,740
That that I that whole metaphor now applies to free will.

1482
01:20:37,980 --> 01:20:38,860
Okay, okay.

1483
01:20:39,180 --> 01:20:43,900
So now instead of suffocation, the concern is manipulation, right?

1484
01:20:45,340 --> 01:20:51,230
And the idea is that we did not evolve in a world where we know about how

1485
01:20:51,230 --> 01:20:52,190
the mind works.

1486
01:20:52,430 --> 01:20:58,110
We evolved in a world where there's like tells in poker, where there's sort of habits or

1487
01:20:58,110 --> 01:21:03,470
things that we can sort of influence one another or be influenced by one another.

1488
01:21:03,630 --> 01:21:08,430
We did not, our brands did not evolve in a world where we could know with mechanistic

1489
01:21:08,430 --> 01:21:10,430
detail how we work.

1490
01:21:11,150 --> 01:21:11,470
Okay.

1491
01:21:11,870 --> 01:21:14,270
That is an evolutionary novelty.

1492
01:21:15,390 --> 01:21:15,710
Okay.

1493
01:21:16,400 --> 01:21:21,920
So now the idea is that we have this evolved system that's concerned with

1494
01:21:22,880 --> 01:21:28,320
when the things that I think I'm free to do are knowable,

1495
01:21:28,640 --> 01:21:29,760
it's a problem.

1496
01:21:30,400 --> 01:21:30,720
Right?

1497
01:21:30,960 --> 01:21:31,440
Yeah.

1498
01:21:31,760 --> 01:21:37,280
And that concern in an evolutionary environment where there's no reductionistic science is

1499
01:21:37,280 --> 01:21:38,690
meaningful and useful.

1500
01:21:38,850 --> 01:21:39,170
Yeah.

1501
01:21:39,330 --> 01:21:45,250
It means that, oh boy, all of a sudden I'm letting David know before I want to let him know

1502
01:21:45,410 --> 01:21:46,610
what I'm going to do.

1503
01:21:46,850 --> 01:21:52,850
It means that David somehow knows something about me that allows him to manipulate

1504
01:21:52,850 --> 01:21:55,170
me in a way that I'm not even aware of.

1505
01:21:55,490 --> 01:21:56,130
Right.

1506
01:21:56,850 --> 01:22:02,290
Those kinds of macroscopic, probably pretty minor, but still substantial for

1507
01:22:02,290 --> 01:22:05,970
fitness things are really, really important.

1508
01:22:06,980 --> 01:22:12,260
And that's the reasonable concern of the am I being manipulated?

1509
01:22:12,340 --> 01:22:14,340
Is manipulation possible concern?

1510
01:22:16,580 --> 01:22:22,020
Now we have this evolutionary novelty where either in

1511
01:22:22,020 --> 01:22:27,460
principle or in practice, and maybe not actually, but we know

1512
01:22:27,460 --> 01:22:32,900
enough now to poke on and manipulate

1513
01:22:33,150 --> 01:22:34,030
everything.

1514
01:22:34,350 --> 01:22:38,430
And if you don't, and if you don't think that's true now, which I don't yet, in principle,

1515
01:22:38,510 --> 01:22:42,350
like, you know, if you know, if science progresses, we might at some point.

1516
01:22:42,670 --> 01:22:46,110
Um, or let's just stipulate that that will happen.

1517
01:22:46,590 --> 01:22:49,950
Then this gets back to like, where do you get off the train, right?

1518
01:22:50,110 --> 01:22:52,830
You know, in principle, like when do you think it's a concern?

1519
01:22:52,990 --> 01:22:54,030
When are you worried about it?

1520
01:22:54,190 --> 01:22:57,950
And the idea is that we are sort of like the floundering fish.

1521
01:22:58,030 --> 01:23:03,780
And this is where the 42 answer comes in, which is that the claim, and we can start

1522
01:23:03,780 --> 01:23:06,580
wrapping up all the dangling pieces now.

1523
01:23:06,660 --> 01:23:10,820
The claim is that free will, when people talk about does free will exist, yes or no?

1524
01:23:11,300 --> 01:23:14,020
It's a little bit like arguing as the fish suffocating.

1525
01:23:14,260 --> 01:23:19,140
There's a real sense in which free will exists, in the sense of it is a psychological

1526
01:23:19,140 --> 01:23:23,940
representation of can I get up earlier in the morning?

1527
01:23:24,590 --> 01:23:27,070
That is a coherent, reasonable thing.

1528
01:23:27,230 --> 01:23:27,550
Yeah.

1529
01:23:27,710 --> 01:23:27,950
Yeah.

1530
01:23:28,110 --> 01:23:29,710
It's different than healing the broken bone.

1531
01:23:29,790 --> 01:23:35,550
And in that respect, I don't agree with like Sam Harris or um uh

1532
01:23:35,630 --> 01:23:38,510
um my I keep blanking on Greg Crusoe, yeah.

1533
01:23:38,670 --> 01:23:41,550
Well, Greg Crusoe, but also um Robert Spolsky.

1534
01:23:41,710 --> 01:23:42,590
Yeah, Robert Spolsky.

1535
01:23:42,830 --> 01:23:47,660
I don't agree with them where you know Sam Harris is like particularly egregious where

1536
01:23:47,660 --> 01:23:50,860
he'll just say like it's not even coherent, like, come on, grow up kids, you know.

1537
01:23:51,100 --> 01:23:53,340
And and I don't I don't agree with that.

1538
01:23:53,580 --> 01:23:59,500
So so I do think free will is real in the sense of it's an evolved

1539
01:23:59,500 --> 01:24:05,260
representation talking about a coherent thing, you know, is it up to the

1540
01:24:05,260 --> 01:24:08,300
state of these planning or means-end systems?

1541
01:24:08,940 --> 01:24:14,330
Um, but there is another sense in which then if you take this

1542
01:24:14,330 --> 01:24:20,170
evolutionary novelty of knowing everything that we know, then the question

1543
01:24:20,170 --> 01:24:23,770
becomes, well, what do you mean by free will?

1544
01:24:23,930 --> 01:24:27,610
Is free will or is is manipulation in principle possible?

1545
01:24:27,690 --> 01:24:30,650
And if that's what you mean by it, you get off the train early, right?

1546
01:24:30,780 --> 01:24:31,980
And you say there's no free will.

1547
01:24:32,060 --> 01:24:34,460
So that's Sam Harris or Robert Spolski.

1548
01:24:34,860 --> 01:24:39,900
Then there's some people who sort of say, well, um, maybe not in principle, but like maybe

1549
01:24:39,900 --> 01:24:45,420
once we know exactly how a system works, uh, we have um, you know, we have the

1550
01:24:45,420 --> 01:24:47,100
technology, I get off there.

1551
01:24:47,260 --> 01:24:49,660
And those people would be sort of incompatibilists.

1552
01:24:49,740 --> 01:24:54,700
So when the when you know more about how a system works, then you say, Oh, we don't have

1553
01:24:54,700 --> 01:24:55,740
free will for that anymore.

1554
01:24:55,900 --> 01:24:56,860
That's done, you know.

1555
01:24:57,020 --> 01:25:01,850
So, like if I knew how let's just pretend like there was a system that was like the

1556
01:25:01,850 --> 01:25:06,410
decision-making system in your head, and scientists like announce we know everything about

1557
01:25:06,410 --> 01:25:08,250
how the decision-making system works.

1558
01:25:08,410 --> 01:25:13,210
There would be a class of people who are like, Well, that means we don't have free will

1559
01:25:13,210 --> 01:25:13,770
anymore, right?

1560
01:25:13,930 --> 01:25:18,650
Even though nobody poked on it, just knowing enough about it is enough for those people to

1561
01:25:18,810 --> 01:25:20,170
then be concerned, right?

1562
01:25:20,810 --> 01:25:24,090
And then there's and then there's like people like me who are like, Well, no, we still have

1563
01:25:24,090 --> 01:25:25,370
free will, we're I'm compatible.

1564
01:25:25,450 --> 01:25:28,010
Let's I it's a levels of analysis thing, right?

1565
01:25:28,170 --> 01:25:32,820
Where you can describe the software, but it doesn't make the intentional level phenomenon

1566
01:25:32,820 --> 01:25:33,460
any less real.

1567
01:25:33,620 --> 01:25:36,900
So that's the software that makes it possible to make a decision.

1568
01:25:36,980 --> 01:25:38,020
There's no problem there.

1569
01:25:38,180 --> 01:25:43,860
However, if a neuroscientist poked on the software, then I would be saying, well, yeah, no,

1570
01:25:43,940 --> 01:25:47,380
that person didn't have free will in that situation because that's a neuroscientist poked

1571
01:25:47,380 --> 01:25:47,700
on their software.

1572
01:25:47,860 --> 01:25:51,860
So that's getting off at the last station, station three, when like it's manipulation in

1573
01:25:51,860 --> 01:25:52,260
practice.

1574
01:25:52,420 --> 01:25:54,420
And I think everybody would get off then.

1575
01:25:54,820 --> 01:25:58,810
So those are all about the concern about manipulation.

1576
01:25:58,970 --> 01:26:02,890
Then it's just this question of like, how quickly do you get off the train?

1577
01:26:03,130 --> 01:26:07,610
But the thing is, is that that's the evolved concern of the psychology.

1578
01:26:07,930 --> 01:26:13,850
And because we never evolved in a world to have this much knowledge, there's just

1579
01:26:13,850 --> 01:26:18,970
this individual difference along this continuum of like, how soon do you get worried about

1580
01:26:18,970 --> 01:26:19,530
manipulation?

1581
01:26:19,610 --> 01:26:24,250
Is it when it's in principle, when it's uh more concretely in principle or actually

1582
01:26:24,250 --> 01:26:24,890
happening?

1583
01:26:25,140 --> 01:26:31,060
And so that's the that's the sort of evolutionary mismatch piece where there's a sense

1584
01:26:31,060 --> 01:26:37,060
in which people who say we don't have free will are right because they're

1585
01:26:37,060 --> 01:26:43,060
sort of they're sort of saying look our evolved psychology is concerned about

1586
01:26:43,060 --> 01:26:43,860
manipulation.

1587
01:26:44,020 --> 01:26:45,460
And is manipulation possible?

1588
01:26:45,620 --> 01:26:46,100
Yeah.

1589
01:26:46,430 --> 01:26:47,070
Right.

1590
01:26:47,550 --> 01:26:50,910
But it's again, there's like no facts of the matter about it.

1591
01:26:51,070 --> 01:26:53,630
It's sort of like, is this fish suffocating?

1592
01:26:53,950 --> 01:26:56,830
There's a sense in which it is, in a sense in which it isn't.

1593
01:26:56,990 --> 01:27:01,630
And there's a sense in which free will is real, in the sense of I currently enjoy free

1594
01:27:01,630 --> 01:27:01,870
will.

1595
01:27:01,950 --> 01:27:04,670
It's in a coherent evolved representation.

1596
01:27:05,310 --> 01:27:10,750
And then, however, if you get off the train right away, there's a sense in which you're

1597
01:27:10,750 --> 01:27:10,910
right.

1598
01:27:10,990 --> 01:27:12,920
Like in principle, I could be manipulated.

1599
01:27:13,000 --> 01:27:14,600
And if that's what you mean by it, then you're right.

1600
01:27:14,680 --> 01:27:15,000
I don't.

1601
01:27:15,160 --> 01:27:16,360
So we can both be right.

1602
01:27:16,440 --> 01:27:18,840
We're just talking about different things, right?

1603
01:27:19,640 --> 01:27:25,640
Um, and if you get off the train later, then we most we might both say we both

1604
01:27:25,800 --> 01:27:31,800
I have free will because nobody has been poking on my um my systems, you know, unless we

1605
01:27:31,800 --> 01:27:32,840
find out otherwise.

1606
01:27:33,080 --> 01:27:38,840
So the basic idea is that there's actually been a bunch of different issues all

1607
01:27:39,110 --> 01:27:40,870
smooshed together.

1608
01:27:41,110 --> 01:27:47,110
And the idea is that if you tease these all apart, so you tease apart, are you

1609
01:27:47,110 --> 01:27:52,630
talking about an evolved representation that is distinguishing between like the difference

1610
01:27:52,630 --> 01:27:55,510
between getting up in the mur morning or breaking a bone?

1611
01:27:55,670 --> 01:27:58,310
Then yes, free will is real, right?

1612
01:27:58,950 --> 01:28:04,620
It's also then the free will representation itself is for the range of circumstances that

1613
01:28:04,620 --> 01:28:05,660
we evolve to deal with.

1614
01:28:05,740 --> 01:28:07,980
Like, is somebody are you currently manipulating me?

1615
01:28:08,060 --> 01:28:08,780
I don't think so.

1616
01:28:08,940 --> 01:28:11,100
You know, like I have free will, right?

1617
01:28:11,580 --> 01:28:11,900
Yeah.

1618
01:28:12,060 --> 01:28:17,740
Um, so that so this is why I think the evolutionary mismatch is really important

1619
01:28:18,220 --> 01:28:24,140
because there's a sense in which you can say free will is real, because you know, the

1620
01:28:24,140 --> 01:28:29,470
fish is uh floundering, like it's if it's experiencing, it's

1621
01:28:29,470 --> 01:28:30,590
suffocating.

1622
01:28:30,830 --> 01:28:35,790
Um, but there's another sense in which like you could manipulate my behavior, or maybe you

1623
01:28:35,870 --> 01:28:36,510
you have.

1624
01:28:36,990 --> 01:28:40,830
Um, and and that's a sense in which you don't have free will.

1625
01:28:42,270 --> 01:28:47,960
I I wonder if the relevant uh individual difference variable

1626
01:28:47,960 --> 01:28:53,480
that's shaping these intuitions is the sense of ownership and how expansive that sense of

1627
01:28:53,480 --> 01:28:54,840
ownership is.

1628
01:28:55,080 --> 01:28:58,360
So on the one hand, you could or the sense of self, let's say.

1629
01:28:58,520 --> 01:29:01,240
So on the one hand, you could have a very narrow conception of self where it's just the

1630
01:29:01,240 --> 01:29:03,560
conscious me that makes decisions.

1631
01:29:03,720 --> 01:29:08,600
And the stuff that's unconscious, my genes, you know, my habits that I acquired as a child,

1632
01:29:08,680 --> 01:29:09,320
that's not me.

1633
01:29:09,480 --> 01:29:12,120
Just the me that's conscious right now making decisions, that's that's the only thing

1634
01:29:12,120 --> 01:29:12,520
that's me.

1635
01:29:13,160 --> 01:29:15,930
Or you could take a more expansive definition of self and say it's all me.

1636
01:29:16,090 --> 01:29:20,730
My genes, my upbringing, my habits, what's going on at the unconscious level, that's all

1637
01:29:20,730 --> 01:29:20,890
me.

1638
01:29:20,970 --> 01:29:21,610
Yeah.

1639
01:29:21,930 --> 01:29:27,850
And so for some people, when when you explain to them that uh unconscious forces or genetic

1640
01:29:27,850 --> 01:29:33,370
forces or childhood forces are shaping your decisions, that reads to them, that reads to

1641
01:29:33,370 --> 01:29:35,370
their evolved mind as I'm being manipulated.

1642
01:29:35,450 --> 01:29:35,610
Yeah.

1643
01:29:35,770 --> 01:29:38,970
I'm being manipulated by something that is not me, that is alien.

1644
01:29:39,210 --> 01:29:40,970
These genes that I have, they're not me.

1645
01:29:41,340 --> 01:29:44,380
These unconscious motivations and drives, they're not me.

1646
01:29:44,460 --> 01:29:44,700
Right?

1647
01:29:44,860 --> 01:29:46,620
These habits that I've acquired, they're not me.

1648
01:29:46,860 --> 01:29:47,100
That's right.

1649
01:29:47,340 --> 01:29:51,100
Uh, and so they register that as manipulation and that I don't have free will.

1650
01:29:51,180 --> 01:29:56,460
I've it's directly analogous to I've been uh manipulated by an evil neuroscientist who did

1651
01:29:56,460 --> 01:29:58,380
uh brain surgery on me without my consent.

1652
01:29:58,620 --> 01:30:03,500
Except it's not the neuroscientist, it's evolution or it's uh the unconscious parts of the

1653
01:30:03,500 --> 01:30:04,140
brain or whatever.

1654
01:30:04,300 --> 01:30:09,740
And so maybe the relevant distinction is do I view evolution in genes and unconscious brain

1655
01:30:09,740 --> 01:30:10,380
processes?

1656
01:30:10,570 --> 01:30:15,610
do I view that stuff as the type of thing that could manipulate me as something that's

1657
01:30:15,610 --> 01:30:16,970
outside of me or external to me?

1658
01:30:17,050 --> 01:30:17,210
Yeah.

1659
01:30:17,370 --> 01:30:19,370
Or do I view it as me, as a part of me?

1660
01:30:19,450 --> 01:30:19,530
Yeah.

1661
01:30:19,690 --> 01:30:21,770
In which case it's not manipulation, it's just me making a decision.

1662
01:30:22,010 --> 01:30:26,010
It's funny you say that because how I got into this was from modularity, because the

1663
01:30:26,010 --> 01:30:30,650
modularity argument was what Fodor meant by module was the stuff that wasn't me.

1664
01:30:30,890 --> 01:30:31,130
Yeah.

1665
01:30:31,370 --> 01:30:35,050
So he was drawing a line around and he was making an argument that, like, hey, if you think

1666
01:30:35,050 --> 01:30:37,610
it's all the homunculus or you inside your head, guess what?

1667
01:30:37,690 --> 01:30:38,250
You're wrong.

1668
01:30:38,410 --> 01:30:42,760
There's like stuff on the periphery like perception where you can't go in and control.

1669
01:30:42,920 --> 01:30:47,160
You can't go in and change the fact that you see a visual illusion, even if you know

1670
01:30:47,160 --> 01:30:50,600
explicitly that the lines are the same length or whatever.

1671
01:30:50,680 --> 01:30:51,160
Yeah.

1672
01:30:51,400 --> 01:30:53,560
Um you can't control it.

1673
01:30:53,800 --> 01:30:57,880
And so that was actually my foray into free will because I was like, look, we just went

1674
01:30:57,880 --> 01:30:59,720
through this whole modular with me with any words.

1675
01:30:59,880 --> 01:31:05,000
Like we went through this whole thing where what the modularity debate was about was about

1676
01:31:05,240 --> 01:31:09,410
like this levels of analysis confusion where like fodder was uh operating at this

1677
01:31:09,410 --> 01:31:13,010
intentional level where there's like the you and then the stuff that isn't you.

1678
01:31:13,170 --> 01:31:13,890
Exactly what you're saying.

1679
01:31:14,050 --> 01:31:18,210
And then people were just drawing the lines of like evolution is not you.

1680
01:31:18,290 --> 01:31:22,130
It's like the thing that causes you to want to eat sh you know sugar when you don't want

1681
01:31:22,130 --> 01:31:22,690
to, right?

1682
01:31:22,850 --> 01:31:23,010
Yes.

1683
01:31:23,330 --> 01:31:26,690
And or it's you it makes you want to sleep with the person even though you don't think you

1684
01:31:26,690 --> 01:31:27,170
should, right?

1685
01:31:27,360 --> 01:31:29,680
Like it's the poking on the homiculus stuff.

1686
01:31:29,840 --> 01:31:30,080
Right.

1687
01:31:30,240 --> 01:31:33,360
And that's the way a lot of popularization understands it.

1688
01:31:33,520 --> 01:31:37,920
And then there was another version, which was the quote unquote sophisticated version,

1689
01:31:38,000 --> 01:31:42,800
which I am part of, which is sort of understanding evolution at the functional level, which

1690
01:31:42,800 --> 01:31:46,480
is just like everything you do, like the decision making or whatever, it's all just

1691
01:31:46,480 --> 01:31:46,880
software.

1692
01:31:46,960 --> 01:31:48,720
And we just do the evolved software.

1693
01:31:48,880 --> 01:31:53,040
And so it's not a you versus your mechanism, it's just mechanisms all the way down.

1694
01:31:53,290 --> 01:31:57,690
And so this was the argument was that there's a levels of analysis confusion where people

1695
01:31:57,690 --> 01:32:03,370
were operating at the intentional level, like Fodor, invoking a you, defining mechanisms as

1696
01:32:03,370 --> 01:32:04,330
opposed to the you.

1697
01:32:04,810 --> 01:32:07,450
And that's not what evolutionary psychologists meant at all.

1698
01:32:07,530 --> 01:32:10,490
They were operating at a lower level at the level of mechanisms.

1699
01:32:10,810 --> 01:32:14,970
And that, and then I so we did that for modularity and said, like, that's why people are

1700
01:32:14,970 --> 01:32:16,810
having this back and forth debate.

1701
01:32:17,020 --> 01:32:20,460
Um, it's just people missing each other and at what level they're just talking about

1702
01:32:20,460 --> 01:32:21,100
modules.

1703
01:32:21,340 --> 01:32:23,820
Fodor meant module meaning not you.

1704
01:32:24,060 --> 01:32:28,060
And a lot of people meant foot module is not you, but of psych, most evolutionary

1705
01:32:28,060 --> 01:32:33,980
psychologists or adaptationists meant just modules are just bits of uh functions

1706
01:32:33,980 --> 01:32:36,860
at the functional level, at the software level.

1707
01:32:36,940 --> 01:32:40,700
It has nothing to do with the stuff that's independent of you one way or another.

1708
01:32:40,940 --> 01:32:43,980
They're using the same word to operate at two different levels.

1709
01:32:44,140 --> 01:32:49,590
That was the argument, the modularity paper, And the idea was sort of that I looked over at

1710
01:32:49,590 --> 01:32:52,150
free will and was like, well, this looks very similar.

1711
01:32:52,310 --> 01:32:55,750
Like, I like I'm I just went through this whole thing with modularity.

1712
01:32:55,830 --> 01:33:01,350
And look, people are talking about free will as being incompatible with mechanisms.

1713
01:33:01,510 --> 01:33:04,150
Some people are, and some people aren't.

1714
01:33:04,390 --> 01:33:08,150
So maybe it's that people who are incompatibilists are like voter.

1715
01:33:08,230 --> 01:33:10,150
They're operating at the intentional level.

1716
01:33:10,310 --> 01:33:15,270
They're sort of saying, look, there's me and my mechanisms, and I'm free, but my mechanisms

1717
01:33:15,270 --> 01:33:15,670
aren't.

1718
01:33:15,910 --> 01:33:17,860
So I'm an incompatibilist, you know.

1719
01:33:18,020 --> 01:33:21,940
But then if there's other people who are sort of like, well, yeah, you are made up of

1720
01:33:21,940 --> 01:33:22,420
mechanisms.

1721
01:33:22,500 --> 01:33:24,740
It's sort of like the evolutionary psychologists.

1722
01:33:24,900 --> 01:33:27,060
So those are the compatibilists, right?

1723
01:33:27,220 --> 01:33:33,140
And so that's how I got into the whole debate was realizing that that it at that this

1724
01:33:33,140 --> 01:33:38,740
level, this deeper structural level, it was a very similar confusion, a levels of analysis

1725
01:33:38,820 --> 01:33:39,780
confusion.

1726
01:33:40,990 --> 01:33:41,390
Yeah.

1727
01:33:41,550 --> 01:33:46,030
I Yeah, but that was before then I got into the mismatch stuff and the figuring that out.

1728
01:33:46,110 --> 01:33:47,870
But that's that was the beginning of me getting into it.

1729
01:33:48,030 --> 01:33:49,230
So you're exactly right.

1730
01:33:49,390 --> 01:33:50,030
Yeah.

1731
01:33:50,910 --> 01:33:51,550
Yeah.

1732
01:33:52,750 --> 01:33:58,350
It it almost strikes me that the mismatch aspect is not the

1733
01:33:58,590 --> 01:34:01,710
unprecedented level of manipulability.

1734
01:34:02,110 --> 01:34:08,110
Manipulability, um, but the uh lack of clarity about what the

1735
01:34:08,350 --> 01:34:14,260
self is and the unprecedented insight into aspects of ourself that are uh

1736
01:34:14,420 --> 01:34:15,780
not currently conscious.

1737
01:34:16,020 --> 01:34:16,580
Yeah.

1738
01:34:16,900 --> 01:34:18,500
Um Yeah, that's a good point.

1739
01:34:18,660 --> 01:34:24,180
Yeah, we're no yeah, we did not evolve for that level of uh yeah, that's a really good way

1740
01:34:24,180 --> 01:34:24,740
to think about it.

1741
01:34:24,820 --> 01:34:25,860
Yeah, that's true.

1742
01:34:26,340 --> 01:34:26,580
Right.

1743
01:34:26,740 --> 01:34:31,460
Like uh w you know, what to call the self or like how expansive or narrow, that that wasn't

1744
01:34:31,460 --> 01:34:35,730
really a a relevant uh uh d distinction that you know would have been selection pressures

1745
01:34:35,730 --> 01:34:38,050
to make sure we get that conceptualization right.

1746
01:34:38,450 --> 01:34:39,570
And so we're free to vary.

1747
01:34:39,650 --> 01:34:43,330
Some some have a an expansive definition of self, some have a narrow definition of self.

1748
01:34:43,570 --> 01:34:47,890
And um and and the mechanism in some sense is up operating correctly.

1749
01:34:47,970 --> 01:34:52,450
Like it's it's designed to detect threats to the self or manipulate and uh manipulative

1750
01:34:52,610 --> 01:34:54,930
attempts to e exploit the self.

1751
01:34:55,170 --> 01:34:57,330
Um and it just depends on how you think of the self.

1752
01:34:57,730 --> 01:35:01,920
You know, if you if you think of the self as as the narrow conscious you at at this time,

1753
01:35:02,080 --> 01:35:05,760
then you really are being manipulated by your unconscious forces and by your genes and by

1754
01:35:05,760 --> 01:35:06,320
your upbringing.

1755
01:35:07,040 --> 01:35:10,560
But but if you view the self expansively, then you're not being manipulated by those things

1756
01:35:10,640 --> 01:35:12,480
because those things are you.

1757
01:35:12,720 --> 01:35:17,040
And so we evolved to detect, you know, uh m potential manipulation.

1758
01:35:17,600 --> 01:35:23,510
And um if neuroscientists really did um uh fully unravel everything going on in the brain

1759
01:35:23,670 --> 01:35:27,910
and could manipulate us by you know giving us pills or or brain surgery or planting

1760
01:35:28,070 --> 01:35:29,750
electrode in our brains or whatever.

1761
01:35:29,910 --> 01:35:33,190
If they could do all those things, that really would be a legitimate case of manipulation

1762
01:35:33,190 --> 01:35:35,110
that we would have good reason to worry about.

1763
01:35:35,270 --> 01:35:36,310
And that wouldn't be mismatched.

1764
01:35:36,390 --> 01:35:37,190
That would be a rational.

1765
01:35:38,470 --> 01:35:38,710
That's right.

1766
01:35:38,790 --> 01:35:40,070
That's getting off at step three.

1767
01:35:40,150 --> 01:35:43,110
Yeah, that's right, where everybody lines up that that's not free will.

1768
01:35:43,270 --> 01:35:43,590
That's right.

1769
01:35:43,910 --> 01:35:43,990
Right.

1770
01:35:44,150 --> 01:35:49,780
But the people who get off at staff step one, um they're already being manipulated by the

1771
01:35:49,780 --> 01:35:54,100
evil neuroscientist in the form of their unconscious mind, in the form of their genes, in

1772
01:35:54,100 --> 01:35:55,700
the form of their childhood.

1773
01:35:56,020 --> 01:35:57,700
Like the evil neuroscientist is already in them.

1774
01:35:57,940 --> 01:35:58,980
And it's already manipulating.

1775
01:35:59,300 --> 01:35:59,620
Yeah, exactly.

1776
01:35:59,860 --> 01:35:59,940
Right?

1777
01:36:00,100 --> 01:36:00,260
Yeah.

1778
01:36:00,420 --> 01:36:00,580
Exactly.

1779
01:36:00,820 --> 01:36:04,660
And so the the difference is just, you know, what are we calling the evil neuroscientist

1780
01:36:04,820 --> 01:36:06,420
and what are we not calling the evil neuroscientists?

1781
01:36:06,820 --> 01:36:06,980
Yeah.

1782
01:36:07,220 --> 01:36:09,700
And and so this is the answer to what is free will.

1783
01:36:09,780 --> 01:36:15,630
It's that you don't you this is why the answer is 42, where the whole

1784
01:36:15,630 --> 01:36:21,310
question assumed that the answer wouldn't be uh it's a representation of an

1785
01:36:21,310 --> 01:36:22,990
evolved organism, right?

1786
01:36:23,310 --> 01:36:23,470
Yeah.

1787
01:36:23,710 --> 01:36:26,590
And the uh and the idea is it is, and that's the answer.

1788
01:36:26,990 --> 01:36:32,990
And then once you understand that that's the answer, then the question of in a particular

1789
01:36:32,990 --> 01:36:34,990
case, is this an instance of free will?

1790
01:36:35,070 --> 01:36:40,620
You can understand why there could be different individuals coming to

1791
01:36:40,620 --> 01:36:41,820
different answers.

1792
01:36:42,060 --> 01:36:46,860
So the level of invariance, as we talked about in earlier podcast, to the answer, what is

1793
01:36:46,860 --> 01:36:50,060
free will, is not what people imagined it to be.

1794
01:36:50,140 --> 01:36:51,580
This is why 42 is apt.

1795
01:36:51,820 --> 01:36:56,300
It's not, it's not a perspective independent definition.

1796
01:36:56,460 --> 01:37:01,260
It's not an evolved system independent definition out in the world.

1797
01:37:01,500 --> 01:37:06,780
It's it's a representation of an ad from caused by an adaptation and

1798
01:37:07,370 --> 01:37:12,890
depending on different things about that organism.

1799
01:37:13,210 --> 01:37:18,970
And because of this evolutionary mismatch, the same content in the world will

1800
01:37:18,970 --> 01:37:24,170
arrive at different conclusions about whether or not free will exists or not, or holds in

1801
01:37:24,170 --> 01:37:25,450
this case or not.

1802
01:37:25,850 --> 01:37:31,460
So it changes the enterprise from deciding what out in the

1803
01:37:31,460 --> 01:37:36,660
world counts as free will, to understanding why and the psychology of

1804
01:37:36,820 --> 01:37:41,860
different evolved critters are arriving at different conclusions.

1805
01:37:42,020 --> 01:37:47,620
And the thing that is predictable and deterministic is the software that we're

1806
01:37:47,620 --> 01:37:50,340
characterizing in our answer of what free will is.

1807
01:37:50,580 --> 01:37:55,590
So we have a theory, it's almost like a meta-theory of everything we've been talking about

1808
01:37:55,750 --> 01:37:58,710
is this is what the scientific study of free will is.

1809
01:37:58,870 --> 01:38:04,390
There's all this labé stuff about um, like this classic study where the question is:

1810
01:38:04,630 --> 01:38:09,910
is there um neurocognitive signature of making a decision before you experiencing making

1811
01:38:09,910 --> 01:38:10,710
your decision?

1812
01:38:11,190 --> 01:38:14,980
And this account says that that's not the study of free will at all.

1813
01:38:15,780 --> 01:38:20,660
That's that's the expression of the concern of the free will system, looking at the how the

1814
01:38:20,660 --> 01:38:26,180
neurocognitive systems of decision making, which won't tell you that that labé stuff will

1815
01:38:26,180 --> 01:38:27,300
not tell us anything.

1816
01:38:27,460 --> 01:38:29,060
It won't settle the matter at all.

1817
01:38:29,220 --> 01:38:29,380
Yes.

1818
01:38:29,620 --> 01:38:34,900
And in fact, what the neurocognitive study of free will is, is the

1819
01:38:34,900 --> 01:38:40,500
neurocognitive study of a system that is representing, for example, the difference between

1820
01:38:40,500 --> 01:38:43,790
getting up early in the morning and healing a broken bone.

1821
01:38:43,870 --> 01:38:49,310
That's concerned about manipulation and deciding whether or not these circumstances count

1822
01:38:49,470 --> 01:38:53,630
as this system should be concerned about the possibility of manipulation.

1823
01:38:53,870 --> 01:38:58,750
So this suggests a completely different way to study free will and a completely different

1824
01:38:58,750 --> 01:39:00,910
way to understand what free will is.

1825
01:39:01,390 --> 01:39:01,630
Yeah.

1826
01:39:01,790 --> 01:39:05,740
No, with the labet stuff, like it it fits what I was saying earlier.

1827
01:39:05,900 --> 01:39:10,460
So if if the neurosignature of making a decision happens before you're consciously aware of

1828
01:39:10,460 --> 01:39:13,020
making that decision, you can interpret that in one of two ways.

1829
01:39:13,420 --> 01:39:16,860
In one way, the neurosignature is this alien force that's manipulating you.

1830
01:39:17,020 --> 01:39:20,460
You're categorizing this as a case of manipulation, in which case I don't have free will.

1831
01:39:21,500 --> 01:39:24,220
Another way to see it is no, that neurosignature is a part of me.

1832
01:39:24,300 --> 01:39:25,580
That's just the way I make decisions.

1833
01:39:25,820 --> 01:39:27,100
It's not manipulating me, it is me.

1834
01:39:27,180 --> 01:39:27,260
Yeah.

1835
01:39:27,420 --> 01:39:27,580
Right.

1836
01:39:28,490 --> 01:39:33,290
And so it it depends on how narrowly or expansively you you your definition of of the self

1837
01:39:33,530 --> 01:39:33,690
is.

1838
01:39:34,010 --> 01:39:34,170
Yeah.

1839
01:39:34,250 --> 01:39:35,770
And where you get off on the train.

1840
01:39:35,930 --> 01:39:38,330
I I like what you're saying, and another way to put it is where you get off on the train,

1841
01:39:38,410 --> 01:39:40,570
and that's why it's not going to settle it for anybody.

1842
01:39:40,810 --> 01:39:41,050
Yeah.

1843
01:39:41,290 --> 01:39:41,610
Yeah.

1844
01:39:41,850 --> 01:39:42,170
Cool.

1845
01:39:42,410 --> 01:39:46,250
So um how how how are you approaching uh testing these ideas empirically?

1846
01:39:46,570 --> 01:39:47,690
That's another thing I was curious about.

1847
01:39:47,930 --> 01:39:48,250
Yeah, yeah.

1848
01:39:48,410 --> 01:39:51,770
I mean, so one is we're testing this individual difference thing of like where do you get

1849
01:39:51,770 --> 01:39:52,890
off the train, which I really love.

1850
01:39:53,130 --> 01:39:53,290
Okay.

1851
01:39:53,370 --> 01:39:53,530
Yeah.

1852
01:39:53,610 --> 01:39:55,450
Um and that's something we're gonna see.

1853
01:39:55,610 --> 01:40:01,480
And we've already um you can sort of you can kind of predict where

1854
01:40:01,480 --> 01:40:02,840
people are gonna get off the train.

1855
01:40:02,920 --> 01:40:03,960
It seems to be pretty stable.

1856
01:40:04,040 --> 01:40:08,120
I mean, I don't want to speak too strongly about it, but we're that's one aspect is just

1857
01:40:08,120 --> 01:40:14,120
sort of giving people, um asking people, giving people scenarios and saying, is there free

1858
01:40:14,120 --> 01:40:14,760
will or not?

1859
01:40:15,000 --> 01:40:21,000
And then, you know, and then looking at, for example, are people who get off at step one,

1860
01:40:21,270 --> 01:40:24,950
are they more likely to confuse levels of analysis, for example, right?

1861
01:40:25,190 --> 01:40:29,110
Um, you know, and but that's one thing is you can just document that difference.

1862
01:40:29,190 --> 01:40:35,190
And I think uh in the context of the existing literature, I think, and

1863
01:40:35,270 --> 01:40:37,830
and this is not part of the theory, this is just my own personal thinking.

1864
01:40:37,990 --> 01:40:43,830
I suspect that the compatibilist incompatibilist distinction is conflating those

1865
01:40:43,830 --> 01:40:47,180
three different, more stable individual differences.

1866
01:40:47,260 --> 01:40:51,900
And I think that in in analogously like what you were saying about like, you know, people's

1867
01:40:51,900 --> 01:40:56,060
training on as to whether or not your genes are part of you or not, and if you lump that in

1868
01:40:56,060 --> 01:41:01,820
or not, these things should all better explain compatibilism or incompatibilism or moving

1869
01:41:01,820 --> 01:41:02,860
people around in that way.

1870
01:41:02,940 --> 01:41:03,340
Right.

1871
01:41:03,500 --> 01:41:05,100
Um so that's one element.

1872
01:41:05,180 --> 01:41:10,130
The other thing is just sort of looking at um is just testing this idea that the efficacy

1873
01:41:10,130 --> 01:41:15,250
of intentional intervention, like the question of like is does free will track um the

1874
01:41:15,250 --> 01:41:19,330
extent to which you believe you could sort of force yourself or convince yourself to do

1875
01:41:19,330 --> 01:41:20,210
something, right?

1876
01:41:20,450 --> 01:41:20,610
Yeah.

1877
01:41:20,770 --> 01:41:26,690
Um and is that um is that um something too um that that's a prediction,

1878
01:41:26,770 --> 01:41:27,330
um, right?

1879
01:41:27,410 --> 01:41:31,280
That that that's so you're looking at the deg the degree to which people say that this

1880
01:41:31,280 --> 01:41:33,280
person has free will and seeing if that correlates to the same thing.

1881
01:41:33,360 --> 01:41:33,760
Yeah, or first.

1882
01:41:34,720 --> 01:41:34,880
Yeah.

1883
01:41:35,120 --> 01:41:36,800
Or for so you do are you doing third and first person?

1884
01:41:37,120 --> 01:41:38,160
Yeah, first and type of person.

1885
01:41:38,400 --> 01:41:39,120
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

1886
01:41:39,360 --> 01:41:39,600
Cool.

1887
01:41:39,760 --> 01:41:40,960
Um so that's one part.

1888
01:41:41,040 --> 01:41:44,480
So basically it would be like, could you convince yourself to do something in this

1889
01:41:44,480 --> 01:41:45,040
situation?

1890
01:41:45,200 --> 01:41:48,800
And then at a later point, it's like, Do you have free will in this situation?

1891
01:41:48,960 --> 01:41:52,000
And those two should sort of track each other, but it shouldn't track other things, like

1892
01:41:52,080 --> 01:41:53,530
how desirable would it be?

1893
01:41:53,770 --> 01:41:59,050
Um, the other thing we're doing too, and this is the other kind of funny part of thinking

1894
01:41:59,210 --> 01:42:05,050
taking this evolutionary step back, is determinism has always been brought up for

1895
01:42:05,050 --> 01:42:07,690
reasons we talked about, like predictability or manipulation.

1896
01:42:07,930 --> 01:42:12,810
But one thing people haven't really realized is that, like, for example, like superhero

1897
01:42:12,810 --> 01:42:17,740
movies Have just as much to do with free will as

1898
01:42:17,820 --> 01:42:19,820
neuroscientists implanting a brain.

1899
01:42:20,380 --> 01:42:25,340
Super superhuman or yeah, superhuman abilities or like the ability to like read minds.

1900
01:42:25,580 --> 01:42:26,940
People love that, right?

1901
01:42:27,020 --> 01:42:30,060
You're like, that's sign me up, hook it to my veins, right?

1902
01:42:30,220 --> 01:42:30,860
Yeah.

1903
01:42:31,180 --> 01:42:35,340
And it that's a case of instinct blindness, where in fact that's more determinism in the

1904
01:42:35,340 --> 01:42:35,820
world, right?

1905
01:42:35,900 --> 01:42:40,380
Like you've you've injected a new deterministic relationship that didn't exist before.

1906
01:42:40,540 --> 01:42:42,620
But David, you can now read my mind.

1907
01:42:42,990 --> 01:42:46,750
And if and if I tell you you can do that, you love that, right?

1908
01:42:46,910 --> 01:42:49,310
And I hate it because for me it's manipulation.

1909
01:42:49,470 --> 01:42:52,430
But if you're my friend or my partner, I might get more.

1910
01:42:52,510 --> 01:42:57,070
And so that's a whole other part where we're actually teasing apart what had been

1911
01:42:57,070 --> 01:43:02,750
conflated, which is determinism where you're the victim of it, where you're the

1912
01:43:02,750 --> 01:43:08,590
patient as opposed to the agent of determinism, and then manipulating social distance.

1913
01:43:08,750 --> 01:43:14,280
So this is the other thing where the literature, because it's been so in implicitly

1914
01:43:14,280 --> 01:43:20,280
focused on the concern about manipulation, that it didn't take it didn't take a

1915
01:43:20,280 --> 01:43:23,560
step back and think, well, what does determinism mean?

1916
01:43:23,800 --> 01:43:28,520
Um, and what happens when you inject new determinism into the world or new deterministic

1917
01:43:28,520 --> 01:43:29,160
relationships?

1918
01:43:29,320 --> 01:43:33,000
There's a whole category that people should not only not mind but love.

1919
01:43:33,470 --> 01:43:37,470
Um, maybe they won't admit to it, but like, could you just, you know, would it be great for

1920
01:43:37,470 --> 01:43:39,070
you to just like fly anywhere you wanted?

1921
01:43:39,150 --> 01:43:39,950
That'd be awesome, right?

1922
01:43:40,030 --> 01:43:42,110
Like, so yeah, people fantasize about that.

1923
01:43:42,190 --> 01:43:48,190
There's a whole uh genre of fiction that's about the acquisition of new deterministic

1924
01:43:48,190 --> 01:43:50,030
relationships that didn't exist before.

1925
01:43:50,190 --> 01:43:53,230
Like I can make fire come out of my arms when I want to.

1926
01:43:53,390 --> 01:43:55,870
It would be bad if it was like uncontrollable, right?

1927
01:43:55,950 --> 01:43:57,630
Like I would burn my family.

1928
01:43:57,790 --> 01:43:59,150
That would be horrible, right?

1929
01:43:59,310 --> 01:44:05,240
So like um, but like having new things under your control is awesome

1930
01:44:05,240 --> 01:44:07,000
for an evolved organism, right?

1931
01:44:07,480 --> 01:44:09,720
This is also the psychology of free will.

1932
01:44:09,880 --> 01:44:14,200
So the psychology of free will doesn't just become like worrying about neuroscientists

1933
01:44:14,200 --> 01:44:15,080
poking on your brain.

1934
01:44:15,160 --> 01:44:21,160
It also becomes the psychology of power and capability.

1935
01:44:21,640 --> 01:44:26,200
And we're getting into this idea of sort of the representation of what's possible.

1936
01:44:26,950 --> 01:44:32,950
And there's that's a whole new interesting area that's that's getting into what we started

1937
01:44:32,950 --> 01:44:38,790
with, which is sort of like if you took a fox and a bird and you mixed up their

1938
01:44:38,790 --> 01:44:43,590
planning systems, they would do very poorly because the bird can fly, but the fox can't,

1939
01:44:43,670 --> 01:44:44,070
you know.

1940
01:44:44,310 --> 01:44:48,950
So if like the the the bird's like, oh, there's a berry across the canyon, you know, I'm

1941
01:44:48,950 --> 01:44:49,830
just gonna go over that way.

1942
01:44:49,910 --> 01:44:52,070
And if it was in the fox, the fox would die, right?

1943
01:44:52,230 --> 01:44:53,510
Because the fox can't fly.

1944
01:44:53,720 --> 01:44:58,760
So, like the ability to represent what you can do and really like it when you can do new

1945
01:44:58,760 --> 01:45:02,280
stuff you thought you couldn't do, that's awesome, right?

1946
01:45:02,440 --> 01:45:02,600
Yeah.

1947
01:45:02,760 --> 01:45:07,080
And so, like the representation of what you can do, and it's not trivial because it

1948
01:45:07,080 --> 01:45:07,480
changes.

1949
01:45:07,560 --> 01:45:10,040
Cause like when you're a baby, you can't do very much.

1950
01:45:10,280 --> 01:45:12,280
Sometimes you get injured, sometimes you get sick.

1951
01:45:12,440 --> 01:45:13,960
Day to day, it changes.

1952
01:45:14,200 --> 01:45:16,680
Some things you can do because other people can help you.

1953
01:45:16,840 --> 01:45:19,560
So it's not even intrinsic within your body envelope.

1954
01:45:19,770 --> 01:45:22,490
you can be hindered, you can, you know, like you'd be tired.

1955
01:45:22,650 --> 01:45:27,370
So, like, I think the free will thing is also a part of a much larger set of adaptations

1956
01:45:27,370 --> 01:45:33,370
for sort of representing what's possible and constantly monitoring that, and also then

1957
01:45:33,370 --> 01:45:39,210
assigning valuation to have I increased what I'm able to do or have I decreased it, you

1958
01:45:39,210 --> 01:45:41,130
know, and that shouldn't be value neutral.

1959
01:45:41,210 --> 01:45:45,930
Like I should love it when I can do something I thought I couldn't, or if I use you do

1960
01:45:45,930 --> 01:45:47,930
something and I'm like, oh, maybe I can do that too.

1961
01:45:48,010 --> 01:45:50,640
You know, like maybe I can catch 20 fish too.

1962
01:45:50,880 --> 01:45:55,200
A lot of advertising literally is like, here's a thing you can do that you thought you

1963
01:45:55,200 --> 01:45:55,680
couldn't do.

1964
01:45:55,760 --> 01:45:57,600
You know, like we should be very attracted to this.

1965
01:45:57,680 --> 01:46:02,240
Like that's a huge swath of advertising is either showing somebody doing something that you

1966
01:46:02,240 --> 01:46:05,200
think you want to do, like, oh my gosh, that person did a backflip.

1967
01:46:05,280 --> 01:46:06,400
Maybe I should drink a Red Bull.

1968
01:46:06,640 --> 01:46:11,680
Or, you know, like the the like, have you ever I I for I gave a talk on this and I looked

1969
01:46:11,680 --> 01:46:15,600
up old um it was like an ATT commercial where it was like, have you ever driven across

1970
01:46:15,680 --> 01:46:16,960
country without looking at a map?

1971
01:46:17,130 --> 01:46:17,530
you will.

1972
01:46:17,690 --> 01:46:21,930
And it was like and it was just showing like a really like crappy, like eight bit, you

1973
01:46:21,930 --> 01:46:23,610
know, um GPS, you know.

1974
01:46:23,690 --> 01:46:26,890
And it was like sent a fax from the beach, you will, you know.

1975
01:46:26,970 --> 01:46:32,570
And so humans just love we're we're just artifact using monkeys, you know, we're just like,

1976
01:46:32,810 --> 01:46:37,290
give me a new tool, that's awesome, you know, and a a lot of advertising is that.

1977
01:46:37,370 --> 01:46:39,440
And I think that's part of free will too.

1978
01:46:39,920 --> 01:46:40,160
Hmm.

1979
01:46:40,320 --> 01:46:40,560
Yeah.

1980
01:46:40,640 --> 01:46:42,240
It's also meta advertising.

1981
01:46:42,320 --> 01:46:46,800
So if I'm trying to advertise to you my ability to advertise your product, I'm gonna want

1982
01:46:46,800 --> 01:46:52,160
to appeal to all the the priming research and saying I can subliminally make people buy

1983
01:46:52,160 --> 01:46:54,640
your soda or whatever, and that's gonna make you hire me.

1984
01:46:54,720 --> 01:46:54,800
Yeah.

1985
01:46:54,960 --> 01:46:59,840
So I wanna inflate the power I have to manipulate people against their their will or or

1986
01:46:59,840 --> 01:47:03,280
beyond their consciousness, because that makes me a more attractive advertiser for you.

1987
01:47:03,440 --> 01:47:05,680
Like I have tremendous powers over the human mind.

1988
01:47:05,840 --> 01:47:07,680
Hire me to advertise your soda.

1989
01:47:07,950 --> 01:47:10,750
Um, the same thing applies, I think, to social scientists.

1990
01:47:10,830 --> 01:47:10,910
Yeah.

1991
01:47:11,070 --> 01:47:15,630
Uh it's uh it's attractive or neuroscientists, it's attractive to say that, yeah, if the

1992
01:47:15,630 --> 01:47:19,470
more knowledge we gain in this area, the more we will have magical powers to just like

1993
01:47:19,470 --> 01:47:21,870
manipulate people or perform Jedi mind tricks on them.

1994
01:47:22,110 --> 01:47:22,270
Exactly.

1995
01:47:22,510 --> 01:47:22,990
Fund my research.

1996
01:47:23,230 --> 01:47:24,670
Yeah, no, we talked about that early on.

1997
01:47:24,750 --> 01:47:30,190
Yeah, yeah, just the selective regime, uh, the institutional selection pressure selects for

1998
01:47:30,190 --> 01:47:35,300
a version of psychology that says we are the special knowledge holders and sort of the

1999
01:47:35,300 --> 01:47:39,700
guardians of the flame of the real engine of decision making.

2000
01:47:39,940 --> 01:47:45,060
And corporation, if you want us to channel it towards your uh lucrative means, let us know

2001
01:47:45,140 --> 01:47:46,020
and we'll help you out.

2002
01:47:46,180 --> 01:47:46,420
Yeah.

2003
01:47:46,820 --> 01:47:46,980
Yeah.

2004
01:47:47,060 --> 01:47:50,820
Or political campaign are if you want us to help you know get votes for your candidate and

2005
01:47:50,820 --> 01:47:53,300
hire us the psychologists who know how to do Jedi mind tricks.

2006
01:47:54,740 --> 01:47:58,660
I think it explains why the unconscious priming stuff was so attractive and compelling to

2007
01:47:58,660 --> 01:47:58,980
the field.

2008
01:47:59,220 --> 01:48:01,060
Why we went down this dumb rabbit hole.

2009
01:48:01,470 --> 01:48:05,550
You know, it's like it's really, it's a really enticing and exciting idea that you could

2010
01:48:05,550 --> 01:48:09,870
get you could manipulate someone's judgments by like making them hold a warm cup of coffee.

2011
01:48:10,030 --> 01:48:15,150
You know, no, if you if you if you basically snip out, if you if you consider like this

2012
01:48:15,150 --> 01:48:20,990
issue of what's under people's control and not, and that issue and

2013
01:48:20,990 --> 01:48:26,990
scientists dealing with that, almost all public discourse about psychology is about that.

2014
01:48:27,150 --> 01:48:29,000
And it's because of this psychology.

2015
01:48:29,080 --> 01:48:32,520
Like I would argue that's an expression of this, of this psychology.

2016
01:48:32,680 --> 01:48:36,840
I mean, it's almost, it's almost like too narrow to call it about free will, right?

2017
01:48:36,920 --> 01:48:41,320
It's sort of like where, where, where I started from, but it's this much bigger set of

2018
01:48:41,320 --> 01:48:46,840
adaptations about control and freedom and autonomy and um

2019
01:48:47,310 --> 01:48:52,670
and manipulation and coercion that there should be super strong selection pressures on.

2020
01:48:52,910 --> 01:48:58,750
And it's a good example of like there's still really low-hanging fruit in adaptationism or

2021
01:48:58,750 --> 01:48:59,950
evolutionary psychology.

2022
01:49:00,110 --> 01:49:03,950
Like, not only is there a lot of stuff to study that isn't just mating, I mean, of course,

2023
01:49:04,030 --> 01:49:07,950
even within mating, as we talk about, like it's overemphasizing sex differences, is like

2024
01:49:08,110 --> 01:49:13,630
the the evolved psychology of like what's possible, like how do I represent what I can do?

2025
01:49:14,940 --> 01:49:16,380
I don't think there's any work on that.

2026
01:49:16,460 --> 01:49:20,700
You know, like the evolved psychology of have I been manipulated or how autonomous am I?

2027
01:49:20,860 --> 01:49:21,900
How does that represent it?

2028
01:49:21,980 --> 01:49:23,180
Like, there's not really much work on that.

2029
01:49:23,260 --> 01:49:25,180
I mean, Chris von Ruden alluded to that.

2030
01:49:25,340 --> 01:49:28,460
Um, you know, that that's an important, like, the sense of autonomy.

2031
01:49:28,540 --> 01:49:34,220
And, you know, people who are in egalitarian societies really value, you know, not

2032
01:49:34,220 --> 01:49:35,980
feeling like they're indebted to people.

2033
01:49:36,140 --> 01:49:37,580
But that's about as far as we've gotten.

2034
01:49:37,740 --> 01:49:41,770
Like, there's not task analyses of these things, there's not, you know, experimental work

2035
01:49:41,850 --> 01:49:42,730
as far as I know.

2036
01:49:42,890 --> 01:49:44,810
So there's just a ton to do.

2037
01:49:44,970 --> 01:49:47,290
But that's free will in two hours.

2038
01:49:47,690 --> 01:49:48,010
Yeah.

2039
01:49:48,170 --> 01:49:49,770
I think I mean we we covered a lot.

2040
01:49:49,850 --> 01:49:51,290
I mean, is there anything we didn't cover?

2041
01:49:52,570 --> 01:49:58,490
Yeah, no, I feel like um, I mean, I I mean, I think there's a lot to sort of, I

2042
01:49:58,490 --> 01:50:02,570
mean, there's so much philosophy about this, and you could kind of go through and sort of

2043
01:50:02,570 --> 01:50:06,970
like, you know, we talked about like reasons responsiveness is like one definition.

2044
01:50:07,130 --> 01:50:12,680
You can kind of go through what I like about this project is nobody

2045
01:50:12,680 --> 01:50:16,920
ends up getting looking super stupid or super smart.

2046
01:50:17,320 --> 01:50:22,040
It's sort of like every position in the free will debate, even like Sam Harris, who frankly

2047
01:50:22,120 --> 01:50:26,920
I'm like annoyed with because he's just so like confident about free will is incoherent.

2048
01:50:27,000 --> 01:50:28,680
Like there's a sense in which he's right, right.

2049
01:50:28,760 --> 01:50:33,830
But like even though, like, you know, I but I think he's like kind of um too strong about

2050
01:50:33,830 --> 01:50:34,070
it.

2051
01:50:34,150 --> 01:50:39,270
Um, but uh but there's a sense in which he's right, and even even incompatibilists or

2052
01:50:39,270 --> 01:50:44,310
compatibilists, sorry, would often still be like evoking like or appealing to like a

2053
01:50:44,310 --> 01:50:48,870
self-like kind of going back up to the intentional level when talking about free will, and

2054
01:50:48,870 --> 01:50:53,720
even like the Dennett and Caruso thing, like as much as Dennett kind of originated like the

2055
01:50:53,720 --> 01:50:58,120
levels of analysis idea, you know, he had the design stance, the intentional stance, the

2056
01:50:58,200 --> 01:50:59,880
the physical stance.

2057
01:51:00,040 --> 01:51:04,200
The Caruso and Dennett book, to just wrap that up, like really what that whole book is

2058
01:51:04,200 --> 01:51:06,680
arguing is the efficacy of different kinds of intervention.

2059
01:51:06,760 --> 01:51:09,400
Like Caruso is like, we shouldn't do an intentional intervention.

2060
01:51:09,480 --> 01:51:12,360
We should just change circumstances or the system.

2061
01:51:12,520 --> 01:51:17,080
Like, not we shouldn't, we shouldn't intervene upon the means-ends psychology of the

2062
01:51:17,080 --> 01:51:17,320
person.

2063
01:51:17,480 --> 01:51:18,910
That's like archaic, right?

2064
01:51:19,070 --> 01:51:19,150
Yeah.

2065
01:51:19,310 --> 01:51:20,750
And Dennett is saying we should.

2066
01:51:20,910 --> 01:51:21,710
That's the whole book.

2067
01:51:21,790 --> 01:51:22,750
You don't even need to read the book.

2068
01:51:23,070 --> 01:51:24,910
Like that's that's actually what the whole debate is about.

2069
01:51:25,150 --> 01:51:28,430
But but I think you can see that once you have this framework, right?

2070
01:51:28,590 --> 01:51:31,070
Um, but that's what they were debating.

2071
01:51:31,230 --> 01:51:34,670
Um uh so like yeah, that that's another thing.

2072
01:51:34,750 --> 01:51:40,750
Like my the the thing I'm saying now to sum up is you can go back through the debate armed

2073
01:51:40,750 --> 01:51:46,430
with this adaptationist approach, and you can basically see the the value

2074
01:51:46,540 --> 01:51:52,540
and the perspective that is correct within a delineated scope, that in every area

2075
01:51:52,540 --> 01:51:57,740
of the argument, you can see in what sense the libertarians are correct, which is that if

2076
01:51:57,740 --> 01:51:59,420
you're deterministic, you're not free.

2077
01:51:59,500 --> 01:52:00,940
There's a sense in which that's true.

2078
01:52:01,100 --> 01:52:05,580
Like I can we can understand now why any human would think that and say that.

2079
01:52:05,740 --> 01:52:08,940
We can also understand that a sense in which it's not true, right?

2080
01:52:09,260 --> 01:52:09,900
Um, yeah.

2081
01:52:10,170 --> 01:52:15,130
So I like that about this project that, like a lot of adaptationism, it doesn't wade into

2082
01:52:15,130 --> 01:52:20,010
the muck and mire of the debate, but it takes a step back and it's like, you're all kind of

2083
01:52:20,010 --> 01:52:21,450
right, you're all kind of wrong.

2084
01:52:21,610 --> 01:52:26,330
Let's think about this just from a different perspective, and we can understand the value

2085
01:52:26,330 --> 01:52:29,210
and the reason why everybody is saying what they're saying.

2086
01:52:29,370 --> 01:52:31,290
And it all fits into a bigger picture.

2087
01:52:31,450 --> 01:52:37,300
And like the thing I really like is that all of the arguments, there's a theory now of why

2088
01:52:37,300 --> 01:52:39,300
those arguments are being put forward.

2089
01:52:39,540 --> 01:52:44,500
Why are philosophers talking about the possibility of neuroscientists manipulating people?

2090
01:52:44,660 --> 01:52:47,300
There's no theory for why they're doing that.

2091
01:52:47,460 --> 01:52:48,900
They just do it in their books.

2092
01:52:49,140 --> 01:52:50,420
This is a theory of that.

2093
01:52:50,580 --> 01:52:52,580
Why are we talking about quantum serve?

2094
01:52:52,660 --> 01:52:53,620
There's no theory of that.

2095
01:52:53,770 --> 01:52:57,290
There's even theorizing about why it doesn't work, and it's a mystery.

2096
01:52:57,450 --> 01:52:58,890
Well, this is a theory of that.

2097
01:52:59,050 --> 01:53:04,650
So I like that this provides a meta theory explaining and contextualizing all the arguments

2098
01:53:04,650 --> 01:53:06,570
into a coherent whole.

2099
01:53:08,090 --> 01:53:13,930
It almost suggests to me that all the philosophical debate about whether or not we

2100
01:53:13,930 --> 01:53:18,890
have free will is kind of pointless and futile, and we should stop arguing about it.

2101
01:53:19,130 --> 01:53:21,290
Would you go so far as to make that claim?

2102
01:53:21,930 --> 01:53:25,540
Um yes and no.

2103
01:53:25,780 --> 01:53:31,060
No, in the following sense, I don't think me, the lazy adaptationist, could have arrived at

2104
01:53:31,060 --> 01:53:33,060
this without all that work people doing.

2105
01:53:33,220 --> 01:53:38,740
Like people worked really hard to interrogate their own intuitions and make

2106
01:53:38,740 --> 01:53:40,180
conceptual distinctions.

2107
01:53:40,340 --> 01:53:45,140
That then I can sort of in an armchair way say, I mean, uh it was hard work on my part too,

2108
01:53:45,220 --> 01:53:48,900
but like to just sort of be like, What's the adaptationism of all of this argument?

2109
01:53:49,350 --> 01:53:54,790
without all that hard work, like really hard work and very smart people, you couldn't do

2110
01:53:54,790 --> 01:53:55,030
that.

2111
01:53:55,190 --> 01:53:57,350
So in that sense, I don't think it was inevitable.

2112
01:53:57,430 --> 01:53:59,430
Or like I don't think it was a waste of time at all.

2113
01:53:59,590 --> 01:54:00,390
Um right.

2114
01:54:00,630 --> 01:54:02,230
But do you think it's a waste of time moving forward?

2115
01:54:02,710 --> 01:54:03,830
We continue to debate the question.

2116
01:54:04,070 --> 01:54:04,150
Yeah.

2117
01:54:04,390 --> 01:54:04,950
Yeah, exactly.

2118
01:54:05,030 --> 01:54:05,590
Yeah, exactly.

2119
01:54:05,670 --> 01:54:07,190
I mean, I think this changes.

2120
01:54:07,430 --> 01:54:09,990
I do think like this might be wrong.

2121
01:54:10,230 --> 01:54:11,910
I don't think we have a clear idea.

2122
01:54:11,990 --> 01:54:15,350
Like we even you and I were hemming and hawing about like, is it a goal system?

2123
01:54:15,430 --> 01:54:16,150
Is it a means-end?

2124
01:54:16,390 --> 01:54:16,950
Like, I don't know.

2125
01:54:17,110 --> 01:54:21,240
Maybe I don't like that's you know, I've only gotten so far in this, and other people

2126
01:54:21,240 --> 01:54:24,440
should step in and we'll be publishing papers presenting these ideas.

2127
01:54:24,600 --> 01:54:27,400
But like, so this is not the last word, this is the beginning.

2128
01:54:27,560 --> 01:54:33,400
But I do think this is an example of adaptationism fundamentally changing the trajectory of

2129
01:54:33,400 --> 01:54:34,440
a research program.

2130
01:54:34,600 --> 01:54:40,520
And I do think the study of free will should be really different than it has been since

2131
01:54:40,520 --> 01:54:42,360
Epicureus till now.

2132
01:54:43,560 --> 01:54:44,120
Yeah.

2133
01:54:44,350 --> 01:54:50,110
I mean, would you go so far as to say that um adaptationism should play this kind of role

2134
01:54:50,110 --> 01:54:54,830
in all philosophical debates, that we should ultimately try to understand uh what

2135
01:54:54,830 --> 01:54:58,350
adaptations and byproducts are leading to the intuitions that we have in these

2136
01:54:58,350 --> 01:54:59,150
philosophical debates.

2137
01:54:59,230 --> 01:55:04,270
And once we understand that, in some important way the debate will uh uh dissolve or

2138
01:55:04,270 --> 01:55:04,750
resolve.

2139
01:55:05,150 --> 01:55:09,760
Yeah, or be transformed into a different uh uh understanding.

2140
01:55:09,920 --> 01:55:10,320
That's right.

2141
01:55:10,480 --> 01:55:13,520
I it's a different way to think about what philosophy has been doing.

2142
01:55:13,600 --> 01:55:19,600
And that I think a lot of philosophers would represent or recognize or

2143
01:55:19,600 --> 01:55:23,520
even embrace, even if they were not coming from an annotationist perspective perspective,

2144
01:55:23,600 --> 01:55:29,120
which is again understanding that what I'm doing as a philosopher is a readout of this

2145
01:55:29,120 --> 01:55:30,560
evolved being.

2146
01:55:30,880 --> 01:55:36,320
And all I can do is sort of document as best I can one

2147
01:55:36,320 --> 01:55:42,070
coherent way or perspective from this perspective, and then others can

2148
01:55:42,070 --> 01:55:46,550
sort of stitch those all together into a more scientific account, like we're doing here for

2149
01:55:46,550 --> 01:55:47,270
free will.

2150
01:55:47,510 --> 01:55:53,270
So, um, so yeah, no, I think I think this should always be an enterprise, and I do think

2151
01:55:53,270 --> 01:55:58,790
it will uh adaptationism will I think completely transform the way we think about

2152
01:55:58,790 --> 01:56:04,760
philosophy, and it will make um what philosophy is, I don't think

2153
01:56:04,760 --> 01:56:07,480
it'll stop doing it'll it won't stop philosophy at all.

2154
01:56:07,640 --> 01:56:13,080
I think it'll actually invigorate it in the sense of it contextualizes what that enterprise

2155
01:56:13,080 --> 01:56:13,400
is.

2156
01:56:13,880 --> 01:56:15,720
Um so yeah.

2157
01:56:16,200 --> 01:56:22,200
Yeah, it's almost like um philosophy is really just psychology, that but it's but it thinks

2158
01:56:22,200 --> 01:56:23,000
it's physics.

2159
01:56:23,960 --> 01:56:26,680
Yeah, like it thinks it's like it's delving into the nature of reality.

2160
01:56:26,760 --> 01:56:29,490
No, it's just delving into your own evolved intuitions as an ape, right?

2161
01:56:29,570 --> 01:56:32,610
And just mapping out all the different intuitive responses you have to different fanciful

2162
01:56:32,610 --> 01:56:33,010
scenarios.

2163
01:56:33,090 --> 01:56:35,810
You're not actually getting into reality, you're just getting into the way the human mind

2164
01:56:35,810 --> 01:56:35,890
works.

2165
01:56:36,050 --> 01:56:39,250
And but I And once we realize that, like it will help us understand how reality works

2166
01:56:39,330 --> 01:56:42,770
because then we can f you know figure out like which of our intuitions we should actually

2167
01:56:42,770 --> 01:56:46,530
trust and which which of them actually make sense and cohere with our best picture of

2168
01:56:46,530 --> 01:56:48,450
empirical reality and so forth.

2169
01:56:48,610 --> 01:56:52,120
So I think you're right that it it should uh invigorate philosophy.

2170
01:56:52,360 --> 01:56:56,280
Yeah, no, and I think that is that point I think was already made by philosophers even

2171
01:56:56,280 --> 01:56:57,320
before Darwin, right?

2172
01:56:57,560 --> 01:57:03,560
Like so, I think I think this is just sort of validating or making concrete what d adding

2173
01:57:03,560 --> 01:57:08,520
Darwinianism or adaptationism specifically into this

2174
01:57:08,520 --> 01:57:09,640
enterprise.

2175
01:57:09,880 --> 01:57:11,000
And yeah, I don't know.

2176
01:57:11,080 --> 01:57:16,600
I mean, like the the intersection of adaptationism and like philosophy, uh it's not

2177
01:57:16,600 --> 01:57:18,840
something that I thought I would do.

2178
01:57:19,000 --> 01:57:24,250
Um, but I guess I'm doing it, but like I it it hasn't I mean we're about to write these

2179
01:57:24,250 --> 01:57:27,610
papers, we're submitting these papers, we've been trying to publish these papers.

2180
01:57:27,850 --> 01:57:32,010
Um it should happen and apparently I'm one of the people doing it.

2181
01:57:32,170 --> 01:57:37,850
You know, Michael and I, um and me and other people hopefully but um but yeah no I mean

2182
01:57:37,930 --> 01:57:42,570
it's it's a it's a new exciting connection between evolution and

2183
01:57:44,460 --> 01:57:45,820
other ways of thinking.

2184
01:57:45,900 --> 01:57:46,220
Yeah.

2185
01:57:46,620 --> 01:57:47,580
Yeah, no, I agree.

2186
01:57:47,660 --> 01:57:49,180
I think it's incredibly valuable.

2187
01:57:49,260 --> 01:57:50,860
Um, it has inspired me personally.

2188
01:57:50,940 --> 01:57:55,260
Like um your your work on this has inspired me to do the same thing with the debate over

2189
01:57:55,260 --> 01:57:55,660
consciousness.

2190
01:57:55,900 --> 01:57:56,220
Oh, awesome.

2191
01:57:56,460 --> 01:58:02,300
I think the debate about consciousness can be um uh uh transformed uh in a similar way by

2192
01:58:02,300 --> 01:58:06,780
taking an adapt adaptationist analysis to you know what the underlying conceptual machinery

2193
01:58:06,780 --> 01:58:10,250
is, what is causing us to be so confused about this debate.

2194
01:58:10,330 --> 01:58:14,010
And as soon as we understand that, the debate about consciousness and how our consciousness

2195
01:58:14,090 --> 01:58:17,850
and what animals are conscious, that it will will be uh utterly transformed once we

2196
01:58:17,850 --> 01:58:21,930
understand the intuitions that are giving rise to this and what it what it means to an

2197
01:58:21,930 --> 01:58:24,810
evolved organism for something to be conscious versus not.

2198
01:58:24,890 --> 01:58:28,650
Um and so I'm I'm maybe we'll do a future episode on consciousness, but um Yeah, I was

2199
01:58:28,650 --> 01:58:30,810
gonna say we have two minutes, you're sure you can do it two minutes.

2200
01:58:31,130 --> 01:58:31,690
Yeah.

2201
01:58:33,280 --> 01:58:34,320
We'll save it for another episode.

2202
01:58:35,440 --> 01:58:37,600
That'll be your teaser for future future episodes.

2203
01:58:38,000 --> 01:58:38,160
Exactly.

2204
01:58:38,240 --> 01:58:38,640
That sounds great.

2205
01:58:38,720 --> 01:58:39,680
But David, this was great.

2206
01:58:48,880 --> 01:58:54,640
I think what it is, there in in behaviorism, there was this thing of when when pigeons or

2207
01:58:54,640 --> 01:58:59,650
rats would get conditioned to um many, many, many, many, many lever presses before they

2208
01:58:59,650 --> 01:59:00,770
would get a reward.

2209
01:59:01,010 --> 01:59:05,250
And then they got a reward, they would sort of be reluctant to push the start pushing the

2210
01:59:05,250 --> 01:59:06,930
lever because they knew it was a lot of work.

2211
01:59:07,090 --> 01:59:10,930
And I think that's me with free will, because it's sort of like it's a long exposition.

2212
01:59:11,010 --> 01:59:15,730
Like we spent two hours and like it's not, you know, like alliance tracking.

2213
01:59:15,810 --> 01:59:18,530
It's like, yeah, cooperation competition, track cues, everything.

2214
01:59:18,770 --> 01:59:21,250
I could do, I could do a I could do an elevator pitch.

2215
01:59:21,490 --> 01:59:27,340
And and and maybe, you know, I will say, like, to the to an adaptationist credit, like I

2216
01:59:27,340 --> 01:59:31,660
think this is really changes the way I think about this and I think it will change the

2217
01:59:31,660 --> 01:59:32,380
science of it.

2218
01:59:32,620 --> 01:59:36,460
And it's cool you can do it in two hours, but it's still like a couple it's still it's not

2219
01:59:36,540 --> 01:59:37,660
it's not a one minute thing.

2220
01:59:37,740 --> 01:59:38,060
Yeah.

2221
01:59:38,140 --> 01:59:38,380
Yeah.

2222
01:59:38,620 --> 01:59:38,940
Yeah.

2223
01:59:39,100 --> 01:59:44,300
I often f experience that frustration a lot myself when people ask me about like my work or

2224
01:59:44,300 --> 01:59:46,860
like what I'm writing about, what my paper's about, or what my theory of humor is.

2225
01:59:46,940 --> 01:59:48,810
I'm like, gosh, do you have two hours?

2226
01:59:49,210 --> 01:59:52,250
And the one minute version, I'm like embarrassed because I'm like, yeah, I'm doing free

2227
01:59:52,250 --> 01:59:52,410
will.

2228
01:59:52,490 --> 01:59:53,530
And it's like, oh God.

2229
01:59:53,610 --> 01:59:58,330
Cause like, you know, then there's just a lot of the shoddy, or like, you know, it's just

2230
01:59:58,330 --> 01:59:59,050
so derivative.

2231
01:59:59,130 --> 02:00:04,730
It's the easiest thing to it's like free will is the canonical, like

2232
02:00:05,210 --> 02:00:09,850
self-important, but sort of paper thin analysis, right?

2233
02:00:10,170 --> 02:00:10,810
Yeah.

2234
02:00:11,160 --> 02:00:12,120
Anyway, yeah.

2235
02:00:12,200 --> 02:00:13,000
But thank you, David.

2236
02:00:13,080 --> 02:00:18,120
This was it was nice to um get it off my chest and uh and think through this aloud.

2237
02:00:18,200 --> 02:00:23,960
And I really like the idea um of sort of the mismatch, especially being like sort of where

2238
02:00:24,120 --> 02:00:26,760
the you and the mechanisms and the variability is.

2239
02:00:26,920 --> 02:00:31,320
That's that's a really nice uh new idea um as a result of this conversation.

2240
02:00:31,400 --> 02:00:32,440
So so thank you.

2241
02:00:33,230 --> 02:00:34,030
No, you're welcome.

2242
02:00:34,110 --> 02:00:39,150
Thank thank you for um enlightening me on a on a topic that um I I didn't know much about.

2243
02:00:39,310 --> 02:00:44,750
I mean I was interested philosophically in the debate, uh uh um and uh you helped um

2244
02:00:45,630 --> 02:00:49,630
inform the philosophical debate in a in a really profound way.

2245
02:00:49,790 --> 02:00:53,150
Um and I j I just find this the topic uh intrinsically interesting.

2246
02:00:53,420 --> 02:00:54,860
Um so yeah, I I had a great time.

2247
02:00:55,180 --> 02:00:55,660
Yeah, thanks.

2248
02:00:55,740 --> 02:00:58,540
And I I have no idea what the answer is, whether you have it or not.

2249
02:00:58,620 --> 02:00:59,740
It's it depends.

2250
02:01:00,460 --> 02:01:01,980
It's the Clark Ferrett answer.

2251
02:01:02,140 --> 02:01:02,460
It depends.

2252
02:01:02,860 --> 02:01:03,900
The correct answer is who cares.

2253
02:01:04,780 --> 02:01:05,340
No, that's right.

2254
02:01:05,420 --> 02:01:05,740
Exactly.

2255
02:01:05,820 --> 02:01:07,020
Yeah, that's that's that's right.

2256
02:01:07,100 --> 02:01:08,780
Yeah, that's and that's a good that's a good answer.

2257
02:01:09,100 --> 02:01:11,100
Or there's there's no right answer is is the is the right answer.

2258
02:01:11,260 --> 02:01:13,100
Or there's a couple answers and yeah.

2259
02:01:13,500 --> 02:01:16,140
Yeah, depending on the question situation you're in, or yeah.

2260
02:01:16,460 --> 02:01:16,700
Exactly.

2261
02:01:17,100 --> 02:01:17,260
Okay.

2262
02:01:17,420 --> 02:01:17,580
All right.

2263
02:01:17,660 --> 02:01:19,180
Well good David, thank you so much.

2264
02:01:19,510 --> 02:01:19,830
Yep.

2265
02:01:19,990 --> 02:01:20,390
Thanks, man.

2266
02:01:20,790 --> 02:01:20,950
Okay.

2267
02:01:21,430 --> 02:01:22,070
Bye.

2268
02:01:24,710 --> 02:01:30,630
Well, David, I am uh pretty tired from talking about free will

2269
02:01:30,710 --> 02:01:32,950
because I was the guest this this episode.

2270
02:01:33,270 --> 02:01:34,070
That's true.

2271
02:01:34,230 --> 02:01:40,230
Um, and you as the listener, um if you're still listening, you made the free

2272
02:01:40,230 --> 02:01:41,670
choice to continue listening.

2273
02:01:41,830 --> 02:01:43,350
We didn't hold a gun to your head.

2274
02:01:43,510 --> 02:01:47,500
Something about this must have uh drawn you to the topic.

2275
02:01:47,820 --> 02:01:53,180
So uh if you made the free choice to continue listening, I would suggest uh intervening

2276
02:01:53,180 --> 02:01:58,620
intentionally on your psychology and getting you to make the free choice to uh recommend

2277
02:01:58,620 --> 02:02:04,380
us, talk about us on social media, visit us on Patreon, uh say a kind word, uh

2278
02:02:04,540 --> 02:02:08,410
or two email us with ideas for topics or questions.

2279
02:02:08,650 --> 02:02:10,650
Anything else people can do, Dave, or did I cover it all?

2280
02:02:11,050 --> 02:02:16,330
Um to just uh refer to some previous bits, they could also send you either a fanny pack or

2281
02:02:16,330 --> 02:02:17,610
either of us French fries.

2282
02:02:18,170 --> 02:02:18,810
That's right.

2283
02:02:18,970 --> 02:02:22,090
Uh ideally uh french fries inside the fanny pack.

2284
02:02:22,410 --> 02:02:24,810
It's a pretty good vessel uh for for french fries.

2285
02:02:25,050 --> 02:02:27,370
I like to eat my french fries out of my fanny pack.

2286
02:02:27,770 --> 02:02:32,570
It's a great image to spend the rest of your week with before until the next episode.

2287
02:02:34,380 --> 02:02:34,780
All right.

2288
02:02:35,420 --> 02:02:35,660
Great.

2289
02:02:35,740 --> 02:02:36,860
Uh it's fun to laugh.

2290
02:02:36,940 --> 02:02:37,900
It feels good to laugh.

2291
02:02:37,980 --> 02:02:38,140
Okay.

2292
02:02:38,220 --> 02:02:39,500
Thank you everybody for listening.

2293
02:02:39,580 --> 02:02:41,660
Um and have a nice week.

2294
02:02:41,980 --> 02:02:42,620
Yep.