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We're your hosts, David Pinsoff and Dave Petrozowski.

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This is the Evolutionary Psychology Podcast.

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I already screwed up.

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It's Evolutionary Psychology the Podcast.

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Well it's it's hard to um we have to enunciate the parentheses too.

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It's hard to um yeah.

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Should I say parentheses?

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I don't know, actually.

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Um, this is the first inaugural episode of the podcast in which Dave Petrozki

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interviews me, David Pinsoff, about how I got into evolutionary psychology, why I love it,

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what kind of research I'm doing right now, and what kind of ideas I'm uh having from an

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evolutionary perspective.

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That's right, David.

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And we will have weekly episodes being posted.

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And in the following episode, David will interview me.

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In this episode, David covers a lot of ground about his interest in status.

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And what else do we talk about?

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I think we talk a a bit about maybe politics a little bit.

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I actually I I'm blinking.

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Um I know we definitely talk about status.

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I forget what else we covered.

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Yeah, because we're actually in the future because we've actually recorded I think nine

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episodes now.

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So but we shouldn't say that because we're breaking the fourth wall.

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Yeah.

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Um so yeah, I I genuinely don't remember what else we covered.

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That's crazy.

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Okay.

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Well maybe somebody can listen and refresh our memory.

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So Okay, thank you for listening.

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Uh welcome to Evolutionary Psychology the Podcast and um welcome to episode

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one, David.

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Welcome.

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All right, good.

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So we're recording.

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So cool.

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Okay.

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Um So David, one thing that a lot of people in Evpsych um

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uh have sort of an origin story.

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Um and I actually realized I never um I've never asked you what is how did you come across

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EvPsy?

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Uh well I was I had a dream, I had a vision, and uh you know uh I uh

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I woke up with this with the website for the Center for Evolutionary Psychology just in my

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brain, I felt the urge to Google it.

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No, I'm just kidding.

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Um, origin story.

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Yeah, it's interesting.

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I feel like a lot of Ev Psych people do have origin stories because it's kind of an odd

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choice.

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Out of all of the careers uh to choose and all of the sub disciplines within the field of

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psychology to choose.

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Uh Ev Psych is a pretty odd one, not merely because it's sort of a minority perspective,

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um, but because it's kind of controversial uh In many ways for many

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different reasons.

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Stephen Pinker wrote a whole book about why it's controversial called The Blank Slate.

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So it's kind of a weird new controversial discipline.

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And you sort of need an origin story to explain why you would choose this weird discipline

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in a way that you wouldn't need an origin story for a lot of other disciplines.

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Like I, you know, if we we were just regular social psychologists or like chemists or

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something, I don't know that we would need uh an origin story necessarily.

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Uh my origin story was I was in the the middle of a kind of uh

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existential crisis in my youth.

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So I didn't know what I wanted to do with my life.

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I I was actually a theater major.

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I thought I wanted to be an actor.

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Um I uh moved to New York with my girlfriend, who's now my wife, um, and uh I

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quickly became disillusioned with uh acting in the theater world, um, and was

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just uh at that time also kind of discovering that I had a brain and I had a pretty good

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one.

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Um, and it took me like a long time to really discover because I hated school uh throughout

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most of my life.

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I didn't really find it rewarding.

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I just kind of coasted and bullshitted my way through it.

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Um, and uh it was really only once I began asking myself

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the question of what I wanted to do with my life that I started really using my brain and

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thinking about like, you know, what what the fuck is going on?

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What is my place in the world?

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What is the world like?

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Like, uh, what am I doing here?

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Um, so I had a kind of intellectual awakening at that time.

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Um, of just I just was reading tons of books, whatever I could get my hands on uh

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voraciously.

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Uh and I just randomly happened to pick up uh a copy of The Selfish Gene

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and uh a copy of uh I think the Blank Slate.

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Um not for any particular reason.

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It's just these were like best-selling books and they looked like something that smart

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people would read, and they had lots of big words in it, so I wanted to read it.

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Um but I just remember uh just being totally blown away by by

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the insights of of evolution, evolutionary theory, selfish gene theory, just the elegance

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of the idea, the explanatory power.

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I just felt like all of the puzzle pieces were just coming together.

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Uh and um from there I just I I read e anything in evolutionary

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psychology I could get my hands on.

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I did I went through the, you know, Tubian Cosmides have that website, the Center for

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Evolutionary Psychology.

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They have all their publications.

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I remember I was just going through and just reading them one by one.

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Like I could not get enough of it.

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Just the feeling of insight was so powerful.

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And so around that time I thought to myself like this is this is what I want

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to do.

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This is what I want to study.

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I don't even care if I'm particularly good at it uh, or I don't need to be that high status

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in it.

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I just want to be a part of it.

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I just want to be around other people who are thinking this way and taking this

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perspective.

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Um, and so uh that's that's basically how it happened.

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I was just at a, you know, I was having an intellectual awakening, an existential crisis,

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and and groping for something.

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Um and out of all the things that I read, something about this perspective

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uh really just open my eyes.

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I it it kind of uh you know that moment in The Matrix where where Keanu Reeves, you know,

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uh wakes up from after being shot by Agent Smith and he can like see the lines of code and

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like the they all shoot the bullets.

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He's like, no, no, and the bullets stop.

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Uh that's sort of how I felt discovering evolutionary psychology, that I could just like

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see the lines of code uh behind, you know all the things that we do.

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Um so yeah I don't know why evolutionary psychology in particular spoke to me.

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Maybe it had I I like to think that it has it's you know it has something to do with like

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its objective insightfulness and explanatory power.

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But yeah, I honestly don't know.

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I knew I I I was interested in psychology, so I was a double major in theater and

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psychology uh in college.

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Um, but I didn't learn any evolutionary psychology.

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I was just kind of vaguely interested in, you know, why people do what they do.

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When I was an actor, I was more interested in the character psyche than than the average

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actor was.

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And my acting teachers would often tell me to, you know, stop thinking and analyzing too

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much, just like get into your body and you know, you know, feel the character rather than

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think too hard about it.

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So even in even as an actor, I was thinking too much about the mind.

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Um and uh I I I knew that I wanted to think more about

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the mind as a career.

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Um and the way of thinking about the mind that seemed uh far and away more promising and

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insightful than any other way was evolutionary psychology.

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And so that's that's where I landed and I've I've been there ever since.

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I I honestly c I can't quit it.

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You know, I as as you know I have I have a lucrative side gig.

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I have a really cool, fun job, you know, working for Cards Against Humanity.

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And even even with that, like I I couldn't like I thought I could just do that after

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getting my PhD.

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Uh but I couldn't.

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I missed it too much.

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Like I I I st couldn't quit keeping up on developments in the field and thinking about it

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and writing about it.

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And I eventually started my blog, Everything is Bullshit, just because I had so many ideas

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I was sitting on, uh, and I had no place to put them.

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Um and uh at the same time, you know, working for Cards Against Humanity, I had developed

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this kind of blunt, cynical writing style that's sort of the voice of our branding.

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And I thought that it would be a great way to pair that skill that I developed to ideas in

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evolutionary psychology, sort of a marriage of these two sides of myself.

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And I think so far it's been working out pretty well.

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I I sort of have developed this like blunt, cynical evolutionary psychologist character on

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everything is bullshit.

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And I think people sort of understand that it's a character because if you if you look at

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like the difference between the the essay and like the comments and my responses to the

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comments.

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It's like, you know, um provocateur in the streets, you know, scholar in the sheets,

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um kind of thing.

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Um and uh I've I've been you know really gratified by it.

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People seem to like the blog a lot.

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Uh and at the same time I've been getting back into research.

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Um I'm a research affiliate at UCLA now.

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I've been, you know, working on a few new papers, lots of big ideas.

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I'm in I have the the luxury of being able to just focus on big ideas and big theoretical

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papers, which I know a lot of academics don't have that luxury because you know the the

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academic incentives are you got to publish, publish, publish lots of stuff and empirical

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stuff.

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Theoretical stuff is extremely undervalued uh in psychology.

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You just got to get those empirical papers out.

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And me, I'm more interested in theory.

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Uh I'm interested in the big the big questions, the Darwinian mysteries.

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That's what gets me going.

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So that's what I've been able to work on.

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I've been lucky enough to to be able to work on that.

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So yeah.

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Cool.

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Um you're you have sort of this unique thing you mentioned, the the uh the side gig.

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What do you think, if anything, um that you're sort of in a unique position.

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Does that give you sort of a unique um scientific perspective on the

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sociology of science, or does it give you a chance to sort of take a step back and look at,

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as you said, you know, what is the currency in the realm being empirical work?

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Um, and are we missing sort of big picture things like theory?

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Um is that something that you think your um your sort of

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position uh have you thought about that?

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Like is that something that you think is um um you're uniquely

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positioned uh in a way?

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Have you thought about that?

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Yeah, a bit.

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Um I I do think that you know, me working on the ideas I want to work on at the pace that

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I work on them on.

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I don't think any academic can really afford to do that and still, you know, be competitive

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in this job market.

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Like I I don't have that many publications, but but the ones I do have I've spent a lot of

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time on and thought really hard about them.

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And the same thing goes for the the ones I'm working on right now.

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I I just don't think academia i exists to facilitate that kind of

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scholarship where you think where you know the the emphasis is more on quality over

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quantity, deep thought over uh superficial thought, um, theory over

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empirics.

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I think it's the other way around in academia uh for all three of those things.

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Um so yeah, I do think I'm I'm uniquely privileged to to um be able to think about these

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big picture questions like what is what is ideology, what is social status, what are our

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sacred values all about, what is humor all about?

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Um and I I just feel extremely lucky to be able to do that.

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Um and uh yeah I'm I'm also excited to get to talk to you about it uh

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because you're such a um well respected and and uh uh excellent scholar in the field.

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Um and nothing gives me greater pleasure than just um you know bouncing ideas off of people

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who who share this powerful perspective and just you know arriving at new insights about

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human nature.

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So well, thanks.

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Um uh when you're doing your work, uh so things like the status game

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paper or the evolution of social paradoxes, we can talk about that in a little bit.

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Um do you have a particular um uh sort of

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diorama of the world in mind?

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Like are you thinking about academia or are you thinking about your life experiences or

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um so so this idea that you know everything is sort of this hidden status

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game?

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Um in your own experience, do you where do you think that idea came from?

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Honestly, um it sort of came randomly.

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Um so as you know, status is a huge topic in evolutionary psychology.

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And I and I think correctly so.

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I think status is arguably uh one of the most important selection pressures that has shaped

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human nature out of out of all of them, I think.

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You know, we kill for status, we die for status.

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Um so I had always been interested in status just because it was such a big topic in

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evolutionary psychology.

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Um, but I remember just randomly, you know, some new uh psychology paper popped up.

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It wasn't even an evolutionary psychology paper, it was just an empirical paper showing

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basically that seeking status lowers your status, or being seen as a status seeker uh

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results in real social costs.

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People view you as selfish, manipulative, uh deceitful, untrustworthy, uh

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mean, narcissistic.

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Um, all sorts of negative judgments are heaped on you uh for being seen as a status seeker.

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I remember when I came across that paper, I think it was called Status is a four-letter

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word or something, um, it just really stuck with me.

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Because that was a huge wrench thrown into my understanding of the world.

239
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Like, how could I reconcile that idea with everything I knew about the importance of status

240
00:14:26,230 --> 00:14:28,950
seeking in humanity?

241
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So, on the one hand, like, it's this huge, important, powerful motive that drives so much

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of what we do.

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And on the other hand, we overtly pursuing it seems to sabotage our

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efforts to pursue it.

245
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We have to somehow pursue status without uh creating common

246
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knowledge of the fact that we're pursuing status and that's a really hard problem to solve

247
00:14:54,180 --> 00:14:58,260
and so that just got me think how how do we do this this i mean what what are the

248
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mechanisms we need to solve this problem of seeking status without being seen as a status

249
00:15:02,820 --> 00:15:08,590
seeker um what what are the what are the cognitive mechanisms um what

250
00:15:08,750 --> 00:15:09,710
are the implications of this?

251
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Could this explain why uh status symbols are so volatile and arbitrary?

252
00:15:14,590 --> 00:15:20,030
Could this be a kind of engine of cultural evolution that throws out variation in what gets

253
00:15:20,030 --> 00:15:21,950
us status and what lowers our status?

254
00:15:22,110 --> 00:15:25,070
Um, I started thinking about how paradoxical it was.

255
00:15:25,230 --> 00:15:31,070
Um and honestly, uh just thinking about this contradiction of us being

256
00:15:31,070 --> 00:15:35,390
status seekers and losing status for seeking status, that contradiction just gave rise to

257
00:15:35,390 --> 00:15:37,540
all the ideas in the paper.

258
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Um just focusing on those two premises.

259
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I think most of the ideas in the paper about sacred values, about cues and signals uh being

260
00:15:46,420 --> 00:15:52,260
uh unstable, um, about uh politics being, you know, about dominance,

261
00:15:52,340 --> 00:15:55,060
but we can't reveal the fact that it's about dominance.

262
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All those things just kind of naturally fell out of that inherent contradiction.

263
00:16:01,060 --> 00:16:06,010
Um and uh yeah, so it it kind of started randomly.

264
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I just this thing caught my attention.

265
00:16:07,770 --> 00:16:11,690
It seemed interesting and important, and I just followed the path wherever it led, and it

266
00:16:11,690 --> 00:16:13,770
led me to this this paper that I'm really excited about.

267
00:16:14,090 --> 00:16:19,530
Uh what what is the sort of short version of why um

268
00:16:19,850 --> 00:16:22,970
seeking status decreases your status?

269
00:16:24,010 --> 00:16:26,320
Um so unfortunately there isn't a short.

270
00:16:26,960 --> 00:16:30,560
It's a complicated question and it's an interesting, you know, it's not I wouldn't say that

271
00:16:30,560 --> 00:16:31,760
it's universally true.

272
00:16:31,920 --> 00:16:36,880
So there are some cases where overtly seeking status doesn't really lower your status all

273
00:16:36,880 --> 00:16:37,440
that much.

274
00:16:37,600 --> 00:16:40,400
Uh and I talk about these uh in the paper.

275
00:16:40,640 --> 00:16:46,530
So for example, if you're if you're uh living in a really poor community and wealth is

276
00:16:46,530 --> 00:16:47,810
super important in a social partner.

277
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Like all the other traits that you're looking for, and in a spouse or a friend, you know,

278
00:16:51,810 --> 00:16:52,370
go out the window.

279
00:16:52,770 --> 00:16:55,170
Do they have resources is the most critical question.

280
00:16:55,410 --> 00:16:59,410
And such an environment, it really makes sense if you're rich to shout from the

281
00:16:59,410 --> 00:17:03,570
mountaintops that you're rich, to really, you know, audaciously display your wealth, buy

282
00:17:03,570 --> 00:17:07,170
expensive things, because that's really important to get the message across that you're

283
00:17:07,170 --> 00:17:08,370
rich, rich, right?

284
00:17:08,690 --> 00:17:14,660
Yes, doing that kind of ostentatious displaying of wealth also makes you look kind

285
00:17:14,660 --> 00:17:16,740
of selfish and vain and petty.

286
00:17:17,940 --> 00:17:22,660
But the costs of those inferences are far outweighed by the benefits of just getting the

287
00:17:22,660 --> 00:17:24,100
message across that you're rich.

288
00:17:24,340 --> 00:17:28,980
Because people don't care about selfishness and vanity as much as they care about wealth

289
00:17:28,980 --> 00:17:31,060
itself in an environment like that.

290
00:17:31,380 --> 00:17:36,900
So an environment like that, the uh the status seeking and signaling can be quite overt and

291
00:17:36,900 --> 00:17:38,180
it's and it's pretty stable.

292
00:17:38,260 --> 00:17:44,070
Uh but then if you go to, say, a wealthier environment where uh people have the resources

293
00:17:44,070 --> 00:17:49,990
they need uh to survive and flourish, uh and um uh uh being seen as

294
00:17:49,990 --> 00:17:53,350
wealthy doesn't actually give you that much of a competitive advantage in the social

295
00:17:53,350 --> 00:17:53,990
marketplace.

296
00:17:54,230 --> 00:17:59,030
Then all of a sudden, the benefits of shouting, I'm rich from the mountaintops, are no

297
00:17:59,030 --> 00:18:00,310
longer as high.

298
00:18:00,870 --> 00:18:06,710
And the costs of being look uh the costs of looking like a selfish, narcissistic, uh

299
00:18:06,950 --> 00:18:09,030
petty person are much higher.

300
00:18:09,190 --> 00:18:13,520
And in that case, the costs uh are likely to outweigh the benefits.

301
00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:19,520
Um and so in environments like that, you might try to covertly signal your

302
00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:19,840
wealth.

303
00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:22,640
Uh, this has been referred to as stealth wealth.

304
00:18:22,800 --> 00:18:28,080
Um, there was a cool essay uh in the New York Times uh analyzing uh a hat that one of the

305
00:18:28,080 --> 00:18:30,720
characters was wearing in the sh the show Succession.

306
00:18:30,880 --> 00:18:34,370
And it looked uh on the surface just like a regular baseball cap.

307
00:18:34,610 --> 00:18:39,170
It sort of conveyed like this working class nonchalance that was kind of surprising in such

308
00:18:39,170 --> 00:18:40,530
a uh wealthy character.

309
00:18:40,770 --> 00:18:45,250
But um the the journalist actually like zoomed in on the on the type of hat it was and did

310
00:18:45,250 --> 00:18:49,330
some research and found that the hat is actually like you know a $50,000 hat.

311
00:18:50,610 --> 00:18:51,010
Right.

312
00:18:51,170 --> 00:18:56,380
And so it's this kind of stealth wealth or or signaling of signaling that you're wealthy

313
00:18:56,380 --> 00:19:01,100
without signaling you're wealthy that tends to arise in communities where uh the benefits

314
00:19:01,100 --> 00:19:05,740
of signaling your wealth are outweighed by the costs of being seen as a selfish, greedy,

315
00:19:05,980 --> 00:19:07,260
narcissistic person.

316
00:19:07,580 --> 00:19:13,500
Well, um so so there's definitely variation into what extent uh status seeking uh is uh

317
00:19:13,660 --> 00:19:16,140
or overt status seeking lowers your status.

318
00:19:16,300 --> 00:19:22,110
But but I would say that in general, most of the time, being seen as a status

319
00:19:22,110 --> 00:19:26,270
seeker is going to lower your status for several reasons.

320
00:19:26,590 --> 00:19:31,150
One is that status seeking is intrinsically self-interested and competitive.

321
00:19:31,870 --> 00:19:33,230
Just the definition of it.

322
00:19:33,390 --> 00:19:36,750
It benefits me personally, and it's, you know, status is zero sum.

323
00:19:36,830 --> 00:19:39,150
When I rise in status, you fall.

324
00:19:39,390 --> 00:19:42,110
So it's intrinsically self-interested and competitive.

325
00:19:42,990 --> 00:19:48,600
And number two, self interested and competitive dispositions are

326
00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,240
intrinsically undesirable in a cooperative partner.

327
00:19:51,400 --> 00:19:55,800
If you're trying to form mutually beneficial uh relationships with other people, you don't

328
00:19:55,800 --> 00:19:59,400
want someone who's only going to be looking out for themselves and wants to compete with

329
00:19:59,400 --> 00:20:01,960
you and be uh better than you, right?

330
00:20:02,680 --> 00:20:08,600
Uh and number three, um your reputation or your your

331
00:20:08,840 --> 00:20:13,400
value as a cooperative partner is an intrinsically important part of your status.

332
00:20:13,730 --> 00:20:18,370
If you're not seen as a valuable cooperative partner, someone that you want to be friends

333
00:20:18,370 --> 00:20:24,130
with or marry or follow in a in a group context, then that by definition

334
00:20:24,290 --> 00:20:25,650
lowers your status.

335
00:20:26,210 --> 00:20:31,570
And so those things are at odds with one another, which means that most of the time being

336
00:20:31,570 --> 00:20:33,970
seen as a status seeker is going to reduce your status.

337
00:20:34,050 --> 00:20:39,330
It's going to come with social costs that uh lower uh your your reputation as a

338
00:20:39,330 --> 00:20:40,920
cooperative person.

339
00:20:42,040 --> 00:20:47,800
And so I think it's intrinsic to the definition of status that

340
00:20:48,200 --> 00:20:52,120
being seen as a status seeker lowers it.

341
00:20:53,080 --> 00:20:55,560
So what what are the inferences that we draw about status seekers?

342
00:20:55,720 --> 00:20:56,280
All sorts of things.

343
00:20:56,360 --> 00:20:57,160
I mean, you name it.

344
00:20:57,640 --> 00:21:01,810
So in the in the couple papers that have been written on this, the main inferences people

345
00:21:01,810 --> 00:21:02,930
draw is that they're selfish.

346
00:21:03,090 --> 00:21:07,330
They're selfish and mean, they're narcissistic, they're manipulative, they're deceitful.

347
00:21:07,490 --> 00:21:11,250
Um, they're willing to throw you under the bus or stab you in the back if it gets them more

348
00:21:11,250 --> 00:21:11,810
status.

349
00:21:11,970 --> 00:21:15,490
Um they're willing to, you know, lie or cheat to get status.

350
00:21:15,650 --> 00:21:19,810
You know, they're if they're athletes, they'll they'll do performance-enhancing drugs.

351
00:21:20,050 --> 00:21:25,970
Um if they're uh in business, they might uh defraud people like uh Sam Bakem Free did.

352
00:21:26,620 --> 00:21:30,700
They'll do whatever it takes to elevate their social standing, even if it means shooting

353
00:21:30,700 --> 00:21:35,980
all over other people or stabbing other people in the back or betraying everyone who trusts

354
00:21:35,980 --> 00:21:36,220
them.

355
00:21:37,180 --> 00:21:39,340
They're seen as really bad people.

356
00:21:39,660 --> 00:21:43,740
And we have all sorts of uh of colorful words to describe these people.

357
00:21:44,060 --> 00:21:48,060
Asshole, dick, douchebag for women, uh a bitch.

358
00:21:48,300 --> 00:21:54,170
Um and uh if we are seen as, you know, sucking up to high

359
00:21:54,250 --> 00:21:56,730
status people to gain status, we're an ass kisser.

360
00:21:57,050 --> 00:21:57,370
Right?

361
00:21:57,610 --> 00:22:02,410
It's interesting that we're that we're using the language of disgust, you know, the anus,

362
00:22:02,730 --> 00:22:06,330
the the male and female reproductive organs, you know.

363
00:22:06,970 --> 00:22:11,770
This suggests to me that being seen as a status seeker is disgusting, which is, you know,

364
00:22:11,850 --> 00:22:17,610
it's a really interesting question why the emotion of disgust is activated by s uh overt

365
00:22:17,610 --> 00:22:18,330
status seeking.

366
00:22:18,490 --> 00:22:20,100
What was disgust doing in there?

367
00:22:20,260 --> 00:22:24,900
I mean, disgust evolved to protect us against pathogens and parasites and toxins.

368
00:22:26,180 --> 00:22:29,060
What does it have to do with with status seeking?

369
00:22:29,300 --> 00:22:35,140
That's a whole other interesting question, but we can leave that aside and just uh

370
00:22:35,780 --> 00:22:41,610
make the basic claim that um status seeking in all of its manifestations, in all of its

371
00:22:41,610 --> 00:22:45,050
guises, there are many different types of status, and there are many different ways that

372
00:22:45,050 --> 00:22:46,490
seeking status can make you look bad.

373
00:22:46,570 --> 00:22:47,450
There are many terms we use.

374
00:22:47,530 --> 00:22:51,610
You know, if you're trying to seek moral status, you're a virtue signaler, you know, you're

375
00:22:51,610 --> 00:22:54,570
sanctimonious, you're you know self-righteous.

376
00:22:54,730 --> 00:22:59,770
You know, if uh if you're um seeking status in terms of money, you're greedy.

377
00:22:59,930 --> 00:23:05,580
Um if you're seeking status in terms of intellectual superiority or pretentious

378
00:23:05,740 --> 00:23:10,540
or pompous, we have all sorts of words to describe the uh status seeking in all of its

379
00:23:10,540 --> 00:23:12,940
manifestations and dimensions, and they're all negative.

380
00:23:13,420 --> 00:23:19,420
Um So yeah, that that was my long answer to your question of w of why seeking

381
00:23:19,420 --> 00:23:20,780
status lowers your status.

382
00:23:21,230 --> 00:23:21,550
Great.

383
00:23:21,790 --> 00:23:27,230
And um from an evolutionary perspective, one of the things that I like about it is we get

384
00:23:27,230 --> 00:23:30,670
to sort of dissect sort of things that seem self-evident.

385
00:23:31,630 --> 00:23:37,390
And so one of the things that it sounds like you're saying is that um and you know

386
00:23:37,630 --> 00:23:42,590
I Annie Wirtz and I have a paper about modularity where we distinguish between intentional

387
00:23:42,590 --> 00:23:43,870
level and functional level.

388
00:23:43,950 --> 00:23:49,300
So the intentional level is sort of the everyday like UI there's an agent in the mind.

389
00:23:49,460 --> 00:23:52,500
And the functional level is basically the level of software.

390
00:23:53,140 --> 00:23:53,460
Yeah.

391
00:23:53,860 --> 00:23:59,460
And so hearing you talk about this, I'm sort of translating some of this into

392
00:23:59,460 --> 00:24:01,940
software level, sort of functional level claims.

393
00:24:02,020 --> 00:24:06,900
And so one idea when, and you can tell me if this is right, is that there's sort of a

394
00:24:06,900 --> 00:24:11,620
system in the mind that's sort of looking for status mutualisms.

395
00:24:11,780 --> 00:24:17,350
So, in other words, that you know, is your status yoked to mine um so that we

396
00:24:17,910 --> 00:24:23,190
benefit if you go up in status I go up in as well and uh there's

397
00:24:23,190 --> 00:24:27,910
opportunities for my status or my extended interest status if you and I are aligned in

398
00:24:27,910 --> 00:24:29,270
status aspiration.

399
00:24:29,510 --> 00:24:35,190
Um but then there's also really sharp delineation of to the degree that they're rival.

400
00:24:35,910 --> 00:24:40,470
So if somebody's a status rival, which presumably is almost everybody uh to various

401
00:24:40,470 --> 00:24:44,790
degrees, um that gets represented and tagged as is really important.

402
00:24:45,030 --> 00:24:47,120
Is that sort of a fair claim?

403
00:24:47,760 --> 00:24:50,080
Um yeah, I think that's fair.

404
00:24:50,400 --> 00:24:53,600
But the the the claim I'm making is somewhat different.

405
00:24:53,920 --> 00:24:59,760
So um all of the the values and motives that we have are fundamentally

406
00:24:59,760 --> 00:25:01,520
in conflict with one another, right?

407
00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:02,800
There are trade-offs to be made.

408
00:25:02,880 --> 00:25:06,160
Investing in one activity precludes you from investing in another activity.

409
00:25:06,320 --> 00:25:10,560
Spending time seeking status precludes you from spending time doing other things like

410
00:25:10,560 --> 00:25:13,120
parenting or finding food or what or whatever.

411
00:25:14,150 --> 00:25:19,430
and the idea that I'm exploring with uh with the social paradoxes paper is that if you're

412
00:25:19,430 --> 00:25:25,110
seen as abnormally high on the status motive, um, what what is that coming at the

413
00:25:25,110 --> 00:25:26,070
expense of?

414
00:25:26,310 --> 00:25:29,270
What is that precluding you from being motivated to do?

415
00:25:29,430 --> 00:25:32,870
Uh and I would say that the inference that people are likely to draw is that it's

416
00:25:32,870 --> 00:25:37,560
precluding you from pursuing more cooperative or altruistic uh endeavors.

417
00:25:37,960 --> 00:25:38,120
I see.

418
00:25:38,280 --> 00:25:40,440
So it's almost like a Yeah, sorry.

419
00:25:40,600 --> 00:25:46,440
Um so most people when faced to ch when forced to choose between say

420
00:25:46,600 --> 00:25:52,120
status and uh keeping someone's trust or or or status and say keeping their

421
00:25:52,120 --> 00:25:58,120
marriage faithful, or status um and uh say, you know, uh uh

422
00:25:58,280 --> 00:26:04,130
betraying someone or lying or um uh dissing someone's, you know,

423
00:26:04,210 --> 00:26:10,210
reputation, a nice person would would choose uh those other things over status.

424
00:26:10,290 --> 00:26:13,170
They'd say, you know, uh the status would be nice, but I'm not gonna lie to get it.

425
00:26:13,250 --> 00:26:16,850
Yeah, the status would be nice, but I'm not gonna betray my best friend to get it, or I'm

426
00:26:16,850 --> 00:26:18,530
not gonna cheat on my spouse to get it.

427
00:26:18,770 --> 00:26:19,090
Right.

428
00:26:19,490 --> 00:26:23,820
But the status seeker in all of those cases is going to choose status over those other

429
00:26:23,820 --> 00:26:24,060
things.

430
00:26:24,140 --> 00:26:26,700
And that is what we're threatened by, I think, at the end of the day.

431
00:26:26,860 --> 00:26:31,260
That is what is driving the negative inferences about a person who is abnormally high on

432
00:26:31,260 --> 00:26:32,700
status seeking motivation.

433
00:26:32,860 --> 00:26:35,180
And there there's plenty of empirical evidence for this as well.

434
00:26:35,340 --> 00:26:39,100
So there's there's literature on so-called dark triad of negative traits, narcissism,

435
00:26:39,260 --> 00:26:41,340
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy.

436
00:26:41,660 --> 00:26:43,740
Narcissism is all about status seeking.

437
00:26:43,820 --> 00:26:45,420
It's about, you know, I deserve better.

438
00:26:45,580 --> 00:26:47,580
I I care about, you know, looking superior.

439
00:26:47,660 --> 00:26:49,500
I want people to think I'm better than them.

440
00:26:49,740 --> 00:26:54,910
Uh and that trait correlates so highly with uh psychopathy and Machiavellianism and just

441
00:26:54,910 --> 00:26:59,790
like mean shitty behaviors that they're that they're seen as almost kind of the same thing.

442
00:27:00,030 --> 00:27:05,070
Um so empirically there is a well-documented relationship between status being abnormally

443
00:27:05,070 --> 00:27:09,950
high on on status seeking motivations and being you know generally a mean asshole.

444
00:27:10,190 --> 00:27:11,280
Um right.

445
00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:15,760
So in some sense, it's a uh exploitation detection.

446
00:27:15,920 --> 00:27:21,920
And the idea is that um somebody who's extreme on this is not going to

447
00:27:21,920 --> 00:27:25,120
be loyal, even if currently we're overlapping.

448
00:27:25,280 --> 00:27:30,880
So if you're a partner, um, you're gonna for now, I'm it's

449
00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:31,520
interaction.

450
00:27:31,600 --> 00:27:35,040
It's it's just like a sort of an interaction where it's sort of transactional, right?

451
00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:39,680
Where I'm benefiting you now, but are you gonna be loyal to me in the future?

452
00:27:39,950 --> 00:27:45,950
Um, and micro cues or longer term cues that somebody's exploitative or really just looking

453
00:27:45,950 --> 00:27:48,590
out for themselves is sort of a flag.

454
00:27:49,150 --> 00:27:49,550
Totally.

455
00:27:49,710 --> 00:27:53,790
And it might differ, you know, based on the the time horizon of the culture.

456
00:27:53,950 --> 00:27:57,230
So it could be that cultures that have a really short time horizon where you really want

457
00:27:57,230 --> 00:27:59,710
the benefits now and you know, fuck the future.

458
00:27:59,870 --> 00:28:04,580
In those cultures, status seeking might not be so bad because it's a cue to benefits now.

459
00:28:04,660 --> 00:28:06,180
And you don't really care about, you know, the long term.

460
00:28:06,260 --> 00:28:10,020
May maybe they'll betray you in in ten years or or or or cheat on you or whatever, but who

461
00:28:10,020 --> 00:28:10,180
cares?

462
00:28:10,260 --> 00:28:11,700
I'll get the benefits from them now.

463
00:28:11,860 --> 00:28:16,260
Um, but if you're in more of a long term stable society, then I think status games start to

464
00:28:16,260 --> 00:28:20,980
become really unstable and and really cloaked and hidden and disguised in all sorts of

465
00:28:20,980 --> 00:28:21,300
ways.

466
00:28:21,540 --> 00:28:21,780
Yeah.

467
00:28:22,100 --> 00:28:26,020
Do you think that the you mentioned that you think it's really targeted of two extreme

468
00:28:26,020 --> 00:28:26,500
versions?

469
00:28:26,660 --> 00:28:28,770
There's sort of two ver op options.

470
00:28:28,930 --> 00:28:34,770
One is that people who are really status seeking are are a kind in the

471
00:28:34,770 --> 00:28:39,410
proper domain of these systems, is to detect people who really are just looking out for

472
00:28:39,410 --> 00:28:39,970
status.

473
00:28:40,210 --> 00:28:46,130
The other option is that those are extreme versions of a natural continuum, which is

474
00:28:46,130 --> 00:28:51,440
that everybody sort of is status seeking, and there's sort of a natural check on.

475
00:28:51,520 --> 00:28:57,280
So if you and I are in a relationship, um, we're both hunters, um, you know, we both

476
00:28:57,440 --> 00:28:59,280
provide each other with meat.

477
00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:04,960
Um, but there's sort of a detection in both of us as to whether or not either one of us is

478
00:29:04,960 --> 00:29:08,320
sort of getting getting uppity from the perspective of the other, you know.

479
00:29:08,400 --> 00:29:13,550
Like, am I starting to signal, oh, you know, David, uh, it's confusing because we have the

480
00:29:13,550 --> 00:29:17,870
same name, but uh so you know, but David, oh yeah, no, he's not, you know, really pulling

481
00:29:17,870 --> 00:29:22,910
his weight, or you know, uh really I got that one, um, that that big game the other day.

482
00:29:23,150 --> 00:29:28,830
Um and so even if I'm not chronically a super narcissistic

483
00:29:28,910 --> 00:29:34,260
dark triad type, um there still might be

484
00:29:34,660 --> 00:29:40,340
sort of design in me to sort of see how much status aspiration

485
00:29:40,580 --> 00:29:43,620
movement I'm allowed by you.

486
00:29:44,020 --> 00:29:47,620
Um uh does that is that is that how you're thinking about it?

487
00:29:47,780 --> 00:29:53,300
Or is it really in terms of like that there are different um uh different sort of types of

488
00:29:53,300 --> 00:29:59,300
people and there are people who are just designed uh to be um status at the expense of

489
00:29:59,300 --> 00:30:01,540
these other longer term relationships?

490
00:30:02,150 --> 00:30:04,070
I definitely view it as more of a continuum.

491
00:30:04,550 --> 00:30:05,830
It's a very smooth continuum.

492
00:30:05,990 --> 00:30:06,150
Yeah.

493
00:30:06,390 --> 00:30:08,710
So I think all humans want status.

494
00:30:08,790 --> 00:30:12,230
So there's there's no there's no one who is zero on the continuum.

495
00:30:12,310 --> 00:30:13,350
That's just not possible.

496
00:30:13,430 --> 00:30:17,430
It's just such an important uh part of our evolutionary history, such an important

497
00:30:17,430 --> 00:30:21,590
correlate of biological fitness that I don't think natural selection would favor anyone who

498
00:30:21,590 --> 00:30:23,030
doesn't care about status at all.

499
00:30:23,750 --> 00:30:29,440
Nevertheless, um there's variation in in status motivation, just as there's variation in

500
00:30:29,440 --> 00:30:30,160
any trait.

501
00:30:30,480 --> 00:30:35,200
And there are costs and benefits of being anywhere on that continuum, just as there are

502
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:39,520
costs and benefits on being anywhere on any trait continuum.

503
00:30:39,840 --> 00:30:44,960
So I view it as very much a smooth continuum and a very hard problem to solve of how do we

504
00:30:44,960 --> 00:30:47,440
assess where other people are on that continuum?

505
00:30:48,480 --> 00:30:53,760
And if everyone's concealing their status seeking motivations, then it becomes increasingly

506
00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:57,410
hard to figure out who the selfish status seekers are.

507
00:30:58,210 --> 00:31:02,930
And if you catch a glimpse of it in someone and you don't catch a glimpse of it in anyone

508
00:31:02,930 --> 00:31:06,690
else, well, that's the best evidence you have that that person is relatively higher on

509
00:31:06,690 --> 00:31:10,450
status seeking motivation than other people, and therefore they're not good to partner up

510
00:31:10,450 --> 00:31:10,770
with.

511
00:31:16,850 --> 00:31:21,010
Maybe you just happen to catch that person doing a typical human thing that anyone would

512
00:31:21,010 --> 00:31:21,250
do.

513
00:31:21,490 --> 00:31:25,420
But because they're the only person you caught and you didn't catch anyone else, that's the

514
00:31:25,420 --> 00:31:27,980
best evidence you have to go on that they're not a good partner.

515
00:31:28,220 --> 00:31:28,540
Yeah.

516
00:31:28,700 --> 00:31:32,940
Uh oh, and one thing that keeps coming up recently in work, and so like uh people like

517
00:31:32,940 --> 00:31:38,220
Aaron Lukashewski and Jimmy Krems is sort of people um have been finding things like, you

518
00:31:38,220 --> 00:31:43,020
know, people in a romantic partner prefer people who are kind and intelligent, but this

519
00:31:43,020 --> 00:31:46,140
sort of the tagline is kind towards whom.

520
00:31:46,460 --> 00:31:52,430
Um so status uh at the expense of others towards whom is sort of the the more uh stilted

521
00:31:52,590 --> 00:31:58,590
tagline here, which is um then there's also the problem of if I'm observing

522
00:31:58,590 --> 00:32:03,630
somebody who is sort of status seeking, um there's two different options.

523
00:32:03,790 --> 00:32:09,630
One is they're status seeking, but who's the beneficiary of it and who's the who who who's

524
00:32:09,630 --> 00:32:12,190
the cost, um, who's the victim of it?

525
00:32:12,430 --> 00:32:18,400
Um and uh as I'm saying that, that sort of sounds similar to this sort of

526
00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:23,920
alliance idea of politics, is that would you make that connection that

527
00:32:24,320 --> 00:32:30,240
that part of the design and part of the hard problem of status is that it's not

528
00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:36,240
intrinsically that status aspiration is a problem, but it's always that there's a

529
00:32:36,480 --> 00:32:41,200
more sophisticated calculation that status is

530
00:32:41,750 --> 00:32:47,670
asserting sort of how things should be or the resources or what power I should have.

531
00:32:47,830 --> 00:32:51,670
Um, and there's a calculation of, well, how am I going to be impacted by that?

532
00:32:51,750 --> 00:32:51,990
Right.

533
00:32:52,150 --> 00:32:57,030
If you, David, stand up in a group and say, um, I want status,

534
00:32:58,070 --> 00:33:03,910
I'm I'm not going to intrinsically view that as a bad thing unless I first say, well, how

535
00:33:03,910 --> 00:33:07,510
is him getting that status going to affect me and my interests?

536
00:33:07,830 --> 00:33:08,150
Yeah.

537
00:33:08,390 --> 00:33:10,470
So that's a really important point.

538
00:33:10,780 --> 00:33:16,380
So if I say I'm better than you, Dave, that's going to be threatening to you.

539
00:33:16,620 --> 00:33:17,020
Right.

540
00:33:17,180 --> 00:33:20,940
But if I say you and I, Dave, are better than that other guy over there.

541
00:33:21,020 --> 00:33:21,260
Right.

542
00:33:21,420 --> 00:33:25,660
Or our group is or you know, our group, our political coalition is better than the other

543
00:33:25,660 --> 00:33:28,780
political coalition, then that's not going to be threatening to you.

544
00:33:28,860 --> 00:33:29,100
Right.

545
00:33:29,260 --> 00:33:32,540
Because you're you're a beneficiary of the of that status seeking.

546
00:33:32,700 --> 00:33:33,020
Right.

547
00:33:33,420 --> 00:33:36,860
So I think really what we find threatening is individual status seeking.

548
00:33:36,940 --> 00:33:39,340
I personally want to be superior to you.

549
00:33:39,580 --> 00:33:40,990
I want to be superior.

550
00:33:41,150 --> 00:33:42,830
I want to be superior to others.

551
00:33:42,910 --> 00:33:43,230
Yeah.

552
00:33:43,390 --> 00:33:47,470
Um, group status seeking, I don't think, is as highly frowned upon.

553
00:33:47,630 --> 00:33:51,710
So if I really want evolutionary psychologists to have higher status than other types of

554
00:33:51,710 --> 00:33:53,870
psychologists, that's not going to be a threat to you.

555
00:33:53,950 --> 00:33:58,750
On the contrary, it might even make me a more attractive social partner for you because

556
00:33:58,750 --> 00:34:02,830
we're going to work together to increase the standing of evolutionary psychologists.

557
00:34:04,270 --> 00:34:10,260
Um so I think what we're threatened by is individual status seeking and not group status

558
00:34:10,260 --> 00:34:10,660
seeking.

559
00:34:10,820 --> 00:34:11,060
Yeah.

560
00:34:11,300 --> 00:34:16,980
Um, unfortunately, the two uh are and can be

561
00:34:17,140 --> 00:34:18,420
uh correlated.

562
00:34:18,900 --> 00:34:23,860
So if I I'm really gung-ho about making sure that you know evolutionary psychologists are

563
00:34:23,860 --> 00:34:26,820
better than other psychologists, and I really just want to shit all over the non

564
00:34:26,900 --> 00:34:31,590
evolutionary psychologists and diss them where whenever I can, that uh empirically is

565
00:34:31,590 --> 00:34:35,030
correlated with me also being uh an individual status seeker.

566
00:34:35,190 --> 00:34:39,910
So in in the paper, I review tons of evidence showing that people who are really zealous uh

567
00:34:39,910 --> 00:34:44,790
about politics, who who are really, you know, love to pontificate about how morally

568
00:34:44,790 --> 00:34:50,470
superior they are on social media, love to, you know, uh uh uh diss the other side,

569
00:34:50,630 --> 00:34:56,310
uh, you know, who indulge in conspiracy theories, um, who support authoritarian

570
00:34:56,310 --> 00:35:00,880
policies for their side, uh, who really like to humiliate members of the the other side,

571
00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:05,280
those that those traits correlate with being a mean and shitty person.

572
00:35:06,320 --> 00:35:11,200
So uh zealous participation in intergroup dominance competition and intergroup status

573
00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:16,640
competition is actually a a pretty good cue of zealous participation and

574
00:35:16,640 --> 00:35:18,690
interpersonal status competition.

575
00:35:19,490 --> 00:35:25,330
It's it's uh it's really interesting too because the um uh uh there you can

576
00:35:25,330 --> 00:35:31,090
be uh so you know psych, for example, um, or any area if you sort of do the

577
00:35:31,090 --> 00:35:32,130
outgroup test, right?

578
00:35:32,210 --> 00:35:37,650
Which is sort of if you see, so if I'm status aspirational for my group and you're not a

579
00:35:37,650 --> 00:35:43,580
member of that group, There are two different uh extreme versions, but they're a continuum

580
00:35:43,660 --> 00:35:43,980
again.

581
00:35:44,060 --> 00:35:50,060
But um, but one is sort of I'll do anything to um uh achieve status for

582
00:35:50,060 --> 00:35:50,620
my group.

583
00:35:50,780 --> 00:35:56,700
The other one though is that I'm sort of I'm I'm doing it in a way that is sort of

584
00:35:56,700 --> 00:35:59,580
palatable um or acceptable.

585
00:35:59,740 --> 00:36:04,670
Um so I'm doing things like um things that don't register

586
00:36:05,550 --> 00:36:07,710
negative reactions from an outgroup.

587
00:36:07,790 --> 00:36:12,990
And I wonder if that's basically the difference between the cue that somebody is an

588
00:36:12,990 --> 00:36:17,550
individual seeker of status versus a good coalition partner.

589
00:36:18,030 --> 00:36:20,590
So if I say, for example, just make it concrete.

590
00:36:20,670 --> 00:36:24,110
So like I'm interested in M-Psych, and instead of being like, well, everybody else is

591
00:36:24,110 --> 00:36:27,230
stupid, I'm just like, well, look, there are important things about evolutionary

592
00:36:27,230 --> 00:36:32,200
psychology, like adaptationism or design-mindedness, or understanding that there are

593
00:36:32,200 --> 00:36:34,840
systems in the mind that we're not conscious of.

594
00:36:35,400 --> 00:36:38,520
These are important things to understand about psychology.

595
00:36:38,760 --> 00:36:44,680
So I am not, I'm sort of positively explaining why I think these things are important.

596
00:36:44,840 --> 00:36:50,040
Now, if to the degree that I specialize in these things, I'm still getting status or

597
00:36:50,040 --> 00:36:51,240
benefits from them.

598
00:36:51,490 --> 00:36:57,330
But if you're reading that or hearing that as somebody who's not an evpsych, that's a very

599
00:36:57,330 --> 00:37:01,250
different thing than me saying, well, you know, uh people who aren't evolutionary

600
00:37:01,250 --> 00:37:02,850
psychologists are stupid.

601
00:37:03,010 --> 00:37:08,610
Um and uh um it's so there there's sort of a way to be

602
00:37:08,610 --> 00:37:14,540
coalitionally entrepreneurial about your subgroup status that

603
00:37:14,540 --> 00:37:18,780
doesn't burn the bridges of sort of a larger community, right?

604
00:37:19,180 --> 00:37:20,860
Um or you can't.

605
00:37:21,020 --> 00:37:21,420
So right.

606
00:37:21,500 --> 00:37:24,620
So like maybe you are just another kind of psychologist.

607
00:37:24,700 --> 00:37:30,460
And so you're asking the question, is David, is is Dave, I'll call myself Dave, um, is

608
00:37:30,460 --> 00:37:34,700
Dave burning bridges um with me versus not?

609
00:37:35,100 --> 00:37:41,030
Um, and I think one is palatable and one isn't, and it's sort of obvious, but I think

610
00:37:41,030 --> 00:37:46,150
one of the reasons why that might be, and I'm curious what you think, is that one, it's

611
00:37:46,150 --> 00:37:50,150
about ultimately is what I'm doing threatening to your status?

612
00:37:50,390 --> 00:37:51,350
Um, right.

613
00:37:51,910 --> 00:37:57,910
And number two, it's also diagnostic of if we do become allied, sort of what

614
00:37:57,990 --> 00:38:03,280
what would my um or if we become entangled, am I going to exploit you or not?

615
00:38:03,440 --> 00:38:03,840
Right.

616
00:38:04,160 --> 00:38:07,920
Um and so this is sort of the thing of like, you know, if somebody talks bad about their

617
00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:11,680
friends and I'm not friends with them, boy, I wouldn't want to be their friend because

618
00:38:11,680 --> 00:38:12,880
they're going to talk bad about me.

619
00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:13,200
Right.

620
00:38:13,360 --> 00:38:18,880
So um so if I'm sort of uh um uh yeah uh I

621
00:38:19,120 --> 00:38:24,320
um the fact that it's palatable for you or not, I think um

622
00:38:25,200 --> 00:38:28,130
it's interesting Yeah.

623
00:38:29,650 --> 00:38:31,330
It's a huge and complicated question.

624
00:38:32,370 --> 00:38:37,970
So what differentiates the you know trash talking other fields of

625
00:38:37,970 --> 00:38:42,930
psychology in a way that might make you look mean from just talking about the positive

626
00:38:42,930 --> 00:38:47,170
things about evolutionary psychology and the value that it plays?

627
00:38:48,770 --> 00:38:54,660
Well, one is I think in the case where you're just talking about the

628
00:38:54,820 --> 00:38:59,540
the the insights of an evolutionary approach in a positive way, um there's plausible

629
00:38:59,540 --> 00:39:00,900
deniability about what your motive is.

630
00:39:00,980 --> 00:39:05,140
So at the end of the day, at the ultimate level, it might be a kind of status seeking move.

631
00:39:05,380 --> 00:39:09,700
By preaching the virtues of of F-Syche, you'll rise in standing in the the F-Syche

632
00:39:09,700 --> 00:39:10,500
community.

633
00:39:10,740 --> 00:39:15,170
Um but it's not obvious to observers that that's what your motive is.

634
00:39:15,410 --> 00:39:21,170
Uh as far as they're concerned, your motive is to, you know, promote knowledge and insight

635
00:39:21,170 --> 00:39:22,050
and understanding.

636
00:39:22,210 --> 00:39:26,530
And so that so when you when you talk about knowledge and insight and understanding, you're

637
00:39:26,530 --> 00:39:30,930
framing what is ult at the ultimate level of status seeking motive in terms of a higher uh

638
00:39:31,090 --> 00:39:36,290
altruistic uh abstract goal, you know, knowledge, wisdom, uh whatever.

639
00:39:36,560 --> 00:39:39,920
And so this might be a good segue into sacred values.

640
00:39:40,160 --> 00:39:44,800
I think in the former case, when you're just talking about insight, you're you're couching

641
00:39:44,800 --> 00:39:49,200
the status seeking in terms of a sacred value, and that ultimately benefits our group by

642
00:39:49,200 --> 00:39:51,440
stabilizing our status game.

643
00:39:51,680 --> 00:39:57,280
Um whereas if you are just being blunt and open about your desire for

644
00:39:57,280 --> 00:40:03,170
intergroup supremacy, then uh the jig is up, it's clear that that status

645
00:40:03,170 --> 00:40:04,690
is ultimately your motive.

646
00:40:05,090 --> 00:40:09,010
And then I can draw all sorts of negative inferences about you.

647
00:40:10,050 --> 00:40:15,970
It's interesting because even if you're overtly seeking status in a

648
00:40:15,970 --> 00:40:21,730
domain that I care about, it's still, it not only makes you look bad, it also

649
00:40:21,730 --> 00:40:24,210
threatens to make our status game collapse.

650
00:40:24,610 --> 00:40:28,740
So at this point it might be worth backtracking on what it means for a status game to

651
00:40:28,740 --> 00:40:29,460
collapse.

652
00:40:29,620 --> 00:40:35,060
Um I am beginning to draw more and more parallels between status seeking and investing in a

653
00:40:35,060 --> 00:40:35,620
stock.

654
00:40:35,940 --> 00:40:41,300
You know, just as stocks can be volatile, um I think status games can be volatile.

655
00:40:41,540 --> 00:40:46,340
Um and just as the source of volatility for a stock is our beliefs about others' beliefs

656
00:40:46,420 --> 00:40:50,290
about others' beliefs about the value of the stock, I think the source of volatility in a

657
00:40:50,290 --> 00:40:55,090
status game is our beliefs about others' beliefs, about others' beliefs, about what we're

658
00:40:55,090 --> 00:40:58,210
actually doing in this status game.

659
00:40:59,810 --> 00:41:05,730
So a status game, in my view, can collapse when we all know

660
00:41:05,730 --> 00:41:09,410
that we all know that we're just engaged in a status game.

661
00:41:09,650 --> 00:41:10,050
Right?

662
00:41:10,210 --> 00:41:13,010
It doesn't collapse if I personally know or suspect it.

663
00:41:13,240 --> 00:41:16,520
It doesn't collapse if I suspect that you suspect it.

664
00:41:16,760 --> 00:41:21,000
It collapses when I know that you know that I know that you know that I know that we're

665
00:41:21,000 --> 00:41:23,080
just engaged in a pissing contest.

666
00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:24,040
Right?

667
00:41:24,360 --> 00:41:28,600
Then all of a sudden, uh what we're doing begins to make us look bad.

668
00:41:28,680 --> 00:41:32,760
We begin to draw negative inferences about each other and worry about the negative

669
00:41:32,760 --> 00:41:35,160
inferences that other people will draw about us.

670
00:41:36,120 --> 00:41:41,110
When that happens, the hierarchy that we've created kind of inverts.

671
00:41:41,190 --> 00:41:43,430
It kind of kind of flips on its head.

672
00:41:43,510 --> 00:41:47,510
So those at the top of our hierarchy, now that we know that this is all just an elaborate

673
00:41:47,510 --> 00:41:51,350
pissing contest, well, those at the top are the people who are most obsessed with winning

674
00:41:51,350 --> 00:41:52,710
that pissing contest.

675
00:41:52,950 --> 00:41:55,750
Those are the worst status seekers of all.

676
00:41:56,390 --> 00:42:00,550
Those at the bottom were relatively uninterested in it, presumably.

677
00:42:00,630 --> 00:42:03,990
And so they begin to look a little bit more humble and modest.

678
00:42:04,950 --> 00:42:09,300
And so the the hierarchy kind of the top of the the hierarchy gets lowered and the bottom

679
00:42:09,300 --> 00:42:10,740
gets lifted a little bit.

680
00:42:11,940 --> 00:42:16,580
And at the same time, now that the status game has has collapsed and the jig is up, we

681
00:42:16,580 --> 00:42:20,820
begin to gain status by doing the opposite of what was done previously.

682
00:42:21,300 --> 00:42:26,820
So if our status game involved, say wearing you know crisp black and white suits and neatly

683
00:42:26,820 --> 00:42:31,940
slicking back our hair or combing our hair, and all of a sudden it becomes common knowledge

684
00:42:31,940 --> 00:42:37,690
that we're just a bunch of stuffy, puffed up status seekers, um, and we

685
00:42:37,690 --> 00:42:41,290
begin to look bad for for you know wearing the suits and combing our hair.

686
00:42:41,530 --> 00:42:46,090
Well, we'll begin to gain status by doing the opposite of that, by letting our hair be long

687
00:42:46,090 --> 00:42:50,090
and wild and and wearing, you know, flowing, colorful outfits.

688
00:42:50,250 --> 00:42:53,610
Uh, because that shows that we're we're different from those status seekers.

689
00:42:53,770 --> 00:42:59,260
We're not the selfish domineering, you know, uh pretentious people we're we're

690
00:42:59,340 --> 00:43:02,060
we're humble, authentic, we're real.

691
00:43:02,380 --> 00:43:08,220
Um, we begin to signal that we don't care about status, which paradoxic paradoxically uh

692
00:43:08,300 --> 00:43:09,260
raises our status.

693
00:43:09,420 --> 00:43:14,140
So when a status game collapses, the hierarchy inverts, and the players begin to gain

694
00:43:14,140 --> 00:43:18,540
status by doing the opposite of what was done previously, or by conspicuously

695
00:43:18,540 --> 00:43:23,660
differentiating themselves from the the collapsed uh uh status seeking

696
00:43:23,660 --> 00:43:24,620
activities.

697
00:43:24,870 --> 00:43:27,430
Um if that makes sense.

698
00:43:27,750 --> 00:43:27,910
Yeah.

699
00:43:27,990 --> 00:43:29,670
It's uh yeah.

700
00:43:29,910 --> 00:43:33,750
So I sort of got uh so I I've I sort of lost track of where we where we were and and what

701
00:43:33,750 --> 00:43:35,110
the original question was, but who who cares?

702
00:43:35,590 --> 00:43:36,150
No, it's good.

703
00:43:36,390 --> 00:43:41,270
It it actually reminds me, so when people go to the zoo often they'll sort of look at

704
00:43:41,270 --> 00:43:45,110
primate dominance hierarchies, uh humans that is.

705
00:43:45,430 --> 00:43:51,360
Um and and it sort of seems really dumb, um, you know, because you're sort of

706
00:43:51,360 --> 00:43:54,640
like, well, why would they be locked into this dominance hierarchy?

707
00:43:54,800 --> 00:44:00,720
And, you know, I think people sort of really naturally uh find that um they

708
00:44:00,720 --> 00:44:02,640
really it really rubs them the wrong way.

709
00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:05,200
And I think that's part of this psychology, right?

710
00:44:05,360 --> 00:44:11,120
Where um I think what you're describing, where the the status game jiggers up, as you

711
00:44:11,120 --> 00:44:17,050
say, um, where it's sort of transparent that it is just dominance or power

712
00:44:17,210 --> 00:44:19,050
or force or coercion.

713
00:44:19,370 --> 00:44:19,690
Yeah.

714
00:44:19,930 --> 00:44:23,450
Um, the difference between or greed, yes, exactly.

715
00:44:24,250 --> 00:44:30,250
Um, number one, those in power historically are always interested in not

716
00:44:30,250 --> 00:44:31,290
letting that be shown.

717
00:44:31,370 --> 00:44:36,280
I mean, there's just an enormous amount of history of people not wanting that to be known

718
00:44:36,360 --> 00:44:40,440
and cracking down on information suggesting that's true.

719
00:44:41,480 --> 00:44:47,320
You know, you get freedom of information acts on uh um you know declassified

720
00:44:47,320 --> 00:44:53,240
materials showing that this was um just power and resources were the motivation,

721
00:44:53,320 --> 00:44:56,200
even though that was not what was uh presented.

722
00:44:56,520 --> 00:45:00,920
Um but it's also that um yeah, I think, and this comes back to I think the idea of

723
00:45:00,920 --> 00:45:01,720
coercion, right?

724
00:45:01,880 --> 00:45:07,830
Where people, because we there's always a third party we can go to and say, look, this

725
00:45:07,830 --> 00:45:10,150
person is exploitative.

726
00:45:10,950 --> 00:45:16,870
And that the third party doesn't like that because it's not benefiting them and it's

727
00:45:16,870 --> 00:45:18,790
diagnostic that you're going to exploit.

728
00:45:18,870 --> 00:45:21,510
I mean, you in this example, but let's say it's a third party, right?

729
00:45:21,670 --> 00:45:23,750
Uh uh exploitative jerk.

730
00:45:23,910 --> 00:45:29,670
Um uh, you know, we're not gonna like the exploitative domineering person because there's

731
00:45:29,670 --> 00:45:35,320
always a larger set of third parties we can go to who look at that and say, Well,

732
00:45:35,480 --> 00:45:40,600
they're not benefiting me because I'm just disinterested and they look pretty exploitative.

733
00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:46,120
Um, and so I wonder if that sort of open flexibility, creativity of

734
00:45:46,120 --> 00:45:51,960
coalitional entrepreneurship is sort of what's lacking in other to some extent, other

735
00:45:51,960 --> 00:45:54,840
primates or the dimensions of dominance or status.

736
00:45:55,080 --> 00:45:59,640
And so when people go to the zoo and they're like, Wow, that seems really horrible.

737
00:45:59,970 --> 00:46:05,730
Um, and even, you know, like I'm uh rereading some Orwell right now, you know, and I think

738
00:46:05,730 --> 00:46:11,570
like part of the horror of like Animal Farm is it's this peeling back of uh

739
00:46:11,730 --> 00:46:17,330
the narrative, the superficial narrative, is that this is really about dominance and power

740
00:46:17,570 --> 00:46:23,170
and being in this uncomfortable place where somebody is still trying to exert coercion or

741
00:46:23,170 --> 00:46:24,930
dominance or power over you.

742
00:46:25,330 --> 00:46:31,180
Um that is just part of human nature is to not want that.

743
00:46:31,340 --> 00:46:34,700
And I think it's because we have this coalitional flexibility.

744
00:46:35,340 --> 00:46:37,180
Yes, I I couldn't agree more.

745
00:46:37,500 --> 00:46:42,940
So when we look at a chimpanzee dominance hierarchy where the alpha male you know

746
00:46:43,100 --> 00:46:48,140
bosses other people or other chimps around and and gets whatever they want, um it's a

747
00:46:48,140 --> 00:46:49,100
little more complicated than that.

748
00:46:49,180 --> 00:46:51,820
Granted, they have to form alliances and keep the peace and break up conflict.

749
00:46:51,900 --> 00:46:55,290
So it's it's it's kind of analogous to human status hierarchies.

750
00:46:55,690 --> 00:47:01,370
But it but the dominance is is more overt than than it typically is in human societies.

751
00:47:02,010 --> 00:47:04,730
And that overtness is really troubling to us.

752
00:47:04,810 --> 00:47:07,370
It it feels icky, it feels immoral.

753
00:47:07,850 --> 00:47:12,970
I think a lot of the huge social changes that have happened throughout history have come

754
00:47:12,970 --> 00:47:18,970
from us seeing a dominance hierarchy for the dominance hierarchy that it in fact was.

755
00:47:19,450 --> 00:47:25,220
I think having a naked dominance hierarchy in among humans uh is

756
00:47:25,300 --> 00:47:27,300
some something close to impossible.

757
00:47:27,540 --> 00:47:33,220
I really think that we always need a moralistic pretext for dominance and for dominance

758
00:47:33,220 --> 00:47:34,100
hierarchy.

759
00:47:34,500 --> 00:47:39,140
We always need some kind of sacred narrative, some kind of myth, some kind of utopia or

760
00:47:39,140 --> 00:47:45,060
dystopia, uh something to justify this hierarchical relationship, this

761
00:47:45,060 --> 00:47:47,810
dominance uh Dynamic.

762
00:47:48,450 --> 00:47:53,170
One of the best examples of this, if you think of North Korea, you could not think of a

763
00:47:53,170 --> 00:47:59,090
clearer example of a dominance hierarchy where Kim is at the top, you know, anyone

764
00:47:59,090 --> 00:48:01,330
who disobeys him gets killed.

765
00:48:01,650 --> 00:48:03,490
It's a brutally hierarchical place.

766
00:48:03,570 --> 00:48:07,170
And do you want to know what the official name of North Korea is?

767
00:48:07,540 --> 00:48:11,620
the People's Democratic Republic of North Korea.

768
00:48:11,940 --> 00:48:17,940
So even the most clearly, obviously hierarchical place from our vantage point still refers

769
00:48:17,940 --> 00:48:20,340
to itself as a democratic place.

770
00:48:20,980 --> 00:48:22,980
You always need a pretext.

771
00:48:23,140 --> 00:48:26,420
You know, even take take the recent, you know, the war in Ukraine.

772
00:48:26,580 --> 00:48:32,500
From our vantage point, it seems pretty obvious that this is a selfish, uh, authoritarian

773
00:48:32,500 --> 00:48:34,100
land grab by Putin.

774
00:48:34,180 --> 00:48:39,870
You know, he wants to crush a rising power uh near him that he feels threatened by,

775
00:48:40,110 --> 00:48:40,430
right?

776
00:48:41,230 --> 00:48:43,950
It's it's just intergroup dominance, straightforwardly.

777
00:48:44,110 --> 00:48:47,310
We're gonna conquer this neighboring territory and take their stuff.

778
00:48:48,830 --> 00:48:53,470
Um, even there, they have to come up with a narrative that we're denazifying Ukraine.

779
00:48:53,550 --> 00:48:58,190
The reason we're going in there isn't just for pure intergroup dominance, it's for a higher

780
00:48:58,190 --> 00:48:58,510
purpose.

781
00:48:58,670 --> 00:49:01,420
It's to get rid of the Nazis, right?

782
00:49:01,980 --> 00:49:07,740
So I think that it is something close to impossible, maybe even impossible, to create a

783
00:49:07,740 --> 00:49:12,380
real dominance hierarchy or a real intergroup dominance hierarchy that is brutal and

784
00:49:12,380 --> 00:49:18,300
coercive without having some kind of shared moral narrative of what's going on.

785
00:49:18,540 --> 00:49:23,420
And as soon as we start to see through that narrative, as soon as we see the emperor as

786
00:49:23,420 --> 00:49:26,620
naked, it can collapse and you can get a social revolution.

787
00:49:26,860 --> 00:49:31,710
And the tragic irony of that happening is that often once that happens, you just get a new

788
00:49:31,710 --> 00:49:34,030
dominance hierarchy and a new moral narrative.

789
00:49:34,350 --> 00:49:34,830
Right?

790
00:49:35,150 --> 00:49:41,070
You look at the, you know, the the socialist revolution in the in Russia, it

791
00:49:41,070 --> 00:49:44,510
was very much an egalitarian revolution.

792
00:49:44,670 --> 00:49:50,640
You know, we want to bring equality to the people, we want to help the working class tear

793
00:49:50,640 --> 00:49:53,440
down hierarchy, tear down the bourgeoisie.

794
00:49:53,680 --> 00:49:54,800
And what do you know?

795
00:49:54,960 --> 00:49:59,680
As soon as they rose to power, they became even more brutally hierarchical and coercive and

796
00:49:59,680 --> 00:50:03,120
tyrannical than the previous system ever was.

797
00:50:04,640 --> 00:50:08,880
And so that kind of cycle is constantly happening.

798
00:50:09,360 --> 00:50:15,010
Um and to me, at least, it gives me some hope,

799
00:50:15,250 --> 00:50:21,010
which suggests that there is f fragility in these kinds of evil systems,

800
00:50:21,090 --> 00:50:25,570
and that they they kind of disintegrate in the light like vampires do.

801
00:50:25,810 --> 00:50:30,690
Which which gives us power, I think, to try to see through them and try to say that the

802
00:50:30,690 --> 00:50:32,450
emperor has no clothes.

803
00:50:32,530 --> 00:50:35,890
Uh, because that can lead to real social change.

804
00:50:36,200 --> 00:50:40,280
The tragedy is that often that social change ends up creating the same hierarchy, but just

805
00:50:40,280 --> 00:50:43,560
in a in a different form, with different people on top and different people on the bottom.

806
00:50:43,800 --> 00:50:49,240
But hopefully if we learn that that is going to be the outcome, we can try to guard against

807
00:50:49,240 --> 00:50:49,480
that.

808
00:50:49,720 --> 00:50:55,640
Um I I don't know how, you know hopeful uh that picture is, but you know,

809
00:50:55,720 --> 00:51:00,840
at the very least I think it it provides insights into these kinds of dynamics.

810
00:51:01,240 --> 00:51:02,910
Um yeah.

811
00:51:03,230 --> 00:51:03,470
Yeah.

812
00:51:03,630 --> 00:51:09,230
Um one question, and I this might lead into then this another question that is where you're

813
00:51:09,230 --> 00:51:15,230
going, I think, um, is that you mentioned that everything needs sort of a moral uh

814
00:51:15,870 --> 00:51:16,910
cast on it.

815
00:51:17,070 --> 00:51:22,110
Um so even the example of North Korea or even you know the Nazis were fighting the

816
00:51:22,110 --> 00:51:22,910
communists, right?

817
00:51:22,990 --> 00:51:28,990
They were they were so exactly um uh uh why do you

818
00:51:28,990 --> 00:51:29,630
need that?

819
00:51:30,110 --> 00:51:30,750
Yeah.

820
00:51:31,420 --> 00:51:37,180
So um as you know, there's a a huge literature and economics and game theory

821
00:51:37,420 --> 00:51:40,860
showing that collective action is really hard.

822
00:51:41,180 --> 00:51:46,460
Um not only is it hard to coordinate uh with other people to have you know shared beliefs

823
00:51:46,460 --> 00:51:52,060
about what the payoffs are to collective action, uh it is hard to get everyone to

824
00:51:52,060 --> 00:51:55,310
cooperate when there is a free rider problem.

825
00:51:55,550 --> 00:52:00,830
So if we all work together and create a common benefit and we do we divide the benefits

826
00:52:00,830 --> 00:52:05,870
equally among us, well then free riders, people who don't participate in the collective

827
00:52:05,870 --> 00:52:09,870
action but reap the benefits from it, they come out ahead.

828
00:52:10,910 --> 00:52:15,230
And so there is a perverse incentive to any collective action to not contribute to the

829
00:52:15,230 --> 00:52:18,350
collective action but still reap the benefits from it.

830
00:52:20,840 --> 00:52:25,560
and so we in order to solve that problem, we evolved all sorts of you know cognitive and

831
00:52:25,560 --> 00:52:31,480
and and cultural mechanisms for punishing free riders, for uh um creating narratives that

832
00:52:31,560 --> 00:52:37,320
um uh broadcast how beneficial it is for us to work together, you know, how uh

833
00:52:37,480 --> 00:52:42,840
bountiful the rewards are gonna be, um, how wonderful the utopia we're we're pursuing is,

834
00:52:43,000 --> 00:52:47,370
uh, how bad things are gonna be if we don't work together and avoid this catastrophe.

835
00:52:47,530 --> 00:52:51,930
We have all sorts of narratives, cognitive systems detecting free riders, detecting

836
00:52:51,930 --> 00:52:54,650
cheaters, monitoring how much other people are contributing.

837
00:52:54,810 --> 00:53:00,090
We have a whole wealth of cultural and cognitive adaptations to solve this collective

838
00:53:00,090 --> 00:53:00,730
action problem.

839
00:53:00,890 --> 00:53:03,850
And even despite all these adaptations, it still often fails.

840
00:53:04,090 --> 00:53:09,290
Um, you still often struggle to get people to work together to achieve a collective benefit

841
00:53:09,690 --> 00:53:11,450
because it's just so hard.

842
00:53:11,850 --> 00:53:15,700
Uh And the incentives are often perverse.

843
00:53:16,500 --> 00:53:22,500
So given that we have this collective action problem, if I am contributing

844
00:53:22,500 --> 00:53:27,620
to a collective benefit in Darwinian terms, and that collective benefit is in the form of

845
00:53:27,620 --> 00:53:33,090
intergroup dominance or intergroup supremacy, and me

846
00:53:33,330 --> 00:53:36,450
contributing to that collective benefit makes me look bad.

847
00:53:36,610 --> 00:53:40,450
If it makes me look like a mean narcissistic Machiavellian status seeker.

848
00:53:40,770 --> 00:53:43,170
To who that is true to my group members.

849
00:53:43,490 --> 00:53:44,370
Uh to your other group members.

850
00:53:44,450 --> 00:53:44,850
Okay, good.

851
00:53:45,010 --> 00:53:45,170
Yeah.

852
00:53:45,410 --> 00:53:45,650
Yeah.

853
00:53:45,810 --> 00:53:51,490
So if I if I am just, you know, coercing and and beating up and being cr needlessly cruel

854
00:53:51,490 --> 00:53:55,010
to outgroups and just being transparent about you know the only reason I'm doing this is

855
00:53:55,250 --> 00:53:56,370
because of dominance.

856
00:53:56,530 --> 00:53:59,090
And um that's gonna make me look bad.

857
00:53:59,380 --> 00:54:04,740
Or if I'm spreading lies and propaganda to try to mobilize my group to dominate the

858
00:54:04,740 --> 00:54:08,340
outgroup and I'm spreading out dehumanizing and demonizing narratives.

859
00:54:08,580 --> 00:54:10,340
And it's transparent that that's my goal.

860
00:54:10,420 --> 00:54:15,940
I'm just I'm just trying to generate hatred and gain power for myself and for our group,

861
00:54:16,100 --> 00:54:20,020
um, just just for the sake of just brute dominance.

862
00:54:20,340 --> 00:54:23,300
I'm gonna look like a real piece of shit.

863
00:54:24,390 --> 00:54:28,390
And so there are so we have this problem of collection act, collective action that's

864
00:54:28,390 --> 00:54:29,670
already really hard to solve.

865
00:54:29,750 --> 00:54:34,950
And if you heap on top of it the idea that contributing to it makes you look bad.

866
00:54:35,110 --> 00:54:41,110
It makes you look amoral, mean, domineering, well then that just heaps even

867
00:54:41,110 --> 00:54:41,750
more costs.

868
00:54:41,990 --> 00:54:45,830
It makes it even more hard to overcome these hurdles of collective action.

869
00:54:45,990 --> 00:54:49,510
How do I contribute to the collective action if it makes me look like a sociopath?

870
00:54:50,070 --> 00:54:50,710
Right?

871
00:54:51,520 --> 00:54:57,360
And so I think the way we solve this problem is through our sacred narratives, that we

872
00:54:57,360 --> 00:55:02,800
have to seek intergroup dominance without creating common knowledge that we're seeking

873
00:55:02,800 --> 00:55:04,240
intergroup dominance.

874
00:55:04,480 --> 00:55:10,400
We have to come up with a sacred narrative that disguises what we're doing in

875
00:55:10,640 --> 00:55:12,880
moralistic or altruistic terms.

876
00:55:13,040 --> 00:55:18,370
If our agenda is ultimately self-interested or or in the interests of our group, we have to

877
00:55:18,370 --> 00:55:21,970
disguise it as being universally benevolent as it helps everyone, it makes the world a

878
00:55:21,970 --> 00:55:22,770
better place.

879
00:55:23,090 --> 00:55:28,450
Um if we have to spread demonizing narratives and propaganda to mobilize the group to

880
00:55:28,450 --> 00:55:30,450
collective action, well, those aren't narratives.

881
00:55:30,530 --> 00:55:31,890
That's not propaganda, it's just the truth.

882
00:55:31,970 --> 00:55:36,050
It's just the obvious, unbiased truth, and anyone who disagrees is just crazy or stupid.

883
00:55:37,000 --> 00:55:43,000
If we're going to exploit or dominate or attack or kill the outgroup, well, we're not doing

884
00:55:43,000 --> 00:55:43,800
that for dominance.

885
00:55:43,880 --> 00:55:45,080
We're doing it because they deserve it.

886
00:55:45,160 --> 00:55:45,640
They're evil.

887
00:55:45,720 --> 00:55:46,680
They're a threat.

888
00:55:46,840 --> 00:55:50,920
They're going to destroy us if we don't handle this situation, right?

889
00:55:52,120 --> 00:55:53,800
They're subhuman.

890
00:55:55,720 --> 00:55:57,160
It's either them or us.

891
00:55:58,360 --> 00:55:59,880
So we need these narratives.

892
00:56:00,150 --> 00:56:04,630
Intergroup dominance could not be possible without these narratives.

893
00:56:04,950 --> 00:56:09,190
Because as soon as we have this narrative, then all of a sudden there are social benefits

894
00:56:09,190 --> 00:56:11,110
to contributing to the collective action.

895
00:56:11,350 --> 00:56:16,710
If what we're su if what we're seeking is a virtuous aim, a virtuous goal, making the world

896
00:56:16,710 --> 00:56:20,950
a better place, bringing about a utopia, then me contributing to that makes me look good

897
00:56:20,950 --> 00:56:21,750
rather than bad.

898
00:56:21,910 --> 00:56:23,670
It makes me look like a virtuous person.

899
00:56:23,830 --> 00:56:28,630
If if the outgroup is genuinely evil and subhuman and wants to destroy us, well then me

900
00:56:28,630 --> 00:56:34,260
attacking them makes me look courageous and uh and valiant and noble,

901
00:56:34,660 --> 00:56:34,980
right?

902
00:56:35,460 --> 00:56:40,900
And so the presence or the absence of the narrative um makes the

903
00:56:40,900 --> 00:56:45,700
difference between uh collective action being successful or being a failure.

904
00:56:46,420 --> 00:56:50,740
With the narrative, I gain lots of status for dominating the outgroup and contributing to

905
00:56:50,740 --> 00:56:51,460
that goal.

906
00:56:51,670 --> 00:56:54,790
Without the narrative, I start to look like a sociopath.

907
00:56:55,590 --> 00:57:01,190
So I think we need these narratives to coordinate uh the the the kinds of evil that has

908
00:57:01,190 --> 00:57:02,470
been so common throughout history.

909
00:57:02,550 --> 00:57:06,390
And if you look at all the all the evil that has been so common throughout history, it

910
00:57:06,390 --> 00:57:08,550
always has a moralistic pretext.

911
00:57:08,630 --> 00:57:11,910
I'm not familiar with any example where there isn't one there.

912
00:57:12,180 --> 00:57:12,980
And I've tried.

913
00:57:13,060 --> 00:57:16,420
I've I've you know, I went on Twitter and I asked like social scientists, academics, do you

914
00:57:16,420 --> 00:57:20,660
have any example of a group throughout history that has dominated or coerced or been

915
00:57:20,660 --> 00:57:21,940
violent to an outgroup?

916
00:57:22,020 --> 00:57:24,340
And they had no moralistic narrative about it at all.

917
00:57:24,500 --> 00:57:27,860
They were just doing it for pure dominance sake, just to get resources, just to take the

918
00:57:27,860 --> 00:57:28,980
women, whatever.

919
00:57:29,140 --> 00:57:34,580
And uh they had no myth or or religious narrative or ideal ideological narrative at all.

920
00:57:34,740 --> 00:57:39,210
And I couldn't find, I've still yet to find an example that has been convincing.

921
00:57:41,290 --> 00:57:45,930
I'm open to the possibility that maybe it exists, but it it if it does, it's very rare.

922
00:57:46,410 --> 00:57:51,210
I think we really need these narratives for collective action to even be possible.

923
00:57:59,130 --> 00:58:04,540
The more uh we agree on this narrative and share it and repeat it to one another and signal

924
00:58:04,540 --> 00:58:08,780
that we believe it and that we're true believers, you know, the more powerful and well

925
00:58:08,860 --> 00:58:12,940
coordinated and cohesive our group becomes, and the more likely our group is to rise in

926
00:58:12,940 --> 00:58:17,980
status and power uh and and do all the things that would have increased our fitness in

927
00:58:17,980 --> 00:58:19,500
ancestral environments.

928
00:58:19,980 --> 00:58:20,380
Yeah.

929
00:58:20,540 --> 00:58:26,460
Um uh it's interesting because I think there is, though, a bit of a uh a

930
00:58:26,460 --> 00:58:31,590
mystery and sort of cold Darwinian logic, which is which is

931
00:58:32,310 --> 00:58:38,150
and I it's and I think um I don't think we're we're disagreeing,

932
00:58:38,310 --> 00:58:44,230
but I think there's there's still sort of a core question that can still be unpacked, which

933
00:58:44,230 --> 00:58:50,230
is um if so let's say that we're in a group together and

934
00:58:50,390 --> 00:58:55,380
um you're exploiting other people for my benefit.

935
00:58:56,100 --> 00:59:01,780
Why would uh it be important for you or me to

936
00:59:02,260 --> 00:59:05,940
uh for that to be framed in a moral way?

937
00:59:06,660 --> 00:59:12,260
Um I think there are arguments for why that is, but I think that's sort of the um because

938
00:59:12,340 --> 00:59:16,210
it makes sense for well yeah, I'll leave it at that.

939
00:59:16,290 --> 00:59:21,250
I mean, why would uh that's the question, and I'm sure you've thought of this, but like why

940
00:59:21,570 --> 00:59:25,250
even because you mentioned this would even be for the people in the group, right?

941
00:59:25,410 --> 00:59:31,330
Like so the people who are benefiting, why would we need that framing

942
00:59:31,730 --> 00:59:36,930
if if actually it's in our interest uh to just be exploitative?

943
00:59:37,490 --> 00:59:38,050
Yeah.

944
00:59:38,360 --> 00:59:41,480
Well, let's uh think about it at the individual level.

945
00:59:41,560 --> 00:59:46,040
I'm an individual group member and I'm deciding whether to participate in ganging up on a

946
00:59:46,040 --> 00:59:51,480
member of of of the out group, um, to you know, exploit them or or or whatever.

947
00:59:52,920 --> 00:59:57,800
In that decision, ultimately there's a system in my head that's uh assessing what are going

948
00:59:57,800 --> 01:00:00,120
to be the reputational consequences of this behavior.

949
01:00:00,280 --> 01:00:03,960
How are people going to see me if I participate in this behavior?

950
01:00:04,450 --> 01:00:10,450
Um and that is should factor into the cost-benefit calculus over and above

951
01:00:10,450 --> 01:00:13,490
the existing cost-benefit calculus about collective action itself.

952
01:00:14,370 --> 01:00:14,690
Right?

953
01:00:14,930 --> 01:00:17,730
Over and above whether I think they're going to be free riders or whether I think we're

954
01:00:17,730 --> 01:00:19,410
sufficiently well coordinated or whatever.

955
01:00:19,570 --> 01:00:23,960
There's this additional layer of what are people going to think of me if I do this.

956
01:00:24,920 --> 01:00:30,760
Um and on top of that, I have to also think about what other

957
01:00:30,760 --> 01:00:34,200
people are going to think that other people are going to think of them.

958
01:00:34,440 --> 01:00:34,600
Right.

959
01:00:34,840 --> 01:00:38,600
Sorry, that was a complicated no no no it's good, but but just to be concrete, I think what

960
01:00:38,600 --> 01:00:42,200
you're saying is just uh is that you and I are in a group.

961
01:00:42,440 --> 01:00:45,000
You're the you're the leader.

962
01:00:45,320 --> 01:00:51,240
I'm not only considering what how your status machinations are

963
01:00:51,240 --> 01:00:55,510
affecting me and also how what I'm gonna think of you.

964
01:00:55,830 --> 01:01:00,070
But part of what I'm gonna think of you is what I think other people will think of you.

965
01:01:00,790 --> 01:01:01,030
Right.

966
01:01:01,270 --> 01:01:01,510
Yes.

967
01:01:01,670 --> 01:01:06,710
If I'm trying to predict your behavior, then I have to get inside your head and and and try

968
01:01:06,710 --> 01:01:12,150
to predict uh how you will predict other people's

969
01:01:12,150 --> 01:01:12,870
judgments.

970
01:01:13,190 --> 01:01:13,750
Exactly.

971
01:01:13,830 --> 01:01:14,470
Yeah.

972
01:01:14,980 --> 01:01:19,220
Um and i i i you know, this layer uh it's called meta representation, thoughts about

973
01:01:19,220 --> 01:01:22,100
thoughts about thoughts about thoughts, or thoughts about other people's thoughts about

974
01:01:22,100 --> 01:01:24,100
your beliefs, about their desires, about your beliefs.

975
01:01:24,260 --> 01:01:29,220
We're very good at this kind of meta representation of embedding these uh layers of mental

976
01:01:29,220 --> 01:01:31,300
states at many different levels.

977
01:01:31,460 --> 01:01:36,180
Um and I think that is crucially important to collective action.

978
01:01:36,420 --> 01:01:39,460
So uh I only want to participate in the collective action if other people are

979
01:01:39,460 --> 01:01:39,860
participating.

980
01:01:39,940 --> 01:01:43,540
If I'm the only one who's going in there, then it it's it's gonna hurt me if I participate,

981
01:01:43,780 --> 01:01:44,100
right?

982
01:01:44,650 --> 01:01:48,810
Um, so what determines whether other people are going to join me?

983
01:01:49,050 --> 01:01:53,290
Well, what determines that is what their beliefs are about what the payoffs are going to

984
01:01:53,290 --> 01:01:54,010
be, right?

985
01:01:54,410 --> 01:01:59,290
And what their beliefs are depends on what they think my beliefs are.

986
01:02:00,250 --> 01:02:06,170
Um and my beliefs, you know, my beliefs about the uh the payoffs of

987
01:02:06,170 --> 01:02:09,370
participating depend on my beliefs about their beliefs about my beliefs.

988
01:02:10,010 --> 01:02:15,780
Uh as so as soon as there's a seed of doubt that's planted in a group, that maybe

989
01:02:16,740 --> 01:02:20,260
our motivations aren't so noble and high-minded.

990
01:02:20,500 --> 01:02:25,460
Maybe we're just doing this for tribal or sadistic reasons.

991
01:02:26,500 --> 01:02:31,380
Even if there's a little bit of doubt, even if I suspect that, then all of a sudden I start

992
01:02:31,380 --> 01:02:34,100
to suspect that other people might have had the same thought.

993
01:02:34,500 --> 01:02:37,940
And then I might suspect that they suspect that I've had that thought.

994
01:02:38,270 --> 01:02:42,110
And as soon as that seed of doubt is planted, it can be like an acid that eats through the

995
01:02:42,110 --> 01:02:42,590
entire group.

996
01:02:42,750 --> 01:02:46,270
Because now all of a sudden I'm doubting whether I will actually get status if I

997
01:02:46,270 --> 01:02:48,990
participate in ganging up on this member of the outgroup.

998
01:02:49,150 --> 01:02:53,390
If I'll if I'll actually look noble and brave, or whether I'll look sociopathic and cruel.

999
01:02:54,110 --> 01:02:56,270
So that doubt can feed on itself.

1000
01:02:58,270 --> 01:03:04,220
So I think that common knowledge of reality can destroy the incentives

1001
01:03:04,220 --> 01:03:10,220
that are necessary to engage uh in uh outgroup cruelty or uh

1002
01:03:10,380 --> 01:03:11,980
intergroup dominance.

1003
01:03:13,900 --> 01:03:18,140
So I think we need the narrative in order for the collective action to be possible.

1004
01:03:18,380 --> 01:03:21,420
And so, yes, there are costs to being deceived about that.

1005
01:03:21,580 --> 01:03:27,500
So if I see you ganging up on the outgroup and um I perceive you as a brave and virtuous

1006
01:03:27,500 --> 01:03:32,610
person for doing that, um, in some sense, I've been deceived about your character.

1007
01:03:32,770 --> 01:03:37,170
I might trust you in other social interactions more than I otherwise would.

1008
01:03:37,410 --> 01:03:41,330
I might be inclined to cooperate with you more than I should.

1009
01:03:43,010 --> 01:03:48,770
But if we're in intense intergroup competition, and whoever wins the competition is the

1010
01:03:48,770 --> 01:03:53,810
group that is more mobilized and cohesive and motivated and committed, where the incentives

1011
01:03:53,810 --> 01:03:59,320
for contributing to the collective action are really high, then the benefits of succeeding

1012
01:03:59,320 --> 01:04:04,920
in that intergroup competition are going to outweigh the costs of being deceived about your

1013
01:04:04,920 --> 01:04:05,880
character.

1014
01:04:06,440 --> 01:04:06,760
Right?

1015
01:04:07,000 --> 01:04:10,120
It's just straightforward cost-benefit calculus.

1016
01:04:10,360 --> 01:04:15,000
When the stakes of the intergroup competition are higher, then I can accept more false

1017
01:04:15,000 --> 01:04:16,760
information about my group.

1018
01:04:16,920 --> 01:04:17,720
Because it's worth it.

1019
01:04:17,880 --> 01:04:22,600
It's worth the deception that we can we can be sufficiently mobilized to outcompete the

1020
01:04:22,600 --> 01:04:23,800
rival group.

1021
01:04:24,690 --> 01:04:27,090
Or at least that's the argument that I make in the paper.

1022
01:04:27,170 --> 01:04:27,250
Yeah.

1023
01:04:27,570 --> 01:04:32,850
That in certain situations of intense intergroup competition, the costs of false

1024
01:04:32,850 --> 01:04:37,730
information about the group and about group members' character can be

1025
01:04:37,730 --> 01:04:43,010
outweighed by the benefits of successful intergroup competition.

1026
01:04:43,970 --> 01:04:44,130
Yeah.

1027
01:04:44,210 --> 01:04:46,610
And even I would say, even if it's not false, right?

1028
01:04:46,690 --> 01:04:51,570
I mean, there's also this thing of uh, and I think this occurs at every scale of social

1029
01:04:51,570 --> 01:04:52,530
interaction.

1030
01:04:53,480 --> 01:04:58,600
there's sort of, well, what in a very again kind of cold Darwinian sense, sort of a

1031
01:04:58,600 --> 01:05:01,800
transactional thing of sort of, well, what does this person afford?

1032
01:05:02,360 --> 01:05:08,360
And if you are uh somebody who's pretty high in dominance, then you sort

1033
01:05:08,360 --> 01:05:13,400
of say, well, look, this is person is really helpful, or they can apply that skill

1034
01:05:14,520 --> 01:05:17,770
to to when it's useful for me, right?

1035
01:05:18,010 --> 01:05:23,610
And um and so that becomes sort of a a thing in a market, in a social market, right?

1036
01:05:23,770 --> 01:05:26,010
But then I don't want it directed at me.

1037
01:05:26,090 --> 01:05:27,050
And so there's two things.

1038
01:05:27,210 --> 01:05:33,130
One is if if you are sort of a a simple dominance uh uh robot

1039
01:05:33,290 --> 01:05:38,700
where you're just sort of exerting dominance uh all over the place, then I should want to

1040
01:05:38,700 --> 01:05:43,100
keep you around when the inner group conflict occurs, and I'm gonna keep you at arm's

1041
01:05:43,100 --> 01:05:44,060
length otherwise.

1042
01:05:44,220 --> 01:05:46,540
Um and there might be design to do that.

1043
01:05:46,700 --> 01:05:51,820
Um and there's sort of roles then, you sort of an implicit roles of sort of, well, here's

1044
01:05:51,820 --> 01:05:56,300
what this person's set of skills are good for, how they might exploit me versus others.

1045
01:05:56,460 --> 01:06:00,460
And I want to direct the I want to direct or the bit direct the business end of their

1046
01:06:00,460 --> 01:06:03,180
exploitation towards others and not towards me.

1047
01:06:03,420 --> 01:06:09,370
Um But then there's the the other part too is then you know if you there's also then

1048
01:06:09,370 --> 01:06:14,970
just partner choice where you know you if you are dominant um there might be

1049
01:06:14,970 --> 01:06:19,530
selection in you to sort of signal when you're gonna be dominant if you need to recruit

1050
01:06:19,530 --> 01:06:24,810
allies and the people that you're actually you're not you could either you know actively

1051
01:06:24,810 --> 01:06:30,180
signal I'm not gonna um uh be dominant towards you or just you know, just signal your

1052
01:06:30,260 --> 01:06:31,860
dominant towards the outgroup.

1053
01:06:31,940 --> 01:06:37,620
And so um uh, you know, selectivity in terms of, and this comes back to that target

1054
01:06:37,620 --> 01:06:39,140
specificity thing, right?

1055
01:06:39,380 --> 01:06:45,300
Um, of who the target of the dominance is, um, I think will be really

1056
01:06:45,300 --> 01:06:47,540
important um for the system.

1057
01:06:48,660 --> 01:06:50,340
I would agree that's important.

1058
01:06:50,580 --> 01:06:56,250
Um, but it's also important um what the reason is for the

1059
01:06:56,250 --> 01:06:57,050
dominance.

1060
01:06:57,850 --> 01:07:03,370
So yeah, and is that and is that because and so this is this is something still a little

1061
01:07:03,450 --> 01:07:05,450
I'm still a little less clear on.

1062
01:07:05,610 --> 01:07:11,370
So is it that to just make it concrete, if I'm in your group and I'm benefiting from the

1063
01:07:11,370 --> 01:07:16,810
basis of the d the of the dominance, even if it's, you know, um but

1064
01:07:17,050 --> 01:07:22,900
I'm also thinking, well uh if other people won't be.

1065
01:07:23,940 --> 01:07:24,500
Right.

1066
01:07:24,980 --> 01:07:25,940
So I have two options.

1067
01:07:26,100 --> 01:07:31,540
Let's say there's a choice where David is going to do something that's going to benefit me,

1068
01:07:31,780 --> 01:07:34,980
but I think third parties will find it morally reprehensible.

1069
01:07:35,060 --> 01:07:40,900
It'll, they'll find it disgusting because it'll um it'll it'll it'll cue to

1070
01:07:40,900 --> 01:07:42,340
them exploitation.

1071
01:07:42,900 --> 01:07:47,770
There's another part which is that David's going to do something that's going to benefit

1072
01:07:47,770 --> 01:07:48,090
me.

1073
01:07:48,970 --> 01:07:54,730
Um, but he's also talking about it in a way, and the way it's presented is

1074
01:07:54,890 --> 01:08:00,410
my model of third parties is it's not going to elicit strong exploitative

1075
01:08:00,410 --> 01:08:01,050
cues.

1076
01:08:01,850 --> 01:08:07,210
It's in my interest, even though both things equally benefit me, it's in my interest to

1077
01:08:07,210 --> 01:08:10,490
care about and prefer the second option.

1078
01:08:10,890 --> 01:08:11,370
Exactly.

1079
01:08:11,850 --> 01:08:17,740
Because there's always a larger coalitional people don't want there

1080
01:08:17,740 --> 01:08:19,180
to be exploitation.

1081
01:08:19,340 --> 01:08:24,780
And so even if we are super dominant, why would we run the

1082
01:08:24,780 --> 01:08:30,460
risk of of such naked dominance that third parties, which there

1083
01:08:30,540 --> 01:08:34,780
always are third parties, um in addition to the victims, yes.

1084
01:08:34,860 --> 01:08:38,060
Um uh to to just give them ammunition.

1085
01:08:38,220 --> 01:08:39,810
Why would we not write?

1086
01:08:39,970 --> 01:08:42,450
And I that's I think you you agree.

1087
01:08:42,610 --> 01:08:43,650
It sounds like you agree with that.

1088
01:08:43,730 --> 01:08:43,890
Yeah.

1089
01:08:43,970 --> 01:08:44,130
Yeah.

1090
01:08:44,450 --> 01:08:44,690
Absolutely.

1091
01:08:44,770 --> 01:08:45,970
That's a that's a great way of putting it.

1092
01:08:46,050 --> 01:08:46,290
Yeah.

1093
01:08:46,450 --> 01:08:46,930
Yeah.

1094
01:08:47,250 --> 01:08:51,330
So where does this so now we we so now we're at great.

1095
01:08:51,490 --> 01:08:52,530
We're I got it.

1096
01:08:52,690 --> 01:08:58,450
Um so now um for those of us who are um on

1097
01:08:58,690 --> 01:09:02,100
board, what what going forward?

1098
01:09:02,340 --> 01:09:06,900
So um, you know, there's sort of these jokes, you know, I wouldn't want to be a member of a

1099
01:09:06,900 --> 01:09:12,820
group that, you know, would take me uh as a member uh for this kind of thing,

1100
01:09:12,980 --> 01:09:18,580
um, given that everything is sort of uh everything is intrinsically sort of a

1101
01:09:18,580 --> 01:09:22,820
status game in some way or another, becoming aware of that.

1102
01:09:22,900 --> 01:09:28,750
Um, Have you thought about sort of what's the punchline in terms of what are things to

1103
01:09:28,750 --> 01:09:29,710
look out for?

1104
01:09:30,030 --> 01:09:36,030
Or um you know, or is this this sort of a

1105
01:09:36,190 --> 01:09:40,750
um I don't want to go on too much of a tangent, but there's sort of two, there's two

1106
01:09:40,750 --> 01:09:41,390
metaphors.

1107
01:09:41,550 --> 01:09:45,870
One is sort of there's a solid fixed set of rules and another is it's sort of like a

1108
01:09:45,870 --> 01:09:46,670
bicycle.

1109
01:09:47,470 --> 01:09:53,360
The people who uh the people who invented um the airplane were were Orville and

1110
01:09:53,360 --> 01:09:56,560
Wilbur uh right, and they were bicycle mechanics.

1111
01:09:56,640 --> 01:10:01,600
And the argument is that you couldn't get a static fixed thing to fly, and people were

1112
01:10:01,600 --> 01:10:05,680
constantly trying, and it was actually no accident that bicycle mechanics invented the

1113
01:10:05,680 --> 01:10:10,000
airplane because what you needed in an airplane was real-time correction, um, because it's

1114
01:10:10,000 --> 01:10:12,160
just too complicated um otherwise.

1115
01:10:12,320 --> 01:10:15,290
Um and so, and and that's the way a bicycle works.

1116
01:10:15,370 --> 01:10:18,410
You can't keep it upright except with just minor real-time correction.

1117
01:10:18,570 --> 01:10:23,210
And so that's a long-winded way of saying is the alternative, and excuse the digression, is

1118
01:10:23,210 --> 01:10:27,930
the alternative sort of a bicycle metaphor where there's not really a fixed set of rules

1119
01:10:27,930 --> 01:10:33,930
for how do we um avoid status schemes, but it's just this idea that we're sort of given

1120
01:10:33,930 --> 01:10:38,360
that there's always this dynamic, There's sort of always corrections on it, or are there

1121
01:10:38,440 --> 01:10:44,200
sort of um ways to sort of check uh the status game

1122
01:10:44,200 --> 01:10:45,880
running rampant or hurting people?

1123
01:10:46,040 --> 01:10:47,560
Um I'm curious what you think.

1124
01:10:48,120 --> 01:10:51,800
If I'm understanding your question correctly, it's what's what does it matter?

1125
01:10:52,040 --> 01:10:54,760
What's the point of all the all this knowledge?

1126
01:10:54,840 --> 01:10:56,760
What are we gonna do with this information?

1127
01:10:57,560 --> 01:11:03,370
How are we gonna use it to lead our lives differently if if if we do, do we ignore it?

1128
01:11:03,450 --> 01:11:04,170
I don't know.

1129
01:11:04,890 --> 01:11:06,090
That's the question.

1130
01:11:06,970 --> 01:11:08,890
The short answer is I don't fucking know.

1131
01:11:09,050 --> 01:11:09,370
Yeah.

1132
01:11:10,890 --> 01:11:12,730
I'm just trying to figure out how things work.

1133
01:11:13,210 --> 01:11:14,330
I'm not a philosopher.

1134
01:11:14,490 --> 01:11:20,170
I'm not, you know, uh I don't have all the answers on on the meaning of life or or or how

1135
01:11:20,170 --> 01:11:21,130
to live it.

1136
01:11:21,930 --> 01:11:26,250
So that's my my first instinct how to answer that question.

1137
01:11:27,770 --> 01:11:33,420
My second way to answer that question uh involves

1138
01:11:33,580 --> 01:11:39,500
just reflecting on the status games we play, not

1139
01:11:39,820 --> 01:11:45,180
from a perspective of despair or nihilism, but from

1140
01:11:45,820 --> 01:11:49,180
a perspective of this is the way reality works.

1141
01:11:49,340 --> 01:11:52,540
We now have a better understanding of how reality works.

1142
01:11:52,780 --> 01:11:56,620
How with this knowledge can we make better choices?

1143
01:11:57,180 --> 01:12:03,010
Um so one thing I've been thinking about is what does it mean for a status

1144
01:12:03,010 --> 01:12:04,930
game to be good or bad?

1145
01:12:05,250 --> 01:12:11,090
Certainly there are differences uh in the types of status games that

1146
01:12:11,090 --> 01:12:15,810
contribute to collective uh benefits and improvements, not just for the players of the

1147
01:12:15,810 --> 01:12:18,530
status game themselves, but for society as a whole.

1148
01:12:18,850 --> 01:12:24,520
And there are some status games that are quite toxic and destructive and generate

1149
01:12:24,520 --> 01:12:29,000
costs, uh, not just for the status seekers themselves, but for society as a whole.

1150
01:12:29,640 --> 01:12:33,800
And so I think understanding that everything is a status game or everything is bullshit to

1151
01:12:33,800 --> 01:12:39,800
slightly oversimplify uh is that we can gain some insights into which

1152
01:12:40,120 --> 01:12:44,570
status competitions are worth engaging in and which ones aren't.

1153
01:12:44,810 --> 01:12:48,730
Now, I have no illusions that this type of information is going to create a radical

1154
01:12:48,730 --> 01:12:52,570
transformation in society because people have incentives to play the status games that

1155
01:12:52,570 --> 01:12:53,290
they're likely to win.

1156
01:12:53,370 --> 01:12:57,210
And if I come along and say that your status game is toxic and stupid, uh, well, they're

1157
01:12:57,210 --> 01:12:59,610
gonna say, fuck you, I'm gonna play it anyway, because I'm likely to win.

1158
01:12:59,690 --> 01:13:02,330
And I, you know, I'm an ape and I ultimately want status.

1159
01:13:02,650 --> 01:13:06,090
And uh, yeah, your status might game might be better for the world, but what do I care

1160
01:13:06,090 --> 01:13:06,410
about that?

1161
01:13:06,490 --> 01:13:08,000
I care about getting status for myself.

1162
01:13:08,080 --> 01:13:09,680
That's what I evolved to care about.

1163
01:13:10,080 --> 01:13:15,360
Or at least that's what the unconscious part of all of us is thinking metaphorically.

1164
01:13:16,720 --> 01:13:21,120
So I have no illusions that that knowledge of this stuff will radically lead to human

1165
01:13:21,120 --> 01:13:22,960
betterment and human flourishing.

1166
01:13:23,120 --> 01:13:25,520
But I think it might make some improvements at the margin.

1167
01:13:25,760 --> 01:13:29,680
So for people who are on the fence, who are, you know, say young and or or they're having a

1168
01:13:29,680 --> 01:13:32,960
midlife crisis or or or they're deciding like what am I going to do with my life?

1169
01:13:33,040 --> 01:13:35,760
What what are what are the status games that I'm going to participate in?

1170
01:13:35,920 --> 01:13:41,490
Um For those people where they're on the fence and information like this might actually tip

1171
01:13:41,490 --> 01:13:44,850
them one way or the other, it might be useful to say, hey, this status game is actually

1172
01:13:44,850 --> 01:13:45,410
better for society.

1173
01:13:45,490 --> 01:13:46,290
Maybe I should play this one.

1174
01:13:46,370 --> 01:13:48,930
You know, if all else is equal, might as well play the better one.

1175
01:13:49,170 --> 01:13:53,810
Um, so I think it could lead to those kinds of improvements at the margin.

1176
01:13:54,690 --> 01:13:59,570
Um, and I think that realistically, if you're a social scientist, that's all you can you

1177
01:13:59,570 --> 01:14:02,690
should hope for uh and all you really can hope for.

1178
01:14:03,010 --> 01:14:08,280
I think uh there's often um a misplaced sense of utopianism in the social

1179
01:14:08,280 --> 01:14:14,040
sciences that can uh paradoxically uh lead to

1180
01:14:14,040 --> 01:14:16,280
disastrous uh outcomes and dystopias.

1181
01:14:16,360 --> 01:14:20,600
You know, eugenics was a very utopian movement and it led to a living nightmare.

1182
01:14:20,760 --> 01:14:24,920
Um, so I think we've got to be very careful with utopian ideas, and we have to do uh what

1183
01:14:24,920 --> 01:14:29,800
Tyler Cowen preaches on his blog, Marginal Revolution, uh, which is pursue marginal

1184
01:14:29,800 --> 01:14:32,120
revolutions, look at changes on the margin.

1185
01:14:32,410 --> 01:14:38,170
Um so what are so I raised this topic of uh good versus bad status

1186
01:14:38,170 --> 01:14:38,730
games.

1187
01:14:38,970 --> 01:14:40,330
I'm still thinking about this.

1188
01:14:40,490 --> 01:14:46,490
My thoughts are still tentative and open to revision, but I think it's probably uh

1189
01:14:47,050 --> 01:14:50,250
fair to say that science is a good status game.

1190
01:14:50,570 --> 01:14:54,010
It might be depressing for some people to hear that science is ultimately a status game and

1191
01:14:54,010 --> 01:14:57,050
not a high-minded quest for knowledge and wisdom.

1192
01:14:58,060 --> 01:14:59,980
I think it ultimately is a status game.

1193
01:15:00,300 --> 01:15:02,620
Those are the incentives that shape its trajectory.

1194
01:15:02,780 --> 01:15:05,500
If you change the status incentives, you will change the outcome of science.

1195
01:15:05,660 --> 01:15:09,500
As we've seen with the replication crisis, if you get status for pumping out lots of low

1196
01:15:09,580 --> 01:15:12,300
quality publications that are unlikely to replicate, then guess what?

1197
01:15:12,380 --> 01:15:15,820
You're gonna have you're gonna have lots of low quality publications that fail to

1198
01:15:15,820 --> 01:15:16,540
replicate.

1199
01:15:16,780 --> 01:15:21,890
If you change the status incentives and reward people not for pumping out counterintuitive,

1200
01:15:21,970 --> 01:15:25,010
flashy findings that don't replicate, and you reward them instead for producing high

1201
01:15:25,090 --> 01:15:29,490
quality work and insightful uh theories, then maybe you'll get that.

1202
01:15:29,570 --> 01:15:34,050
So we have to figure out how to change the status incentives of science so that we get uh

1203
01:15:34,050 --> 01:15:35,650
better results.

1204
01:15:36,370 --> 01:15:39,410
Um, so science is a good status game, I think.

1205
01:15:39,810 --> 01:15:41,810
It's not perfect, it certainly has its problems.

1206
01:15:41,970 --> 01:15:46,660
Certainly in psychology it has a lot of problems, and we can uh make some changes to try to

1207
01:15:46,660 --> 01:15:47,780
solve those problems.

1208
01:15:48,020 --> 01:15:50,100
Um, what's another good status game?

1209
01:15:50,260 --> 01:15:54,820
Um, I think uh markets are a good status game.

1210
01:15:54,980 --> 01:15:59,620
Uh I know a lot of people in academia are uh, you know, have some antipathy towards

1211
01:15:59,620 --> 01:16:00,980
capitalism and towards markets.

1212
01:16:01,060 --> 01:16:03,300
So I understand this is not a popular view.

1213
01:16:03,460 --> 01:16:09,430
Um, but I think if you look at the history of capitalism and the increases it has caused in

1214
01:16:09,430 --> 01:16:12,950
our standard of living, it is a pretty damn good status game.

1215
01:16:13,270 --> 01:16:17,590
You have people competing to provide goods and services to other people at more and more

1216
01:16:17,590 --> 01:16:22,470
affordable prices, that is going to lead to better and better results over time, more

1217
01:16:22,550 --> 01:16:26,950
innovation, more things that people want and like at more and more affordable prices.

1218
01:16:27,110 --> 01:16:31,300
That has pretty positive results for society.

1219
01:16:32,340 --> 01:16:38,020
Why people are so uh hostile towards markets and capitalism is another interesting

1220
01:16:38,020 --> 01:16:39,140
psychological question.

1221
01:16:39,300 --> 01:16:43,300
I think it has to do with the overtness of the status seeking, which you know we talked

1222
01:16:43,300 --> 01:16:44,500
about previously.

1223
01:16:44,740 --> 01:16:48,260
Um businesses are profit-seeking entities.

1224
01:16:48,500 --> 01:16:51,860
Money is a kind of status, and so if all they care about is profit, then they look really

1225
01:16:51,860 --> 01:16:53,140
icky and ugly.

1226
01:16:53,620 --> 01:16:56,020
Uh, and we don't want to be associated with that.

1227
01:16:56,270 --> 01:16:57,950
And so what do businesses have to do?

1228
01:16:58,190 --> 01:17:01,710
No business in their mission statement says our mission is to seek profit.

1229
01:17:01,870 --> 01:17:06,510
No, they say our mission is to bring joy into people's lives or to follow grandma's uh

1230
01:17:06,510 --> 01:17:11,870
recipe or, you know, build sustainable communities, whatever high-minded bullshit you see

1231
01:17:11,870 --> 01:17:14,510
on corporate mission statements or values statements, right?

1232
01:17:14,670 --> 01:17:18,350
The corporation can't just say that it's that it wants to make as much money as possible

1233
01:17:18,430 --> 01:17:23,140
because then it it will, you know, look bad and people will not want to work for the

1234
01:17:23,140 --> 01:17:26,580
company and people won't want to buy the goods or services produced by that company.

1235
01:17:26,660 --> 01:17:28,420
So it needs a high-minded narrative.

1236
01:17:28,500 --> 01:17:30,740
The problem is that everyone sees through it.

1237
01:17:30,980 --> 01:17:34,420
We all know that at the end of the day, businesses want our money.

1238
01:17:34,580 --> 01:17:36,260
And that makes it icky and ugly.

1239
01:17:36,340 --> 01:17:40,660
And that makes capitalism itself, despite it producing wonderful, bountiful benefits for

1240
01:17:40,660 --> 01:17:46,270
us, in the form of a beautifully uh rich and colorful standard of living

1241
01:17:46,430 --> 01:17:52,350
with you know technologies and tools and riches beyond the wildest dreams of our

1242
01:17:52,350 --> 01:17:52,910
ancestors.

1243
01:17:53,070 --> 01:17:57,390
Despite all that, because the status seeking is overt and out in the open and on the

1244
01:17:57,390 --> 01:18:01,950
surface, it looks icky and we don't like it, and we gain status by being anti-capitalist.

1245
01:18:02,110 --> 01:18:04,510
I think that is a huge mistake.

1246
01:18:04,830 --> 01:18:10,440
Um it saddens me uh that uh academia has taken that kind of

1247
01:18:10,440 --> 01:18:11,640
anti-capitalist approach.

1248
01:18:11,800 --> 01:18:14,280
Granted, you can talk about the costs of capitalism.

1249
01:18:14,520 --> 01:18:16,600
Certainly it has negative externalities.

1250
01:18:16,760 --> 01:18:19,400
You we could talk about ways of of fixing it with government intervention.

1251
01:18:19,480 --> 01:18:21,160
That that all that's all fine.

1252
01:18:21,320 --> 01:18:24,040
Um, but you have to acknowledge the benefits too, right?

1253
01:18:24,200 --> 01:18:28,520
You you you have to have a realistic understanding of how reality works.

1254
01:18:28,760 --> 01:18:34,090
Um and even the the goals that that progressives came, you know, claim to care about, like

1255
01:18:34,090 --> 01:18:35,210
equality between groups.

1256
01:18:35,370 --> 01:18:40,010
There's no greater engine of equality and tolerance of outgroups than capitalism.

1257
01:18:40,250 --> 01:18:44,570
There's tons of research on this, that exposure to a market economy makes you more tolerant

1258
01:18:44,570 --> 01:18:49,450
of outgroups, less willing to exploit them, because it is straightforwardly incentivized.

1259
01:18:49,610 --> 01:18:52,650
If I only trade with members of my group, I'm going to make less money.

1260
01:18:52,900 --> 01:18:56,340
If I only hire members of my group, I'm going to have fewer job candidates.

1261
01:18:56,580 --> 01:18:59,780
If I only work for members of my group, I'm going to have fewer job offers.

1262
01:18:59,940 --> 01:19:03,780
If I only buy stuff from members of my group, I'm going to get shittier products.

1263
01:19:04,020 --> 01:19:09,540
Capitalism directively incentivizes the destruction of intergroup boundaries and

1264
01:19:09,540 --> 01:19:10,660
intergroup barriers.

1265
01:19:10,980 --> 01:19:16,900
It is not only one of the most powerful mechanisms for alleviating poverty, it is the most

1266
01:19:16,900 --> 01:19:21,450
powerful mechanism for breaking down intergroup boundaries and for creating economic

1267
01:19:21,450 --> 01:19:24,650
interdependence between countries and disincentivizing war.

1268
01:19:24,810 --> 01:19:30,570
So it gets progressives all the things they want: reducing poverty, creating

1269
01:19:30,570 --> 01:19:35,930
intergroup equality, reducing the uh benefits of war, and yet they hate it.

1270
01:19:36,090 --> 01:19:42,010
And that to me is one of the greatest tragedies of progressive ideology at this moment in

1271
01:19:42,010 --> 01:19:42,330
time.

1272
01:19:42,730 --> 01:19:44,600
So I went off on a huge tangent there.

1273
01:19:44,680 --> 01:19:44,840
Sorry.

1274
01:19:45,320 --> 01:19:45,640
It's good.

1275
01:19:45,800 --> 01:19:50,840
No, and we we should have a larger conversation because I think, you know, um uh um you

1276
01:19:50,840 --> 01:19:56,680
know um I do think that uh there's also a distinction and

1277
01:19:56,680 --> 01:20:02,680
maybe we can have this discussion um next time or or soon um there is also distinction

1278
01:20:02,760 --> 01:20:07,390
sort of between um free market and capitalism.

1279
01:20:07,550 --> 01:20:08,350
Um right.

1280
01:20:08,430 --> 01:20:13,870
And I think one of the criticisms of capitalism, I think everything you're saying is right,

1281
01:20:14,270 --> 01:20:19,150
um within certain s circumspect boundaries.

1282
01:20:19,390 --> 01:20:24,990
Um but if you look at um sort of the externalities

1283
01:20:25,230 --> 01:20:30,750
um of uh an interest in making profit um

1284
01:20:31,390 --> 01:20:36,980
the the entities that are um you know there's a really

1285
01:20:36,980 --> 01:20:42,740
interesting uh history of sort of even what corporate law is, um, and and sort of that,

1286
01:20:42,900 --> 01:20:48,580
you know, it's the there's institutional selection for the externalities

1287
01:20:48,660 --> 01:20:49,620
don't matter.

1288
01:20:49,780 --> 01:20:54,500
Uh, and what matters is profitability and maximizing profitability.

1289
01:20:54,580 --> 01:20:56,980
And so, you know, people talk about it doesn't even matter.

1290
01:20:57,140 --> 01:21:03,070
Everybody in the in the institution can be well intended, but still the the

1291
01:21:03,070 --> 01:21:07,950
institutional selection is um selects for a certain thing.

1292
01:21:08,030 --> 01:21:12,270
And as we know from from natural selection, you know, whatever the selection pressure is,

1293
01:21:12,590 --> 01:21:13,710
intentions be damned.

1294
01:21:13,870 --> 01:21:16,110
That will be sort of what what's created.

1295
01:21:16,190 --> 01:21:21,870
And so um uh yeah I think there's a larger um sort of discussion to have about

1296
01:21:22,030 --> 01:21:27,800
um is is a corporation or is a modern corporation

1297
01:21:27,800 --> 01:21:33,800
that's protected by the force of the state um or that's exploiting um as as

1298
01:21:33,800 --> 01:21:39,000
a as sort of an externality um you know um uh is that

1299
01:21:40,520 --> 01:21:45,800
is that what people mean by capitalism if so then there's a really fair argument against it

1300
01:21:45,880 --> 01:21:51,400
because it's actually not a free market um system and I think that's where

1301
01:21:51,880 --> 01:21:56,570
um you know, I uh I think that's where there's there's a reasonable argument.

1302
01:21:56,650 --> 01:22:01,530
So you don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater that you don't um and I think uh

1303
01:22:01,690 --> 01:22:03,610
yeah, I think I'll I'll leave it at that.

1304
01:22:04,010 --> 01:22:04,810
Uh yeah, no.

1305
01:22:05,130 --> 01:22:07,610
Wow, who would have thought we'd have we'd have gone in this direction, but yeah, I'm I'm

1306
01:22:07,690 --> 01:22:08,010
game.

1307
01:22:08,090 --> 01:22:08,570
Let's go for it.

1308
01:22:08,650 --> 01:22:08,810
Yeah.

1309
01:22:08,890 --> 01:22:12,490
Um so yeah, I love that distinction between markets and capitalism.

1310
01:22:12,570 --> 01:22:14,650
There's actually a great book on this topic.

1311
01:22:14,730 --> 01:22:19,370
I forget the author is called uh Markets Without Capitalism, I want to say, or Markets Not

1312
01:22:19,370 --> 01:22:20,090
Capitalism.

1313
01:22:20,650 --> 01:22:26,600
Um And they distinguish between open competition between businesses to provide

1314
01:22:26,600 --> 01:22:31,320
goods and services and voluntary association or consumption of their goods and services,

1315
01:22:31,640 --> 01:22:37,400
and uh capitalism uh under places like the United States,

1316
01:22:37,640 --> 01:22:42,520
where you have the biggest businesses often colluding with the government to entrench their

1317
01:22:42,520 --> 01:22:44,280
position and entrench their power.

1318
01:22:44,520 --> 01:22:50,470
And often you get regulatory capture where they pass uh uh regulatory barriers to

1319
01:22:50,470 --> 01:22:53,110
prevent competitors from entering into the industry.

1320
01:22:53,270 --> 01:22:56,710
They try to get you know occupational licenses that makes it harder to get a job of that

1321
01:22:56,710 --> 01:22:59,990
industry, which increases the salaries of people in that industry industry.

1322
01:23:00,070 --> 01:23:05,110
So you get all sorts of collusion between the biggest players in any uh market and the

1323
01:23:05,110 --> 01:23:06,470
government itself.

1324
01:23:06,790 --> 01:23:10,710
Uh and that I think is often what people are objecting to with capitalism.

1325
01:23:11,110 --> 01:23:16,720
It's it's the uh um abuse of state power uh by uh

1326
01:23:16,960 --> 01:23:21,840
uh big businesses and and major players and and the industry and the uh corruption and

1327
01:23:21,840 --> 01:23:26,160
collusion between them yeah uh and the government that a lot of people I think correctly

1328
01:23:26,400 --> 01:23:26,960
object to.

1329
01:23:27,360 --> 01:23:27,760
That's right.

1330
01:23:27,920 --> 01:23:32,400
Yeah yeah corporate corporate welfare essentially to put to put it simply yeah.

1331
01:23:33,120 --> 01:23:33,520
Yes.

1332
01:23:33,680 --> 01:23:34,000
Yes.

1333
01:23:34,160 --> 01:23:38,290
So that's that's an important caveat that I don't think that is a good status game.

1334
01:23:38,450 --> 01:23:40,450
I think that's a very bad status game.

1335
01:23:40,610 --> 01:23:46,370
What I think is a good status game is the kind of open competition uh that is where where

1336
01:23:47,010 --> 01:23:53,010
the competition is not um unfair at the start, where where the big players don't have a

1337
01:23:53,010 --> 01:23:56,850
pre existing advantage because they're cozying up to people in government.

1338
01:23:57,010 --> 01:23:57,170
Right.

1339
01:23:57,330 --> 01:23:57,490
Right.

1340
01:23:57,650 --> 01:24:00,930
That's that's the kind of status game that I think ultimately results in collective

1341
01:24:00,930 --> 01:24:04,530
betterment and improvements in our standard of living, where whoever has the best goods and

1342
01:24:04,530 --> 01:24:05,490
services wins.

1343
01:24:05,740 --> 01:24:09,820
You know, whoever can produce them, you know, efficiently with the lowest price and the

1344
01:24:10,140 --> 01:24:13,260
whoever, you know, produces the best stuff, they get the richest.

1345
01:24:13,420 --> 01:24:15,740
You know, that is a is a good status game.

1346
01:24:15,900 --> 01:24:21,900
But if I have a if I'm a big player in the industry and I use the government to entrench uh

1347
01:24:22,060 --> 01:24:27,980
our interests and and and have a kind of monopolistic grab over that industry, then that

1348
01:24:27,980 --> 01:24:28,860
is bad.

1349
01:24:29,020 --> 01:24:32,460
Um so yeah, important distinctions to be made there for sure.

1350
01:24:32,700 --> 01:24:38,470
Um And it's an interesting overall political conversation to be

1351
01:24:38,470 --> 01:24:38,710
had.

1352
01:24:38,950 --> 01:24:44,950
But the broader point is just that if we're going to be good progressives and

1353
01:24:44,950 --> 01:24:50,230
try to think about the negative externalities that market competition is creating, and if

1354
01:24:50,230 --> 01:24:54,310
we're going to try to create wise government interventions, which I think the progressive

1355
01:24:54,310 --> 01:24:58,870
movement is all about, and I think that's a legitimate goal, then you have to acknowledge

1356
01:24:58,920 --> 01:25:02,600
that in addition to the negative externalities that are happening, there are extraordinary

1357
01:25:02,600 --> 01:25:03,480
benefits.

1358
01:25:03,960 --> 01:25:07,960
Um and you have to have some perspective as well and not just want to, you know, throw out

1359
01:25:07,960 --> 01:25:11,240
the entire system or burn it all to the ground.

1360
01:25:11,560 --> 01:25:14,680
Um so Yeah, no, no, yeah, yeah.

1361
01:25:14,840 --> 01:25:17,480
Yeah, no, I I I agree with that.

1362
01:25:17,640 --> 01:25:23,250
And and so swinging back then, the argument would be that more information

1363
01:25:23,490 --> 01:25:29,410
about the externalities of status schemes, um, and and sort of laying

1364
01:25:29,410 --> 01:25:29,730
bare.

1365
01:25:30,370 --> 01:25:34,770
I mean, almost it's sort of a cartoonish view of the world, but sort of the idea would be

1366
01:25:34,770 --> 01:25:40,210
that um uh to the extent that there's sort of disinterested third parties are sort of like,

1367
01:25:40,450 --> 01:25:43,970
here are the status games, you young person growing up in the world.

1368
01:25:44,130 --> 01:25:48,780
Here is what exists, here are their externalities, and you just sort of shop for them.

1369
01:25:48,860 --> 01:25:54,780
And then some combination of, well, here is my interest in proclivities, and I think I

1370
01:25:54,780 --> 01:25:57,580
could do well in this, or maybe you you narrow it down.

1371
01:25:57,740 --> 01:26:02,140
Um, that sort of is all happening implicitly now, uh, or not at all.

1372
01:26:02,300 --> 01:26:07,660
But the idea would sort of be, and again, I don't, I don't, I'm not suggesting this is a

1373
01:26:07,660 --> 01:26:12,730
realistic thing, but in an ideal world, it would just be sort of more information about we

1374
01:26:12,810 --> 01:26:18,810
we all acknowledge that these are all status games um and uh and then it's just

1375
01:26:18,810 --> 01:26:24,330
information about which ones fit you and then which what externalities there are um

1376
01:26:24,650 --> 01:26:29,850
to them both within uh and across so I mean you know the

1377
01:26:29,850 --> 01:26:35,450
externalities within of science uh there's a there's this long

1378
01:26:35,610 --> 01:26:40,650
standing thing that's kind of going by the wayside now of or ideally of

1379
01:26:41,440 --> 01:26:46,080
people being good scientific mentors, but being predatory socially or sexually on people,

1380
01:26:46,240 --> 01:26:46,560
right?

1381
01:26:47,040 --> 01:26:52,080
Um, and and that was sort of uh because those costs were hidden or there wasn't

1382
01:26:52,080 --> 01:26:57,920
coordination around those costs, that wasn't sort of understood, or uh

1383
01:26:58,080 --> 01:26:59,520
there wasn't outrage about that.

1384
01:26:59,600 --> 01:27:00,480
And now there is.

1385
01:27:00,560 --> 01:27:06,400
Um it just not it's certainly still happening, but it's um it's less, hopefully, because of

1386
01:27:06,400 --> 01:27:06,720
that.

1387
01:27:07,040 --> 01:27:12,850
Um so so yeah, so I guess the idea would be then as much as possible just being

1388
01:27:12,850 --> 01:27:18,530
aware that there are these externalities, people being people, and they're they're they're

1389
01:27:18,530 --> 01:27:23,730
always sort of uh and just being aware of sort of uh checking those externalities,

1390
01:27:23,810 --> 01:27:26,050
especially when they're pernicious or negative.

1391
01:27:26,610 --> 01:27:27,330
Absolutely.

1392
01:27:27,490 --> 01:27:33,250
Um and I think one broader implication of this way of thinking

1393
01:27:33,570 --> 01:27:37,060
is that cynicism is underrated.

1394
01:27:37,380 --> 01:27:42,420
I think people uh pay a lot of social costs for being seen as a cynical person.

1395
01:27:42,580 --> 01:27:48,180
I think people rightly or wrongly think that cynics are mean and untrustworthy and

1396
01:27:48,180 --> 01:27:49,140
unpleasant.

1397
01:27:49,460 --> 01:27:55,220
Um but I think there is a different kind of more

1398
01:27:55,220 --> 01:28:00,500
enlightened cynicism, which is not born of despair or uh

1399
01:28:00,690 --> 01:28:03,970
nihilism or self-entitlement or bitterness.

1400
01:28:04,450 --> 01:28:09,730
Um, but just born of an honest recognition of the fact that that we're animals, that we're

1401
01:28:09,730 --> 01:28:15,730
apes, and that we have all sorts of, you know, undesirable and unflattering motives and

1402
01:28:15,730 --> 01:28:16,530
drives.

1403
01:28:16,850 --> 01:28:22,450
Um, and that if we want to understand why people do the things they do and why our world is

1404
01:28:22,450 --> 01:28:26,450
structured the way it is, it really helps to have a clear-eyed understanding of that.

1405
01:28:27,480 --> 01:28:32,280
And to see through the bullshit stories that we're so prone to telling about ourselves.

1406
01:28:32,760 --> 01:28:38,680
I think that kind of cynicism, to the extent that it's rooted in reality and a

1407
01:28:38,680 --> 01:28:42,200
solid understanding of human psychology and human nature, can be really good.

1408
01:28:42,280 --> 01:28:44,760
It can be a great thing.

1409
01:28:44,920 --> 01:28:47,800
It can help make dominance games collapse.

1410
01:28:47,960 --> 01:28:50,440
It can help us see that the emperor is naked.

1411
01:28:52,760 --> 01:28:58,510
It can prevent, you know, bullies from taking power in the first place if we see

1412
01:28:58,510 --> 01:29:03,070
through their motives and have a more cynical understanding about human nature in general.

1413
01:29:03,870 --> 01:29:07,870
Um that doesn't say, you know, maybe maybe there are costs to it at taking this kind of

1414
01:29:07,870 --> 01:29:08,430
cynical perspective.

1415
01:29:08,510 --> 01:29:08,830
I'm not sure.

1416
01:29:08,910 --> 01:29:10,030
I haven't thought through it all.

1417
01:29:10,190 --> 01:29:14,510
But I think at the at the very least, I would say that cynicism, at least of the kind we're

1418
01:29:14,510 --> 01:29:16,350
talking about, is underrated.

1419
01:29:18,620 --> 01:29:24,540
And it's helpful when we're evaluating, you know, the various status games we play and

1420
01:29:24,540 --> 01:29:26,060
which ones we should participate in.

1421
01:29:26,220 --> 01:29:30,620
It's helpful to see them as status games in the first place, which is uh impossible to do

1422
01:29:30,620 --> 01:29:32,220
unless you're sufficiently cynical.

1423
01:29:32,380 --> 01:29:32,700
Right.

1424
01:29:32,860 --> 01:29:37,340
To even see the stuff we're doing as status games is already a very cynical thing to do.

1425
01:29:38,210 --> 01:29:42,370
Um, it's sort of to to even get to the place where you can decide between good and bad

1426
01:29:42,370 --> 01:29:44,690
status games, you have to be a pretty cynical person.

1427
01:29:45,090 --> 01:29:51,090
And I think if we could get rid of some of the stigma of being a cynic, um that

1428
01:29:51,090 --> 01:29:52,770
might be helpful.

1429
01:29:53,250 --> 01:29:57,890
What what does cynical mean to you, and how do you think most people understand the word?

1430
01:29:58,610 --> 01:30:03,280
So the con uh my understanding of cynic cynicism and the cynicism that I subscribe to is

1431
01:30:03,280 --> 01:30:06,560
different from the intuitive understanding of what cynicism is.

1432
01:30:06,800 --> 01:30:12,800
So the intuitive understanding of cynicism is that um everyone is selfish and they don't

1433
01:30:12,880 --> 01:30:15,120
and it's just every man for themselves.

1434
01:30:15,280 --> 01:30:17,680
Um uh nobody can be trusted.

1435
01:30:17,840 --> 01:30:20,080
Uh it's just a dog-eat dog world.

1436
01:30:20,320 --> 01:30:23,600
So that's not the kind of cynicism that I subscribe to.

1437
01:30:24,240 --> 01:30:27,310
Um I don't think self-interest is our only motive.

1438
01:30:27,470 --> 01:30:31,870
We also care about our families, we care about our friends, we care about our groups, uh,

1439
01:30:31,950 --> 01:30:37,630
and we often do uh uh altruistic things for our friends and family and fellow group

1440
01:30:37,630 --> 01:30:37,950
members.

1441
01:30:38,110 --> 01:30:42,670
Ultimately it cashes out in in uh long-term benefits for us, otherwise it wouldn't exist.

1442
01:30:43,070 --> 01:30:48,430
Um but we do care about other people, not just ourselves.

1443
01:30:49,400 --> 01:30:54,520
So, my kind of cynicism is not that everything is self-interested.

1444
01:30:54,920 --> 01:30:56,040
It's a little bit broader.

1445
01:30:56,200 --> 01:30:59,400
Everything is self-interested, nepotistic, or group interested.

1446
01:31:01,160 --> 01:31:04,840
Everything, or at least our deepest motives, our basic motives that arose by natural

1447
01:31:04,840 --> 01:31:05,240
selection.

1448
01:31:05,320 --> 01:31:07,000
They can really only be one of three things.

1449
01:31:07,160 --> 01:31:11,400
They can be self-interested, nepotistic, or group interested.

1450
01:31:11,640 --> 01:31:17,010
There's no other way for the genes underlying those motives to be driven to fixation than

1451
01:31:17,010 --> 01:31:20,690
if they provide benefits to the focal individual who has the genes, or they provide

1452
01:31:20,690 --> 01:31:24,850
benefits to the focal individual's kin who have some likelihood of sharing the gene, or

1453
01:31:24,850 --> 01:31:30,850
they provide benefits to some individual within the focal individual's group who are likely

1454
01:31:30,850 --> 01:31:35,490
to benefit the focal individual in some way, either by reciprocating or working together

1455
01:31:35,490 --> 01:31:40,770
with that person or or helping that person compete against others, etc.

1456
01:31:42,560 --> 01:31:48,160
So, my brand of cynicism, which I call Darwinian cynicism, is just basically

1457
01:31:48,160 --> 01:31:52,320
focusing on the unholy trinity of human nature, which is selfishness, nepotism, and

1458
01:31:52,320 --> 01:31:58,080
groupishness, and using that as a uh heuristic for

1459
01:31:58,400 --> 01:32:04,080
uh it predicting and and of and um explaining human behavior,

1460
01:32:04,510 --> 01:32:10,510
That anytime we see someone doing something, we should try as our, you

1461
01:32:10,510 --> 01:32:15,950
know, at first, our first best guess should be that it comes down to some kind of uh

1462
01:32:15,950 --> 01:32:19,710
self-interested benefit, some kind of benefit to the person's family, or some kind of uh

1463
01:32:19,710 --> 01:32:21,790
groupish benefit.

1464
01:32:22,030 --> 01:32:25,790
Um, and if we can't explain the individual's behavior in those terms, then we can start

1465
01:32:25,790 --> 01:32:27,870
maybe reaching for other weirder explanations.

1466
01:32:27,950 --> 01:32:31,390
But that should be our first best guess, given that we're animals and we're products of

1467
01:32:31,390 --> 01:32:32,590
natural selection.

1468
01:32:33,230 --> 01:32:36,300
Um, So that's the kind of cynicism I subscribe to.

1469
01:32:36,380 --> 01:32:37,500
Why is that cynical?

1470
01:32:37,980 --> 01:32:43,260
Well, because it rules out a motive that is very common in human culture and human

1471
01:32:43,260 --> 01:32:43,900
discourse.

1472
01:32:44,140 --> 01:32:50,140
It rules out the motive of making the world a better place, of being

1473
01:32:50,460 --> 01:32:56,220
just altruistic toward everyone, you know, regardless of who they are, how likely they are

1474
01:32:56,220 --> 01:32:58,380
to reciprocate, how much status it gets you.

1475
01:32:58,460 --> 01:33:01,210
Though none of that meant we just want to do good for good's sake.

1476
01:33:01,290 --> 01:33:06,250
We want to, you know, we wanna uh you know um save the planet, we wanna uh

1477
01:33:06,570 --> 01:33:11,290
improve the welfare of the human flourishing, you know, the good of the species.

1478
01:33:11,690 --> 01:33:16,730
You know, evolutionary biologists discovered uh many decades ago that

1479
01:33:17,130 --> 01:33:20,730
motivations to act in the good of the species cannot evolve, right?

1480
01:33:20,970 --> 01:33:26,040
This was an early kind of group selectionist idea from Wynne Edwards that the lemmings will

1481
01:33:26,040 --> 01:33:29,960
throw themselves off the cliff to control population be for the good of the species.

1482
01:33:30,120 --> 01:33:33,240
Evolutionary biologists now know that that's that's not how evolution works.

1483
01:33:33,480 --> 01:33:35,320
Organisms don't act for the good of the species.

1484
01:33:35,400 --> 01:33:37,800
They can't evolve to act for the good of the species.

1485
01:33:38,200 --> 01:33:43,160
They evolve to act for the good of themselves and their kin and those who share uh the the

1486
01:33:43,160 --> 01:33:44,280
genes in question.

1487
01:33:44,520 --> 01:33:48,250
And they can even do that while driving their species off a cliff.

1488
01:33:48,410 --> 01:33:49,770
So many species go extinct.

1489
01:33:49,850 --> 01:33:53,530
This is called species suicide, because each member of the species is doing something that

1490
01:33:53,530 --> 01:33:58,170
is in in their individual fitness interests while collectively harming the entire species.

1491
01:33:58,410 --> 01:34:02,730
So if we're investing lots of time and resources in competing with each other for status or

1492
01:34:02,890 --> 01:34:08,330
mates, that's time and resources that we could have been investing into uh other activities

1493
01:34:08,330 --> 01:34:10,640
that could have helped our species proliferate.

1494
01:34:10,800 --> 01:34:13,600
Instead, we're burning those resources fighting with each other.

1495
01:34:14,880 --> 01:34:20,640
And the more of those resources get sunk into the competition, the worse the species is

1496
01:34:21,360 --> 01:34:23,600
uh as a whole.

1497
01:34:23,840 --> 01:34:29,520
And so um, good of the species motives

1498
01:34:29,520 --> 01:34:30,640
can't evolve.

1499
01:34:30,800 --> 01:34:34,560
And yet we often claim to have good of the species motives.

1500
01:34:34,830 --> 01:34:40,110
So if you look at um Starbucks' corporate mission statement, I think it's something like

1501
01:34:40,270 --> 01:34:46,110
our mission is to uh inspire and nurture the human spirit, uh, one cup, one neighborhood at

1502
01:34:46,110 --> 01:34:46,590
a time.

1503
01:34:46,830 --> 01:34:51,230
That's a kind of you know, making the world a better place, you know, generally altruistic

1504
01:34:51,230 --> 01:34:51,870
goal.

1505
01:34:52,430 --> 01:34:56,270
Um and I don't think those those types of goals are plausible.

1506
01:34:56,420 --> 01:34:58,900
I don't think they can plausibly evolve.

1507
01:34:59,140 --> 01:35:04,340
And so, insofar as someone is describing their motives in those overly altruistic terms, we

1508
01:35:04,340 --> 01:35:07,060
should be skeptical, just as we're skeptical of Starbucks's mission statement.

1509
01:35:07,220 --> 01:35:12,180
Nobody is trying to predict what Starbucks is going to do next by saying, hmm, what would

1510
01:35:12,180 --> 01:35:14,820
most likely inspire and nurture the human spirit?

1511
01:35:14,980 --> 01:35:18,420
Is this going to be more inspiring and nurturing to the human spirit, or is this

1512
01:35:18,420 --> 01:35:21,540
acquisition going to be more inspiring and nurture to the human to the human spirit?

1513
01:35:21,620 --> 01:35:23,380
No one's asking that question.

1514
01:35:23,710 --> 01:35:26,830
Because that's the wrong question to ask if you want to actually predict what Starbucks is

1515
01:35:26,830 --> 01:35:27,070
going to do.

1516
01:35:27,150 --> 01:35:29,950
If you want to actually predict what Starbucks is going to do, you have to ask what's going

1517
01:35:29,950 --> 01:35:31,470
to maximize their profit.

1518
01:35:31,710 --> 01:35:35,870
Similarly, I think we need to view humans in the same way.

1519
01:35:36,030 --> 01:35:40,990
We have PR systems in the same way that Starbucks has PR systems, and they serve the same

1520
01:35:40,990 --> 01:35:43,790
function as the PR systems of Starbucks.

1521
01:35:44,030 --> 01:35:48,190
And if we want to understand and predict human behavior in the same way that economists can

1522
01:35:48,190 --> 01:35:53,140
understand and predict the activity of corporations, we need to see through that PR.

1523
01:35:53,300 --> 01:35:56,740
We need to see through that bullshit and we need to get sufficiently cynical in the same

1524
01:35:56,740 --> 01:36:00,900
way that economists I think are sufficiently cynical about uh what goes on in the

1525
01:36:00,900 --> 01:36:01,860
marketplace.

1526
01:36:03,860 --> 01:36:09,860
Yeah, um if I can redescribe what you're saying and see if if the idea

1527
01:36:09,860 --> 01:36:15,460
is not that uh claims about things being beneficial to people don't exist.

1528
01:36:15,700 --> 01:36:21,270
It's not uh uh reducing those down to um that they

1529
01:36:21,270 --> 01:36:22,070
don't exist.

1530
01:36:22,470 --> 01:36:28,390
It's that um all claims about what should be

1531
01:36:28,390 --> 01:36:34,310
done are arise out of evolved design that is a product of

1532
01:36:34,310 --> 01:36:35,270
natural selection.

1533
01:36:35,430 --> 01:36:41,350
And so of all of the um ideas about what should be

1534
01:36:41,350 --> 01:36:47,260
done, they're all coming out of motivational systems designed by natural selection.

1535
01:36:47,340 --> 01:36:52,300
And so they're not designed purely for a group benefit.

1536
01:36:53,100 --> 01:36:58,460
Even if that's sort of I would I would say it may be group benefit, but not species

1537
01:36:58,460 --> 01:37:00,140
benefit, not general benefit, not industrial.

1538
01:37:00,540 --> 01:37:01,180
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

1539
01:37:01,260 --> 01:37:01,340
Yeah.

1540
01:37:01,820 --> 01:37:03,020
Sure, sure, sure, sure.

1541
01:37:03,180 --> 01:37:08,940
So uh so that so the sophistication is to understand that there may be

1542
01:37:08,940 --> 01:37:14,790
times where uh designs might produce ideas that are

1543
01:37:14,790 --> 01:37:19,750
really terrible and shitty and create really bad externalities, or they might create really

1544
01:37:19,750 --> 01:37:22,870
great externalities and really good beneficial things that do.

1545
01:37:23,910 --> 01:37:28,790
But in every case, it's the results of design for

1546
01:37:29,190 --> 01:37:32,230
quote-unquote self or extended interest.

1547
01:37:32,870 --> 01:37:38,550
And so it's not the case that we shouldn't shop between those things that have crappy

1548
01:37:38,550 --> 01:37:40,150
outcomes and good outcomes.

1549
01:37:40,390 --> 01:37:46,120
It's that we should be skeptical when somebody is selling

1550
01:37:46,120 --> 01:37:48,920
us a pure motive.

1551
01:37:49,800 --> 01:37:50,200
Yes.

1552
01:37:50,440 --> 01:37:56,040
And so really this comes back to this idea of openness, which is that so I mean I I I

1553
01:37:56,040 --> 01:38:02,040
genuinely believe that many people uh throughout history um

1554
01:38:02,670 --> 01:38:06,510
have done really heroic things to make the world better.

1555
01:38:07,230 --> 01:38:11,950
But the idea would be that in every single case, that's the result of design.

1556
01:38:12,190 --> 01:38:17,710
That's either from a Darwinian sense misfiring or is well, well, well designed and firing.

1557
01:38:18,270 --> 01:38:19,790
But we can understand.

1558
01:38:19,950 --> 01:38:25,790
So, you know, if we're white working for civil rights or rights of a disenfranchised

1559
01:38:25,950 --> 01:38:30,670
group, we can understand that we're doing it because we also care about

1560
01:38:31,980 --> 01:38:37,900
uh people care that we care about it and we want to be heard and hearing us

1561
01:38:37,900 --> 01:38:40,220
being heard uh is validating.

1562
01:38:40,380 --> 01:38:45,260
Um but in that case the social benefit and our personal benefits align.

1563
01:38:45,580 --> 01:38:51,260
Um and uh and so if everybody knows that that's true and we know it's true,

1564
01:38:51,580 --> 01:38:53,210
then it's okay.

1565
01:38:53,370 --> 01:38:59,130
Um, but if I'm sort of selling this thing that um I'm not getting anything out of it,

1566
01:38:59,290 --> 01:39:01,690
I'm really just sacrificing myself.

1567
01:39:01,850 --> 01:39:07,690
Um, that's the thing to be skeptical of, sort of um is is the idea.

1568
01:39:08,330 --> 01:39:10,810
Yeah, that's that's a great way of putting it.

1569
01:39:11,050 --> 01:39:15,980
Um or at least I think that is the more insightful way to see things.

1570
01:39:16,460 --> 01:39:21,980
Um I recognize that, you know, maybe we don't want to see things that way all the time.

1571
01:39:22,140 --> 01:39:27,580
You know, maybe we have our objective, you know, evolutionary psychologist hat that we put

1572
01:39:27,580 --> 01:39:31,340
on it sometimes when, you know, when we're making more abstract decisions about, you know,

1573
01:39:31,500 --> 01:39:34,060
public policy or what status game we want to play or whatever.

1574
01:39:34,220 --> 01:39:38,220
But when we're actually playing those status games in in the moment, um, maybe we take that

1575
01:39:38,220 --> 01:39:43,090
hat off and we we we you know subscribe to the feel-good narratives and and and the

1576
01:39:43,090 --> 01:39:47,090
sacredness and and you'll get caught up in it, just like any normal human being would.

1577
01:39:47,250 --> 01:39:50,850
And and um I think that's okay.

1578
01:39:51,490 --> 01:39:57,170
Um I don't think this kind of Darwinian cynicism is is a is a hat to wear at all

1579
01:39:57,170 --> 01:39:57,570
times.

1580
01:39:57,810 --> 01:40:02,690
I think if you did wear it at all times, uh it would probably be pretty depressing and and

1581
01:40:02,690 --> 01:40:04,690
your and your life would be pretty unlivable.

1582
01:40:04,930 --> 01:40:10,080
Um, you know, I don't I certainly don't wear that hat when I'm like hanging out with my

1583
01:40:10,080 --> 01:40:10,720
daughter.

1584
01:40:10,960 --> 01:40:16,000
Um yeah, it's at the end of the day a gene replication strategy that I'm so interested in

1585
01:40:16,000 --> 01:40:17,120
her well-being.

1586
01:40:17,280 --> 01:40:22,080
Uh, but it's certainly I'm I'm not thinking that way when I'm when I'm taking care of her.

1587
01:40:22,320 --> 01:40:27,120
Um so yeah, I think there's a time and a place to to put on this this perspective.

1588
01:40:27,360 --> 01:40:30,730
Um, and it's not necessarily all the time.

1589
01:40:31,370 --> 01:40:31,770
Yeah.

1590
01:40:32,010 --> 01:40:37,850
And I I for me, and you know, uh maybe this is just uh a difference,

1591
01:40:37,930 --> 01:40:43,610
uh, and maybe I don't do this, but um I think there's also something to be said, and I I

1592
01:40:43,610 --> 01:40:48,170
like um I like um

1593
01:40:49,340 --> 01:40:52,540
Work that sort of questions the initial assumption.

1594
01:40:52,700 --> 01:40:58,540
I remember just real quick, I took an argument debate class once in undergraduate in

1595
01:40:58,540 --> 01:40:59,100
college.

1596
01:40:59,340 --> 01:41:04,300
And I remember I was sort of arguing a position, and the professor said, Well, you're

1597
01:41:04,300 --> 01:41:08,140
accepting the first premise of the argument, and that's really your problem.

1598
01:41:08,940 --> 01:41:13,180
And I realized that as soon as I accepted the first premise, which is almost feels polite

1599
01:41:13,180 --> 01:41:18,060
to do, you know, it it sometimes that can be the lethal point.

1600
01:41:19,190 --> 01:41:25,110
And what I really like is where we there's sort of sometimes false choices that you

1601
01:41:25,110 --> 01:41:25,750
can reject.

1602
01:41:25,830 --> 01:41:31,830
And so for me at least, I don't know if I take off my Darwinian

1603
01:41:31,830 --> 01:41:37,750
hat when I'm with my son in the following sense of when I'm with him, I feel sheer

1604
01:41:37,750 --> 01:41:43,270
joy and I benefit immensely from all of the time and

1605
01:41:43,270 --> 01:41:45,830
energy and devotion I put into him.

1606
01:41:45,990 --> 01:41:49,900
And at the same time, I realize why that exists, right?

1607
01:41:50,060 --> 01:41:55,820
Like that that it's still um so so I think for me at least it

1608
01:41:55,820 --> 01:42:01,820
comes back to um if you think that the reason

1609
01:42:01,820 --> 01:42:07,340
why love exists or caring about people exists, exists in this sort of abstract,

1610
01:42:07,500 --> 01:42:10,780
disembodied way that has nothing to do with your biology.

1611
01:42:10,940 --> 01:42:15,510
And that in order for it to exist, it has to be independent and exist away from this

1612
01:42:15,510 --> 01:42:20,950
biology if you're forced to make this choice between there's an evolutionary logic for this

1613
01:42:20,950 --> 01:42:23,990
being the outcome, or else it's not good.

1614
01:42:24,390 --> 01:42:28,710
For me at least, that's sort of the distinction I would like to get rid of, right?

1615
01:42:28,790 --> 01:42:34,470
Which is sort of to say uh um, you know, it's all

1616
01:42:34,870 --> 01:42:37,590
um there's all an evolved logic to it.

1617
01:42:37,830 --> 01:42:43,140
And then once you accept that, then it's a matter of, well, what are the externalities?

1618
01:42:43,300 --> 01:42:46,500
What are the consequences going from there?

1619
01:42:46,660 --> 01:42:52,500
And so uh so no, I think that's right that you know, if you if you understand a

1620
01:42:52,500 --> 01:42:58,340
Darwinian perspective as as being an ulterior motive, then you should take the

1621
01:42:58,340 --> 01:42:58,900
hat off.

1622
01:42:59,060 --> 01:43:04,740
But for me at least, I sort of keep my hat on, but I view it as just sort of uh

1623
01:43:05,140 --> 01:43:08,020
it's an additional thing in the same way.

1624
01:43:08,100 --> 01:43:13,710
Like when I look out and see, I think it's really cool that I can see and I know that

1625
01:43:13,710 --> 01:43:16,030
that's all made possible my machinery.

1626
01:43:16,190 --> 01:43:21,310
And for me at least, like knowing that it's machinery doesn't make it less cool, right?

1627
01:43:21,790 --> 01:43:27,790
Um so um yeah anyway I I uh um yeah maybe

1628
01:43:27,790 --> 01:43:33,390
that's just a mixed metaphor in in uh but but I uh um but I

1629
01:43:33,390 --> 01:43:38,720
agree completely that um uh that this idea of

1630
01:43:38,720 --> 01:43:44,160
cynicism in this way um can be depressing

1631
01:43:44,640 --> 01:43:50,560
um but i don't think it needs to be um like i think right now what

1632
01:43:50,560 --> 01:43:56,160
we're doing is uh you know is an attempt to increase our status um

1633
01:43:56,480 --> 01:44:00,560
but i'm learning something from it and i hope other people do and i think that's an

1634
01:44:00,560 --> 01:44:06,370
externality of it um and i think it's beneficial um and I don't think it's a

1635
01:44:06,370 --> 01:44:11,970
bad thing to want status either, because you know, people um uh

1636
01:44:12,850 --> 01:44:18,850
if you look at people who uh people who are um

1637
01:44:19,330 --> 01:44:25,090
low bargaining power, people who are harmed by people who are victims, uh like

1638
01:44:25,570 --> 01:44:30,290
if you look at what it looks like when somebody doesn't have status, that can be a bad

1639
01:44:30,290 --> 01:44:30,770
situation.

1640
01:44:30,930 --> 01:44:36,700
So I don't think you know people people deserve status by virtue of being

1641
01:44:36,700 --> 01:44:37,020
people.

1642
01:44:37,180 --> 01:44:42,620
Um yeah and uh it's just a matter of people don't deserve status by virtue of exploiting

1643
01:44:42,620 --> 01:44:43,260
other people.

1644
01:44:43,420 --> 01:44:48,860
Um and I think that that's a consensus um an open information

1645
01:44:49,020 --> 01:44:54,380
structure is required to like make that split that hair I would say.

1646
01:44:54,860 --> 01:44:55,500
Yeah.

1647
01:44:55,910 --> 01:45:01,750
I ideally the only ways to get status in our world would be by, you know, producing

1648
01:45:01,750 --> 01:45:06,870
goods and services that other people want, or by coming up with new and ins uh insightful

1649
01:45:07,030 --> 01:45:13,030
ideas in science or philosophy, or by, you know, uh effectively helping

1650
01:45:13,030 --> 01:45:13,750
others.

1651
01:45:13,910 --> 01:45:17,590
Um ideally those would be the only ways to get status.

1652
01:45:17,750 --> 01:45:21,380
And certainly those are existing ways that you can get status.

1653
01:45:21,460 --> 01:45:23,540
And that's wonderful that that that is true.

1654
01:45:23,780 --> 01:45:26,180
There are other bad ways that you can get status too.

1655
01:45:26,340 --> 01:45:32,340
And you know, ideally we can try to uh attack those other ways and hopefully get status

1656
01:45:32,340 --> 01:45:33,460
for attacking them.

1657
01:45:33,860 --> 01:45:34,100
Yeah.

1658
01:45:34,340 --> 01:45:38,820
And uh and then one quick throwback at the beginning of this, you mentioned you didn't like

1659
01:45:38,820 --> 01:45:39,460
school.

1660
01:45:39,790 --> 01:45:42,350
uh and and now you can't not do it.

1661
01:45:43,950 --> 01:45:49,630
What do you in light of this discussion have you

1662
01:45:49,790 --> 01:45:55,470
uh um and you know if it if it's too self divulging uh you can just say no

1663
01:45:55,630 --> 01:46:01,390
but have you thought about um why or what switched

1664
01:46:01,550 --> 01:46:04,700
um what led to that switch?

1665
01:46:05,180 --> 01:46:06,700
Um, well, it's interesting.

1666
01:46:06,940 --> 01:46:11,020
Um, so I hated most of school.

1667
01:46:11,500 --> 01:46:14,780
Um, but there were a few bits and pieces I did like.

1668
01:46:14,940 --> 01:46:19,420
So I didn't really like biology class, but the part on evolution I loved.

1669
01:46:19,980 --> 01:46:25,980
That was the only part where like my attention just perked up, and I was like, wow, I can't

1670
01:46:25,980 --> 01:46:28,620
believe how elegant and insightful this is.

1671
01:46:28,780 --> 01:46:30,780
This explains everything.

1672
01:46:31,370 --> 01:46:34,970
And then I, you know, when I went back to like ribosomes or whatever, I started falling

1673
01:46:34,970 --> 01:46:35,770
asleep again.

1674
01:46:36,010 --> 01:46:42,010
Um and uh and the other subject I liked in

1675
01:46:42,010 --> 01:46:44,890
high school was I took an AP psychology course.

1676
01:46:45,130 --> 01:46:50,970
Um and I found that interesting and I, you know, didn't fall asleep during that class.

1677
01:46:51,290 --> 01:46:56,500
Um so maybe I'm just innately interested in evolution and psychology and and then when

1678
01:46:56,500 --> 01:47:00,020
those things were put together it it kind of it was everything to me.

1679
01:47:00,260 --> 01:47:01,460
Um, I don't know.

1680
01:47:01,700 --> 01:47:04,900
It's an interesting question why why we choose the particular paths we choose.

1681
01:47:05,060 --> 01:47:09,140
Ma maybe there's just a lot of genetic variation and maybe maybe I have genes for being

1682
01:47:09,140 --> 01:47:10,820
interested in evolutionary psychology.

1683
01:47:10,980 --> 01:47:12,420
Who who knows?

1684
01:47:12,810 --> 01:47:17,370
We uh we uh um uh one can do a task analysis of curiosity.

1685
01:47:17,450 --> 01:47:18,890
We actually did that as a group.

1686
01:47:18,970 --> 01:47:20,090
Um interesting.

1687
01:47:20,330 --> 01:47:22,970
Uh so maybe we can get some folks on about that.

1688
01:47:23,130 --> 01:47:27,370
So yeah, certainly there's variation in in the elicitors of curiosity for people.

1689
01:47:27,530 --> 01:47:29,850
Different people are curious about different things.

1690
01:47:30,090 --> 01:47:35,700
Um, but for me, I I think education was too much about

1691
01:47:36,020 --> 01:47:40,980
um you have to do this stupid thing and jump through this arbitrary hoop and come up with a

1692
01:47:40,980 --> 01:47:42,340
bullshit paper.

1693
01:47:42,580 --> 01:47:48,340
You have to, you know, read the novel and, you know, talk about metaphors and symbolism or

1694
01:47:48,420 --> 01:47:49,060
or whatever.

1695
01:47:49,220 --> 01:47:52,500
And like it all just seemed pointless and stupid.

1696
01:47:52,820 --> 01:47:58,390
Um and the only thing that really excited me was the feeling of insight, the feeling of

1697
01:47:58,390 --> 01:48:03,430
understanding of the puzzle pieces coming together, of a really simple idea that explains a

1698
01:48:03,430 --> 01:48:04,950
lot of complex things.

1699
01:48:06,390 --> 01:48:08,630
That has been my my North Star, I think.

1700
01:48:08,710 --> 01:48:12,870
And I and I got very little of that in high school and college.

1701
01:48:13,190 --> 01:48:16,870
Um, but I came to it on my own and discovered it on my own.

1702
01:48:17,030 --> 01:48:19,030
And when I found it, I couldn't get enough of it.

1703
01:48:20,920 --> 01:48:23,080
So I think that that would be the the difference.

1704
01:48:23,320 --> 01:48:27,640
I I don't think the current education system is structured on eliciting that feeling of

1705
01:48:27,640 --> 01:48:31,480
insight and awe uh and explanatory power.

1706
01:48:31,720 --> 01:48:35,720
Uh it has a different set of incentives and a different set of goals that you know I'd be

1707
01:48:35,800 --> 01:48:36,280
happy to get into.

1708
01:48:36,600 --> 01:48:38,840
And I think you can tell a very cynical story about it.

1709
01:48:39,400 --> 01:48:44,520
Um, but uh it's not, I think, designed to uh nurture

1710
01:48:44,840 --> 01:48:48,280
people's sense of curiosity and wonder and awe.

1711
01:48:48,440 --> 01:48:50,790
Uh oftentimes it ends up crushing it.

1712
01:48:51,990 --> 01:48:52,390
Yeah.

1713
01:48:52,630 --> 01:48:55,030
Um it sounds like principle.

1714
01:48:56,070 --> 01:48:59,830
Um you you want principles that are applicable.

1715
01:48:59,990 --> 01:49:05,430
Uh and and in some sense what was happening was in a way sort of

1716
01:49:05,430 --> 01:49:06,630
coercive, right?

1717
01:49:06,790 --> 01:49:12,710
It was just uh there's a a well-known psychologist who um I actually

1718
01:49:12,870 --> 01:49:14,960
um This stuck with me.

1719
01:49:15,040 --> 01:49:21,040
What she said was the way we teach high school science is

1720
01:49:21,200 --> 01:49:26,480
like science laboratories is a bit analogous to like if the way we taught

1721
01:49:26,480 --> 01:49:32,480
baseball was for kids to recreate plays, great baseball plays

1722
01:49:32,560 --> 01:49:33,520
of history.

1723
01:49:33,760 --> 01:49:39,760
So you sort of like force people to behave in exactly the same way as this particular play

1724
01:49:39,760 --> 01:49:40,160
happens.

1725
01:49:40,240 --> 01:49:45,370
So the person in left field should run this way, the person should hit the ball exactly

1726
01:49:45,370 --> 01:49:45,930
this way.

1727
01:49:46,090 --> 01:49:48,330
And that's how the training begins.

1728
01:49:48,810 --> 01:49:53,850
And then only if you're good enough at that are you allowed to sort of do it creatively on

1729
01:49:53,850 --> 01:49:54,570
your own.

1730
01:49:54,810 --> 01:49:55,610
Um right.

1731
01:49:55,770 --> 01:50:01,050
So it's sort of this pantomime of um of here's what you do,

1732
01:50:01,530 --> 01:50:06,970
without giving people the autonomy and the creativity to sort of apply

1733
01:50:06,970 --> 01:50:08,090
principles.

1734
01:50:10,000 --> 01:50:10,640
Yeah.

1735
01:50:11,600 --> 01:50:17,520
It it is sad, but I think in a perverse way, it's it's it's part of what

1736
01:50:17,520 --> 01:50:20,960
the system is all about, because it's part of measuring your ability to do that.

1737
01:50:21,200 --> 01:50:26,320
And your ability to do that is a very valuable quality in the marketplace.

1738
01:50:26,720 --> 01:50:31,280
You know, if you look at what kinds of employees people want to hire, you want to hire the

1739
01:50:31,280 --> 01:50:36,320
employee that's gonna follow the rules, that's gonna do what you say, that's gonna, you

1740
01:50:36,320 --> 01:50:38,160
know, toe the line.

1741
01:50:39,150 --> 01:50:43,230
If if they if they need to bullshit to to get something done that's going to be in the in

1742
01:50:43,230 --> 01:50:48,830
the in the corporation's interests, whether it be writing a a mission statement or a a

1743
01:50:48,830 --> 01:50:52,590
PR campaign, that's the kind of employee you want.

1744
01:50:52,670 --> 01:50:56,190
You want a conformist, obedient, uh rule follower.

1745
01:50:56,910 --> 01:51:01,790
Um and also you want, you know, a smart, attentive person who can pay attention to boring

1746
01:51:01,790 --> 01:51:05,320
bullshit and jump through arbitrary hoops if they need to.

1747
01:51:05,560 --> 01:51:10,440
Um, you need someone who's hardworking, who's who's organized and sticks to a schedule and

1748
01:51:10,440 --> 01:51:11,720
can get get shit done.

1749
01:51:11,960 --> 01:51:16,600
I mean, those are the types of traits that you need to prevail in the current educational

1750
01:51:16,600 --> 01:51:16,760
system.

1751
01:51:16,840 --> 01:51:20,200
And those are the types of traits that a lot of businesses want.

1752
01:51:20,520 --> 01:51:25,400
And that's ultimately what the what the education system is about, I think, is signaling

1753
01:51:25,400 --> 01:51:28,120
that you have those traits, not giving you those traits.

1754
01:51:28,200 --> 01:51:32,040
I don't think it it actually teaches you to be smarter or more hardworking.

1755
01:51:33,790 --> 01:51:39,470
But it allows you to get a credential that says that you do have those

1756
01:51:39,470 --> 01:51:40,110
traits.

1757
01:51:41,950 --> 01:51:45,790
And that makes you very attractive as an employee.

1758
01:51:48,510 --> 01:51:54,510
So yeah, I uh I I I very much subscribe to the the signaling

1759
01:51:54,510 --> 01:52:00,280
model of education uh Pioneered by an economist by the name of Spence, I

1760
01:52:00,280 --> 01:52:04,520
think, and popularized by Brian Kaplan in his book, The Case Against Education, which I

1761
01:52:04,520 --> 01:52:07,160
think is a really interesting and provocative book.

1762
01:52:08,040 --> 01:52:12,440
I'm probably not qualified to judge the economics of it because I'm not an economist, but

1763
01:52:12,440 --> 01:52:16,120
from a psychological and sociological perspective, I think it is a really powerful theory

1764
01:52:16,120 --> 01:52:17,640
of what education is all about.

1765
01:52:17,880 --> 01:52:21,190
That it's ultimately about signaling that we have these traits that are desirable to

1766
01:52:21,190 --> 01:52:21,830
employers.

1767
01:52:21,990 --> 01:52:27,830
And it's not about actually increasing our productivity or our civic mindedness or

1768
01:52:28,070 --> 01:52:29,990
any other high-minded thing.

1769
01:52:30,150 --> 01:52:36,150
Uh so sorry to you know bring the conversation back to a cynical place,

1770
01:52:36,390 --> 01:52:37,910
cynical, dark, and depressing place.

1771
01:52:38,550 --> 01:52:42,470
We were getting so uplifting and and uh positive there, and I brought us back down.

1772
01:52:42,550 --> 01:52:43,350
I'm sorry.

1773
01:52:43,670 --> 01:52:47,080
Um No, don't be.

1774
01:52:47,160 --> 01:52:50,920
Um no, and I mean I think yeah, and I think the converse of that.

1775
01:52:51,000 --> 01:52:56,760
I mean, so like uh John Dewey um and other people, if you look at sort

1776
01:52:56,760 --> 01:53:02,360
of people trying to design science or education

1777
01:53:02,600 --> 01:53:08,290
generally, um, in a way that uh encourages creativity

1778
01:53:08,450 --> 01:53:09,730
and autonomy.

1779
01:53:10,050 --> 01:53:14,450
Um there's a lot of sort of historically was a lot of work on that.

1780
01:53:14,610 --> 01:53:20,370
Um and uh yeah, I think if you were to ask sort of what is the current

1781
01:53:20,370 --> 01:53:26,210
system well designed to do, I think that that these newer analyses, um I think it would be

1782
01:53:26,210 --> 01:53:27,730
hard to to escape this idea.

1783
01:53:27,810 --> 01:53:33,540
But I think it comes back to again, um not not you shouldn't apologize

1784
01:53:33,860 --> 01:53:39,380
because the first thing to uh to change something is to sort of acknowledge that it is that

1785
01:53:39,380 --> 01:53:44,580
way um and that it is just uh a consequence of sort of institutional history.

1786
01:53:44,740 --> 01:53:50,340
Um and and and it continues to exist and there are status games involved.

1787
01:53:50,580 --> 01:53:56,020
And so if you want something to change, um uh the leverage point is

1788
01:53:56,390 --> 01:54:02,230
either find new people whose status would benefit from a realignment of how

1789
01:54:02,230 --> 01:54:07,910
the system is structured, or uh or go after the

1790
01:54:07,910 --> 01:54:13,510
status of, you know, there's an enormous uh incentive to um

1791
01:54:13,830 --> 01:54:18,550
institutional incentive, for example, to teach to tests, because people make profits on

1792
01:54:18,550 --> 01:54:18,710
that.

1793
01:54:18,870 --> 01:54:23,540
And uh it's very easy to sort of say, well, look, we're improving this thing.

1794
01:54:23,700 --> 01:54:29,220
And the first thing you or I know who has had any training in um psychology is that you're

1795
01:54:29,220 --> 01:54:33,460
confusing the measurement for the um for the thing being measured.

1796
01:54:33,620 --> 01:54:39,380
Um and if you take that to an absurdity, you know, where you confuse those two things, the

1797
01:54:39,380 --> 01:54:45,190
thing that you're actually trying to improve, um, which is the child, um, for example,

1798
01:54:45,350 --> 01:54:49,990
even in ideal world, you're sort of gonna end up with uh a poorly designed system.

1799
01:54:50,150 --> 01:54:55,670
Um so uh I think being being blind about what

1800
01:54:55,990 --> 01:55:01,910
institutional selections or what status schemes are going on um is is not a

1801
01:55:01,910 --> 01:55:03,110
a cheerful thing at all.

1802
01:55:03,190 --> 01:55:04,710
So you shouldn't apologize.

1803
01:55:05,940 --> 01:55:11,300
Yeah, it's it's it's one of one of the benefits of of a cynical perspective, I think,

1804
01:55:11,860 --> 01:55:17,380
um, at least in in the Darwinian sense, is that you get a better understanding of how

1805
01:55:17,380 --> 01:55:20,100
things work, even if it's not a pretty picture.

1806
01:55:20,580 --> 01:55:24,820
Um, and that's the only way to make them better is if you have a clearer understanding of

1807
01:55:24,820 --> 01:55:25,140
it.

1808
01:55:26,740 --> 01:55:27,540
Sounds good.

1809
01:55:27,780 --> 01:55:30,100
Um any final thoughts.

1810
01:55:31,370 --> 01:55:36,090
Well, this was a very uh wide ranging and fun conversation.

1811
01:55:36,170 --> 01:55:40,010
I love all the different turns it took and uh I had a I had a blast.

1812
01:55:40,250 --> 01:55:41,290
Yeah, me too.

1813
01:55:41,450 --> 01:55:42,970
Uh sounds good.

1814
01:55:43,130 --> 01:55:46,810
Well um we'll we'll see what happens uh next time.

1815
01:55:47,210 --> 01:55:47,770
Cool.

1816
01:55:48,010 --> 01:55:48,570
All right.

1817
01:55:48,730 --> 01:55:49,690
Thanks, man.

1818
01:55:52,250 --> 01:55:53,450
Thank you for listening.

1819
01:55:53,610 --> 01:55:58,570
Uh if you like what you're hearing, please leave us a kind review or check out our Patreon

1820
01:55:58,570 --> 01:56:00,330
page if you want to throw us some money.

1821
01:56:00,580 --> 01:56:02,820
Uh yeah.

1822
01:56:02,980 --> 01:56:03,380
Yeah.

1823
01:56:04,180 --> 01:56:04,660
I don't know.

1824
01:56:05,140 --> 01:56:06,180
Is there anything else to say?

1825
01:56:06,500 --> 01:56:12,180
Um uh come back for the next episode and um or if you're in the middle of

1826
01:56:12,180 --> 01:56:14,580
binge listening, you know, go for that.

1827
01:56:15,220 --> 01:56:15,540
Okay.

1828
01:56:15,940 --> 01:56:18,660
Um stay tuned for the for the next episode.