WEBVTT 00:00:00.640 --> 00:00:04.400 We're your hosts, David Pinsoff and Dave Petrozowski. 00:00:04.720 --> 00:00:08.000 This is the Evolutionary Psychology Podcast. 00:00:08.400 --> 00:00:09.280 I already screwed up. 00:00:09.360 --> 00:00:11.280 It's Evolutionary Psychology the Podcast. 00:00:11.520 --> 00:00:16.400 Well it's it's hard to um we have to enunciate the parentheses too. 00:00:16.640 --> 00:00:17.680 It's hard to um yeah. 00:00:18.160 --> 00:00:19.680 Should I say parentheses? 00:00:20.400 --> 00:00:21.920 I don't know, actually. 00:00:46.470 --> 00:00:52.360 Um, this is the first inaugural episode of the podcast in which Dave Petrozki 00:00:52.440 --> 00:00:57.960 interviews me, David Pinsoff, about how I got into evolutionary psychology, why I love it, 00:00:58.120 --> 00:01:02.680 what kind of research I'm doing right now, and what kind of ideas I'm uh having from an 00:01:02.680 --> 00:01:03.880 evolutionary perspective. 00:01:04.200 --> 00:01:05.160 That's right, David. 00:01:05.240 --> 00:01:08.920 And we will have weekly episodes being posted. 00:01:09.080 --> 00:01:12.600 And in the following episode, David will interview me. 00:01:12.840 --> 00:01:17.960 In this episode, David covers a lot of ground about his interest in status. 00:01:18.520 --> 00:01:20.730 And what else do we talk about? 00:01:21.130 --> 00:01:24.810 I think we talk a a bit about maybe politics a little bit. 00:01:24.970 --> 00:01:27.050 I actually I I'm blinking. 00:01:28.410 --> 00:01:30.650 Um I know we definitely talk about status. 00:01:30.730 --> 00:01:31.690 I forget what else we covered. 00:01:31.930 --> 00:01:36.570 Yeah, because we're actually in the future because we've actually recorded I think nine 00:01:36.570 --> 00:01:37.370 episodes now. 00:01:37.450 --> 00:01:40.330 So but we shouldn't say that because we're breaking the fourth wall. 00:01:40.810 --> 00:01:41.210 Yeah. 00:01:41.450 --> 00:01:45.360 Um so yeah, I I genuinely don't remember what else we covered. 00:01:45.920 --> 00:01:46.480 That's crazy. 00:01:46.880 --> 00:01:47.120 Okay. 00:01:47.200 --> 00:01:49.760 Well maybe somebody can listen and refresh our memory. 00:01:49.920 --> 00:01:53.040 So Okay, thank you for listening. 00:01:53.120 --> 00:01:59.040 Uh welcome to Evolutionary Psychology the Podcast and um welcome to episode 00:01:59.040 --> 00:02:00.160 one, David. 00:02:01.280 --> 00:02:02.080 Welcome. 00:02:04.320 --> 00:02:05.040 All right, good. 00:02:05.200 --> 00:02:06.160 So we're recording. 00:02:06.320 --> 00:02:07.200 So cool. 00:02:07.440 --> 00:02:07.760 Okay. 00:02:08.000 --> 00:02:13.790 Um So David, one thing that a lot of people in Evpsych um 00:02:14.190 --> 00:02:17.150 uh have sort of an origin story. 00:02:17.310 --> 00:02:23.310 Um and I actually realized I never um I've never asked you what is how did you come across 00:02:23.310 --> 00:02:24.190 EvPsy? 00:02:25.870 --> 00:02:31.710 Uh well I was I had a dream, I had a vision, and uh you know uh I uh 00:02:31.870 --> 00:02:37.180 I woke up with this with the website for the Center for Evolutionary Psychology just in my 00:02:37.180 --> 00:02:38.620 brain, I felt the urge to Google it. 00:02:38.700 --> 00:02:39.340 No, I'm just kidding. 00:02:39.500 --> 00:02:42.540 Um, origin story. 00:02:42.620 --> 00:02:43.180 Yeah, it's interesting. 00:02:43.260 --> 00:02:47.340 I feel like a lot of Ev Psych people do have origin stories because it's kind of an odd 00:02:47.340 --> 00:02:47.740 choice. 00:02:48.060 --> 00:02:53.820 Out of all of the careers uh to choose and all of the sub disciplines within the field of 00:02:53.820 --> 00:02:55.260 psychology to choose. 00:02:55.420 --> 00:03:00.540 Uh Ev Psych is a pretty odd one, not merely because it's sort of a minority perspective, 00:03:00.780 --> 00:03:06.490 um, but because it's kind of controversial uh In many ways for many 00:03:06.490 --> 00:03:07.530 different reasons. 00:03:08.170 --> 00:03:11.690 Stephen Pinker wrote a whole book about why it's controversial called The Blank Slate. 00:03:12.730 --> 00:03:17.050 So it's kind of a weird new controversial discipline. 00:03:17.130 --> 00:03:23.130 And you sort of need an origin story to explain why you would choose this weird discipline 00:03:23.370 --> 00:03:26.650 in a way that you wouldn't need an origin story for a lot of other disciplines. 00:03:26.730 --> 00:03:30.810 Like I, you know, if we we were just regular social psychologists or like chemists or 00:03:30.810 --> 00:03:35.060 something, I don't know that we would need uh an origin story necessarily. 00:03:35.220 --> 00:03:41.060 Uh my origin story was I was in the the middle of a kind of uh 00:03:41.300 --> 00:03:43.700 existential crisis in my youth. 00:03:43.940 --> 00:03:46.820 So I didn't know what I wanted to do with my life. 00:03:46.980 --> 00:03:48.420 I I was actually a theater major. 00:03:48.500 --> 00:03:50.100 I thought I wanted to be an actor. 00:03:50.260 --> 00:03:56.260 Um I uh moved to New York with my girlfriend, who's now my wife, um, and uh I 00:03:56.260 --> 00:04:02.150 quickly became disillusioned with uh acting in the theater world, um, and was 00:04:02.390 --> 00:04:07.910 just uh at that time also kind of discovering that I had a brain and I had a pretty good 00:04:07.910 --> 00:04:08.230 one. 00:04:08.470 --> 00:04:14.150 Um, and it took me like a long time to really discover because I hated school uh throughout 00:04:14.150 --> 00:04:14.870 most of my life. 00:04:14.950 --> 00:04:16.150 I didn't really find it rewarding. 00:04:16.230 --> 00:04:19.270 I just kind of coasted and bullshitted my way through it. 00:04:19.510 --> 00:04:25.500 Um, and uh it was really only once I began asking myself 00:04:25.500 --> 00:04:28.860 the question of what I wanted to do with my life that I started really using my brain and 00:04:28.860 --> 00:04:31.740 thinking about like, you know, what what the fuck is going on? 00:04:31.900 --> 00:04:32.940 What is my place in the world? 00:04:33.020 --> 00:04:34.060 What is the world like? 00:04:34.220 --> 00:04:36.140 Like, uh, what am I doing here? 00:04:36.380 --> 00:04:39.260 Um, so I had a kind of intellectual awakening at that time. 00:04:39.340 --> 00:04:43.820 Um, of just I just was reading tons of books, whatever I could get my hands on uh 00:04:43.980 --> 00:04:45.260 voraciously. 00:04:45.740 --> 00:04:50.730 Uh and I just randomly happened to pick up uh a copy of The Selfish Gene 00:04:51.690 --> 00:04:55.850 and uh a copy of uh I think the Blank Slate. 00:04:56.490 --> 00:04:58.650 Um not for any particular reason. 00:04:58.810 --> 00:05:01.770 It's just these were like best-selling books and they looked like something that smart 00:05:01.770 --> 00:05:04.810 people would read, and they had lots of big words in it, so I wanted to read it. 00:05:05.610 --> 00:05:11.500 Um but I just remember uh just being totally blown away by by 00:05:11.500 --> 00:05:17.500 the insights of of evolution, evolutionary theory, selfish gene theory, just the elegance 00:05:17.500 --> 00:05:19.820 of the idea, the explanatory power. 00:05:19.980 --> 00:05:23.900 I just felt like all of the puzzle pieces were just coming together. 00:05:24.140 --> 00:05:29.900 Uh and um from there I just I I read e anything in evolutionary 00:05:29.900 --> 00:05:31.580 psychology I could get my hands on. 00:05:31.660 --> 00:05:35.230 I did I went through the, you know, Tubian Cosmides have that website, the Center for 00:05:35.230 --> 00:05:36.190 Evolutionary Psychology. 00:05:36.350 --> 00:05:37.550 They have all their publications. 00:05:37.710 --> 00:05:40.750 I remember I was just going through and just reading them one by one. 00:05:40.830 --> 00:05:42.590 Like I could not get enough of it. 00:05:43.070 --> 00:05:46.750 Just the feeling of insight was so powerful. 00:05:47.870 --> 00:05:53.790 And so around that time I thought to myself like this is this is what I want 00:05:53.790 --> 00:05:54.190 to do. 00:05:54.350 --> 00:05:55.630 This is what I want to study. 00:05:56.030 --> 00:06:00.760 I don't even care if I'm particularly good at it uh, or I don't need to be that high status 00:06:00.760 --> 00:06:01.000 in it. 00:06:01.080 --> 00:06:02.040 I just want to be a part of it. 00:06:02.120 --> 00:06:05.560 I just want to be around other people who are thinking this way and taking this 00:06:05.560 --> 00:06:06.840 perspective. 00:06:07.160 --> 00:06:11.320 Um, and so uh that's that's basically how it happened. 00:06:11.480 --> 00:06:17.160 I was just at a, you know, I was having an intellectual awakening, an existential crisis, 00:06:17.240 --> 00:06:19.240 and and groping for something. 00:06:19.480 --> 00:06:25.240 Um and out of all the things that I read, something about this perspective 00:06:25.640 --> 00:06:28.430 uh really just open my eyes. 00:06:28.510 --> 00:06:34.270 I it it kind of uh you know that moment in The Matrix where where Keanu Reeves, you know, 00:06:34.350 --> 00:06:39.310 uh wakes up from after being shot by Agent Smith and he can like see the lines of code and 00:06:39.310 --> 00:06:40.750 like the they all shoot the bullets. 00:06:40.830 --> 00:06:43.150 He's like, no, no, and the bullets stop. 00:06:44.030 --> 00:06:48.990 Uh that's sort of how I felt discovering evolutionary psychology, that I could just like 00:06:48.990 --> 00:06:53.580 see the lines of code uh behind, you know all the things that we do. 00:06:54.220 --> 00:07:00.140 Um so yeah I don't know why evolutionary psychology in particular spoke to me. 00:07:00.380 --> 00:07:04.140 Maybe it had I I like to think that it has it's you know it has something to do with like 00:07:04.140 --> 00:07:07.420 its objective insightfulness and explanatory power. 00:07:09.100 --> 00:07:11.100 But yeah, I honestly don't know. 00:07:12.110 --> 00:07:15.790 I knew I I I was interested in psychology, so I was a double major in theater and 00:07:15.790 --> 00:07:17.870 psychology uh in college. 00:07:18.270 --> 00:07:21.150 Um, but I didn't learn any evolutionary psychology. 00:07:21.310 --> 00:07:24.270 I was just kind of vaguely interested in, you know, why people do what they do. 00:07:24.510 --> 00:07:28.830 When I was an actor, I was more interested in the character psyche than than the average 00:07:28.830 --> 00:07:29.710 actor was. 00:07:29.870 --> 00:07:34.510 And my acting teachers would often tell me to, you know, stop thinking and analyzing too 00:07:34.510 --> 00:07:38.960 much, just like get into your body and you know, you know, feel the character rather than 00:07:38.960 --> 00:07:39.760 think too hard about it. 00:07:39.840 --> 00:07:43.760 So even in even as an actor, I was thinking too much about the mind. 00:07:44.320 --> 00:07:50.080 Um and uh I I I knew that I wanted to think more about 00:07:50.080 --> 00:07:51.680 the mind as a career. 00:07:52.080 --> 00:07:57.440 Um and the way of thinking about the mind that seemed uh far and away more promising and 00:07:57.440 --> 00:08:00.800 insightful than any other way was evolutionary psychology. 00:08:01.030 --> 00:08:04.310 And so that's that's where I landed and I've I've been there ever since. 00:08:04.390 --> 00:08:05.990 I I honestly c I can't quit it. 00:08:06.150 --> 00:08:08.790 You know, I as as you know I have I have a lucrative side gig. 00:08:08.870 --> 00:08:12.150 I have a really cool, fun job, you know, working for Cards Against Humanity. 00:08:12.310 --> 00:08:16.470 And even even with that, like I I couldn't like I thought I could just do that after 00:08:16.470 --> 00:08:17.430 getting my PhD. 00:08:17.830 --> 00:08:18.630 Uh but I couldn't. 00:08:18.710 --> 00:08:19.590 I missed it too much. 00:08:19.750 --> 00:08:25.020 Like I I I st couldn't quit keeping up on developments in the field and thinking about it 00:08:25.020 --> 00:08:25.980 and writing about it. 00:08:26.140 --> 00:08:29.980 And I eventually started my blog, Everything is Bullshit, just because I had so many ideas 00:08:29.980 --> 00:08:33.660 I was sitting on, uh, and I had no place to put them. 00:08:34.460 --> 00:08:39.820 Um and uh at the same time, you know, working for Cards Against Humanity, I had developed 00:08:39.820 --> 00:08:44.910 this kind of blunt, cynical writing style that's sort of the voice of our branding. 00:08:45.230 --> 00:08:50.910 And I thought that it would be a great way to pair that skill that I developed to ideas in 00:08:50.910 --> 00:08:54.830 evolutionary psychology, sort of a marriage of these two sides of myself. 00:08:55.230 --> 00:08:57.630 And I think so far it's been working out pretty well. 00:08:58.190 --> 00:09:02.670 I I sort of have developed this like blunt, cynical evolutionary psychologist character on 00:09:02.670 --> 00:09:03.790 everything is bullshit. 00:09:03.950 --> 00:09:06.990 And I think people sort of understand that it's a character because if you if you look at 00:09:07.070 --> 00:09:10.680 like the difference between the the essay and like the comments and my responses to the 00:09:10.680 --> 00:09:11.000 comments. 00:09:11.160 --> 00:09:17.000 It's like, you know, um provocateur in the streets, you know, scholar in the sheets, 00:09:17.240 --> 00:09:18.840 um kind of thing. 00:09:19.080 --> 00:09:22.120 Um and uh I've I've been you know really gratified by it. 00:09:22.200 --> 00:09:23.720 People seem to like the blog a lot. 00:09:23.880 --> 00:09:26.680 Uh and at the same time I've been getting back into research. 00:09:26.760 --> 00:09:28.760 Um I'm a research affiliate at UCLA now. 00:09:28.840 --> 00:09:32.430 I've been, you know, working on a few new papers, lots of big ideas. 00:09:32.590 --> 00:09:37.230 I'm in I have the the luxury of being able to just focus on big ideas and big theoretical 00:09:37.230 --> 00:09:41.150 papers, which I know a lot of academics don't have that luxury because you know the the 00:09:41.150 --> 00:09:45.230 academic incentives are you got to publish, publish, publish lots of stuff and empirical 00:09:45.230 --> 00:09:45.550 stuff. 00:09:45.710 --> 00:09:49.550 Theoretical stuff is extremely undervalued uh in psychology. 00:09:49.630 --> 00:09:51.310 You just got to get those empirical papers out. 00:09:51.470 --> 00:09:53.070 And me, I'm more interested in theory. 00:09:53.230 --> 00:09:56.380 Uh I'm interested in the big the big questions, the Darwinian mysteries. 00:09:56.620 --> 00:09:57.500 That's what gets me going. 00:09:57.660 --> 00:09:58.860 So that's what I've been able to work on. 00:09:59.020 --> 00:10:01.420 I've been lucky enough to to be able to work on that. 00:10:01.580 --> 00:10:02.540 So yeah. 00:10:02.860 --> 00:10:03.340 Cool. 00:10:03.580 --> 00:10:09.500 Um you're you have sort of this unique thing you mentioned, the the uh the side gig. 00:10:10.540 --> 00:10:15.900 What do you think, if anything, um that you're sort of in a unique position. 00:10:16.220 --> 00:10:21.340 Does that give you sort of a unique um scientific perspective on the 00:10:21.990 --> 00:10:27.750 sociology of science, or does it give you a chance to sort of take a step back and look at, 00:10:29.190 --> 00:10:34.390 as you said, you know, what is the currency in the realm being empirical work? 00:10:34.790 --> 00:10:38.950 Um, and are we missing sort of big picture things like theory? 00:10:39.190 --> 00:10:44.900 Um is that something that you think your um your sort of 00:10:44.900 --> 00:10:46.980 position uh have you thought about that? 00:10:47.140 --> 00:10:52.900 Like is that something that you think is um um you're uniquely 00:10:52.900 --> 00:10:54.420 positioned uh in a way? 00:10:54.580 --> 00:10:55.940 Have you thought about that? 00:10:56.500 --> 00:10:57.620 Yeah, a bit. 00:10:57.780 --> 00:11:03.540 Um I I do think that you know, me working on the ideas I want to work on at the pace that 00:11:03.540 --> 00:11:05.220 I work on them on. 00:11:06.710 --> 00:11:11.590 I don't think any academic can really afford to do that and still, you know, be competitive 00:11:11.590 --> 00:11:12.870 in this job market. 00:11:14.630 --> 00:11:19.110 Like I I don't have that many publications, but but the ones I do have I've spent a lot of 00:11:19.110 --> 00:11:20.470 time on and thought really hard about them. 00:11:20.550 --> 00:11:23.350 And the same thing goes for the the ones I'm working on right now. 00:11:24.550 --> 00:11:29.740 I I just don't think academia i exists to facilitate that kind of 00:11:29.740 --> 00:11:34.220 scholarship where you think where you know the the emphasis is more on quality over 00:11:34.220 --> 00:11:39.740 quantity, deep thought over uh superficial thought, um, theory over 00:11:39.740 --> 00:11:40.300 empirics. 00:11:40.380 --> 00:11:44.700 I think it's the other way around in academia uh for all three of those things. 00:11:44.940 --> 00:11:50.780 Um so yeah, I do think I'm I'm uniquely privileged to to um be able to think about these 00:11:50.780 --> 00:11:55.830 big picture questions like what is what is ideology, what is social status, what are our 00:11:56.230 --> 00:12:00.710 sacred values all about, what is humor all about? 00:12:00.950 --> 00:12:04.870 Um and I I just feel extremely lucky to be able to do that. 00:12:05.110 --> 00:12:11.030 Um and uh yeah I'm I'm also excited to get to talk to you about it uh 00:12:11.190 --> 00:12:16.980 because you're such a um well respected and and uh uh excellent scholar in the field. 00:12:17.060 --> 00:12:22.900 Um and nothing gives me greater pleasure than just um you know bouncing ideas off of people 00:12:22.900 --> 00:12:28.420 who who share this powerful perspective and just you know arriving at new insights about 00:12:28.420 --> 00:12:29.220 human nature. 00:12:29.380 --> 00:12:30.980 So well, thanks. 00:12:31.220 --> 00:12:37.220 Um uh when you're doing your work, uh so things like the status game 00:12:37.300 --> 00:12:41.540 paper or the evolution of social paradoxes, we can talk about that in a little bit. 00:12:41.780 --> 00:12:47.550 Um do you have a particular um uh sort of 00:12:47.870 --> 00:12:50.030 diorama of the world in mind? 00:12:50.190 --> 00:12:55.950 Like are you thinking about academia or are you thinking about your life experiences or 00:12:56.430 --> 00:13:02.110 um so so this idea that you know everything is sort of this hidden status 00:13:02.110 --> 00:13:02.750 game? 00:13:02.990 --> 00:13:08.750 Um in your own experience, do you where do you think that idea came from? 00:13:09.710 --> 00:13:13.820 Honestly, um it sort of came randomly. 00:13:14.060 --> 00:13:19.180 Um so as you know, status is a huge topic in evolutionary psychology. 00:13:19.260 --> 00:13:20.620 And I and I think correctly so. 00:13:20.780 --> 00:13:26.380 I think status is arguably uh one of the most important selection pressures that has shaped 00:13:26.380 --> 00:13:28.620 human nature out of out of all of them, I think. 00:13:28.780 --> 00:13:31.340 You know, we kill for status, we die for status. 00:13:31.660 --> 00:13:35.990 Um so I had always been interested in status just because it was such a big topic in 00:13:35.990 --> 00:13:37.430 evolutionary psychology. 00:13:37.590 --> 00:13:42.470 Um, but I remember just randomly, you know, some new uh psychology paper popped up. 00:13:42.550 --> 00:13:45.510 It wasn't even an evolutionary psychology paper, it was just an empirical paper showing 00:13:45.750 --> 00:13:50.870 basically that seeking status lowers your status, or being seen as a status seeker uh 00:13:50.950 --> 00:13:52.390 results in real social costs. 00:13:52.550 --> 00:13:57.670 People view you as selfish, manipulative, uh deceitful, untrustworthy, uh 00:13:58.120 --> 00:14:00.120 mean, narcissistic. 00:14:00.280 --> 00:14:06.200 Um, all sorts of negative judgments are heaped on you uh for being seen as a status seeker. 00:14:06.440 --> 00:14:10.200 I remember when I came across that paper, I think it was called Status is a four-letter 00:14:10.360 --> 00:14:14.600 word or something, um, it just really stuck with me. 00:14:14.920 --> 00:14:20.710 Because that was a huge wrench thrown into my understanding of the world. 00:14:20.870 --> 00:14:26.230 Like, how could I reconcile that idea with everything I knew about the importance of status 00:14:26.230 --> 00:14:28.950 seeking in humanity? 00:14:29.190 --> 00:14:34.870 So, on the one hand, like, it's this huge, important, powerful motive that drives so much 00:14:34.870 --> 00:14:35.590 of what we do. 00:14:35.750 --> 00:14:41.510 And on the other hand, we overtly pursuing it seems to sabotage our 00:14:41.510 --> 00:14:42.790 efforts to pursue it. 00:14:42.950 --> 00:14:48.820 We have to somehow pursue status without uh creating common 00:14:48.820 --> 00:14:54.020 knowledge of the fact that we're pursuing status and that's a really hard problem to solve 00:14:54.180 --> 00:14:58.260 and so that just got me think how how do we do this this i mean what what are the 00:14:58.260 --> 00:15:02.820 mechanisms we need to solve this problem of seeking status without being seen as a status 00:15:02.820 --> 00:15:08.590 seeker um what what are the what are the cognitive mechanisms um what 00:15:08.750 --> 00:15:09.710 are the implications of this? 00:15:09.870 --> 00:15:14.350 Could this explain why uh status symbols are so volatile and arbitrary? 00:15:14.590 --> 00:15:20.030 Could this be a kind of engine of cultural evolution that throws out variation in what gets 00:15:20.030 --> 00:15:21.950 us status and what lowers our status? 00:15:22.110 --> 00:15:25.070 Um, I started thinking about how paradoxical it was. 00:15:25.230 --> 00:15:31.070 Um and honestly, uh just thinking about this contradiction of us being 00:15:31.070 --> 00:15:35.390 status seekers and losing status for seeking status, that contradiction just gave rise to 00:15:35.390 --> 00:15:37.540 all the ideas in the paper. 00:15:37.860 --> 00:15:40.980 Um just focusing on those two premises. 00:15:41.140 --> 00:15:46.420 I think most of the ideas in the paper about sacred values, about cues and signals uh being 00:15:46.420 --> 00:15:52.260 uh unstable, um, about uh politics being, you know, about dominance, 00:15:52.340 --> 00:15:55.060 but we can't reveal the fact that it's about dominance. 00:15:55.540 --> 00:16:00.660 All those things just kind of naturally fell out of that inherent contradiction. 00:16:01.060 --> 00:16:06.010 Um and uh yeah, so it it kind of started randomly. 00:16:06.090 --> 00:16:07.690 I just this thing caught my attention. 00:16:07.770 --> 00:16:11.690 It seemed interesting and important, and I just followed the path wherever it led, and it 00:16:11.690 --> 00:16:13.770 led me to this this paper that I'm really excited about. 00:16:14.090 --> 00:16:19.530 Uh what what is the sort of short version of why um 00:16:19.850 --> 00:16:22.970 seeking status decreases your status? 00:16:24.010 --> 00:16:26.320 Um so unfortunately there isn't a short. 00:16:26.960 --> 00:16:30.560 It's a complicated question and it's an interesting, you know, it's not I wouldn't say that 00:16:30.560 --> 00:16:31.760 it's universally true. 00:16:31.920 --> 00:16:36.880 So there are some cases where overtly seeking status doesn't really lower your status all 00:16:36.880 --> 00:16:37.440 that much. 00:16:37.600 --> 00:16:40.400 Uh and I talk about these uh in the paper. 00:16:40.640 --> 00:16:46.530 So for example, if you're if you're uh living in a really poor community and wealth is 00:16:46.530 --> 00:16:47.810 super important in a social partner. 00:16:48.290 --> 00:16:51.730 Like all the other traits that you're looking for, and in a spouse or a friend, you know, 00:16:51.810 --> 00:16:52.370 go out the window. 00:16:52.770 --> 00:16:55.170 Do they have resources is the most critical question. 00:16:55.410 --> 00:16:59.410 And such an environment, it really makes sense if you're rich to shout from the 00:16:59.410 --> 00:17:03.570 mountaintops that you're rich, to really, you know, audaciously display your wealth, buy 00:17:03.570 --> 00:17:07.170 expensive things, because that's really important to get the message across that you're 00:17:07.170 --> 00:17:08.370 rich, rich, right? 00:17:08.690 --> 00:17:14.660 Yes, doing that kind of ostentatious displaying of wealth also makes you look kind 00:17:14.660 --> 00:17:16.740 of selfish and vain and petty. 00:17:17.940 --> 00:17:22.660 But the costs of those inferences are far outweighed by the benefits of just getting the 00:17:22.660 --> 00:17:24.100 message across that you're rich. 00:17:24.340 --> 00:17:28.980 Because people don't care about selfishness and vanity as much as they care about wealth 00:17:28.980 --> 00:17:31.060 itself in an environment like that. 00:17:31.380 --> 00:17:36.900 So an environment like that, the uh the status seeking and signaling can be quite overt and 00:17:36.900 --> 00:17:38.180 it's and it's pretty stable. 00:17:38.260 --> 00:17:44.070 Uh but then if you go to, say, a wealthier environment where uh people have the resources 00:17:44.070 --> 00:17:49.990 they need uh to survive and flourish, uh and um uh uh being seen as 00:17:49.990 --> 00:17:53.350 wealthy doesn't actually give you that much of a competitive advantage in the social 00:17:53.350 --> 00:17:53.990 marketplace. 00:17:54.230 --> 00:17:59.030 Then all of a sudden, the benefits of shouting, I'm rich from the mountaintops, are no 00:17:59.030 --> 00:18:00.310 longer as high. 00:18:00.870 --> 00:18:06.710 And the costs of being look uh the costs of looking like a selfish, narcissistic, uh 00:18:06.950 --> 00:18:09.030 petty person are much higher. 00:18:09.190 --> 00:18:13.520 And in that case, the costs uh are likely to outweigh the benefits. 00:18:13.760 --> 00:18:19.520 Um and so in environments like that, you might try to covertly signal your 00:18:19.520 --> 00:18:19.840 wealth. 00:18:20.000 --> 00:18:22.640 Uh, this has been referred to as stealth wealth. 00:18:22.800 --> 00:18:28.080 Um, there was a cool essay uh in the New York Times uh analyzing uh a hat that one of the 00:18:28.080 --> 00:18:30.720 characters was wearing in the sh the show Succession. 00:18:30.880 --> 00:18:34.370 And it looked uh on the surface just like a regular baseball cap. 00:18:34.610 --> 00:18:39.170 It sort of conveyed like this working class nonchalance that was kind of surprising in such 00:18:39.170 --> 00:18:40.530 a uh wealthy character. 00:18:40.770 --> 00:18:45.250 But um the the journalist actually like zoomed in on the on the type of hat it was and did 00:18:45.250 --> 00:18:49.330 some research and found that the hat is actually like you know a $50,000 hat. 00:18:50.610 --> 00:18:51.010 Right. 00:18:51.170 --> 00:18:56.380 And so it's this kind of stealth wealth or or signaling of signaling that you're wealthy 00:18:56.380 --> 00:19:01.100 without signaling you're wealthy that tends to arise in communities where uh the benefits 00:19:01.100 --> 00:19:05.740 of signaling your wealth are outweighed by the costs of being seen as a selfish, greedy, 00:19:05.980 --> 00:19:07.260 narcissistic person. 00:19:07.580 --> 00:19:13.500 Well, um so so there's definitely variation into what extent uh status seeking uh is uh 00:19:13.660 --> 00:19:16.140 or overt status seeking lowers your status. 00:19:16.300 --> 00:19:22.110 But but I would say that in general, most of the time, being seen as a status 00:19:22.110 --> 00:19:26.270 seeker is going to lower your status for several reasons. 00:19:26.590 --> 00:19:31.150 One is that status seeking is intrinsically self-interested and competitive. 00:19:31.870 --> 00:19:33.230 Just the definition of it. 00:19:33.390 --> 00:19:36.750 It benefits me personally, and it's, you know, status is zero sum. 00:19:36.830 --> 00:19:39.150 When I rise in status, you fall. 00:19:39.390 --> 00:19:42.110 So it's intrinsically self-interested and competitive. 00:19:42.990 --> 00:19:48.600 And number two, self interested and competitive dispositions are 00:19:48.600 --> 00:19:51.240 intrinsically undesirable in a cooperative partner. 00:19:51.400 --> 00:19:55.800 If you're trying to form mutually beneficial uh relationships with other people, you don't 00:19:55.800 --> 00:19:59.400 want someone who's only going to be looking out for themselves and wants to compete with 00:19:59.400 --> 00:20:01.960 you and be uh better than you, right? 00:20:02.680 --> 00:20:08.600 Uh and number three, um your reputation or your your 00:20:08.840 --> 00:20:13.400 value as a cooperative partner is an intrinsically important part of your status. 00:20:13.730 --> 00:20:18.370 If you're not seen as a valuable cooperative partner, someone that you want to be friends 00:20:18.370 --> 00:20:24.130 with or marry or follow in a in a group context, then that by definition 00:20:24.290 --> 00:20:25.650 lowers your status. 00:20:26.210 --> 00:20:31.570 And so those things are at odds with one another, which means that most of the time being 00:20:31.570 --> 00:20:33.970 seen as a status seeker is going to reduce your status. 00:20:34.050 --> 00:20:39.330 It's going to come with social costs that uh lower uh your your reputation as a 00:20:39.330 --> 00:20:40.920 cooperative person. 00:20:42.040 --> 00:20:47.800 And so I think it's intrinsic to the definition of status that 00:20:48.200 --> 00:20:52.120 being seen as a status seeker lowers it. 00:20:53.080 --> 00:20:55.560 So what what are the inferences that we draw about status seekers? 00:20:55.720 --> 00:20:56.280 All sorts of things. 00:20:56.360 --> 00:20:57.160 I mean, you name it. 00:20:57.640 --> 00:21:01.810 So in the in the couple papers that have been written on this, the main inferences people 00:21:01.810 --> 00:21:02.930 draw is that they're selfish. 00:21:03.090 --> 00:21:07.330 They're selfish and mean, they're narcissistic, they're manipulative, they're deceitful. 00:21:07.490 --> 00:21:11.250 Um, they're willing to throw you under the bus or stab you in the back if it gets them more 00:21:11.250 --> 00:21:11.810 status. 00:21:11.970 --> 00:21:15.490 Um they're willing to, you know, lie or cheat to get status. 00:21:15.650 --> 00:21:19.810 You know, they're if they're athletes, they'll they'll do performance-enhancing drugs. 00:21:20.050 --> 00:21:25.970 Um if they're uh in business, they might uh defraud people like uh Sam Bakem Free did. 00:21:26.620 --> 00:21:30.700 They'll do whatever it takes to elevate their social standing, even if it means shooting 00:21:30.700 --> 00:21:35.980 all over other people or stabbing other people in the back or betraying everyone who trusts 00:21:35.980 --> 00:21:36.220 them. 00:21:37.180 --> 00:21:39.340 They're seen as really bad people. 00:21:39.660 --> 00:21:43.740 And we have all sorts of uh of colorful words to describe these people. 00:21:44.060 --> 00:21:48.060 Asshole, dick, douchebag for women, uh a bitch. 00:21:48.300 --> 00:21:54.170 Um and uh if we are seen as, you know, sucking up to high 00:21:54.250 --> 00:21:56.730 status people to gain status, we're an ass kisser. 00:21:57.050 --> 00:21:57.370 Right? 00:21:57.610 --> 00:22:02.410 It's interesting that we're that we're using the language of disgust, you know, the anus, 00:22:02.730 --> 00:22:06.330 the the male and female reproductive organs, you know. 00:22:06.970 --> 00:22:11.770 This suggests to me that being seen as a status seeker is disgusting, which is, you know, 00:22:11.850 --> 00:22:17.610 it's a really interesting question why the emotion of disgust is activated by s uh overt 00:22:17.610 --> 00:22:18.330 status seeking. 00:22:18.490 --> 00:22:20.100 What was disgust doing in there? 00:22:20.260 --> 00:22:24.900 I mean, disgust evolved to protect us against pathogens and parasites and toxins. 00:22:26.180 --> 00:22:29.060 What does it have to do with with status seeking? 00:22:29.300 --> 00:22:35.140 That's a whole other interesting question, but we can leave that aside and just uh 00:22:35.780 --> 00:22:41.610 make the basic claim that um status seeking in all of its manifestations, in all of its 00:22:41.610 --> 00:22:45.050 guises, there are many different types of status, and there are many different ways that 00:22:45.050 --> 00:22:46.490 seeking status can make you look bad. 00:22:46.570 --> 00:22:47.450 There are many terms we use. 00:22:47.530 --> 00:22:51.610 You know, if you're trying to seek moral status, you're a virtue signaler, you know, you're 00:22:51.610 --> 00:22:54.570 sanctimonious, you're you know self-righteous. 00:22:54.730 --> 00:22:59.770 You know, if uh if you're um seeking status in terms of money, you're greedy. 00:22:59.930 --> 00:23:05.580 Um if you're seeking status in terms of intellectual superiority or pretentious 00:23:05.740 --> 00:23:10.540 or pompous, we have all sorts of words to describe the uh status seeking in all of its 00:23:10.540 --> 00:23:12.940 manifestations and dimensions, and they're all negative. 00:23:13.420 --> 00:23:19.420 Um So yeah, that that was my long answer to your question of w of why seeking 00:23:19.420 --> 00:23:20.780 status lowers your status. 00:23:21.230 --> 00:23:21.550 Great. 00:23:21.790 --> 00:23:27.230 And um from an evolutionary perspective, one of the things that I like about it is we get 00:23:27.230 --> 00:23:30.670 to sort of dissect sort of things that seem self-evident. 00:23:31.630 --> 00:23:37.390 And so one of the things that it sounds like you're saying is that um and you know 00:23:37.630 --> 00:23:42.590 I Annie Wirtz and I have a paper about modularity where we distinguish between intentional 00:23:42.590 --> 00:23:43.870 level and functional level. 00:23:43.950 --> 00:23:49.300 So the intentional level is sort of the everyday like UI there's an agent in the mind. 00:23:49.460 --> 00:23:52.500 And the functional level is basically the level of software. 00:23:53.140 --> 00:23:53.460 Yeah. 00:23:53.860 --> 00:23:59.460 And so hearing you talk about this, I'm sort of translating some of this into 00:23:59.460 --> 00:24:01.940 software level, sort of functional level claims. 00:24:02.020 --> 00:24:06.900 And so one idea when, and you can tell me if this is right, is that there's sort of a 00:24:06.900 --> 00:24:11.620 system in the mind that's sort of looking for status mutualisms. 00:24:11.780 --> 00:24:17.350 So, in other words, that you know, is your status yoked to mine um so that we 00:24:17.910 --> 00:24:23.190 benefit if you go up in status I go up in as well and uh there's 00:24:23.190 --> 00:24:27.910 opportunities for my status or my extended interest status if you and I are aligned in 00:24:27.910 --> 00:24:29.270 status aspiration. 00:24:29.510 --> 00:24:35.190 Um but then there's also really sharp delineation of to the degree that they're rival. 00:24:35.910 --> 00:24:40.470 So if somebody's a status rival, which presumably is almost everybody uh to various 00:24:40.470 --> 00:24:44.790 degrees, um that gets represented and tagged as is really important. 00:24:45.030 --> 00:24:47.120 Is that sort of a fair claim? 00:24:47.760 --> 00:24:50.080 Um yeah, I think that's fair. 00:24:50.400 --> 00:24:53.600 But the the the claim I'm making is somewhat different. 00:24:53.920 --> 00:24:59.760 So um all of the the values and motives that we have are fundamentally 00:24:59.760 --> 00:25:01.520 in conflict with one another, right? 00:25:01.600 --> 00:25:02.800 There are trade-offs to be made. 00:25:02.880 --> 00:25:06.160 Investing in one activity precludes you from investing in another activity. 00:25:06.320 --> 00:25:10.560 Spending time seeking status precludes you from spending time doing other things like 00:25:10.560 --> 00:25:13.120 parenting or finding food or what or whatever. 00:25:14.150 --> 00:25:19.430 and the idea that I'm exploring with uh with the social paradoxes paper is that if you're 00:25:19.430 --> 00:25:25.110 seen as abnormally high on the status motive, um, what what is that coming at the 00:25:25.110 --> 00:25:26.070 expense of? 00:25:26.310 --> 00:25:29.270 What is that precluding you from being motivated to do? 00:25:29.430 --> 00:25:32.870 Uh and I would say that the inference that people are likely to draw is that it's 00:25:32.870 --> 00:25:37.560 precluding you from pursuing more cooperative or altruistic uh endeavors. 00:25:37.960 --> 00:25:38.120 I see. 00:25:38.280 --> 00:25:40.440 So it's almost like a Yeah, sorry. 00:25:40.600 --> 00:25:46.440 Um so most people when faced to ch when forced to choose between say 00:25:46.600 --> 00:25:52.120 status and uh keeping someone's trust or or or status and say keeping their 00:25:52.120 --> 00:25:58.120 marriage faithful, or status um and uh say, you know, uh uh 00:25:58.280 --> 00:26:04.130 betraying someone or lying or um uh dissing someone's, you know, 00:26:04.210 --> 00:26:10.210 reputation, a nice person would would choose uh those other things over status. 00:26:10.290 --> 00:26:13.170 They'd say, you know, uh the status would be nice, but I'm not gonna lie to get it. 00:26:13.250 --> 00:26:16.850 Yeah, the status would be nice, but I'm not gonna betray my best friend to get it, or I'm 00:26:16.850 --> 00:26:18.530 not gonna cheat on my spouse to get it. 00:26:18.770 --> 00:26:19.090 Right. 00:26:19.490 --> 00:26:23.820 But the status seeker in all of those cases is going to choose status over those other 00:26:23.820 --> 00:26:24.060 things. 00:26:24.140 --> 00:26:26.700 And that is what we're threatened by, I think, at the end of the day. 00:26:26.860 --> 00:26:31.260 That is what is driving the negative inferences about a person who is abnormally high on 00:26:31.260 --> 00:26:32.700 status seeking motivation. 00:26:32.860 --> 00:26:35.180 And there there's plenty of empirical evidence for this as well. 00:26:35.340 --> 00:26:39.100 So there's there's literature on so-called dark triad of negative traits, narcissism, 00:26:39.260 --> 00:26:41.340 Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. 00:26:41.660 --> 00:26:43.740 Narcissism is all about status seeking. 00:26:43.820 --> 00:26:45.420 It's about, you know, I deserve better. 00:26:45.580 --> 00:26:47.580 I I care about, you know, looking superior. 00:26:47.660 --> 00:26:49.500 I want people to think I'm better than them. 00:26:49.740 --> 00:26:54.910 Uh and that trait correlates so highly with uh psychopathy and Machiavellianism and just 00:26:54.910 --> 00:26:59.790 like mean shitty behaviors that they're that they're seen as almost kind of the same thing. 00:27:00.030 --> 00:27:05.070 Um so empirically there is a well-documented relationship between status being abnormally 00:27:05.070 --> 00:27:09.950 high on on status seeking motivations and being you know generally a mean asshole. 00:27:10.190 --> 00:27:11.280 Um right. 00:27:11.520 --> 00:27:15.760 So in some sense, it's a uh exploitation detection. 00:27:15.920 --> 00:27:21.920 And the idea is that um somebody who's extreme on this is not going to 00:27:21.920 --> 00:27:25.120 be loyal, even if currently we're overlapping. 00:27:25.280 --> 00:27:30.880 So if you're a partner, um, you're gonna for now, I'm it's 00:27:30.880 --> 00:27:31.520 interaction. 00:27:31.600 --> 00:27:35.040 It's it's just like a sort of an interaction where it's sort of transactional, right? 00:27:35.200 --> 00:27:39.680 Where I'm benefiting you now, but are you gonna be loyal to me in the future? 00:27:39.950 --> 00:27:45.950 Um, and micro cues or longer term cues that somebody's exploitative or really just looking 00:27:45.950 --> 00:27:48.590 out for themselves is sort of a flag. 00:27:49.150 --> 00:27:49.550 Totally. 00:27:49.710 --> 00:27:53.790 And it might differ, you know, based on the the time horizon of the culture. 00:27:53.950 --> 00:27:57.230 So it could be that cultures that have a really short time horizon where you really want 00:27:57.230 --> 00:27:59.710 the benefits now and you know, fuck the future. 00:27:59.870 --> 00:28:04.580 In those cultures, status seeking might not be so bad because it's a cue to benefits now. 00:28:04.660 --> 00:28:06.180 And you don't really care about, you know, the long term. 00:28:06.260 --> 00:28:10.020 May maybe they'll betray you in in ten years or or or or cheat on you or whatever, but who 00:28:10.020 --> 00:28:10.180 cares? 00:28:10.260 --> 00:28:11.700 I'll get the benefits from them now. 00:28:11.860 --> 00:28:16.260 Um, but if you're in more of a long term stable society, then I think status games start to 00:28:16.260 --> 00:28:20.980 become really unstable and and really cloaked and hidden and disguised in all sorts of 00:28:20.980 --> 00:28:21.300 ways. 00:28:21.540 --> 00:28:21.780 Yeah. 00:28:22.100 --> 00:28:26.020 Do you think that the you mentioned that you think it's really targeted of two extreme 00:28:26.020 --> 00:28:26.500 versions? 00:28:26.660 --> 00:28:28.770 There's sort of two ver op options. 00:28:28.930 --> 00:28:34.770 One is that people who are really status seeking are are a kind in the 00:28:34.770 --> 00:28:39.410 proper domain of these systems, is to detect people who really are just looking out for 00:28:39.410 --> 00:28:39.970 status. 00:28:40.210 --> 00:28:46.130 The other option is that those are extreme versions of a natural continuum, which is 00:28:46.130 --> 00:28:51.440 that everybody sort of is status seeking, and there's sort of a natural check on. 00:28:51.520 --> 00:28:57.280 So if you and I are in a relationship, um, we're both hunters, um, you know, we both 00:28:57.440 --> 00:28:59.280 provide each other with meat. 00:28:59.360 --> 00:29:04.960 Um, but there's sort of a detection in both of us as to whether or not either one of us is 00:29:04.960 --> 00:29:08.320 sort of getting getting uppity from the perspective of the other, you know. 00:29:08.400 --> 00:29:13.550 Like, am I starting to signal, oh, you know, David, uh, it's confusing because we have the 00:29:13.550 --> 00:29:17.870 same name, but uh so you know, but David, oh yeah, no, he's not, you know, really pulling 00:29:17.870 --> 00:29:22.910 his weight, or you know, uh really I got that one, um, that that big game the other day. 00:29:23.150 --> 00:29:28.830 Um and so even if I'm not chronically a super narcissistic 00:29:28.910 --> 00:29:34.260 dark triad type, um there still might be 00:29:34.660 --> 00:29:40.340 sort of design in me to sort of see how much status aspiration 00:29:40.580 --> 00:29:43.620 movement I'm allowed by you. 00:29:44.020 --> 00:29:47.620 Um uh does that is that is that how you're thinking about it? 00:29:47.780 --> 00:29:53.300 Or is it really in terms of like that there are different um uh different sort of types of 00:29:53.300 --> 00:29:59.300 people and there are people who are just designed uh to be um status at the expense of 00:29:59.300 --> 00:30:01.540 these other longer term relationships? 00:30:02.150 --> 00:30:04.070 I definitely view it as more of a continuum. 00:30:04.550 --> 00:30:05.830 It's a very smooth continuum. 00:30:05.990 --> 00:30:06.150 Yeah. 00:30:06.390 --> 00:30:08.710 So I think all humans want status. 00:30:08.790 --> 00:30:12.230 So there's there's no there's no one who is zero on the continuum. 00:30:12.310 --> 00:30:13.350 That's just not possible. 00:30:13.430 --> 00:30:17.430 It's just such an important uh part of our evolutionary history, such an important 00:30:17.430 --> 00:30:21.590 correlate of biological fitness that I don't think natural selection would favor anyone who 00:30:21.590 --> 00:30:23.030 doesn't care about status at all. 00:30:23.750 --> 00:30:29.440 Nevertheless, um there's variation in in status motivation, just as there's variation in 00:30:29.440 --> 00:30:30.160 any trait. 00:30:30.480 --> 00:30:35.200 And there are costs and benefits of being anywhere on that continuum, just as there are 00:30:35.200 --> 00:30:39.520 costs and benefits on being anywhere on any trait continuum. 00:30:39.840 --> 00:30:44.960 So I view it as very much a smooth continuum and a very hard problem to solve of how do we 00:30:44.960 --> 00:30:47.440 assess where other people are on that continuum? 00:30:48.480 --> 00:30:53.760 And if everyone's concealing their status seeking motivations, then it becomes increasingly 00:30:53.760 --> 00:30:57.410 hard to figure out who the selfish status seekers are. 00:30:58.210 --> 00:31:02.930 And if you catch a glimpse of it in someone and you don't catch a glimpse of it in anyone 00:31:02.930 --> 00:31:06.690 else, well, that's the best evidence you have that that person is relatively higher on 00:31:06.690 --> 00:31:10.450 status seeking motivation than other people, and therefore they're not good to partner up 00:31:10.450 --> 00:31:10.770 with. 00:31:16.850 --> 00:31:21.010 Maybe you just happen to catch that person doing a typical human thing that anyone would 00:31:21.010 --> 00:31:21.250 do. 00:31:21.490 --> 00:31:25.420 But because they're the only person you caught and you didn't catch anyone else, that's the 00:31:25.420 --> 00:31:27.980 best evidence you have to go on that they're not a good partner. 00:31:28.220 --> 00:31:28.540 Yeah. 00:31:28.700 --> 00:31:32.940 Uh oh, and one thing that keeps coming up recently in work, and so like uh people like 00:31:32.940 --> 00:31:38.220 Aaron Lukashewski and Jimmy Krems is sort of people um have been finding things like, you 00:31:38.220 --> 00:31:43.020 know, people in a romantic partner prefer people who are kind and intelligent, but this 00:31:43.020 --> 00:31:46.140 sort of the tagline is kind towards whom. 00:31:46.460 --> 00:31:52.430 Um so status uh at the expense of others towards whom is sort of the the more uh stilted 00:31:52.590 --> 00:31:58.590 tagline here, which is um then there's also the problem of if I'm observing 00:31:58.590 --> 00:32:03.630 somebody who is sort of status seeking, um there's two different options. 00:32:03.790 --> 00:32:09.630 One is they're status seeking, but who's the beneficiary of it and who's the who who who's 00:32:09.630 --> 00:32:12.190 the cost, um, who's the victim of it? 00:32:12.430 --> 00:32:18.400 Um and uh as I'm saying that, that sort of sounds similar to this sort of 00:32:18.400 --> 00:32:23.920 alliance idea of politics, is that would you make that connection that 00:32:24.320 --> 00:32:30.240 that part of the design and part of the hard problem of status is that it's not 00:32:30.240 --> 00:32:36.240 intrinsically that status aspiration is a problem, but it's always that there's a 00:32:36.480 --> 00:32:41.200 more sophisticated calculation that status is 00:32:41.750 --> 00:32:47.670 asserting sort of how things should be or the resources or what power I should have. 00:32:47.830 --> 00:32:51.670 Um, and there's a calculation of, well, how am I going to be impacted by that? 00:32:51.750 --> 00:32:51.990 Right. 00:32:52.150 --> 00:32:57.030 If you, David, stand up in a group and say, um, I want status, 00:32:58.070 --> 00:33:03.910 I'm I'm not going to intrinsically view that as a bad thing unless I first say, well, how 00:33:03.910 --> 00:33:07.510 is him getting that status going to affect me and my interests? 00:33:07.830 --> 00:33:08.150 Yeah. 00:33:08.390 --> 00:33:10.470 So that's a really important point. 00:33:10.780 --> 00:33:16.380 So if I say I'm better than you, Dave, that's going to be threatening to you. 00:33:16.620 --> 00:33:17.020 Right. 00:33:17.180 --> 00:33:20.940 But if I say you and I, Dave, are better than that other guy over there. 00:33:21.020 --> 00:33:21.260 Right. 00:33:21.420 --> 00:33:25.660 Or our group is or you know, our group, our political coalition is better than the other 00:33:25.660 --> 00:33:28.780 political coalition, then that's not going to be threatening to you. 00:33:28.860 --> 00:33:29.100 Right. 00:33:29.260 --> 00:33:32.540 Because you're you're a beneficiary of the of that status seeking. 00:33:32.700 --> 00:33:33.020 Right. 00:33:33.420 --> 00:33:36.860 So I think really what we find threatening is individual status seeking. 00:33:36.940 --> 00:33:39.340 I personally want to be superior to you. 00:33:39.580 --> 00:33:40.990 I want to be superior. 00:33:41.150 --> 00:33:42.830 I want to be superior to others. 00:33:42.910 --> 00:33:43.230 Yeah. 00:33:43.390 --> 00:33:47.470 Um, group status seeking, I don't think, is as highly frowned upon. 00:33:47.630 --> 00:33:51.710 So if I really want evolutionary psychologists to have higher status than other types of 00:33:51.710 --> 00:33:53.870 psychologists, that's not going to be a threat to you. 00:33:53.950 --> 00:33:58.750 On the contrary, it might even make me a more attractive social partner for you because 00:33:58.750 --> 00:34:02.830 we're going to work together to increase the standing of evolutionary psychologists. 00:34:04.270 --> 00:34:10.260 Um so I think what we're threatened by is individual status seeking and not group status 00:34:10.260 --> 00:34:10.660 seeking. 00:34:10.820 --> 00:34:11.060 Yeah. 00:34:11.300 --> 00:34:16.980 Um, unfortunately, the two uh are and can be 00:34:17.140 --> 00:34:18.420 uh correlated. 00:34:18.900 --> 00:34:23.860 So if I I'm really gung-ho about making sure that you know evolutionary psychologists are 00:34:23.860 --> 00:34:26.820 better than other psychologists, and I really just want to shit all over the non 00:34:26.900 --> 00:34:31.590 evolutionary psychologists and diss them where whenever I can, that uh empirically is 00:34:31.590 --> 00:34:35.030 correlated with me also being uh an individual status seeker. 00:34:35.190 --> 00:34:39.910 So in in the paper, I review tons of evidence showing that people who are really zealous uh 00:34:39.910 --> 00:34:44.790 about politics, who who are really, you know, love to pontificate about how morally 00:34:44.790 --> 00:34:50.470 superior they are on social media, love to, you know, uh uh uh diss the other side, 00:34:50.630 --> 00:34:56.310 uh, you know, who indulge in conspiracy theories, um, who support authoritarian 00:34:56.310 --> 00:35:00.880 policies for their side, uh, who really like to humiliate members of the the other side, 00:35:01.120 --> 00:35:05.280 those that those traits correlate with being a mean and shitty person. 00:35:06.320 --> 00:35:11.200 So uh zealous participation in intergroup dominance competition and intergroup status 00:35:11.200 --> 00:35:16.640 competition is actually a a pretty good cue of zealous participation and 00:35:16.640 --> 00:35:18.690 interpersonal status competition. 00:35:19.490 --> 00:35:25.330 It's it's uh it's really interesting too because the um uh uh there you can 00:35:25.330 --> 00:35:31.090 be uh so you know psych, for example, um, or any area if you sort of do the 00:35:31.090 --> 00:35:32.130 outgroup test, right? 00:35:32.210 --> 00:35:37.650 Which is sort of if you see, so if I'm status aspirational for my group and you're not a 00:35:37.650 --> 00:35:43.580 member of that group, There are two different uh extreme versions, but they're a continuum 00:35:43.660 --> 00:35:43.980 again. 00:35:44.060 --> 00:35:50.060 But um, but one is sort of I'll do anything to um uh achieve status for 00:35:50.060 --> 00:35:50.620 my group. 00:35:50.780 --> 00:35:56.700 The other one though is that I'm sort of I'm I'm doing it in a way that is sort of 00:35:56.700 --> 00:35:59.580 palatable um or acceptable. 00:35:59.740 --> 00:36:04.670 Um so I'm doing things like um things that don't register 00:36:05.550 --> 00:36:07.710 negative reactions from an outgroup. 00:36:07.790 --> 00:36:12.990 And I wonder if that's basically the difference between the cue that somebody is an 00:36:12.990 --> 00:36:17.550 individual seeker of status versus a good coalition partner. 00:36:18.030 --> 00:36:20.590 So if I say, for example, just make it concrete. 00:36:20.670 --> 00:36:24.110 So like I'm interested in M-Psych, and instead of being like, well, everybody else is 00:36:24.110 --> 00:36:27.230 stupid, I'm just like, well, look, there are important things about evolutionary 00:36:27.230 --> 00:36:32.200 psychology, like adaptationism or design-mindedness, or understanding that there are 00:36:32.200 --> 00:36:34.840 systems in the mind that we're not conscious of. 00:36:35.400 --> 00:36:38.520 These are important things to understand about psychology. 00:36:38.760 --> 00:36:44.680 So I am not, I'm sort of positively explaining why I think these things are important. 00:36:44.840 --> 00:36:50.040 Now, if to the degree that I specialize in these things, I'm still getting status or 00:36:50.040 --> 00:36:51.240 benefits from them. 00:36:51.490 --> 00:36:57.330 But if you're reading that or hearing that as somebody who's not an evpsych, that's a very 00:36:57.330 --> 00:37:01.250 different thing than me saying, well, you know, uh people who aren't evolutionary 00:37:01.250 --> 00:37:02.850 psychologists are stupid. 00:37:03.010 --> 00:37:08.610 Um and uh um it's so there there's sort of a way to be 00:37:08.610 --> 00:37:14.540 coalitionally entrepreneurial about your subgroup status that 00:37:14.540 --> 00:37:18.780 doesn't burn the bridges of sort of a larger community, right? 00:37:19.180 --> 00:37:20.860 Um or you can't. 00:37:21.020 --> 00:37:21.420 So right. 00:37:21.500 --> 00:37:24.620 So like maybe you are just another kind of psychologist. 00:37:24.700 --> 00:37:30.460 And so you're asking the question, is David, is is Dave, I'll call myself Dave, um, is 00:37:30.460 --> 00:37:34.700 Dave burning bridges um with me versus not? 00:37:35.100 --> 00:37:41.030 Um, and I think one is palatable and one isn't, and it's sort of obvious, but I think 00:37:41.030 --> 00:37:46.150 one of the reasons why that might be, and I'm curious what you think, is that one, it's 00:37:46.150 --> 00:37:50.150 about ultimately is what I'm doing threatening to your status? 00:37:50.390 --> 00:37:51.350 Um, right. 00:37:51.910 --> 00:37:57.910 And number two, it's also diagnostic of if we do become allied, sort of what 00:37:57.990 --> 00:38:03.280 what would my um or if we become entangled, am I going to exploit you or not? 00:38:03.440 --> 00:38:03.840 Right. 00:38:04.160 --> 00:38:07.920 Um and so this is sort of the thing of like, you know, if somebody talks bad about their 00:38:07.920 --> 00:38:11.680 friends and I'm not friends with them, boy, I wouldn't want to be their friend because 00:38:11.680 --> 00:38:12.880 they're going to talk bad about me. 00:38:12.960 --> 00:38:13.200 Right. 00:38:13.360 --> 00:38:18.880 So um so if I'm sort of uh um uh yeah uh I 00:38:19.120 --> 00:38:24.320 um the fact that it's palatable for you or not, I think um 00:38:25.200 --> 00:38:28.130 it's interesting Yeah. 00:38:29.650 --> 00:38:31.330 It's a huge and complicated question. 00:38:32.370 --> 00:38:37.970 So what differentiates the you know trash talking other fields of 00:38:37.970 --> 00:38:42.930 psychology in a way that might make you look mean from just talking about the positive 00:38:42.930 --> 00:38:47.170 things about evolutionary psychology and the value that it plays? 00:38:48.770 --> 00:38:54.660 Well, one is I think in the case where you're just talking about the 00:38:54.820 --> 00:38:59.540 the the insights of an evolutionary approach in a positive way, um there's plausible 00:38:59.540 --> 00:39:00.900 deniability about what your motive is. 00:39:00.980 --> 00:39:05.140 So at the end of the day, at the ultimate level, it might be a kind of status seeking move. 00:39:05.380 --> 00:39:09.700 By preaching the virtues of of F-Syche, you'll rise in standing in the the F-Syche 00:39:09.700 --> 00:39:10.500 community. 00:39:10.740 --> 00:39:15.170 Um but it's not obvious to observers that that's what your motive is. 00:39:15.410 --> 00:39:21.170 Uh as far as they're concerned, your motive is to, you know, promote knowledge and insight 00:39:21.170 --> 00:39:22.050 and understanding. 00:39:22.210 --> 00:39:26.530 And so that so when you when you talk about knowledge and insight and understanding, you're 00:39:26.530 --> 00:39:30.930 framing what is ult at the ultimate level of status seeking motive in terms of a higher uh 00:39:31.090 --> 00:39:36.290 altruistic uh abstract goal, you know, knowledge, wisdom, uh whatever. 00:39:36.560 --> 00:39:39.920 And so this might be a good segue into sacred values. 00:39:40.160 --> 00:39:44.800 I think in the former case, when you're just talking about insight, you're you're couching 00:39:44.800 --> 00:39:49.200 the status seeking in terms of a sacred value, and that ultimately benefits our group by 00:39:49.200 --> 00:39:51.440 stabilizing our status game. 00:39:51.680 --> 00:39:57.280 Um whereas if you are just being blunt and open about your desire for 00:39:57.280 --> 00:40:03.170 intergroup supremacy, then uh the jig is up, it's clear that that status 00:40:03.170 --> 00:40:04.690 is ultimately your motive. 00:40:05.090 --> 00:40:09.010 And then I can draw all sorts of negative inferences about you. 00:40:10.050 --> 00:40:15.970 It's interesting because even if you're overtly seeking status in a 00:40:15.970 --> 00:40:21.730 domain that I care about, it's still, it not only makes you look bad, it also 00:40:21.730 --> 00:40:24.210 threatens to make our status game collapse. 00:40:24.610 --> 00:40:28.740 So at this point it might be worth backtracking on what it means for a status game to 00:40:28.740 --> 00:40:29.460 collapse. 00:40:29.620 --> 00:40:35.060 Um I am beginning to draw more and more parallels between status seeking and investing in a 00:40:35.060 --> 00:40:35.620 stock. 00:40:35.940 --> 00:40:41.300 You know, just as stocks can be volatile, um I think status games can be volatile. 00:40:41.540 --> 00:40:46.340 Um and just as the source of volatility for a stock is our beliefs about others' beliefs 00:40:46.420 --> 00:40:50.290 about others' beliefs about the value of the stock, I think the source of volatility in a 00:40:50.290 --> 00:40:55.090 status game is our beliefs about others' beliefs, about others' beliefs, about what we're 00:40:55.090 --> 00:40:58.210 actually doing in this status game. 00:40:59.810 --> 00:41:05.730 So a status game, in my view, can collapse when we all know 00:41:05.730 --> 00:41:09.410 that we all know that we're just engaged in a status game. 00:41:09.650 --> 00:41:10.050 Right? 00:41:10.210 --> 00:41:13.010 It doesn't collapse if I personally know or suspect it. 00:41:13.240 --> 00:41:16.520 It doesn't collapse if I suspect that you suspect it. 00:41:16.760 --> 00:41:21.000 It collapses when I know that you know that I know that you know that I know that we're 00:41:21.000 --> 00:41:23.080 just engaged in a pissing contest. 00:41:23.480 --> 00:41:24.040 Right? 00:41:24.360 --> 00:41:28.600 Then all of a sudden, uh what we're doing begins to make us look bad. 00:41:28.680 --> 00:41:32.760 We begin to draw negative inferences about each other and worry about the negative 00:41:32.760 --> 00:41:35.160 inferences that other people will draw about us. 00:41:36.120 --> 00:41:41.110 When that happens, the hierarchy that we've created kind of inverts. 00:41:41.190 --> 00:41:43.430 It kind of kind of flips on its head. 00:41:43.510 --> 00:41:47.510 So those at the top of our hierarchy, now that we know that this is all just an elaborate 00:41:47.510 --> 00:41:51.350 pissing contest, well, those at the top are the people who are most obsessed with winning 00:41:51.350 --> 00:41:52.710 that pissing contest. 00:41:52.950 --> 00:41:55.750 Those are the worst status seekers of all. 00:41:56.390 --> 00:42:00.550 Those at the bottom were relatively uninterested in it, presumably. 00:42:00.630 --> 00:42:03.990 And so they begin to look a little bit more humble and modest. 00:42:04.950 --> 00:42:09.300 And so the the hierarchy kind of the top of the the hierarchy gets lowered and the bottom 00:42:09.300 --> 00:42:10.740 gets lifted a little bit. 00:42:11.940 --> 00:42:16.580 And at the same time, now that the status game has has collapsed and the jig is up, we 00:42:16.580 --> 00:42:20.820 begin to gain status by doing the opposite of what was done previously. 00:42:21.300 --> 00:42:26.820 So if our status game involved, say wearing you know crisp black and white suits and neatly 00:42:26.820 --> 00:42:31.940 slicking back our hair or combing our hair, and all of a sudden it becomes common knowledge 00:42:31.940 --> 00:42:37.690 that we're just a bunch of stuffy, puffed up status seekers, um, and we 00:42:37.690 --> 00:42:41.290 begin to look bad for for you know wearing the suits and combing our hair. 00:42:41.530 --> 00:42:46.090 Well, we'll begin to gain status by doing the opposite of that, by letting our hair be long 00:42:46.090 --> 00:42:50.090 and wild and and wearing, you know, flowing, colorful outfits. 00:42:50.250 --> 00:42:53.610 Uh, because that shows that we're we're different from those status seekers. 00:42:53.770 --> 00:42:59.260 We're not the selfish domineering, you know, uh pretentious people we're we're 00:42:59.340 --> 00:43:02.060 we're humble, authentic, we're real. 00:43:02.380 --> 00:43:08.220 Um, we begin to signal that we don't care about status, which paradoxic paradoxically uh 00:43:08.300 --> 00:43:09.260 raises our status. 00:43:09.420 --> 00:43:14.140 So when a status game collapses, the hierarchy inverts, and the players begin to gain 00:43:14.140 --> 00:43:18.540 status by doing the opposite of what was done previously, or by conspicuously 00:43:18.540 --> 00:43:23.660 differentiating themselves from the the collapsed uh uh status seeking 00:43:23.660 --> 00:43:24.620 activities. 00:43:24.870 --> 00:43:27.430 Um if that makes sense. 00:43:27.750 --> 00:43:27.910 Yeah. 00:43:27.990 --> 00:43:29.670 It's uh yeah. 00:43:29.910 --> 00:43:33.750 So I sort of got uh so I I've I sort of lost track of where we where we were and and what 00:43:33.750 --> 00:43:35.110 the original question was, but who who cares? 00:43:35.590 --> 00:43:36.150 No, it's good. 00:43:36.390 --> 00:43:41.270 It it actually reminds me, so when people go to the zoo often they'll sort of look at 00:43:41.270 --> 00:43:45.110 primate dominance hierarchies, uh humans that is. 00:43:45.430 --> 00:43:51.360 Um and and it sort of seems really dumb, um, you know, because you're sort of 00:43:51.360 --> 00:43:54.640 like, well, why would they be locked into this dominance hierarchy? 00:43:54.800 --> 00:44:00.720 And, you know, I think people sort of really naturally uh find that um they 00:44:00.720 --> 00:44:02.640 really it really rubs them the wrong way. 00:44:02.800 --> 00:44:05.200 And I think that's part of this psychology, right? 00:44:05.360 --> 00:44:11.120 Where um I think what you're describing, where the the status game jiggers up, as you 00:44:11.120 --> 00:44:17.050 say, um, where it's sort of transparent that it is just dominance or power 00:44:17.210 --> 00:44:19.050 or force or coercion. 00:44:19.370 --> 00:44:19.690 Yeah. 00:44:19.930 --> 00:44:23.450 Um, the difference between or greed, yes, exactly. 00:44:24.250 --> 00:44:30.250 Um, number one, those in power historically are always interested in not 00:44:30.250 --> 00:44:31.290 letting that be shown. 00:44:31.370 --> 00:44:36.280 I mean, there's just an enormous amount of history of people not wanting that to be known 00:44:36.360 --> 00:44:40.440 and cracking down on information suggesting that's true. 00:44:41.480 --> 00:44:47.320 You know, you get freedom of information acts on uh um you know declassified 00:44:47.320 --> 00:44:53.240 materials showing that this was um just power and resources were the motivation, 00:44:53.320 --> 00:44:56.200 even though that was not what was uh presented. 00:44:56.520 --> 00:45:00.920 Um but it's also that um yeah, I think, and this comes back to I think the idea of 00:45:00.920 --> 00:45:01.720 coercion, right? 00:45:01.880 --> 00:45:07.830 Where people, because we there's always a third party we can go to and say, look, this 00:45:07.830 --> 00:45:10.150 person is exploitative. 00:45:10.950 --> 00:45:16.870 And that the third party doesn't like that because it's not benefiting them and it's 00:45:16.870 --> 00:45:18.790 diagnostic that you're going to exploit. 00:45:18.870 --> 00:45:21.510 I mean, you in this example, but let's say it's a third party, right? 00:45:21.670 --> 00:45:23.750 Uh uh exploitative jerk. 00:45:23.910 --> 00:45:29.670 Um uh, you know, we're not gonna like the exploitative domineering person because there's 00:45:29.670 --> 00:45:35.320 always a larger set of third parties we can go to who look at that and say, Well, 00:45:35.480 --> 00:45:40.600 they're not benefiting me because I'm just disinterested and they look pretty exploitative. 00:45:40.840 --> 00:45:46.120 Um, and so I wonder if that sort of open flexibility, creativity of 00:45:46.120 --> 00:45:51.960 coalitional entrepreneurship is sort of what's lacking in other to some extent, other 00:45:51.960 --> 00:45:54.840 primates or the dimensions of dominance or status. 00:45:55.080 --> 00:45:59.640 And so when people go to the zoo and they're like, Wow, that seems really horrible. 00:45:59.970 --> 00:46:05.730 Um, and even, you know, like I'm uh rereading some Orwell right now, you know, and I think 00:46:05.730 --> 00:46:11.570 like part of the horror of like Animal Farm is it's this peeling back of uh 00:46:11.730 --> 00:46:17.330 the narrative, the superficial narrative, is that this is really about dominance and power 00:46:17.570 --> 00:46:23.170 and being in this uncomfortable place where somebody is still trying to exert coercion or 00:46:23.170 --> 00:46:24.930 dominance or power over you. 00:46:25.330 --> 00:46:31.180 Um that is just part of human nature is to not want that. 00:46:31.340 --> 00:46:34.700 And I think it's because we have this coalitional flexibility. 00:46:35.340 --> 00:46:37.180 Yes, I I couldn't agree more. 00:46:37.500 --> 00:46:42.940 So when we look at a chimpanzee dominance hierarchy where the alpha male you know 00:46:43.100 --> 00:46:48.140 bosses other people or other chimps around and and gets whatever they want, um it's a 00:46:48.140 --> 00:46:49.100 little more complicated than that. 00:46:49.180 --> 00:46:51.820 Granted, they have to form alliances and keep the peace and break up conflict. 00:46:51.900 --> 00:46:55.290 So it's it's it's kind of analogous to human status hierarchies. 00:46:55.690 --> 00:47:01.370 But it but the dominance is is more overt than than it typically is in human societies. 00:47:02.010 --> 00:47:04.730 And that overtness is really troubling to us. 00:47:04.810 --> 00:47:07.370 It it feels icky, it feels immoral. 00:47:07.850 --> 00:47:12.970 I think a lot of the huge social changes that have happened throughout history have come 00:47:12.970 --> 00:47:18.970 from us seeing a dominance hierarchy for the dominance hierarchy that it in fact was. 00:47:19.450 --> 00:47:25.220 I think having a naked dominance hierarchy in among humans uh is 00:47:25.300 --> 00:47:27.300 some something close to impossible. 00:47:27.540 --> 00:47:33.220 I really think that we always need a moralistic pretext for dominance and for dominance 00:47:33.220 --> 00:47:34.100 hierarchy. 00:47:34.500 --> 00:47:39.140 We always need some kind of sacred narrative, some kind of myth, some kind of utopia or 00:47:39.140 --> 00:47:45.060 dystopia, uh something to justify this hierarchical relationship, this 00:47:45.060 --> 00:47:47.810 dominance uh Dynamic. 00:47:48.450 --> 00:47:53.170 One of the best examples of this, if you think of North Korea, you could not think of a 00:47:53.170 --> 00:47:59.090 clearer example of a dominance hierarchy where Kim is at the top, you know, anyone 00:47:59.090 --> 00:48:01.330 who disobeys him gets killed. 00:48:01.650 --> 00:48:03.490 It's a brutally hierarchical place. 00:48:03.570 --> 00:48:07.170 And do you want to know what the official name of North Korea is? 00:48:07.540 --> 00:48:11.620 the People's Democratic Republic of North Korea. 00:48:11.940 --> 00:48:17.940 So even the most clearly, obviously hierarchical place from our vantage point still refers 00:48:17.940 --> 00:48:20.340 to itself as a democratic place. 00:48:20.980 --> 00:48:22.980 You always need a pretext. 00:48:23.140 --> 00:48:26.420 You know, even take take the recent, you know, the war in Ukraine. 00:48:26.580 --> 00:48:32.500 From our vantage point, it seems pretty obvious that this is a selfish, uh, authoritarian 00:48:32.500 --> 00:48:34.100 land grab by Putin. 00:48:34.180 --> 00:48:39.870 You know, he wants to crush a rising power uh near him that he feels threatened by, 00:48:40.110 --> 00:48:40.430 right? 00:48:41.230 --> 00:48:43.950 It's it's just intergroup dominance, straightforwardly. 00:48:44.110 --> 00:48:47.310 We're gonna conquer this neighboring territory and take their stuff. 00:48:48.830 --> 00:48:53.470 Um, even there, they have to come up with a narrative that we're denazifying Ukraine. 00:48:53.550 --> 00:48:58.190 The reason we're going in there isn't just for pure intergroup dominance, it's for a higher 00:48:58.190 --> 00:48:58.510 purpose. 00:48:58.670 --> 00:49:01.420 It's to get rid of the Nazis, right? 00:49:01.980 --> 00:49:07.740 So I think that it is something close to impossible, maybe even impossible, to create a 00:49:07.740 --> 00:49:12.380 real dominance hierarchy or a real intergroup dominance hierarchy that is brutal and 00:49:12.380 --> 00:49:18.300 coercive without having some kind of shared moral narrative of what's going on. 00:49:18.540 --> 00:49:23.420 And as soon as we start to see through that narrative, as soon as we see the emperor as 00:49:23.420 --> 00:49:26.620 naked, it can collapse and you can get a social revolution. 00:49:26.860 --> 00:49:31.710 And the tragic irony of that happening is that often once that happens, you just get a new 00:49:31.710 --> 00:49:34.030 dominance hierarchy and a new moral narrative. 00:49:34.350 --> 00:49:34.830 Right? 00:49:35.150 --> 00:49:41.070 You look at the, you know, the the socialist revolution in the in Russia, it 00:49:41.070 --> 00:49:44.510 was very much an egalitarian revolution. 00:49:44.670 --> 00:49:50.640 You know, we want to bring equality to the people, we want to help the working class tear 00:49:50.640 --> 00:49:53.440 down hierarchy, tear down the bourgeoisie. 00:49:53.680 --> 00:49:54.800 And what do you know? 00:49:54.960 --> 00:49:59.680 As soon as they rose to power, they became even more brutally hierarchical and coercive and 00:49:59.680 --> 00:50:03.120 tyrannical than the previous system ever was. 00:50:04.640 --> 00:50:08.880 And so that kind of cycle is constantly happening. 00:50:09.360 --> 00:50:15.010 Um and to me, at least, it gives me some hope, 00:50:15.250 --> 00:50:21.010 which suggests that there is f fragility in these kinds of evil systems, 00:50:21.090 --> 00:50:25.570 and that they they kind of disintegrate in the light like vampires do. 00:50:25.810 --> 00:50:30.690 Which which gives us power, I think, to try to see through them and try to say that the 00:50:30.690 --> 00:50:32.450 emperor has no clothes. 00:50:32.530 --> 00:50:35.890 Uh, because that can lead to real social change. 00:50:36.200 --> 00:50:40.280 The tragedy is that often that social change ends up creating the same hierarchy, but just 00:50:40.280 --> 00:50:43.560 in a in a different form, with different people on top and different people on the bottom. 00:50:43.800 --> 00:50:49.240 But hopefully if we learn that that is going to be the outcome, we can try to guard against 00:50:49.240 --> 00:50:49.480 that. 00:50:49.720 --> 00:50:55.640 Um I I don't know how, you know hopeful uh that picture is, but you know, 00:50:55.720 --> 00:51:00.840 at the very least I think it it provides insights into these kinds of dynamics. 00:51:01.240 --> 00:51:02.910 Um yeah. 00:51:03.230 --> 00:51:03.470 Yeah. 00:51:03.630 --> 00:51:09.230 Um one question, and I this might lead into then this another question that is where you're 00:51:09.230 --> 00:51:15.230 going, I think, um, is that you mentioned that everything needs sort of a moral uh 00:51:15.870 --> 00:51:16.910 cast on it. 00:51:17.070 --> 00:51:22.110 Um so even the example of North Korea or even you know the Nazis were fighting the 00:51:22.110 --> 00:51:22.910 communists, right? 00:51:22.990 --> 00:51:28.990 They were they were so exactly um uh uh why do you 00:51:28.990 --> 00:51:29.630 need that? 00:51:30.110 --> 00:51:30.750 Yeah. 00:51:31.420 --> 00:51:37.180 So um as you know, there's a a huge literature and economics and game theory 00:51:37.420 --> 00:51:40.860 showing that collective action is really hard. 00:51:41.180 --> 00:51:46.460 Um not only is it hard to coordinate uh with other people to have you know shared beliefs 00:51:46.460 --> 00:51:52.060 about what the payoffs are to collective action, uh it is hard to get everyone to 00:51:52.060 --> 00:51:55.310 cooperate when there is a free rider problem. 00:51:55.550 --> 00:52:00.830 So if we all work together and create a common benefit and we do we divide the benefits 00:52:00.830 --> 00:52:05.870 equally among us, well then free riders, people who don't participate in the collective 00:52:05.870 --> 00:52:09.870 action but reap the benefits from it, they come out ahead. 00:52:10.910 --> 00:52:15.230 And so there is a perverse incentive to any collective action to not contribute to the 00:52:15.230 --> 00:52:18.350 collective action but still reap the benefits from it. 00:52:20.840 --> 00:52:25.560 and so we in order to solve that problem, we evolved all sorts of you know cognitive and 00:52:25.560 --> 00:52:31.480 and and cultural mechanisms for punishing free riders, for uh um creating narratives that 00:52:31.560 --> 00:52:37.320 um uh broadcast how beneficial it is for us to work together, you know, how uh 00:52:37.480 --> 00:52:42.840 bountiful the rewards are gonna be, um, how wonderful the utopia we're we're pursuing is, 00:52:43.000 --> 00:52:47.370 uh, how bad things are gonna be if we don't work together and avoid this catastrophe. 00:52:47.530 --> 00:52:51.930 We have all sorts of narratives, cognitive systems detecting free riders, detecting 00:52:51.930 --> 00:52:54.650 cheaters, monitoring how much other people are contributing. 00:52:54.810 --> 00:53:00.090 We have a whole wealth of cultural and cognitive adaptations to solve this collective 00:53:00.090 --> 00:53:00.730 action problem. 00:53:00.890 --> 00:53:03.850 And even despite all these adaptations, it still often fails. 00:53:04.090 --> 00:53:09.290 Um, you still often struggle to get people to work together to achieve a collective benefit 00:53:09.690 --> 00:53:11.450 because it's just so hard. 00:53:11.850 --> 00:53:15.700 Uh And the incentives are often perverse. 00:53:16.500 --> 00:53:22.500 So given that we have this collective action problem, if I am contributing 00:53:22.500 --> 00:53:27.620 to a collective benefit in Darwinian terms, and that collective benefit is in the form of 00:53:27.620 --> 00:53:33.090 intergroup dominance or intergroup supremacy, and me 00:53:33.330 --> 00:53:36.450 contributing to that collective benefit makes me look bad. 00:53:36.610 --> 00:53:40.450 If it makes me look like a mean narcissistic Machiavellian status seeker. 00:53:40.770 --> 00:53:43.170 To who that is true to my group members. 00:53:43.490 --> 00:53:44.370 Uh to your other group members. 00:53:44.450 --> 00:53:44.850 Okay, good. 00:53:45.010 --> 00:53:45.170 Yeah. 00:53:45.410 --> 00:53:45.650 Yeah. 00:53:45.810 --> 00:53:51.490 So if I if I am just, you know, coercing and and beating up and being cr needlessly cruel 00:53:51.490 --> 00:53:55.010 to outgroups and just being transparent about you know the only reason I'm doing this is 00:53:55.250 --> 00:53:56.370 because of dominance. 00:53:56.530 --> 00:53:59.090 And um that's gonna make me look bad. 00:53:59.380 --> 00:54:04.740 Or if I'm spreading lies and propaganda to try to mobilize my group to dominate the 00:54:04.740 --> 00:54:08.340 outgroup and I'm spreading out dehumanizing and demonizing narratives. 00:54:08.580 --> 00:54:10.340 And it's transparent that that's my goal. 00:54:10.420 --> 00:54:15.940 I'm just I'm just trying to generate hatred and gain power for myself and for our group, 00:54:16.100 --> 00:54:20.020 um, just just for the sake of just brute dominance. 00:54:20.340 --> 00:54:23.300 I'm gonna look like a real piece of shit. 00:54:24.390 --> 00:54:28.390 And so there are so we have this problem of collection act, collective action that's 00:54:28.390 --> 00:54:29.670 already really hard to solve. 00:54:29.750 --> 00:54:34.950 And if you heap on top of it the idea that contributing to it makes you look bad. 00:54:35.110 --> 00:54:41.110 It makes you look amoral, mean, domineering, well then that just heaps even 00:54:41.110 --> 00:54:41.750 more costs. 00:54:41.990 --> 00:54:45.830 It makes it even more hard to overcome these hurdles of collective action. 00:54:45.990 --> 00:54:49.510 How do I contribute to the collective action if it makes me look like a sociopath? 00:54:50.070 --> 00:54:50.710 Right? 00:54:51.520 --> 00:54:57.360 And so I think the way we solve this problem is through our sacred narratives, that we 00:54:57.360 --> 00:55:02.800 have to seek intergroup dominance without creating common knowledge that we're seeking 00:55:02.800 --> 00:55:04.240 intergroup dominance. 00:55:04.480 --> 00:55:10.400 We have to come up with a sacred narrative that disguises what we're doing in 00:55:10.640 --> 00:55:12.880 moralistic or altruistic terms. 00:55:13.040 --> 00:55:18.370 If our agenda is ultimately self-interested or or in the interests of our group, we have to 00:55:18.370 --> 00:55:21.970 disguise it as being universally benevolent as it helps everyone, it makes the world a 00:55:21.970 --> 00:55:22.770 better place. 00:55:23.090 --> 00:55:28.450 Um if we have to spread demonizing narratives and propaganda to mobilize the group to 00:55:28.450 --> 00:55:30.450 collective action, well, those aren't narratives. 00:55:30.530 --> 00:55:31.890 That's not propaganda, it's just the truth. 00:55:31.970 --> 00:55:36.050 It's just the obvious, unbiased truth, and anyone who disagrees is just crazy or stupid. 00:55:37.000 --> 00:55:43.000 If we're going to exploit or dominate or attack or kill the outgroup, well, we're not doing 00:55:43.000 --> 00:55:43.800 that for dominance. 00:55:43.880 --> 00:55:45.080 We're doing it because they deserve it. 00:55:45.160 --> 00:55:45.640 They're evil. 00:55:45.720 --> 00:55:46.680 They're a threat. 00:55:46.840 --> 00:55:50.920 They're going to destroy us if we don't handle this situation, right? 00:55:52.120 --> 00:55:53.800 They're subhuman. 00:55:55.720 --> 00:55:57.160 It's either them or us. 00:55:58.360 --> 00:55:59.880 So we need these narratives. 00:56:00.150 --> 00:56:04.630 Intergroup dominance could not be possible without these narratives. 00:56:04.950 --> 00:56:09.190 Because as soon as we have this narrative, then all of a sudden there are social benefits 00:56:09.190 --> 00:56:11.110 to contributing to the collective action. 00:56:11.350 --> 00:56:16.710 If what we're su if what we're seeking is a virtuous aim, a virtuous goal, making the world 00:56:16.710 --> 00:56:20.950 a better place, bringing about a utopia, then me contributing to that makes me look good 00:56:20.950 --> 00:56:21.750 rather than bad. 00:56:21.910 --> 00:56:23.670 It makes me look like a virtuous person. 00:56:23.830 --> 00:56:28.630 If if the outgroup is genuinely evil and subhuman and wants to destroy us, well then me 00:56:28.630 --> 00:56:34.260 attacking them makes me look courageous and uh and valiant and noble, 00:56:34.660 --> 00:56:34.980 right? 00:56:35.460 --> 00:56:40.900 And so the presence or the absence of the narrative um makes the 00:56:40.900 --> 00:56:45.700 difference between uh collective action being successful or being a failure. 00:56:46.420 --> 00:56:50.740 With the narrative, I gain lots of status for dominating the outgroup and contributing to 00:56:50.740 --> 00:56:51.460 that goal. 00:56:51.670 --> 00:56:54.790 Without the narrative, I start to look like a sociopath. 00:56:55.590 --> 00:57:01.190 So I think we need these narratives to coordinate uh the the the kinds of evil that has 00:57:01.190 --> 00:57:02.470 been so common throughout history. 00:57:02.550 --> 00:57:06.390 And if you look at all the all the evil that has been so common throughout history, it 00:57:06.390 --> 00:57:08.550 always has a moralistic pretext. 00:57:08.630 --> 00:57:11.910 I'm not familiar with any example where there isn't one there. 00:57:12.180 --> 00:57:12.980 And I've tried. 00:57:13.060 --> 00:57:16.420 I've I've you know, I went on Twitter and I asked like social scientists, academics, do you 00:57:16.420 --> 00:57:20.660 have any example of a group throughout history that has dominated or coerced or been 00:57:20.660 --> 00:57:21.940 violent to an outgroup? 00:57:22.020 --> 00:57:24.340 And they had no moralistic narrative about it at all. 00:57:24.500 --> 00:57:27.860 They were just doing it for pure dominance sake, just to get resources, just to take the 00:57:27.860 --> 00:57:28.980 women, whatever. 00:57:29.140 --> 00:57:34.580 And uh they had no myth or or religious narrative or ideal ideological narrative at all. 00:57:34.740 --> 00:57:39.210 And I couldn't find, I've still yet to find an example that has been convincing. 00:57:41.290 --> 00:57:45.930 I'm open to the possibility that maybe it exists, but it it if it does, it's very rare. 00:57:46.410 --> 00:57:51.210 I think we really need these narratives for collective action to even be possible. 00:57:59.130 --> 00:58:04.540 The more uh we agree on this narrative and share it and repeat it to one another and signal 00:58:04.540 --> 00:58:08.780 that we believe it and that we're true believers, you know, the more powerful and well 00:58:08.860 --> 00:58:12.940 coordinated and cohesive our group becomes, and the more likely our group is to rise in 00:58:12.940 --> 00:58:17.980 status and power uh and and do all the things that would have increased our fitness in 00:58:17.980 --> 00:58:19.500 ancestral environments. 00:58:19.980 --> 00:58:20.380 Yeah. 00:58:20.540 --> 00:58:26.460 Um uh it's interesting because I think there is, though, a bit of a uh a 00:58:26.460 --> 00:58:31.590 mystery and sort of cold Darwinian logic, which is which is 00:58:32.310 --> 00:58:38.150 and I it's and I think um I don't think we're we're disagreeing, 00:58:38.310 --> 00:58:44.230 but I think there's there's still sort of a core question that can still be unpacked, which 00:58:44.230 --> 00:58:50.230 is um if so let's say that we're in a group together and 00:58:50.390 --> 00:58:55.380 um you're exploiting other people for my benefit. 00:58:56.100 --> 00:59:01.780 Why would uh it be important for you or me to 00:59:02.260 --> 00:59:05.940 uh for that to be framed in a moral way? 00:59:06.660 --> 00:59:12.260 Um I think there are arguments for why that is, but I think that's sort of the um because 00:59:12.340 --> 00:59:16.210 it makes sense for well yeah, I'll leave it at that. 00:59:16.290 --> 00:59:21.250 I mean, why would uh that's the question, and I'm sure you've thought of this, but like why 00:59:21.570 --> 00:59:25.250 even because you mentioned this would even be for the people in the group, right? 00:59:25.410 --> 00:59:31.330 Like so the people who are benefiting, why would we need that framing 00:59:31.730 --> 00:59:36.930 if if actually it's in our interest uh to just be exploitative? 00:59:37.490 --> 00:59:38.050 Yeah. 00:59:38.360 --> 00:59:41.480 Well, let's uh think about it at the individual level. 00:59:41.560 --> 00:59:46.040 I'm an individual group member and I'm deciding whether to participate in ganging up on a 00:59:46.040 --> 00:59:51.480 member of of of the out group, um, to you know, exploit them or or or whatever. 00:59:52.920 --> 00:59:57.800 In that decision, ultimately there's a system in my head that's uh assessing what are going 00:59:57.800 --> 01:00:00.120 to be the reputational consequences of this behavior. 01:00:00.280 --> 01:00:03.960 How are people going to see me if I participate in this behavior? 01:00:04.450 --> 01:00:10.450 Um and that is should factor into the cost-benefit calculus over and above 01:00:10.450 --> 01:00:13.490 the existing cost-benefit calculus about collective action itself. 01:00:14.370 --> 01:00:14.690 Right? 01:00:14.930 --> 01:00:17.730 Over and above whether I think they're going to be free riders or whether I think we're 01:00:17.730 --> 01:00:19.410 sufficiently well coordinated or whatever. 01:00:19.570 --> 01:00:23.960 There's this additional layer of what are people going to think of me if I do this. 01:00:24.920 --> 01:00:30.760 Um and on top of that, I have to also think about what other 01:00:30.760 --> 01:00:34.200 people are going to think that other people are going to think of them. 01:00:34.440 --> 01:00:34.600 Right. 01:00:34.840 --> 01:00:38.600 Sorry, that was a complicated no no no it's good, but but just to be concrete, I think what 01:00:38.600 --> 01:00:42.200 you're saying is just uh is that you and I are in a group. 01:00:42.440 --> 01:00:45.000 You're the you're the leader. 01:00:45.320 --> 01:00:51.240 I'm not only considering what how your status machinations are 01:00:51.240 --> 01:00:55.510 affecting me and also how what I'm gonna think of you. 01:00:55.830 --> 01:01:00.070 But part of what I'm gonna think of you is what I think other people will think of you. 01:01:00.790 --> 01:01:01.030 Right. 01:01:01.270 --> 01:01:01.510 Yes. 01:01:01.670 --> 01:01:06.710 If I'm trying to predict your behavior, then I have to get inside your head and and and try 01:01:06.710 --> 01:01:12.150 to predict uh how you will predict other people's 01:01:12.150 --> 01:01:12.870 judgments. 01:01:13.190 --> 01:01:13.750 Exactly. 01:01:13.830 --> 01:01:14.470 Yeah. 01:01:14.980 --> 01:01:19.220 Um and i i i you know, this layer uh it's called meta representation, thoughts about 01:01:19.220 --> 01:01:22.100 thoughts about thoughts about thoughts, or thoughts about other people's thoughts about 01:01:22.100 --> 01:01:24.100 your beliefs, about their desires, about your beliefs. 01:01:24.260 --> 01:01:29.220 We're very good at this kind of meta representation of embedding these uh layers of mental 01:01:29.220 --> 01:01:31.300 states at many different levels. 01:01:31.460 --> 01:01:36.180 Um and I think that is crucially important to collective action. 01:01:36.420 --> 01:01:39.460 So uh I only want to participate in the collective action if other people are 01:01:39.460 --> 01:01:39.860 participating. 01:01:39.940 --> 01:01:43.540 If I'm the only one who's going in there, then it it's it's gonna hurt me if I participate, 01:01:43.780 --> 01:01:44.100 right? 01:01:44.650 --> 01:01:48.810 Um, so what determines whether other people are going to join me? 01:01:49.050 --> 01:01:53.290 Well, what determines that is what their beliefs are about what the payoffs are going to 01:01:53.290 --> 01:01:54.010 be, right? 01:01:54.410 --> 01:01:59.290 And what their beliefs are depends on what they think my beliefs are. 01:02:00.250 --> 01:02:06.170 Um and my beliefs, you know, my beliefs about the uh the payoffs of 01:02:06.170 --> 01:02:09.370 participating depend on my beliefs about their beliefs about my beliefs. 01:02:10.010 --> 01:02:15.780 Uh as so as soon as there's a seed of doubt that's planted in a group, that maybe 01:02:16.740 --> 01:02:20.260 our motivations aren't so noble and high-minded. 01:02:20.500 --> 01:02:25.460 Maybe we're just doing this for tribal or sadistic reasons. 01:02:26.500 --> 01:02:31.380 Even if there's a little bit of doubt, even if I suspect that, then all of a sudden I start 01:02:31.380 --> 01:02:34.100 to suspect that other people might have had the same thought. 01:02:34.500 --> 01:02:37.940 And then I might suspect that they suspect that I've had that thought. 01:02:38.270 --> 01:02:42.110 And as soon as that seed of doubt is planted, it can be like an acid that eats through the 01:02:42.110 --> 01:02:42.590 entire group. 01:02:42.750 --> 01:02:46.270 Because now all of a sudden I'm doubting whether I will actually get status if I 01:02:46.270 --> 01:02:48.990 participate in ganging up on this member of the outgroup. 01:02:49.150 --> 01:02:53.390 If I'll if I'll actually look noble and brave, or whether I'll look sociopathic and cruel. 01:02:54.110 --> 01:02:56.270 So that doubt can feed on itself. 01:02:58.270 --> 01:03:04.220 So I think that common knowledge of reality can destroy the incentives 01:03:04.220 --> 01:03:10.220 that are necessary to engage uh in uh outgroup cruelty or uh 01:03:10.380 --> 01:03:11.980 intergroup dominance. 01:03:13.900 --> 01:03:18.140 So I think we need the narrative in order for the collective action to be possible. 01:03:18.380 --> 01:03:21.420 And so, yes, there are costs to being deceived about that. 01:03:21.580 --> 01:03:27.500 So if I see you ganging up on the outgroup and um I perceive you as a brave and virtuous 01:03:27.500 --> 01:03:32.610 person for doing that, um, in some sense, I've been deceived about your character. 01:03:32.770 --> 01:03:37.170 I might trust you in other social interactions more than I otherwise would. 01:03:37.410 --> 01:03:41.330 I might be inclined to cooperate with you more than I should. 01:03:43.010 --> 01:03:48.770 But if we're in intense intergroup competition, and whoever wins the competition is the 01:03:48.770 --> 01:03:53.810 group that is more mobilized and cohesive and motivated and committed, where the incentives 01:03:53.810 --> 01:03:59.320 for contributing to the collective action are really high, then the benefits of succeeding 01:03:59.320 --> 01:04:04.920 in that intergroup competition are going to outweigh the costs of being deceived about your 01:04:04.920 --> 01:04:05.880 character. 01:04:06.440 --> 01:04:06.760 Right? 01:04:07.000 --> 01:04:10.120 It's just straightforward cost-benefit calculus. 01:04:10.360 --> 01:04:15.000 When the stakes of the intergroup competition are higher, then I can accept more false 01:04:15.000 --> 01:04:16.760 information about my group. 01:04:16.920 --> 01:04:17.720 Because it's worth it. 01:04:17.880 --> 01:04:22.600 It's worth the deception that we can we can be sufficiently mobilized to outcompete the 01:04:22.600 --> 01:04:23.800 rival group. 01:04:24.690 --> 01:04:27.090 Or at least that's the argument that I make in the paper. 01:04:27.170 --> 01:04:27.250 Yeah. 01:04:27.570 --> 01:04:32.850 That in certain situations of intense intergroup competition, the costs of false 01:04:32.850 --> 01:04:37.730 information about the group and about group members' character can be 01:04:37.730 --> 01:04:43.010 outweighed by the benefits of successful intergroup competition. 01:04:43.970 --> 01:04:44.130 Yeah. 01:04:44.210 --> 01:04:46.610 And even I would say, even if it's not false, right? 01:04:46.690 --> 01:04:51.570 I mean, there's also this thing of uh, and I think this occurs at every scale of social 01:04:51.570 --> 01:04:52.530 interaction. 01:04:53.480 --> 01:04:58.600 there's sort of, well, what in a very again kind of cold Darwinian sense, sort of a 01:04:58.600 --> 01:05:01.800 transactional thing of sort of, well, what does this person afford? 01:05:02.360 --> 01:05:08.360 And if you are uh somebody who's pretty high in dominance, then you sort 01:05:08.360 --> 01:05:13.400 of say, well, look, this is person is really helpful, or they can apply that skill 01:05:14.520 --> 01:05:17.770 to to when it's useful for me, right? 01:05:18.010 --> 01:05:23.610 And um and so that becomes sort of a a thing in a market, in a social market, right? 01:05:23.770 --> 01:05:26.010 But then I don't want it directed at me. 01:05:26.090 --> 01:05:27.050 And so there's two things. 01:05:27.210 --> 01:05:33.130 One is if if you are sort of a a simple dominance uh uh robot 01:05:33.290 --> 01:05:38.700 where you're just sort of exerting dominance uh all over the place, then I should want to 01:05:38.700 --> 01:05:43.100 keep you around when the inner group conflict occurs, and I'm gonna keep you at arm's 01:05:43.100 --> 01:05:44.060 length otherwise. 01:05:44.220 --> 01:05:46.540 Um and there might be design to do that. 01:05:46.700 --> 01:05:51.820 Um and there's sort of roles then, you sort of an implicit roles of sort of, well, here's 01:05:51.820 --> 01:05:56.300 what this person's set of skills are good for, how they might exploit me versus others. 01:05:56.460 --> 01:06:00.460 And I want to direct the I want to direct or the bit direct the business end of their 01:06:00.460 --> 01:06:03.180 exploitation towards others and not towards me. 01:06:03.420 --> 01:06:09.370 Um But then there's the the other part too is then you know if you there's also then 01:06:09.370 --> 01:06:14.970 just partner choice where you know you if you are dominant um there might be 01:06:14.970 --> 01:06:19.530 selection in you to sort of signal when you're gonna be dominant if you need to recruit 01:06:19.530 --> 01:06:24.810 allies and the people that you're actually you're not you could either you know actively 01:06:24.810 --> 01:06:30.180 signal I'm not gonna um uh be dominant towards you or just you know, just signal your 01:06:30.260 --> 01:06:31.860 dominant towards the outgroup. 01:06:31.940 --> 01:06:37.620 And so um uh, you know, selectivity in terms of, and this comes back to that target 01:06:37.620 --> 01:06:39.140 specificity thing, right? 01:06:39.380 --> 01:06:45.300 Um, of who the target of the dominance is, um, I think will be really 01:06:45.300 --> 01:06:47.540 important um for the system. 01:06:48.660 --> 01:06:50.340 I would agree that's important. 01:06:50.580 --> 01:06:56.250 Um, but it's also important um what the reason is for the 01:06:56.250 --> 01:06:57.050 dominance. 01:06:57.850 --> 01:07:03.370 So yeah, and is that and is that because and so this is this is something still a little 01:07:03.450 --> 01:07:05.450 I'm still a little less clear on. 01:07:05.610 --> 01:07:11.370 So is it that to just make it concrete, if I'm in your group and I'm benefiting from the 01:07:11.370 --> 01:07:16.810 basis of the d the of the dominance, even if it's, you know, um but 01:07:17.050 --> 01:07:22.900 I'm also thinking, well uh if other people won't be. 01:07:23.940 --> 01:07:24.500 Right. 01:07:24.980 --> 01:07:25.940 So I have two options. 01:07:26.100 --> 01:07:31.540 Let's say there's a choice where David is going to do something that's going to benefit me, 01:07:31.780 --> 01:07:34.980 but I think third parties will find it morally reprehensible. 01:07:35.060 --> 01:07:40.900 It'll, they'll find it disgusting because it'll um it'll it'll it'll cue to 01:07:40.900 --> 01:07:42.340 them exploitation. 01:07:42.900 --> 01:07:47.770 There's another part which is that David's going to do something that's going to benefit 01:07:47.770 --> 01:07:48.090 me. 01:07:48.970 --> 01:07:54.730 Um, but he's also talking about it in a way, and the way it's presented is 01:07:54.890 --> 01:08:00.410 my model of third parties is it's not going to elicit strong exploitative 01:08:00.410 --> 01:08:01.050 cues. 01:08:01.850 --> 01:08:07.210 It's in my interest, even though both things equally benefit me, it's in my interest to 01:08:07.210 --> 01:08:10.490 care about and prefer the second option. 01:08:10.890 --> 01:08:11.370 Exactly. 01:08:11.850 --> 01:08:17.740 Because there's always a larger coalitional people don't want there 01:08:17.740 --> 01:08:19.180 to be exploitation. 01:08:19.340 --> 01:08:24.780 And so even if we are super dominant, why would we run the 01:08:24.780 --> 01:08:30.460 risk of of such naked dominance that third parties, which there 01:08:30.540 --> 01:08:34.780 always are third parties, um in addition to the victims, yes. 01:08:34.860 --> 01:08:38.060 Um uh to to just give them ammunition. 01:08:38.220 --> 01:08:39.810 Why would we not write? 01:08:39.970 --> 01:08:42.450 And I that's I think you you agree. 01:08:42.610 --> 01:08:43.650 It sounds like you agree with that. 01:08:43.730 --> 01:08:43.890 Yeah. 01:08:43.970 --> 01:08:44.130 Yeah. 01:08:44.450 --> 01:08:44.690 Absolutely. 01:08:44.770 --> 01:08:45.970 That's a that's a great way of putting it. 01:08:46.050 --> 01:08:46.290 Yeah. 01:08:46.450 --> 01:08:46.930 Yeah. 01:08:47.250 --> 01:08:51.330 So where does this so now we we so now we're at great. 01:08:51.490 --> 01:08:52.530 We're I got it. 01:08:52.690 --> 01:08:58.450 Um so now um for those of us who are um on 01:08:58.690 --> 01:09:02.100 board, what what going forward? 01:09:02.340 --> 01:09:06.900 So um, you know, there's sort of these jokes, you know, I wouldn't want to be a member of a 01:09:06.900 --> 01:09:12.820 group that, you know, would take me uh as a member uh for this kind of thing, 01:09:12.980 --> 01:09:18.580 um, given that everything is sort of uh everything is intrinsically sort of a 01:09:18.580 --> 01:09:22.820 status game in some way or another, becoming aware of that. 01:09:22.900 --> 01:09:28.750 Um, Have you thought about sort of what's the punchline in terms of what are things to 01:09:28.750 --> 01:09:29.710 look out for? 01:09:30.030 --> 01:09:36.030 Or um you know, or is this this sort of a 01:09:36.190 --> 01:09:40.750 um I don't want to go on too much of a tangent, but there's sort of two, there's two 01:09:40.750 --> 01:09:41.390 metaphors. 01:09:41.550 --> 01:09:45.870 One is sort of there's a solid fixed set of rules and another is it's sort of like a 01:09:45.870 --> 01:09:46.670 bicycle. 01:09:47.470 --> 01:09:53.360 The people who uh the people who invented um the airplane were were Orville and 01:09:53.360 --> 01:09:56.560 Wilbur uh right, and they were bicycle mechanics. 01:09:56.640 --> 01:10:01.600 And the argument is that you couldn't get a static fixed thing to fly, and people were 01:10:01.600 --> 01:10:05.680 constantly trying, and it was actually no accident that bicycle mechanics invented the 01:10:05.680 --> 01:10:10.000 airplane because what you needed in an airplane was real-time correction, um, because it's 01:10:10.000 --> 01:10:12.160 just too complicated um otherwise. 01:10:12.320 --> 01:10:15.290 Um and so, and and that's the way a bicycle works. 01:10:15.370 --> 01:10:18.410 You can't keep it upright except with just minor real-time correction. 01:10:18.570 --> 01:10:23.210 And so that's a long-winded way of saying is the alternative, and excuse the digression, is 01:10:23.210 --> 01:10:27.930 the alternative sort of a bicycle metaphor where there's not really a fixed set of rules 01:10:27.930 --> 01:10:33.930 for how do we um avoid status schemes, but it's just this idea that we're sort of given 01:10:33.930 --> 01:10:38.360 that there's always this dynamic, There's sort of always corrections on it, or are there 01:10:38.440 --> 01:10:44.200 sort of um ways to sort of check uh the status game 01:10:44.200 --> 01:10:45.880 running rampant or hurting people? 01:10:46.040 --> 01:10:47.560 Um I'm curious what you think. 01:10:48.120 --> 01:10:51.800 If I'm understanding your question correctly, it's what's what does it matter? 01:10:52.040 --> 01:10:54.760 What's the point of all the all this knowledge? 01:10:54.840 --> 01:10:56.760 What are we gonna do with this information? 01:10:57.560 --> 01:11:03.370 How are we gonna use it to lead our lives differently if if if we do, do we ignore it? 01:11:03.450 --> 01:11:04.170 I don't know. 01:11:04.890 --> 01:11:06.090 That's the question. 01:11:06.970 --> 01:11:08.890 The short answer is I don't fucking know. 01:11:09.050 --> 01:11:09.370 Yeah. 01:11:10.890 --> 01:11:12.730 I'm just trying to figure out how things work. 01:11:13.210 --> 01:11:14.330 I'm not a philosopher. 01:11:14.490 --> 01:11:20.170 I'm not, you know, uh I don't have all the answers on on the meaning of life or or or how 01:11:20.170 --> 01:11:21.130 to live it. 01:11:21.930 --> 01:11:26.250 So that's my my first instinct how to answer that question. 01:11:27.770 --> 01:11:33.420 My second way to answer that question uh involves 01:11:33.580 --> 01:11:39.500 just reflecting on the status games we play, not 01:11:39.820 --> 01:11:45.180 from a perspective of despair or nihilism, but from 01:11:45.820 --> 01:11:49.180 a perspective of this is the way reality works. 01:11:49.340 --> 01:11:52.540 We now have a better understanding of how reality works. 01:11:52.780 --> 01:11:56.620 How with this knowledge can we make better choices? 01:11:57.180 --> 01:12:03.010 Um so one thing I've been thinking about is what does it mean for a status 01:12:03.010 --> 01:12:04.930 game to be good or bad? 01:12:05.250 --> 01:12:11.090 Certainly there are differences uh in the types of status games that 01:12:11.090 --> 01:12:15.810 contribute to collective uh benefits and improvements, not just for the players of the 01:12:15.810 --> 01:12:18.530 status game themselves, but for society as a whole. 01:12:18.850 --> 01:12:24.520 And there are some status games that are quite toxic and destructive and generate 01:12:24.520 --> 01:12:29.000 costs, uh, not just for the status seekers themselves, but for society as a whole. 01:12:29.640 --> 01:12:33.800 And so I think understanding that everything is a status game or everything is bullshit to 01:12:33.800 --> 01:12:39.800 slightly oversimplify uh is that we can gain some insights into which 01:12:40.120 --> 01:12:44.570 status competitions are worth engaging in and which ones aren't. 01:12:44.810 --> 01:12:48.730 Now, I have no illusions that this type of information is going to create a radical 01:12:48.730 --> 01:12:52.570 transformation in society because people have incentives to play the status games that 01:12:52.570 --> 01:12:53.290 they're likely to win. 01:12:53.370 --> 01:12:57.210 And if I come along and say that your status game is toxic and stupid, uh, well, they're 01:12:57.210 --> 01:12:59.610 gonna say, fuck you, I'm gonna play it anyway, because I'm likely to win. 01:12:59.690 --> 01:13:02.330 And I, you know, I'm an ape and I ultimately want status. 01:13:02.650 --> 01:13:06.090 And uh, yeah, your status might game might be better for the world, but what do I care 01:13:06.090 --> 01:13:06.410 about that? 01:13:06.490 --> 01:13:08.000 I care about getting status for myself. 01:13:08.080 --> 01:13:09.680 That's what I evolved to care about. 01:13:10.080 --> 01:13:15.360 Or at least that's what the unconscious part of all of us is thinking metaphorically. 01:13:16.720 --> 01:13:21.120 So I have no illusions that that knowledge of this stuff will radically lead to human 01:13:21.120 --> 01:13:22.960 betterment and human flourishing. 01:13:23.120 --> 01:13:25.520 But I think it might make some improvements at the margin. 01:13:25.760 --> 01:13:29.680 So for people who are on the fence, who are, you know, say young and or or they're having a 01:13:29.680 --> 01:13:32.960 midlife crisis or or or they're deciding like what am I going to do with my life? 01:13:33.040 --> 01:13:35.760 What what are what are the status games that I'm going to participate in? 01:13:35.920 --> 01:13:41.490 Um For those people where they're on the fence and information like this might actually tip 01:13:41.490 --> 01:13:44.850 them one way or the other, it might be useful to say, hey, this status game is actually 01:13:44.850 --> 01:13:45.410 better for society. 01:13:45.490 --> 01:13:46.290 Maybe I should play this one. 01:13:46.370 --> 01:13:48.930 You know, if all else is equal, might as well play the better one. 01:13:49.170 --> 01:13:53.810 Um, so I think it could lead to those kinds of improvements at the margin. 01:13:54.690 --> 01:13:59.570 Um, and I think that realistically, if you're a social scientist, that's all you can you 01:13:59.570 --> 01:14:02.690 should hope for uh and all you really can hope for. 01:14:03.010 --> 01:14:08.280 I think uh there's often um a misplaced sense of utopianism in the social 01:14:08.280 --> 01:14:14.040 sciences that can uh paradoxically uh lead to 01:14:14.040 --> 01:14:16.280 disastrous uh outcomes and dystopias. 01:14:16.360 --> 01:14:20.600 You know, eugenics was a very utopian movement and it led to a living nightmare. 01:14:20.760 --> 01:14:24.920 Um, so I think we've got to be very careful with utopian ideas, and we have to do uh what 01:14:24.920 --> 01:14:29.800 Tyler Cowen preaches on his blog, Marginal Revolution, uh, which is pursue marginal 01:14:29.800 --> 01:14:32.120 revolutions, look at changes on the margin. 01:14:32.410 --> 01:14:38.170 Um so what are so I raised this topic of uh good versus bad status 01:14:38.170 --> 01:14:38.730 games. 01:14:38.970 --> 01:14:40.330 I'm still thinking about this. 01:14:40.490 --> 01:14:46.490 My thoughts are still tentative and open to revision, but I think it's probably uh 01:14:47.050 --> 01:14:50.250 fair to say that science is a good status game. 01:14:50.570 --> 01:14:54.010 It might be depressing for some people to hear that science is ultimately a status game and 01:14:54.010 --> 01:14:57.050 not a high-minded quest for knowledge and wisdom. 01:14:58.060 --> 01:14:59.980 I think it ultimately is a status game. 01:15:00.300 --> 01:15:02.620 Those are the incentives that shape its trajectory. 01:15:02.780 --> 01:15:05.500 If you change the status incentives, you will change the outcome of science. 01:15:05.660 --> 01:15:09.500 As we've seen with the replication crisis, if you get status for pumping out lots of low 01:15:09.580 --> 01:15:12.300 quality publications that are unlikely to replicate, then guess what? 01:15:12.380 --> 01:15:15.820 You're gonna have you're gonna have lots of low quality publications that fail to 01:15:15.820 --> 01:15:16.540 replicate. 01:15:16.780 --> 01:15:21.890 If you change the status incentives and reward people not for pumping out counterintuitive, 01:15:21.970 --> 01:15:25.010 flashy findings that don't replicate, and you reward them instead for producing high 01:15:25.090 --> 01:15:29.490 quality work and insightful uh theories, then maybe you'll get that. 01:15:29.570 --> 01:15:34.050 So we have to figure out how to change the status incentives of science so that we get uh 01:15:34.050 --> 01:15:35.650 better results. 01:15:36.370 --> 01:15:39.410 Um, so science is a good status game, I think. 01:15:39.810 --> 01:15:41.810 It's not perfect, it certainly has its problems. 01:15:41.970 --> 01:15:46.660 Certainly in psychology it has a lot of problems, and we can uh make some changes to try to 01:15:46.660 --> 01:15:47.780 solve those problems. 01:15:48.020 --> 01:15:50.100 Um, what's another good status game? 01:15:50.260 --> 01:15:54.820 Um, I think uh markets are a good status game. 01:15:54.980 --> 01:15:59.620 Uh I know a lot of people in academia are uh, you know, have some antipathy towards 01:15:59.620 --> 01:16:00.980 capitalism and towards markets. 01:16:01.060 --> 01:16:03.300 So I understand this is not a popular view. 01:16:03.460 --> 01:16:09.430 Um, but I think if you look at the history of capitalism and the increases it has caused in 01:16:09.430 --> 01:16:12.950 our standard of living, it is a pretty damn good status game. 01:16:13.270 --> 01:16:17.590 You have people competing to provide goods and services to other people at more and more 01:16:17.590 --> 01:16:22.470 affordable prices, that is going to lead to better and better results over time, more 01:16:22.550 --> 01:16:26.950 innovation, more things that people want and like at more and more affordable prices. 01:16:27.110 --> 01:16:31.300 That has pretty positive results for society. 01:16:32.340 --> 01:16:38.020 Why people are so uh hostile towards markets and capitalism is another interesting 01:16:38.020 --> 01:16:39.140 psychological question. 01:16:39.300 --> 01:16:43.300 I think it has to do with the overtness of the status seeking, which you know we talked 01:16:43.300 --> 01:16:44.500 about previously. 01:16:44.740 --> 01:16:48.260 Um businesses are profit-seeking entities. 01:16:48.500 --> 01:16:51.860 Money is a kind of status, and so if all they care about is profit, then they look really 01:16:51.860 --> 01:16:53.140 icky and ugly. 01:16:53.620 --> 01:16:56.020 Uh, and we don't want to be associated with that. 01:16:56.270 --> 01:16:57.950 And so what do businesses have to do? 01:16:58.190 --> 01:17:01.710 No business in their mission statement says our mission is to seek profit. 01:17:01.870 --> 01:17:06.510 No, they say our mission is to bring joy into people's lives or to follow grandma's uh 01:17:06.510 --> 01:17:11.870 recipe or, you know, build sustainable communities, whatever high-minded bullshit you see 01:17:11.870 --> 01:17:14.510 on corporate mission statements or values statements, right? 01:17:14.670 --> 01:17:18.350 The corporation can't just say that it's that it wants to make as much money as possible 01:17:18.430 --> 01:17:23.140 because then it it will, you know, look bad and people will not want to work for the 01:17:23.140 --> 01:17:26.580 company and people won't want to buy the goods or services produced by that company. 01:17:26.660 --> 01:17:28.420 So it needs a high-minded narrative. 01:17:28.500 --> 01:17:30.740 The problem is that everyone sees through it. 01:17:30.980 --> 01:17:34.420 We all know that at the end of the day, businesses want our money. 01:17:34.580 --> 01:17:36.260 And that makes it icky and ugly. 01:17:36.340 --> 01:17:40.660 And that makes capitalism itself, despite it producing wonderful, bountiful benefits for 01:17:40.660 --> 01:17:46.270 us, in the form of a beautifully uh rich and colorful standard of living 01:17:46.430 --> 01:17:52.350 with you know technologies and tools and riches beyond the wildest dreams of our 01:17:52.350 --> 01:17:52.910 ancestors. 01:17:53.070 --> 01:17:57.390 Despite all that, because the status seeking is overt and out in the open and on the 01:17:57.390 --> 01:18:01.950 surface, it looks icky and we don't like it, and we gain status by being anti-capitalist. 01:18:02.110 --> 01:18:04.510 I think that is a huge mistake. 01:18:04.830 --> 01:18:10.440 Um it saddens me uh that uh academia has taken that kind of 01:18:10.440 --> 01:18:11.640 anti-capitalist approach. 01:18:11.800 --> 01:18:14.280 Granted, you can talk about the costs of capitalism. 01:18:14.520 --> 01:18:16.600 Certainly it has negative externalities. 01:18:16.760 --> 01:18:19.400 You we could talk about ways of of fixing it with government intervention. 01:18:19.480 --> 01:18:21.160 That that all that's all fine. 01:18:21.320 --> 01:18:24.040 Um, but you have to acknowledge the benefits too, right? 01:18:24.200 --> 01:18:28.520 You you you have to have a realistic understanding of how reality works. 01:18:28.760 --> 01:18:34.090 Um and even the the goals that that progressives came, you know, claim to care about, like 01:18:34.090 --> 01:18:35.210 equality between groups. 01:18:35.370 --> 01:18:40.010 There's no greater engine of equality and tolerance of outgroups than capitalism. 01:18:40.250 --> 01:18:44.570 There's tons of research on this, that exposure to a market economy makes you more tolerant 01:18:44.570 --> 01:18:49.450 of outgroups, less willing to exploit them, because it is straightforwardly incentivized. 01:18:49.610 --> 01:18:52.650 If I only trade with members of my group, I'm going to make less money. 01:18:52.900 --> 01:18:56.340 If I only hire members of my group, I'm going to have fewer job candidates. 01:18:56.580 --> 01:18:59.780 If I only work for members of my group, I'm going to have fewer job offers. 01:18:59.940 --> 01:19:03.780 If I only buy stuff from members of my group, I'm going to get shittier products. 01:19:04.020 --> 01:19:09.540 Capitalism directively incentivizes the destruction of intergroup boundaries and 01:19:09.540 --> 01:19:10.660 intergroup barriers. 01:19:10.980 --> 01:19:16.900 It is not only one of the most powerful mechanisms for alleviating poverty, it is the most 01:19:16.900 --> 01:19:21.450 powerful mechanism for breaking down intergroup boundaries and for creating economic 01:19:21.450 --> 01:19:24.650 interdependence between countries and disincentivizing war. 01:19:24.810 --> 01:19:30.570 So it gets progressives all the things they want: reducing poverty, creating 01:19:30.570 --> 01:19:35.930 intergroup equality, reducing the uh benefits of war, and yet they hate it. 01:19:36.090 --> 01:19:42.010 And that to me is one of the greatest tragedies of progressive ideology at this moment in 01:19:42.010 --> 01:19:42.330 time. 01:19:42.730 --> 01:19:44.600 So I went off on a huge tangent there. 01:19:44.680 --> 01:19:44.840 Sorry. 01:19:45.320 --> 01:19:45.640 It's good. 01:19:45.800 --> 01:19:50.840 No, and we we should have a larger conversation because I think, you know, um uh um you 01:19:50.840 --> 01:19:56.680 know um I do think that uh there's also a distinction and 01:19:56.680 --> 01:20:02.680 maybe we can have this discussion um next time or or soon um there is also distinction 01:20:02.760 --> 01:20:07.390 sort of between um free market and capitalism. 01:20:07.550 --> 01:20:08.350 Um right. 01:20:08.430 --> 01:20:13.870 And I think one of the criticisms of capitalism, I think everything you're saying is right, 01:20:14.270 --> 01:20:19.150 um within certain s circumspect boundaries. 01:20:19.390 --> 01:20:24.990 Um but if you look at um sort of the externalities 01:20:25.230 --> 01:20:30.750 um of uh an interest in making profit um 01:20:31.390 --> 01:20:36.980 the the entities that are um you know there's a really 01:20:36.980 --> 01:20:42.740 interesting uh history of sort of even what corporate law is, um, and and sort of that, 01:20:42.900 --> 01:20:48.580 you know, it's the there's institutional selection for the externalities 01:20:48.660 --> 01:20:49.620 don't matter. 01:20:49.780 --> 01:20:54.500 Uh, and what matters is profitability and maximizing profitability. 01:20:54.580 --> 01:20:56.980 And so, you know, people talk about it doesn't even matter. 01:20:57.140 --> 01:21:03.070 Everybody in the in the institution can be well intended, but still the the 01:21:03.070 --> 01:21:07.950 institutional selection is um selects for a certain thing. 01:21:08.030 --> 01:21:12.270 And as we know from from natural selection, you know, whatever the selection pressure is, 01:21:12.590 --> 01:21:13.710 intentions be damned. 01:21:13.870 --> 01:21:16.110 That will be sort of what what's created. 01:21:16.190 --> 01:21:21.870 And so um uh yeah I think there's a larger um sort of discussion to have about 01:21:22.030 --> 01:21:27.800 um is is a corporation or is a modern corporation 01:21:27.800 --> 01:21:33.800 that's protected by the force of the state um or that's exploiting um as as 01:21:33.800 --> 01:21:39.000 a as sort of an externality um you know um uh is that 01:21:40.520 --> 01:21:45.800 is that what people mean by capitalism if so then there's a really fair argument against it 01:21:45.880 --> 01:21:51.400 because it's actually not a free market um system and I think that's where 01:21:51.880 --> 01:21:56.570 um you know, I uh I think that's where there's there's a reasonable argument. 01:21:56.650 --> 01:22:01.530 So you don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater that you don't um and I think uh 01:22:01.690 --> 01:22:03.610 yeah, I think I'll I'll leave it at that. 01:22:04.010 --> 01:22:04.810 Uh yeah, no. 01:22:05.130 --> 01:22:07.610 Wow, who would have thought we'd have we'd have gone in this direction, but yeah, I'm I'm 01:22:07.690 --> 01:22:08.010 game. 01:22:08.090 --> 01:22:08.570 Let's go for it. 01:22:08.650 --> 01:22:08.810 Yeah. 01:22:08.890 --> 01:22:12.490 Um so yeah, I love that distinction between markets and capitalism. 01:22:12.570 --> 01:22:14.650 There's actually a great book on this topic. 01:22:14.730 --> 01:22:19.370 I forget the author is called uh Markets Without Capitalism, I want to say, or Markets Not 01:22:19.370 --> 01:22:20.090 Capitalism. 01:22:20.650 --> 01:22:26.600 Um And they distinguish between open competition between businesses to provide 01:22:26.600 --> 01:22:31.320 goods and services and voluntary association or consumption of their goods and services, 01:22:31.640 --> 01:22:37.400 and uh capitalism uh under places like the United States, 01:22:37.640 --> 01:22:42.520 where you have the biggest businesses often colluding with the government to entrench their 01:22:42.520 --> 01:22:44.280 position and entrench their power. 01:22:44.520 --> 01:22:50.470 And often you get regulatory capture where they pass uh uh regulatory barriers to 01:22:50.470 --> 01:22:53.110 prevent competitors from entering into the industry. 01:22:53.270 --> 01:22:56.710 They try to get you know occupational licenses that makes it harder to get a job of that 01:22:56.710 --> 01:22:59.990 industry, which increases the salaries of people in that industry industry. 01:23:00.070 --> 01:23:05.110 So you get all sorts of collusion between the biggest players in any uh market and the 01:23:05.110 --> 01:23:06.470 government itself. 01:23:06.790 --> 01:23:10.710 Uh and that I think is often what people are objecting to with capitalism. 01:23:11.110 --> 01:23:16.720 It's it's the uh um abuse of state power uh by uh 01:23:16.960 --> 01:23:21.840 uh big businesses and and major players and and the industry and the uh corruption and 01:23:21.840 --> 01:23:26.160 collusion between them yeah uh and the government that a lot of people I think correctly 01:23:26.400 --> 01:23:26.960 object to. 01:23:27.360 --> 01:23:27.760 That's right. 01:23:27.920 --> 01:23:32.400 Yeah yeah corporate corporate welfare essentially to put to put it simply yeah. 01:23:33.120 --> 01:23:33.520 Yes. 01:23:33.680 --> 01:23:34.000 Yes. 01:23:34.160 --> 01:23:38.290 So that's that's an important caveat that I don't think that is a good status game. 01:23:38.450 --> 01:23:40.450 I think that's a very bad status game. 01:23:40.610 --> 01:23:46.370 What I think is a good status game is the kind of open competition uh that is where where 01:23:47.010 --> 01:23:53.010 the competition is not um unfair at the start, where where the big players don't have a 01:23:53.010 --> 01:23:56.850 pre existing advantage because they're cozying up to people in government. 01:23:57.010 --> 01:23:57.170 Right. 01:23:57.330 --> 01:23:57.490 Right. 01:23:57.650 --> 01:24:00.930 That's that's the kind of status game that I think ultimately results in collective 01:24:00.930 --> 01:24:04.530 betterment and improvements in our standard of living, where whoever has the best goods and 01:24:04.530 --> 01:24:05.490 services wins. 01:24:05.740 --> 01:24:09.820 You know, whoever can produce them, you know, efficiently with the lowest price and the 01:24:10.140 --> 01:24:13.260 whoever, you know, produces the best stuff, they get the richest. 01:24:13.420 --> 01:24:15.740 You know, that is a is a good status game. 01:24:15.900 --> 01:24:21.900 But if I have a if I'm a big player in the industry and I use the government to entrench uh 01:24:22.060 --> 01:24:27.980 our interests and and and have a kind of monopolistic grab over that industry, then that 01:24:27.980 --> 01:24:28.860 is bad. 01:24:29.020 --> 01:24:32.460 Um so yeah, important distinctions to be made there for sure. 01:24:32.700 --> 01:24:38.470 Um And it's an interesting overall political conversation to be 01:24:38.470 --> 01:24:38.710 had. 01:24:38.950 --> 01:24:44.950 But the broader point is just that if we're going to be good progressives and 01:24:44.950 --> 01:24:50.230 try to think about the negative externalities that market competition is creating, and if 01:24:50.230 --> 01:24:54.310 we're going to try to create wise government interventions, which I think the progressive 01:24:54.310 --> 01:24:58.870 movement is all about, and I think that's a legitimate goal, then you have to acknowledge 01:24:58.920 --> 01:25:02.600 that in addition to the negative externalities that are happening, there are extraordinary 01:25:02.600 --> 01:25:03.480 benefits. 01:25:03.960 --> 01:25:07.960 Um and you have to have some perspective as well and not just want to, you know, throw out 01:25:07.960 --> 01:25:11.240 the entire system or burn it all to the ground. 01:25:11.560 --> 01:25:14.680 Um so Yeah, no, no, yeah, yeah. 01:25:14.840 --> 01:25:17.480 Yeah, no, I I I agree with that. 01:25:17.640 --> 01:25:23.250 And and so swinging back then, the argument would be that more information 01:25:23.490 --> 01:25:29.410 about the externalities of status schemes, um, and and sort of laying 01:25:29.410 --> 01:25:29.730 bare. 01:25:30.370 --> 01:25:34.770 I mean, almost it's sort of a cartoonish view of the world, but sort of the idea would be 01:25:34.770 --> 01:25:40.210 that um uh to the extent that there's sort of disinterested third parties are sort of like, 01:25:40.450 --> 01:25:43.970 here are the status games, you young person growing up in the world. 01:25:44.130 --> 01:25:48.780 Here is what exists, here are their externalities, and you just sort of shop for them. 01:25:48.860 --> 01:25:54.780 And then some combination of, well, here is my interest in proclivities, and I think I 01:25:54.780 --> 01:25:57.580 could do well in this, or maybe you you narrow it down. 01:25:57.740 --> 01:26:02.140 Um, that sort of is all happening implicitly now, uh, or not at all. 01:26:02.300 --> 01:26:07.660 But the idea would sort of be, and again, I don't, I don't, I'm not suggesting this is a 01:26:07.660 --> 01:26:12.730 realistic thing, but in an ideal world, it would just be sort of more information about we 01:26:12.810 --> 01:26:18.810 we all acknowledge that these are all status games um and uh and then it's just 01:26:18.810 --> 01:26:24.330 information about which ones fit you and then which what externalities there are um 01:26:24.650 --> 01:26:29.850 to them both within uh and across so I mean you know the 01:26:29.850 --> 01:26:35.450 externalities within of science uh there's a there's this long 01:26:35.610 --> 01:26:40.650 standing thing that's kind of going by the wayside now of or ideally of 01:26:41.440 --> 01:26:46.080 people being good scientific mentors, but being predatory socially or sexually on people, 01:26:46.240 --> 01:26:46.560 right? 01:26:47.040 --> 01:26:52.080 Um, and and that was sort of uh because those costs were hidden or there wasn't 01:26:52.080 --> 01:26:57.920 coordination around those costs, that wasn't sort of understood, or uh 01:26:58.080 --> 01:26:59.520 there wasn't outrage about that. 01:26:59.600 --> 01:27:00.480 And now there is. 01:27:00.560 --> 01:27:06.400 Um it just not it's certainly still happening, but it's um it's less, hopefully, because of 01:27:06.400 --> 01:27:06.720 that. 01:27:07.040 --> 01:27:12.850 Um so so yeah, so I guess the idea would be then as much as possible just being 01:27:12.850 --> 01:27:18.530 aware that there are these externalities, people being people, and they're they're they're 01:27:18.530 --> 01:27:23.730 always sort of uh and just being aware of sort of uh checking those externalities, 01:27:23.810 --> 01:27:26.050 especially when they're pernicious or negative. 01:27:26.610 --> 01:27:27.330 Absolutely. 01:27:27.490 --> 01:27:33.250 Um and I think one broader implication of this way of thinking 01:27:33.570 --> 01:27:37.060 is that cynicism is underrated. 01:27:37.380 --> 01:27:42.420 I think people uh pay a lot of social costs for being seen as a cynical person. 01:27:42.580 --> 01:27:48.180 I think people rightly or wrongly think that cynics are mean and untrustworthy and 01:27:48.180 --> 01:27:49.140 unpleasant. 01:27:49.460 --> 01:27:55.220 Um but I think there is a different kind of more 01:27:55.220 --> 01:28:00.500 enlightened cynicism, which is not born of despair or uh 01:28:00.690 --> 01:28:03.970 nihilism or self-entitlement or bitterness. 01:28:04.450 --> 01:28:09.730 Um, but just born of an honest recognition of the fact that that we're animals, that we're 01:28:09.730 --> 01:28:15.730 apes, and that we have all sorts of, you know, undesirable and unflattering motives and 01:28:15.730 --> 01:28:16.530 drives. 01:28:16.850 --> 01:28:22.450 Um, and that if we want to understand why people do the things they do and why our world is 01:28:22.450 --> 01:28:26.450 structured the way it is, it really helps to have a clear-eyed understanding of that. 01:28:27.480 --> 01:28:32.280 And to see through the bullshit stories that we're so prone to telling about ourselves. 01:28:32.760 --> 01:28:38.680 I think that kind of cynicism, to the extent that it's rooted in reality and a 01:28:38.680 --> 01:28:42.200 solid understanding of human psychology and human nature, can be really good. 01:28:42.280 --> 01:28:44.760 It can be a great thing. 01:28:44.920 --> 01:28:47.800 It can help make dominance games collapse. 01:28:47.960 --> 01:28:50.440 It can help us see that the emperor is naked. 01:28:52.760 --> 01:28:58.510 It can prevent, you know, bullies from taking power in the first place if we see 01:28:58.510 --> 01:29:03.070 through their motives and have a more cynical understanding about human nature in general. 01:29:03.870 --> 01:29:07.870 Um that doesn't say, you know, maybe maybe there are costs to it at taking this kind of 01:29:07.870 --> 01:29:08.430 cynical perspective. 01:29:08.510 --> 01:29:08.830 I'm not sure. 01:29:08.910 --> 01:29:10.030 I haven't thought through it all. 01:29:10.190 --> 01:29:14.510 But I think at the at the very least, I would say that cynicism, at least of the kind we're 01:29:14.510 --> 01:29:16.350 talking about, is underrated. 01:29:18.620 --> 01:29:24.540 And it's helpful when we're evaluating, you know, the various status games we play and 01:29:24.540 --> 01:29:26.060 which ones we should participate in. 01:29:26.220 --> 01:29:30.620 It's helpful to see them as status games in the first place, which is uh impossible to do 01:29:30.620 --> 01:29:32.220 unless you're sufficiently cynical. 01:29:32.380 --> 01:29:32.700 Right. 01:29:32.860 --> 01:29:37.340 To even see the stuff we're doing as status games is already a very cynical thing to do. 01:29:38.210 --> 01:29:42.370 Um, it's sort of to to even get to the place where you can decide between good and bad 01:29:42.370 --> 01:29:44.690 status games, you have to be a pretty cynical person. 01:29:45.090 --> 01:29:51.090 And I think if we could get rid of some of the stigma of being a cynic, um that 01:29:51.090 --> 01:29:52.770 might be helpful. 01:29:53.250 --> 01:29:57.890 What what does cynical mean to you, and how do you think most people understand the word? 01:29:58.610 --> 01:30:03.280 So the con uh my understanding of cynic cynicism and the cynicism that I subscribe to is 01:30:03.280 --> 01:30:06.560 different from the intuitive understanding of what cynicism is. 01:30:06.800 --> 01:30:12.800 So the intuitive understanding of cynicism is that um everyone is selfish and they don't 01:30:12.880 --> 01:30:15.120 and it's just every man for themselves. 01:30:15.280 --> 01:30:17.680 Um uh nobody can be trusted. 01:30:17.840 --> 01:30:20.080 Uh it's just a dog-eat dog world. 01:30:20.320 --> 01:30:23.600 So that's not the kind of cynicism that I subscribe to. 01:30:24.240 --> 01:30:27.310 Um I don't think self-interest is our only motive. 01:30:27.470 --> 01:30:31.870 We also care about our families, we care about our friends, we care about our groups, uh, 01:30:31.950 --> 01:30:37.630 and we often do uh uh altruistic things for our friends and family and fellow group 01:30:37.630 --> 01:30:37.950 members. 01:30:38.110 --> 01:30:42.670 Ultimately it cashes out in in uh long-term benefits for us, otherwise it wouldn't exist. 01:30:43.070 --> 01:30:48.430 Um but we do care about other people, not just ourselves. 01:30:49.400 --> 01:30:54.520 So, my kind of cynicism is not that everything is self-interested. 01:30:54.920 --> 01:30:56.040 It's a little bit broader. 01:30:56.200 --> 01:30:59.400 Everything is self-interested, nepotistic, or group interested. 01:31:01.160 --> 01:31:04.840 Everything, or at least our deepest motives, our basic motives that arose by natural 01:31:04.840 --> 01:31:05.240 selection. 01:31:05.320 --> 01:31:07.000 They can really only be one of three things. 01:31:07.160 --> 01:31:11.400 They can be self-interested, nepotistic, or group interested. 01:31:11.640 --> 01:31:17.010 There's no other way for the genes underlying those motives to be driven to fixation than 01:31:17.010 --> 01:31:20.690 if they provide benefits to the focal individual who has the genes, or they provide 01:31:20.690 --> 01:31:24.850 benefits to the focal individual's kin who have some likelihood of sharing the gene, or 01:31:24.850 --> 01:31:30.850 they provide benefits to some individual within the focal individual's group who are likely 01:31:30.850 --> 01:31:35.490 to benefit the focal individual in some way, either by reciprocating or working together 01:31:35.490 --> 01:31:40.770 with that person or or helping that person compete against others, etc. 01:31:42.560 --> 01:31:48.160 So, my brand of cynicism, which I call Darwinian cynicism, is just basically 01:31:48.160 --> 01:31:52.320 focusing on the unholy trinity of human nature, which is selfishness, nepotism, and 01:31:52.320 --> 01:31:58.080 groupishness, and using that as a uh heuristic for 01:31:58.400 --> 01:32:04.080 uh it predicting and and of and um explaining human behavior, 01:32:04.510 --> 01:32:10.510 That anytime we see someone doing something, we should try as our, you 01:32:10.510 --> 01:32:15.950 know, at first, our first best guess should be that it comes down to some kind of uh 01:32:15.950 --> 01:32:19.710 self-interested benefit, some kind of benefit to the person's family, or some kind of uh 01:32:19.710 --> 01:32:21.790 groupish benefit. 01:32:22.030 --> 01:32:25.790 Um, and if we can't explain the individual's behavior in those terms, then we can start 01:32:25.790 --> 01:32:27.870 maybe reaching for other weirder explanations. 01:32:27.950 --> 01:32:31.390 But that should be our first best guess, given that we're animals and we're products of 01:32:31.390 --> 01:32:32.590 natural selection. 01:32:33.230 --> 01:32:36.300 Um, So that's the kind of cynicism I subscribe to. 01:32:36.380 --> 01:32:37.500 Why is that cynical? 01:32:37.980 --> 01:32:43.260 Well, because it rules out a motive that is very common in human culture and human 01:32:43.260 --> 01:32:43.900 discourse. 01:32:44.140 --> 01:32:50.140 It rules out the motive of making the world a better place, of being 01:32:50.460 --> 01:32:56.220 just altruistic toward everyone, you know, regardless of who they are, how likely they are 01:32:56.220 --> 01:32:58.380 to reciprocate, how much status it gets you. 01:32:58.460 --> 01:33:01.210 Though none of that meant we just want to do good for good's sake. 01:33:01.290 --> 01:33:06.250 We want to, you know, we wanna uh you know um save the planet, we wanna uh 01:33:06.570 --> 01:33:11.290 improve the welfare of the human flourishing, you know, the good of the species. 01:33:11.690 --> 01:33:16.730 You know, evolutionary biologists discovered uh many decades ago that 01:33:17.130 --> 01:33:20.730 motivations to act in the good of the species cannot evolve, right? 01:33:20.970 --> 01:33:26.040 This was an early kind of group selectionist idea from Wynne Edwards that the lemmings will 01:33:26.040 --> 01:33:29.960 throw themselves off the cliff to control population be for the good of the species. 01:33:30.120 --> 01:33:33.240 Evolutionary biologists now know that that's that's not how evolution works. 01:33:33.480 --> 01:33:35.320 Organisms don't act for the good of the species. 01:33:35.400 --> 01:33:37.800 They can't evolve to act for the good of the species. 01:33:38.200 --> 01:33:43.160 They evolve to act for the good of themselves and their kin and those who share uh the the 01:33:43.160 --> 01:33:44.280 genes in question. 01:33:44.520 --> 01:33:48.250 And they can even do that while driving their species off a cliff. 01:33:48.410 --> 01:33:49.770 So many species go extinct. 01:33:49.850 --> 01:33:53.530 This is called species suicide, because each member of the species is doing something that 01:33:53.530 --> 01:33:58.170 is in in their individual fitness interests while collectively harming the entire species. 01:33:58.410 --> 01:34:02.730 So if we're investing lots of time and resources in competing with each other for status or 01:34:02.890 --> 01:34:08.330 mates, that's time and resources that we could have been investing into uh other activities 01:34:08.330 --> 01:34:10.640 that could have helped our species proliferate. 01:34:10.800 --> 01:34:13.600 Instead, we're burning those resources fighting with each other. 01:34:14.880 --> 01:34:20.640 And the more of those resources get sunk into the competition, the worse the species is 01:34:21.360 --> 01:34:23.600 uh as a whole. 01:34:23.840 --> 01:34:29.520 And so um, good of the species motives 01:34:29.520 --> 01:34:30.640 can't evolve. 01:34:30.800 --> 01:34:34.560 And yet we often claim to have good of the species motives. 01:34:34.830 --> 01:34:40.110 So if you look at um Starbucks' corporate mission statement, I think it's something like 01:34:40.270 --> 01:34:46.110 our mission is to uh inspire and nurture the human spirit, uh, one cup, one neighborhood at 01:34:46.110 --> 01:34:46.590 a time. 01:34:46.830 --> 01:34:51.230 That's a kind of you know, making the world a better place, you know, generally altruistic 01:34:51.230 --> 01:34:51.870 goal. 01:34:52.430 --> 01:34:56.270 Um and I don't think those those types of goals are plausible. 01:34:56.420 --> 01:34:58.900 I don't think they can plausibly evolve. 01:34:59.140 --> 01:35:04.340 And so, insofar as someone is describing their motives in those overly altruistic terms, we 01:35:04.340 --> 01:35:07.060 should be skeptical, just as we're skeptical of Starbucks's mission statement. 01:35:07.220 --> 01:35:12.180 Nobody is trying to predict what Starbucks is going to do next by saying, hmm, what would 01:35:12.180 --> 01:35:14.820 most likely inspire and nurture the human spirit? 01:35:14.980 --> 01:35:18.420 Is this going to be more inspiring and nurturing to the human spirit, or is this 01:35:18.420 --> 01:35:21.540 acquisition going to be more inspiring and nurture to the human to the human spirit? 01:35:21.620 --> 01:35:23.380 No one's asking that question. 01:35:23.710 --> 01:35:26.830 Because that's the wrong question to ask if you want to actually predict what Starbucks is 01:35:26.830 --> 01:35:27.070 going to do. 01:35:27.150 --> 01:35:29.950 If you want to actually predict what Starbucks is going to do, you have to ask what's going 01:35:29.950 --> 01:35:31.470 to maximize their profit. 01:35:31.710 --> 01:35:35.870 Similarly, I think we need to view humans in the same way. 01:35:36.030 --> 01:35:40.990 We have PR systems in the same way that Starbucks has PR systems, and they serve the same 01:35:40.990 --> 01:35:43.790 function as the PR systems of Starbucks. 01:35:44.030 --> 01:35:48.190 And if we want to understand and predict human behavior in the same way that economists can 01:35:48.190 --> 01:35:53.140 understand and predict the activity of corporations, we need to see through that PR. 01:35:53.300 --> 01:35:56.740 We need to see through that bullshit and we need to get sufficiently cynical in the same 01:35:56.740 --> 01:36:00.900 way that economists I think are sufficiently cynical about uh what goes on in the 01:36:00.900 --> 01:36:01.860 marketplace. 01:36:03.860 --> 01:36:09.860 Yeah, um if I can redescribe what you're saying and see if if the idea 01:36:09.860 --> 01:36:15.460 is not that uh claims about things being beneficial to people don't exist. 01:36:15.700 --> 01:36:21.270 It's not uh uh reducing those down to um that they 01:36:21.270 --> 01:36:22.070 don't exist. 01:36:22.470 --> 01:36:28.390 It's that um all claims about what should be 01:36:28.390 --> 01:36:34.310 done are arise out of evolved design that is a product of 01:36:34.310 --> 01:36:35.270 natural selection. 01:36:35.430 --> 01:36:41.350 And so of all of the um ideas about what should be 01:36:41.350 --> 01:36:47.260 done, they're all coming out of motivational systems designed by natural selection. 01:36:47.340 --> 01:36:52.300 And so they're not designed purely for a group benefit. 01:36:53.100 --> 01:36:58.460 Even if that's sort of I would I would say it may be group benefit, but not species 01:36:58.460 --> 01:37:00.140 benefit, not general benefit, not industrial. 01:37:00.540 --> 01:37:01.180 Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. 01:37:01.260 --> 01:37:01.340 Yeah. 01:37:01.820 --> 01:37:03.020 Sure, sure, sure, sure. 01:37:03.180 --> 01:37:08.940 So uh so that so the sophistication is to understand that there may be 01:37:08.940 --> 01:37:14.790 times where uh designs might produce ideas that are 01:37:14.790 --> 01:37:19.750 really terrible and shitty and create really bad externalities, or they might create really 01:37:19.750 --> 01:37:22.870 great externalities and really good beneficial things that do. 01:37:23.910 --> 01:37:28.790 But in every case, it's the results of design for 01:37:29.190 --> 01:37:32.230 quote-unquote self or extended interest. 01:37:32.870 --> 01:37:38.550 And so it's not the case that we shouldn't shop between those things that have crappy 01:37:38.550 --> 01:37:40.150 outcomes and good outcomes. 01:37:40.390 --> 01:37:46.120 It's that we should be skeptical when somebody is selling 01:37:46.120 --> 01:37:48.920 us a pure motive. 01:37:49.800 --> 01:37:50.200 Yes. 01:37:50.440 --> 01:37:56.040 And so really this comes back to this idea of openness, which is that so I mean I I I 01:37:56.040 --> 01:38:02.040 genuinely believe that many people uh throughout history um 01:38:02.670 --> 01:38:06.510 have done really heroic things to make the world better. 01:38:07.230 --> 01:38:11.950 But the idea would be that in every single case, that's the result of design. 01:38:12.190 --> 01:38:17.710 That's either from a Darwinian sense misfiring or is well, well, well designed and firing. 01:38:18.270 --> 01:38:19.790 But we can understand. 01:38:19.950 --> 01:38:25.790 So, you know, if we're white working for civil rights or rights of a disenfranchised 01:38:25.950 --> 01:38:30.670 group, we can understand that we're doing it because we also care about 01:38:31.980 --> 01:38:37.900 uh people care that we care about it and we want to be heard and hearing us 01:38:37.900 --> 01:38:40.220 being heard uh is validating. 01:38:40.380 --> 01:38:45.260 Um but in that case the social benefit and our personal benefits align. 01:38:45.580 --> 01:38:51.260 Um and uh and so if everybody knows that that's true and we know it's true, 01:38:51.580 --> 01:38:53.210 then it's okay. 01:38:53.370 --> 01:38:59.130 Um, but if I'm sort of selling this thing that um I'm not getting anything out of it, 01:38:59.290 --> 01:39:01.690 I'm really just sacrificing myself. 01:39:01.850 --> 01:39:07.690 Um, that's the thing to be skeptical of, sort of um is is the idea. 01:39:08.330 --> 01:39:10.810 Yeah, that's that's a great way of putting it. 01:39:11.050 --> 01:39:15.980 Um or at least I think that is the more insightful way to see things. 01:39:16.460 --> 01:39:21.980 Um I recognize that, you know, maybe we don't want to see things that way all the time. 01:39:22.140 --> 01:39:27.580 You know, maybe we have our objective, you know, evolutionary psychologist hat that we put 01:39:27.580 --> 01:39:31.340 on it sometimes when, you know, when we're making more abstract decisions about, you know, 01:39:31.500 --> 01:39:34.060 public policy or what status game we want to play or whatever. 01:39:34.220 --> 01:39:38.220 But when we're actually playing those status games in in the moment, um, maybe we take that 01:39:38.220 --> 01:39:43.090 hat off and we we we you know subscribe to the feel-good narratives and and and the 01:39:43.090 --> 01:39:47.090 sacredness and and you'll get caught up in it, just like any normal human being would. 01:39:47.250 --> 01:39:50.850 And and um I think that's okay. 01:39:51.490 --> 01:39:57.170 Um I don't think this kind of Darwinian cynicism is is a is a hat to wear at all 01:39:57.170 --> 01:39:57.570 times. 01:39:57.810 --> 01:40:02.690 I think if you did wear it at all times, uh it would probably be pretty depressing and and 01:40:02.690 --> 01:40:04.690 your and your life would be pretty unlivable. 01:40:04.930 --> 01:40:10.080 Um, you know, I don't I certainly don't wear that hat when I'm like hanging out with my 01:40:10.080 --> 01:40:10.720 daughter. 01:40:10.960 --> 01:40:16.000 Um yeah, it's at the end of the day a gene replication strategy that I'm so interested in 01:40:16.000 --> 01:40:17.120 her well-being. 01:40:17.280 --> 01:40:22.080 Uh, but it's certainly I'm I'm not thinking that way when I'm when I'm taking care of her. 01:40:22.320 --> 01:40:27.120 Um so yeah, I think there's a time and a place to to put on this this perspective. 01:40:27.360 --> 01:40:30.730 Um, and it's not necessarily all the time. 01:40:31.370 --> 01:40:31.770 Yeah. 01:40:32.010 --> 01:40:37.850 And I I for me, and you know, uh maybe this is just uh a difference, 01:40:37.930 --> 01:40:43.610 uh, and maybe I don't do this, but um I think there's also something to be said, and I I 01:40:43.610 --> 01:40:48.170 like um I like um 01:40:49.340 --> 01:40:52.540 Work that sort of questions the initial assumption. 01:40:52.700 --> 01:40:58.540 I remember just real quick, I took an argument debate class once in undergraduate in 01:40:58.540 --> 01:40:59.100 college. 01:40:59.340 --> 01:41:04.300 And I remember I was sort of arguing a position, and the professor said, Well, you're 01:41:04.300 --> 01:41:08.140 accepting the first premise of the argument, and that's really your problem. 01:41:08.940 --> 01:41:13.180 And I realized that as soon as I accepted the first premise, which is almost feels polite 01:41:13.180 --> 01:41:18.060 to do, you know, it it sometimes that can be the lethal point. 01:41:19.190 --> 01:41:25.110 And what I really like is where we there's sort of sometimes false choices that you 01:41:25.110 --> 01:41:25.750 can reject. 01:41:25.830 --> 01:41:31.830 And so for me at least, I don't know if I take off my Darwinian 01:41:31.830 --> 01:41:37.750 hat when I'm with my son in the following sense of when I'm with him, I feel sheer 01:41:37.750 --> 01:41:43.270 joy and I benefit immensely from all of the time and 01:41:43.270 --> 01:41:45.830 energy and devotion I put into him. 01:41:45.990 --> 01:41:49.900 And at the same time, I realize why that exists, right? 01:41:50.060 --> 01:41:55.820 Like that that it's still um so so I think for me at least it 01:41:55.820 --> 01:42:01.820 comes back to um if you think that the reason 01:42:01.820 --> 01:42:07.340 why love exists or caring about people exists, exists in this sort of abstract, 01:42:07.500 --> 01:42:10.780 disembodied way that has nothing to do with your biology. 01:42:10.940 --> 01:42:15.510 And that in order for it to exist, it has to be independent and exist away from this 01:42:15.510 --> 01:42:20.950 biology if you're forced to make this choice between there's an evolutionary logic for this 01:42:20.950 --> 01:42:23.990 being the outcome, or else it's not good. 01:42:24.390 --> 01:42:28.710 For me at least, that's sort of the distinction I would like to get rid of, right? 01:42:28.790 --> 01:42:34.470 Which is sort of to say uh um, you know, it's all 01:42:34.870 --> 01:42:37.590 um there's all an evolved logic to it. 01:42:37.830 --> 01:42:43.140 And then once you accept that, then it's a matter of, well, what are the externalities? 01:42:43.300 --> 01:42:46.500 What are the consequences going from there? 01:42:46.660 --> 01:42:52.500 And so uh so no, I think that's right that you know, if you if you understand a 01:42:52.500 --> 01:42:58.340 Darwinian perspective as as being an ulterior motive, then you should take the 01:42:58.340 --> 01:42:58.900 hat off. 01:42:59.060 --> 01:43:04.740 But for me at least, I sort of keep my hat on, but I view it as just sort of uh 01:43:05.140 --> 01:43:08.020 it's an additional thing in the same way. 01:43:08.100 --> 01:43:13.710 Like when I look out and see, I think it's really cool that I can see and I know that 01:43:13.710 --> 01:43:16.030 that's all made possible my machinery. 01:43:16.190 --> 01:43:21.310 And for me at least, like knowing that it's machinery doesn't make it less cool, right? 01:43:21.790 --> 01:43:27.790 Um so um yeah anyway I I uh um yeah maybe 01:43:27.790 --> 01:43:33.390 that's just a mixed metaphor in in uh but but I uh um but I 01:43:33.390 --> 01:43:38.720 agree completely that um uh that this idea of 01:43:38.720 --> 01:43:44.160 cynicism in this way um can be depressing 01:43:44.640 --> 01:43:50.560 um but i don't think it needs to be um like i think right now what 01:43:50.560 --> 01:43:56.160 we're doing is uh you know is an attempt to increase our status um 01:43:56.480 --> 01:44:00.560 but i'm learning something from it and i hope other people do and i think that's an 01:44:00.560 --> 01:44:06.370 externality of it um and i think it's beneficial um and I don't think it's a 01:44:06.370 --> 01:44:11.970 bad thing to want status either, because you know, people um uh 01:44:12.850 --> 01:44:18.850 if you look at people who uh people who are um 01:44:19.330 --> 01:44:25.090 low bargaining power, people who are harmed by people who are victims, uh like 01:44:25.570 --> 01:44:30.290 if you look at what it looks like when somebody doesn't have status, that can be a bad 01:44:30.290 --> 01:44:30.770 situation. 01:44:30.930 --> 01:44:36.700 So I don't think you know people people deserve status by virtue of being 01:44:36.700 --> 01:44:37.020 people. 01:44:37.180 --> 01:44:42.620 Um yeah and uh it's just a matter of people don't deserve status by virtue of exploiting 01:44:42.620 --> 01:44:43.260 other people. 01:44:43.420 --> 01:44:48.860 Um and I think that that's a consensus um an open information 01:44:49.020 --> 01:44:54.380 structure is required to like make that split that hair I would say. 01:44:54.860 --> 01:44:55.500 Yeah. 01:44:55.910 --> 01:45:01.750 I ideally the only ways to get status in our world would be by, you know, producing 01:45:01.750 --> 01:45:06.870 goods and services that other people want, or by coming up with new and ins uh insightful 01:45:07.030 --> 01:45:13.030 ideas in science or philosophy, or by, you know, uh effectively helping 01:45:13.030 --> 01:45:13.750 others. 01:45:13.910 --> 01:45:17.590 Um ideally those would be the only ways to get status. 01:45:17.750 --> 01:45:21.380 And certainly those are existing ways that you can get status. 01:45:21.460 --> 01:45:23.540 And that's wonderful that that that is true. 01:45:23.780 --> 01:45:26.180 There are other bad ways that you can get status too. 01:45:26.340 --> 01:45:32.340 And you know, ideally we can try to uh attack those other ways and hopefully get status 01:45:32.340 --> 01:45:33.460 for attacking them. 01:45:33.860 --> 01:45:34.100 Yeah. 01:45:34.340 --> 01:45:38.820 And uh and then one quick throwback at the beginning of this, you mentioned you didn't like 01:45:38.820 --> 01:45:39.460 school. 01:45:39.790 --> 01:45:42.350 uh and and now you can't not do it. 01:45:43.950 --> 01:45:49.630 What do you in light of this discussion have you 01:45:49.790 --> 01:45:55.470 uh um and you know if it if it's too self divulging uh you can just say no 01:45:55.630 --> 01:46:01.390 but have you thought about um why or what switched 01:46:01.550 --> 01:46:04.700 um what led to that switch? 01:46:05.180 --> 01:46:06.700 Um, well, it's interesting. 01:46:06.940 --> 01:46:11.020 Um, so I hated most of school. 01:46:11.500 --> 01:46:14.780 Um, but there were a few bits and pieces I did like. 01:46:14.940 --> 01:46:19.420 So I didn't really like biology class, but the part on evolution I loved. 01:46:19.980 --> 01:46:25.980 That was the only part where like my attention just perked up, and I was like, wow, I can't 01:46:25.980 --> 01:46:28.620 believe how elegant and insightful this is. 01:46:28.780 --> 01:46:30.780 This explains everything. 01:46:31.370 --> 01:46:34.970 And then I, you know, when I went back to like ribosomes or whatever, I started falling 01:46:34.970 --> 01:46:35.770 asleep again. 01:46:36.010 --> 01:46:42.010 Um and uh and the other subject I liked in 01:46:42.010 --> 01:46:44.890 high school was I took an AP psychology course. 01:46:45.130 --> 01:46:50.970 Um and I found that interesting and I, you know, didn't fall asleep during that class. 01:46:51.290 --> 01:46:56.500 Um so maybe I'm just innately interested in evolution and psychology and and then when 01:46:56.500 --> 01:47:00.020 those things were put together it it kind of it was everything to me. 01:47:00.260 --> 01:47:01.460 Um, I don't know. 01:47:01.700 --> 01:47:04.900 It's an interesting question why why we choose the particular paths we choose. 01:47:05.060 --> 01:47:09.140 Ma maybe there's just a lot of genetic variation and maybe maybe I have genes for being 01:47:09.140 --> 01:47:10.820 interested in evolutionary psychology. 01:47:10.980 --> 01:47:12.420 Who who knows? 01:47:12.810 --> 01:47:17.370 We uh we uh um uh one can do a task analysis of curiosity. 01:47:17.450 --> 01:47:18.890 We actually did that as a group. 01:47:18.970 --> 01:47:20.090 Um interesting. 01:47:20.330 --> 01:47:22.970 Uh so maybe we can get some folks on about that. 01:47:23.130 --> 01:47:27.370 So yeah, certainly there's variation in in the elicitors of curiosity for people. 01:47:27.530 --> 01:47:29.850 Different people are curious about different things. 01:47:30.090 --> 01:47:35.700 Um, but for me, I I think education was too much about 01:47:36.020 --> 01:47:40.980 um you have to do this stupid thing and jump through this arbitrary hoop and come up with a 01:47:40.980 --> 01:47:42.340 bullshit paper. 01:47:42.580 --> 01:47:48.340 You have to, you know, read the novel and, you know, talk about metaphors and symbolism or 01:47:48.420 --> 01:47:49.060 or whatever. 01:47:49.220 --> 01:47:52.500 And like it all just seemed pointless and stupid. 01:47:52.820 --> 01:47:58.390 Um and the only thing that really excited me was the feeling of insight, the feeling of 01:47:58.390 --> 01:48:03.430 understanding of the puzzle pieces coming together, of a really simple idea that explains a 01:48:03.430 --> 01:48:04.950 lot of complex things. 01:48:06.390 --> 01:48:08.630 That has been my my North Star, I think. 01:48:08.710 --> 01:48:12.870 And I and I got very little of that in high school and college. 01:48:13.190 --> 01:48:16.870 Um, but I came to it on my own and discovered it on my own. 01:48:17.030 --> 01:48:19.030 And when I found it, I couldn't get enough of it. 01:48:20.920 --> 01:48:23.080 So I think that that would be the the difference. 01:48:23.320 --> 01:48:27.640 I I don't think the current education system is structured on eliciting that feeling of 01:48:27.640 --> 01:48:31.480 insight and awe uh and explanatory power. 01:48:31.720 --> 01:48:35.720 Uh it has a different set of incentives and a different set of goals that you know I'd be 01:48:35.800 --> 01:48:36.280 happy to get into. 01:48:36.600 --> 01:48:38.840 And I think you can tell a very cynical story about it. 01:48:39.400 --> 01:48:44.520 Um, but uh it's not, I think, designed to uh nurture 01:48:44.840 --> 01:48:48.280 people's sense of curiosity and wonder and awe. 01:48:48.440 --> 01:48:50.790 Uh oftentimes it ends up crushing it. 01:48:51.990 --> 01:48:52.390 Yeah. 01:48:52.630 --> 01:48:55.030 Um it sounds like principle. 01:48:56.070 --> 01:48:59.830 Um you you want principles that are applicable. 01:48:59.990 --> 01:49:05.430 Uh and and in some sense what was happening was in a way sort of 01:49:05.430 --> 01:49:06.630 coercive, right? 01:49:06.790 --> 01:49:12.710 It was just uh there's a a well-known psychologist who um I actually 01:49:12.870 --> 01:49:14.960 um This stuck with me. 01:49:15.040 --> 01:49:21.040 What she said was the way we teach high school science is 01:49:21.200 --> 01:49:26.480 like science laboratories is a bit analogous to like if the way we taught 01:49:26.480 --> 01:49:32.480 baseball was for kids to recreate plays, great baseball plays 01:49:32.560 --> 01:49:33.520 of history. 01:49:33.760 --> 01:49:39.760 So you sort of like force people to behave in exactly the same way as this particular play 01:49:39.760 --> 01:49:40.160 happens. 01:49:40.240 --> 01:49:45.370 So the person in left field should run this way, the person should hit the ball exactly 01:49:45.370 --> 01:49:45.930 this way. 01:49:46.090 --> 01:49:48.330 And that's how the training begins. 01:49:48.810 --> 01:49:53.850 And then only if you're good enough at that are you allowed to sort of do it creatively on 01:49:53.850 --> 01:49:54.570 your own. 01:49:54.810 --> 01:49:55.610 Um right. 01:49:55.770 --> 01:50:01.050 So it's sort of this pantomime of um of here's what you do, 01:50:01.530 --> 01:50:06.970 without giving people the autonomy and the creativity to sort of apply 01:50:06.970 --> 01:50:08.090 principles. 01:50:10.000 --> 01:50:10.640 Yeah. 01:50:11.600 --> 01:50:17.520 It it is sad, but I think in a perverse way, it's it's it's part of what 01:50:17.520 --> 01:50:20.960 the system is all about, because it's part of measuring your ability to do that. 01:50:21.200 --> 01:50:26.320 And your ability to do that is a very valuable quality in the marketplace. 01:50:26.720 --> 01:50:31.280 You know, if you look at what kinds of employees people want to hire, you want to hire the 01:50:31.280 --> 01:50:36.320 employee that's gonna follow the rules, that's gonna do what you say, that's gonna, you 01:50:36.320 --> 01:50:38.160 know, toe the line. 01:50:39.150 --> 01:50:43.230 If if they if they need to bullshit to to get something done that's going to be in the in 01:50:43.230 --> 01:50:48.830 the in the corporation's interests, whether it be writing a a mission statement or a a 01:50:48.830 --> 01:50:52.590 PR campaign, that's the kind of employee you want. 01:50:52.670 --> 01:50:56.190 You want a conformist, obedient, uh rule follower. 01:50:56.910 --> 01:51:01.790 Um and also you want, you know, a smart, attentive person who can pay attention to boring 01:51:01.790 --> 01:51:05.320 bullshit and jump through arbitrary hoops if they need to. 01:51:05.560 --> 01:51:10.440 Um, you need someone who's hardworking, who's who's organized and sticks to a schedule and 01:51:10.440 --> 01:51:11.720 can get get shit done. 01:51:11.960 --> 01:51:16.600 I mean, those are the types of traits that you need to prevail in the current educational 01:51:16.600 --> 01:51:16.760 system. 01:51:16.840 --> 01:51:20.200 And those are the types of traits that a lot of businesses want. 01:51:20.520 --> 01:51:25.400 And that's ultimately what the what the education system is about, I think, is signaling 01:51:25.400 --> 01:51:28.120 that you have those traits, not giving you those traits. 01:51:28.200 --> 01:51:32.040 I don't think it it actually teaches you to be smarter or more hardworking. 01:51:33.790 --> 01:51:39.470 But it allows you to get a credential that says that you do have those 01:51:39.470 --> 01:51:40.110 traits. 01:51:41.950 --> 01:51:45.790 And that makes you very attractive as an employee. 01:51:48.510 --> 01:51:54.510 So yeah, I uh I I I very much subscribe to the the signaling 01:51:54.510 --> 01:52:00.280 model of education uh Pioneered by an economist by the name of Spence, I 01:52:00.280 --> 01:52:04.520 think, and popularized by Brian Kaplan in his book, The Case Against Education, which I 01:52:04.520 --> 01:52:07.160 think is a really interesting and provocative book. 01:52:08.040 --> 01:52:12.440 I'm probably not qualified to judge the economics of it because I'm not an economist, but 01:52:12.440 --> 01:52:16.120 from a psychological and sociological perspective, I think it is a really powerful theory 01:52:16.120 --> 01:52:17.640 of what education is all about. 01:52:17.880 --> 01:52:21.190 That it's ultimately about signaling that we have these traits that are desirable to 01:52:21.190 --> 01:52:21.830 employers. 01:52:21.990 --> 01:52:27.830 And it's not about actually increasing our productivity or our civic mindedness or 01:52:28.070 --> 01:52:29.990 any other high-minded thing. 01:52:30.150 --> 01:52:36.150 Uh so sorry to you know bring the conversation back to a cynical place, 01:52:36.390 --> 01:52:37.910 cynical, dark, and depressing place. 01:52:38.550 --> 01:52:42.470 We were getting so uplifting and and uh positive there, and I brought us back down. 01:52:42.550 --> 01:52:43.350 I'm sorry. 01:52:43.670 --> 01:52:47.080 Um No, don't be. 01:52:47.160 --> 01:52:50.920 Um no, and I mean I think yeah, and I think the converse of that. 01:52:51.000 --> 01:52:56.760 I mean, so like uh John Dewey um and other people, if you look at sort 01:52:56.760 --> 01:53:02.360 of people trying to design science or education 01:53:02.600 --> 01:53:08.290 generally, um, in a way that uh encourages creativity 01:53:08.450 --> 01:53:09.730 and autonomy. 01:53:10.050 --> 01:53:14.450 Um there's a lot of sort of historically was a lot of work on that. 01:53:14.610 --> 01:53:20.370 Um and uh yeah, I think if you were to ask sort of what is the current 01:53:20.370 --> 01:53:26.210 system well designed to do, I think that that these newer analyses, um I think it would be 01:53:26.210 --> 01:53:27.730 hard to to escape this idea. 01:53:27.810 --> 01:53:33.540 But I think it comes back to again, um not not you shouldn't apologize 01:53:33.860 --> 01:53:39.380 because the first thing to uh to change something is to sort of acknowledge that it is that 01:53:39.380 --> 01:53:44.580 way um and that it is just uh a consequence of sort of institutional history. 01:53:44.740 --> 01:53:50.340 Um and and and it continues to exist and there are status games involved. 01:53:50.580 --> 01:53:56.020 And so if you want something to change, um uh the leverage point is 01:53:56.390 --> 01:54:02.230 either find new people whose status would benefit from a realignment of how 01:54:02.230 --> 01:54:07.910 the system is structured, or uh or go after the 01:54:07.910 --> 01:54:13.510 status of, you know, there's an enormous uh incentive to um 01:54:13.830 --> 01:54:18.550 institutional incentive, for example, to teach to tests, because people make profits on 01:54:18.550 --> 01:54:18.710 that. 01:54:18.870 --> 01:54:23.540 And uh it's very easy to sort of say, well, look, we're improving this thing. 01:54:23.700 --> 01:54:29.220 And the first thing you or I know who has had any training in um psychology is that you're 01:54:29.220 --> 01:54:33.460 confusing the measurement for the um for the thing being measured. 01:54:33.620 --> 01:54:39.380 Um and if you take that to an absurdity, you know, where you confuse those two things, the 01:54:39.380 --> 01:54:45.190 thing that you're actually trying to improve, um, which is the child, um, for example, 01:54:45.350 --> 01:54:49.990 even in ideal world, you're sort of gonna end up with uh a poorly designed system. 01:54:50.150 --> 01:54:55.670 Um so uh I think being being blind about what 01:54:55.990 --> 01:55:01.910 institutional selections or what status schemes are going on um is is not a 01:55:01.910 --> 01:55:03.110 a cheerful thing at all. 01:55:03.190 --> 01:55:04.710 So you shouldn't apologize. 01:55:05.940 --> 01:55:11.300 Yeah, it's it's it's one of one of the benefits of of a cynical perspective, I think, 01:55:11.860 --> 01:55:17.380 um, at least in in the Darwinian sense, is that you get a better understanding of how 01:55:17.380 --> 01:55:20.100 things work, even if it's not a pretty picture. 01:55:20.580 --> 01:55:24.820 Um, and that's the only way to make them better is if you have a clearer understanding of 01:55:24.820 --> 01:55:25.140 it. 01:55:26.740 --> 01:55:27.540 Sounds good. 01:55:27.780 --> 01:55:30.100 Um any final thoughts. 01:55:31.370 --> 01:55:36.090 Well, this was a very uh wide ranging and fun conversation. 01:55:36.170 --> 01:55:40.010 I love all the different turns it took and uh I had a I had a blast. 01:55:40.250 --> 01:55:41.290 Yeah, me too. 01:55:41.450 --> 01:55:42.970 Uh sounds good. 01:55:43.130 --> 01:55:46.810 Well um we'll we'll see what happens uh next time. 01:55:47.210 --> 01:55:47.770 Cool. 01:55:48.010 --> 01:55:48.570 All right. 01:55:48.730 --> 01:55:49.690 Thanks, man. 01:55:52.250 --> 01:55:53.450 Thank you for listening. 01:55:53.610 --> 01:55:58.570 Uh if you like what you're hearing, please leave us a kind review or check out our Patreon 01:55:58.570 --> 01:56:00.330 page if you want to throw us some money. 01:56:00.580 --> 01:56:02.820 Uh yeah. 01:56:02.980 --> 01:56:03.380 Yeah. 01:56:04.180 --> 01:56:04.660 I don't know. 01:56:05.140 --> 01:56:06.180 Is there anything else to say? 01:56:06.500 --> 01:56:12.180 Um uh come back for the next episode and um or if you're in the middle of 01:56:12.180 --> 01:56:14.580 binge listening, you know, go for that. 01:56:15.220 --> 01:56:15.540 Okay. 01:56:15.940 --> 01:56:18.660 Um stay tuned for the for the next episode.