The conversation, in brief.
In this episode of the podcast, hosts Dave Pietraszewski and David Pinsof are joined by behavioral economist and Max Planck Institute research group leader Dr. Hannes Rusch. The discussion explores Rusch's transition from studying cooperation to investigating the darker aspects of human nature, including exploitation, intergroup conflict, and cheating. The speakers examine economic and game-theoretic models of exploitation, drawing parallels between slavery, abusive relationships, and economic monopolies. They discuss how outside options, power asymmetries, and deception shape exploitative behavior. Additionally, Rusch shares empirical findings regarding the temporal instability of in-group favoritism and reflects on his recent work examining heroism, risky altruism, and the integration of formal economic modeling with evolutionary psychology.
Through the conversation.
20 sections010:00 – 7:45Introducing Hannes Rusch and the Darker Side of Human Behavior
Hosts Dave Pietraszewski and David Pinsof introduce their guest, Dr. Hannes Rusch, a behavioral economist and independent research group leader at the Max Planck Institute. The hosts praise Rusch's precise, mathematical approach to abstract concepts. Rusch explains that his research transitioned from the well-studied evolution of cooperation to the darker, less-studied aspects of human nature, specifically human exploitation and intergroup conflict.
And then at some point, I was thinking, okay, this literature is very well developed.
“this literature is very well developed.” 6:25
And then you suddenly turn to the not so nice features of human nature, right?
“turn to the not so nice features of human nature, right?” 6:36
027:45 – 12:04Defining and Studying Exploitation Across a Spectrum of Behaviors
Hannes Rusch discusses the challenges of formally defining exploitation, noting that philosophical attempts to define it as taking unfair advantage often lead back to unresolved debates over fairness. Instead of relying on a strict analytical definition, Rusch and his team study clear examples of exploitative behavior, such as slavery, examining a full spectrum of actions through the lens of modern behavioral science.
So what I'm trying to do is rather to have a look around and say, okay, we we probably all agree that slavery is exploitative.
“we probably all agree that slavery is exploitative.” 10:12
So what is it that people are doing there and why are they doing it?
“What is it that people are doing there and why are they doing it?” 10:19
0312:04 – 17:06Modeling Exploitation Through Game Theory and Economic Pillars
Host Dave Pietraszewski and guest Hannes Rusch discuss the three-pillar research project on exploitation, which includes microeconomic theory, behavioral experiments, and applied archive data. They explore how mathematical models conceptualize exploitative relationships like slavery by examining how a dominant party constrains a victim's outside options and reduces wages.
assume you're the master, I'm the slave. Then what you want to do is you want to prevent me from running away
“assume you're the master, I'm the slave. Then what you want to do is you want to prevent me from running away” 14:11
exploitation, the way you're thinking of it, is when an actor pays a cost to constrain the outside options of the recipient
“exploitation, the way you're thinking of it, is when an actor pays a cost to constrain the outside options” 15:24
0417:06 – 24:08Deception, Violence, and Parallels in Abusive Relationships and Monopolies
The speakers draw parallels between formal models of exploitation and everyday interpersonal dynamics, abusive relationships, and economic monopolies. Hannes Rusch explains that exploitative strategies often involve luring victims through deception before resorting to confinement or punishment, noting that deception serves as a cost-effective alternative to violence.
you could think of a monopoly as exploitative. It's doing exactly the same thing
“You could think of a monopoly
uh as exploitative.
It's
it's doing exactly the same thing” 23:39
0524:09 – 33:10Modeling Unconstrained Exploitation and Perceptions of Professional Exploitation
Hannes Rusch discusses with the hosts how economic models of markets are expanded by criminology and law to study unconstrained exploiters who ignore legal rules. Rusch describes survey research examining professional exploitation in the US, utilizing a situational interdependence framework to determine what makes individuals feel exploited and how power asymmetry predicts these perceptions.
what if the exploiters or the potential exploiters don't care about the law?
“what if the exploiters or the potential exploiters don't care about the law?” 24:59
the strongest predictor for own feelings of own feelings of exploitation but also of third party observer ratings of okay, this boss is clearly exploiting this employee
“strongest predictor for um feelings or or feelings of own feelings of um exploitation but also of third party observer ratings of” 30:51
0633:11 – 36:10Symmetry, Deception, and the Relationship Between Exploitation and Cheating
The speakers debate whether exploitation can occur between symmetrical partners, discussing whether deception serves as a primary tool when physical threats or power asymmetries are absent. They also explore connections to cheater detection and whether cheating represents a form of deception within social interactions.
Deception would be the only means available for for equally powerful individuals to exploit each other.
“Deception would be the only means available for for equally powerful individuals to exploit each other.” 33:45
deception can be one means to get people into a relationship with you, or maybe make them even work on promised conditions which turn out not to be true.
“deception can be one means to get people into a relationship with you, or maybe make them even work on promised conditions which turn out not to be true.” 35:39
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and guest Hannes Rusch discuss psychological biases in detecting and rationalizing exploitation. They examine whether exploiters consciously recognize unfair advantages or use post hoc justifications, touching on economic disparities like the gender pay gap and how outside options influence perceptions of fairness.
my evolved psychology should take advantage of that, but not frame it as exploitation
“my evolved psychology should take advantage of that, but not frame it as exploitation” 36:38
0842:08 – 48:13Collective Action and Coordination in Intergroup Exploitation
The speakers explore collective action and intergroup exploitation, discussing whether groups require a moral or religious pretext or if leaders simply test the waters for coordination. Hannes Rusch and the hosts mention the mobbing game as a framework for understanding how groups coordinate to impose costs and extract benefits.
We need coordination devices to figure out if a sufficient mass of people in our group is willing to like show the behavior
“We need coordination devices to figure out if a sufficient mass of people in our group is willing to like show the behavior” 44:58
0948:13 – 51:36Mobbing Games, Coordination, and Signaling Deterrence
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and guest Hannes Rusch discuss how mobbing behavior acts as a coordination game rather than reflecting inherent animosity toward specific groups. They examine signaling deterrence, the witch hunt game model, and how ecological cues of paranoia can escalate group conflict.
It's not necessarily that they're that they're they're dumb or or or or incompetent or mean or something like that. It's just that they're visibly different from everyone else, and that helps us coordinate.
“It's not necessarily that they're that they're they're dumb or or or or incompetent or mean or something like that. It's just that they're visibly different from everyone else, and that helps us coordinate.” 48:38
The more the more paranoid you are about being ganged up on, the more willing you should be to gang up on exactly.
“The more the more paranoid you are about being uh ganged up on, the more willing you should be to gang up on exactly.” 51:15
The speakers transition from exploitation to intergroup conflict, exploring economic bargaining models where fighting is typically inefficient. Hannes Rusch and the hosts discuss endogenous outgroup definition, rich minorities, social alienation, and how demagoguery and scapegoating leverage coordination mechanisms.
fighting in itself is most of the time very inefficient. It's destroying opportunity options or it's destroying energy and destroying resources.
“fighting in itself is most of the time very inefficient. It's destroying opportunity um options or it's destroying energy and destroying resources.” 52:53
a lot of quote unquote scapegoating or demagoguery is this is just beautifully capturing this deep structure of of exploitation.
“a lot of quote unquote scapegoating or demagoguery is this is just beautifully capturing this deep structure of of exploitation.” 59:39
David Pinsof and Hannes Rusch transition from discussing exploitation to examining group memberships and the in-group out-group literature. Rusch describes his replication and longitudinal extension of experimental paradigms measuring individual differences in groupy behavior and group markers.
what I wanted to do, or one of the main projects in the In the disk grid project is actually trying to replicate and then to look into the possible temporal dynamics of preferences
“trying to replicate and then to look into the possible temporal dynamics of preferences” 1:02:23
Hannes Rusch explains his surprising finding that in-group favoritism is extremely unstable within individuals over time across repeated measurements in both minimal and natural group contexts, prompting a discussion about stability, meaning, and future research.
what I see for both group contexts is that um in group favoritism is super unstable within persons.
“in group favoritism is super unstable within persons” 1:06:25
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and guest Hannes Rusch discuss whether individual differences in "groupiness" or coalitionality are stable over time. Rusch explains that while aggregate distributions of group favoritism types replicate, individual measures across different time points show low correlation, suggesting that coalitional behavior reflects flexible cognitive settings responding to social context rather than fixed personality traits.
Within contexts, there is no con correlation over time, right?
“Within contexts, there is no con correlation over time, right?” 1:15:11
Over one year there's zero correlation.
“Over one year there's zero correlation.” 1:15:17
Hannes Rusch shares his recent research interests spanning the economics of crime and dark human behaviors, alongside a longstanding fascination with heroism and high-stakes altruism. Rusch and the hosts discuss the limitations of standard economic games like dictator games in testing evolutionary theories of inclusive fitness and altruism.
So that's a new interest I have, or relatively recent, but it's still it still fits in well with me being interested in all sorts of dark behaviors
“still fits in well with me being interested in all sorts of dark behaviors” 1:22:56
I'm not co like 100% convinced that you can test a theory about inclusive fitness
“I'm not co like 100% convinced that you can test a theory about inclusive fitness” 1:23:58
Host Dave Pietraszewski and guest Hannes Rusch discuss the definition of heroism as high-stakes altruistic behavior in natural contexts, emphasizing the severe personal costs involved. They draw parallels between risky heroism and Ed Hagan's work on suicidality and costly signaling as bargaining strategies.
Defined, yeah, defined defined, sorry, um defined as really like high-stakes altruistic behavior in natural contexts.
“defined as really like high-stakes altruistic behavior in natural contexts” 1:24:40
What I mean is really: you're the guy who runs into the burning building to rescue the kid, or you're the soldier who like throws himself on the grenade to protect his comrades.
“you're the guy who runs into the burning building to rescue the kid” 1:25:05
Host David Pinsof, Dave Pietraszewski, and guest Hannes Rusch explore whether bravery can be formalized using coordination games like the stag hunt. They discuss the distinction between bravery and recklessness, military selection against pure fearlessness, and how institutions use honors like the Medal of Honor as rhetoric to encourage group-beneficial sacrifice.
David Pinsof suggests that bravery might be captured by the stag hunt game, where the first person to stick their neck out helps coordinate the group on a better, more beneficial equilibrium.
“it seems like the stag hunt captures bravery really nicely” 1:30:40
Hannes Rusch notes that military selection does not simply recruit fearless individuals, as fear is important to prevent soldiers from risking their lives for minuscule goals.
“it's not very difficult to select people on fearlessness right so you could also say bravery is something like showing that you are not afraid of anything” 1:32:50
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and guest Hannes Rusch discuss how in-group favoritism and hostility can be artificially manipulated by leaders. The speakers examine how conflicts do not permanently destroy human relationships, noting that deception and false flags are often cheaper mechanisms of exploitation than outright coercion or imprisonment.
it shows us that in-group favoritism is malleable for better or for worse
“it shows us that in-group favoritism is malleable for better or for worse” 1:40:38
it's often even cheaper to stage an elaborate false flag than it is to actually coercively force someone to do your bidding
“It's often even cheaper to stage an elaborate false flag than it is to actually um coercively force someone to do your bidding” 1:42:33
Hannes Rusch shares how he discovered evolutionary theory through philosophy, eventually transitioning into economics where evolutionary perspectives are less central compared to social norms and institutions. The hosts and guest discuss levels of analysis, bridging individual cognitive architecture with population-level cultural evolution.
in economics, evolutionary thinking is relatively underdeveloped
“in economics, evolutionary thinking is relatively underdeveloped” 1:44:05
191:48:27 – 1:53:06Integrating Economics and Evolutionary Psychology Through Formalization
The speakers discuss the role of economics and formal modeling in studying human behavior, institutions, and fairness. They examine how mathematical precision helps sharpen communication, prevent reinvention of existing models, and integrate insights from evolutionary psychology and economics.
The reason actually why or why I would say I like economics so much is that we have the formal language that allows us to model all these kinds of questions.
“we have the formal language that allows us to model all these kinds of questions” 1:50:47
The hosts express their appreciation for Hannes Rusch's rigorous research and contributions to the evolutionary psychology community. They highlight opportunities at the Max Planck Society, plug upcoming group leader positions, and conclude with standard podcast outro announcements.
David and Dave thank Hannes for his work, praise his talent for combining formalization with important real-world topics, and discuss positions at the Max Planck Society.
“you are just doing such incredibly important work” 1:53:13