Through the conversation.
20 sections010:00 – 5:30Introduction to Scientific Mechanisms and Philosophy
Dave Pietraszewski and David Pinsof introduce guest Lauren Ross, a philosopher of science. The hosts discuss their frustrations regarding conceptual confusions in evolutionary psychology, particularly concerning how scientists define and communicate explanatory frameworks and mechanisms.
The hosts describe the conversation as therapeutic for voicing frustrations with conceptual confusions in their field.
“this was a therapeutic conversation in that regard where we got to voice our” 2:20
Lauren Ross explains her work in the philosophy of science focusing on causation and explanation. She discusses why the term 'mechanism' is used as a status marker in the life sciences, noting that a lack of consensus on its definition creates challenges in peer review and funding.
In many life sciences, identifying mechanisms is often required for getting work funded and published.
“you need to identify mechanisms and provide mechanistic insights.” 8:29
The lack of agreement on how to define a mechanism supports disagreements among scientists.
“this sort of connects to and nicely supports this situation you're referring to” 8:43
0312:04 – 15:52Causal Systems and Varieties of Scientific Explanation
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and Lauren Ross discuss the ambiguity of the term 'mechanism' in science, examining how different types of causal systems and explanations matter for distinct research projects across various scientific disciplines.
The speakers discuss how the term mechanism is often ambiguous and problematic because it is used in many different ways across sciences.
“And right now, the term mechanism is getting in the way of our ability to do that.” 14:24
Lauren Ross notes that different scientific fields care about various causal distinctions that are currently lacking clear terminology.
“causal distinctions that matter in science.” 15:29
0415:52 – 24:07Evolutionary Behavioral Science and Explanatory Depth
The speakers contrast the goals of evolutionary behavioral sciences with standard social sciences, highlighting the pursuit of functional schematics, evolutionary history, and deeper levels of explanation integrated with the natural sciences.
David Pinsof suggests that evolutionary behavioral sciences differ from non-evolutionary ones through a desire for a deeper level of explanatory depth.
“what separates the evolutionary behavioral sciences from the non-evolutionary behavioral sciences is a desire to go to a deeper level of explanatory depth.” 17:50
Lauren Ross explains that philosophy of science shows how different scientific explanations depend heavily on having a precise explanatory target.
“A first thing you have to be very clear about is what do you want to explain?” 23:20
0524:07 – 28:34Defining Explanatory Targets and Pluralism in Science
Lauren Ross, Dave Pietraszewski, and David Pinsof discuss the importance of precise explanatory targets in science. Ross explains that science requires clear standards for why-questions, moving away from a single 'theory of everything' toward a pluralistic approach that evaluates explanations by the control and information they provide rather than reductionist depth.
Philosopher Nagel provides an example of ambiguous scientific questions regarding human lungs.
“So there's an example, the philosopher Nagel has this example that nicely fits with this” 25:17
Philosophy of science embraces a pluralistic view where various legitimate explanations exist under strict standards.
“So now in philosophy of science, we're more pluralist. We think there are many different types of explanations” 26:35
0628:34 – 36:11Theoretical Fragmentation and Philosophical Rigor in the Behavioral Sciences
The speakers examine how behavioral sciences accumulate ad hoc explanations without explicit targets, leading to professional misunderstandings and conflict. They explore how philosophy can act as conceptual engineering to help integrate theories and address the ongoing theoretical crisis across social and psychological disciplines.
Social and behavioral sciences accumulate explanations implicitly without clarifying their underlying targets.
“The explanatory target is always implicit.” 28:52
David Pinsof argues that philosophy functions as the non-empirical aspect of scientific work, working out premise implications.
“I think of philosophy as in large part a kind of theoretical science, or or at least the non-empirical aspects” 35:36
0736:11 – 41:38Role of Philosophy in Scientific Explanation and Communication
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and Lauren Ross discuss how philosophy of science provides normative justification and helps clarify distinctions in scientific explanations. They examine how philosophers can collaborate with scientists to resolve unnecessary debates, improve science communication to the public, and navigate the social dynamics of peer review and grant writing.
If you're searching for that justification, that normative element, that's where you can really, I think, do helpful work.
“searching for that justification, that normative element, that's where you can really, I think, do helpful work.” 38:12
Part of what we're doing is there's just these distinctions. You're trying to distinguish explanation is one thing scientists are interested in, description is another project, and those are different.
“there's just these distinctions. You're trying to distinguish explanation is one thing scientists are interested in, description is another project” 39:22
0841:40 – 48:14Practical Application and Public Science Communication Challenges
David Pinsof and Lauren Ross explore practical ways behavioural scientists can engage with philosophy, utilize resources like the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and overcome challenges in communicating complex concepts like causation and mechanism to the public while avoiding reductionist biases.
You all probably are philosophers a little bit already, and that I mean you you brought up Dennett a number of times, but in some cases, finding the places where the kind of theoretical elements of your work... are coming up
“you all probably are philosophers a little bit already” 42:40
When you become expert in an area, you sort of lose your theory of mind or your vantage point from somewhere else. And so you forget that your comp your the complicated words in your field don't, you know, mean something to someone else.
“When you become expert in an area, you sort of lose your theory of mind” 45:44
Lauren Ross, Dave Pietraszewski, and David Pinsof discuss the challenges of integrating multiple evolved ontologies in psychology—such as folk physics, artifact systems, and theory of mind. They examine why intuitive, physical, billiard-ball causal models dominate public and scientific thinking, making abstract functional design stances and evolutionary perspectives seem unintuitive or speculative.
I think psychology is really hard because maybe uniquely it's three evolved ontologies.
“psychology is really hard because maybe uniquely it's three uh evolved ontologies.” 51:10
Everyday common sense, belief, desire psychology is so effective.
“everyday common sense, belief, desire psychology is so effective.” 53:16
1056:35 – 1:00:19Measurement Biases and the Theory Crisis in Behavioral Sciences
The speakers compare measuring complex mental and biological phenomena to medical diagnostics, exploring how the preference for easily quantifiable physical signs over subjective symptoms creates biases in science. They discuss how these measurement challenges contribute to the theory crisis in behavioral sciences and why institutional tolerance for abstract constructs is needed.
One of the symptoms of the theory crisis, especially in the behavioral sciences, is that constructs are re-descriptions of the data.
“constructs are re-descriptions of the data.” 59:44
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and Lauren Ross discuss how different types of scientific evidence are perceived as concrete or "sciencey," comparing quantitative social science measures to historical examples in bacteriology like Robert Koch's use of microscopy and photography. They explore the challenges researchers face when navigating institutional rules and proposing novel ideas.
The numbers look sciencey. But if I say I think there's a system that tracks alliances...
“The numbers look sciencey. But if I say I think there's a system that tracks alliances” 1:01:08
Robert Koch, who was postulating that germs were the cause of certain diseases, couldn't early on take pictures
“Robert Koch, who was postulating that germs were the cause of certain diseases, couldn't early on take pictures” 1:01:46
David Pinsof pitches a framework for evaluating scientific explanations based on assumptions and predictive power, which Lauren Ross and Dave Pietraszewski critique and refine by discussing plausibility, breadth, and the temporal delay between theorizing unobserved mechanisms and gathering data to test them.
the way I'm thinking about how to evaluate a good explanation is in terms of the ratio of what it assumes to what it successfully predicts or explains.
“the way I'm thinking about how to evaluate a good explanation is in terms of the ratio of what it assumes to what it successfully predicts or explains” 1:04:35
131:12:24 – 1:18:40Functional Explanations and Evolutionary Approaches in Cognitive Science
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and Lauren Ross discuss how functional and goal-oriented systems shape causal cognition and reverse-engineering. They examine how evolutionary psychology introduces mechanical levels and design accounts that transcend intentional descriptions, while addressing skepticism from researchers who favor more reductionist molecular or single-molecule approaches.
you're very much focused on like what's the function of their reasoning in this situation.
“you're very much focused on like what's the function of their reasoning in this situation.” 1:13:10
The speakers explore how different fields define mechanisms, contrasting network mechanisms in neuroscience with reductive molecular biology. They also address common criticisms of adaptationism, analyzing the logic behind the just-so story objection and how functional predictions can be rigorously evaluated.
the more reductive molecular biology researchers are like, you guys don't have mechanisms.
“the more reductive molecular biology researchers are like, you guys don't have mechanisms.” 1:21:10
evolutionary behavioral scientists, they just think everything's adaptive.
“evolutionary behavioral scientists, they just think everything's adaptive.” 1:22:45
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and Lauren Ross discuss the common assumption that all causal explanations must be rooted in lower-level physiological or physical mechanisms. They examine examples from medicine and social science where higher-level structural factors, such as socioeconomic status or systemic racism, provide more useful explanations than purely physiological ones.
And so being able to tackle those assumptions head on, I think is a nice focus
“tackle those assumptions head on, I think is a nice focus” 1:24:57
And having social things as causes is perfectly fine. Here's why.
“having social things as causes is perfectly fine” 1:28:29
David Pinsof and Lauren Ross debate whether scientific explanations must be consistent with adjacent lower levels of organization. Pinsof argues that psychological and cognitive theories should not contradict evolutionary biology, while Ross questions whether higher-level life sciences must strictly align with fundamental physics.
in the same way, if I'm positing psychological mechanisms, I don't want to be positing mechanisms that are incompatible with what we know about how natural selection works
“if I'm positing psychological mechanisms, I don't want to be positing mechanisms that are incompatible” 1:30:30
And I would say, why or does everything in biology and social science need to be compatible with physics?
“does everything in biology and social science need to be compatible with physics?” 1:33:32
Dave Pietraszewski, David Pinsof, and guest Lauren Ross discuss whether higher-level sciences like psychology and chemistry need to be beholden to fundamental physics. They examine how evolutionary theory and biology constrain psychological models, share historical examples from chemistry and molecular biology regarding functional discovery, and reflect on pluralism in scientific explanation.
I wouldn't I don't want to assume it does, and I think there's lots of successful work in all sorts of higher level sciences that's totally ignorant of fundamental physics
“I wouldn't I don't want to assume it does, and I think there's lots of successful work in all sorts of higher level sciences that's totally ignorant of” 1:36:33
It used to be the case that philosophers were looking for the one single way that explanations worked.
“It used to be the case that philosophers were looking for the one single way that explanations worked.” 1:43:02
As the episode concludes, the hosts discuss time perception research from an adaptationist perspective, share humorous remarks, and direct listeners to the show notes for details on Lauren Ross's published books and papers in philosophy of science.
the an adaptationist approach to time perception is fantastic so please keep I would love I would love to read that paper.
“the an adaptationist approach to time perception is fantastic so please keep I would love I would love to read that paper.” 1:47:34
Hosts Dave Pietraszewski and David Pinsof chat about podcast merchandise ideas, joking about subtle t-shirts and the concealable social stigma sometimes associated with being evolutionary psychologists in academia.
The hosts discuss the idea of merchandise and the concealable stigma of their profession.
“In the in the pro in the professional literature of stigma, it's a remote” 1:49:25
The hosts playfully explore extreme commitment signals like face tattoos as a way to filter uncommitted evolutionary psychologists, before wrapping up the episode with advice on understanding differing scientific perspectives.
The speakers joke about using face tattoos as a costly signal of commitment.
“I mean it would be a very costly signal.” 1:50:15