Through the conversation.
22 sectionsHosts David Pinsoff and David Pietraszewski introduce the topic of free will, discussing why it generates intense debate and how an adaptationist perspective approaches philosophical and psychological inquiries into human nature.
if we want to understand something like philosophy or philosophizing, we need to understand how it emerges from the adaptations and their byproducts
“if we want to understand something like philosophy or philosophizing, we need to” 6:26
029:53 – 12:01Universal Foundations of Free Will in Human Culture
David Pinsoff connects the free will debate to Donald Brown's list of human universals, highlighting concepts like intention, choice making, and self-control that appear across cultures and suggest a cognitive foundation for human agency.
the conceptual machinery underlying free will may well be a part of human nature, may be a part of the human cognitive phenotype
“the conceptual machinery underlying free will may well be a part of human nature” 10:40
Actions under self-control, distinguished from those not under control. That I find incredibly fascinating.
“Actions under self-control, distinguished from those not under control.” 11:13
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss whether the human concept of free will is rooted in our evolved cognitive phenotype. They examine adaptationist perspectives, the psychological underpinnings of free will, and the concept of evolutionary mismatch.
the way we think about and talk about free will uh is rooted in fundamental aspects of the human cognitive phenotype
“the way we think about and talk about free will uh is rooted in fundamental aspects of the” 12:24
evolutionary mismatch is when the adaptations of an organism is mismatched with the current environment
“evolutionary mismatch is when the adaptations of an organism is mismatched with the current environment” 17:00
0419:27 – 24:06The Core Dilemma and Philosophical Camps of Free Will
The speakers delve into what people are actually worrying about when discussing free will, noting the tension between subjective feelings of freedom and the mechanical nature of biological systems, leading to different philosophical camps.
if you look into how we work, we don't see anything like freedom at the level of how we actually work
“if you look into how we work, we don't see anything like” 22:53
0524:06 – 34:32Philosophical Perspectives on Determinism and Free Will
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss the major philosophical stances on free will, contrasting incompatibilist viewpoints—such as illusionism and libertarianism—with compatibilist perspectives. They explore how these debates manifest in discussions about criminal justice, moral responsibility, and the underlying mechanics of human agency.
So that is the compatibilist uh camp where yes, things are deterministic, but we still have freedom
“things are deterministic, but we still have freedom, and freedom is compatible with determinism” 24:32
they both are seeing the world the same way, that there is this fundamental conflict
“they both are seeing the world the same way, that there is this fundamental conflict” 27:23
The hosts transition into examining concrete examples of human agency and decision-making, differentiating between actions that respond to incentives, like changing one's sleep schedule, and involuntary biological processes, such as healing a broken bone.
if I wanted to, I could start waking up earlier than I do currently
“if I wanted to, I could start waking up earlier than I do currently” 34:51
what I can't do unlike the wake up early thing is just sort of convince myself to heal my broken bone
“what I can't do unlike the wake up early thing is just sort of convince myself to heal my broken bone” 35:18
0736:11 – 40:52Adaptationist perspective on detecting internal versus external control
Dave Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss the adaptive significance of distinguishing between outcomes we can control through internal planning and motivational systems and those we cannot, comparing waking up early to healing a broken bone.
It would be disastrous if you got that question wrong.
“It would be disastrous if you got that question wrong.” 36:17
There are huge costs to getting this distinction wrong, of detecting this difference.
“So there are huge costs to getting this distinction wrong.” 36:39
0840:52 – 48:15Free will as the efficacy of intentional intervention
The speakers examine how the human intuition of free will maps onto whether planning and means-end systems can be influenced by intentional intervention, rewards, or punishments, contrasting normal decision-making with addiction and habit.
Free will intuitions track whether a decision depends on the planning and means-end systems.
“that's the argument, is that it's the means end or goal-based system.” 45:33
Free will reflects whether intentional intervention and incentives can effectively alter a person's behavior.
“what free will is, is the efficacy of intentional intervention for third” 48:10
0948:15 – 52:18First-Person Reasoning and Reasons Responsiveness in Free Will
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss the first-person perspective of free will, focusing on counterfactual reasoning, whether self-reflection can change one's behavior, and why philosophical definitions center on reasons responsiveness.
For the self, for the for the first person, it's like uh can reasoning about the potential implications or consequences of this change my behavior?
“For the self, for the for the first person, it's like uh can reasoning about the potential implications or consequences of this change my behavior?” 49:31
And so I think what we have just been describing earlier explains why reasons responsiveness was a definition of free will people came up with.
“And so I think what we have just been describing earlier explains why reasons responsiveness was a definition of free will people came up with.” 52:07
1052:19 – 1:00:16Signaling Loyalty, Manipulation, and Predictability Concerns
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof examine how individuals might suppress free will signals to demonstrate allyship or romantic commitment, and how the fear of manipulation and being predictable relates to debates surrounding free will and evolutionary psychology.
And so it's almost like you want to uh destroy your free will to signal that you're a good ally and you're never gonna in the same way that you might want to signal that for a romantic relationship.
“And so it's almost like you want to uh destroy your free will to signal that you're a good ally and you're never gonna in the same way that you might want to signal that for a romantic relationship.” 52:52
And I think the concern about manipulation is central to the problem of free will.
“And I think the concern about manipulation is central to the problem of free will.” 55:31
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss why evolutionary psychology and the mechanics of human behavior cause discomfort and fear of determinism. They propose an empirical project categorizing people into individual differences regarding free will based on when manipulation invalidates free will, identifying three distinct stops along the free will train.
And we actually think that there's a more precise way to carve people up as into individual differences, and it might even be stable.
“carve people up as into individual differences, and it might even be stable” 1:01:13
And I think most compatibilists get off at stop three.
“most compatibilists get off at stop three” 1:04:14
The speakers examine how extreme pressures, such as holding a gun to someone's head or facing survival threats, affect perceived free will and bypass means-end reasoning. They discuss how value judgments and error management perspectives drive people to ascribe more free will to morally bad outcomes.
I think that's because ultimately this is still about interventionism, like it's causal interventionism
“this is still about interventionism, like it's causal interventionism” 1:06:10
when there's a negative, morally bad outcome, people ascribe more free will to that outcome.
“when there's a negative, morally bad outcome, people ascribe more free will” 1:11:28
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss how predictability and determinism relate to the philosophical debate on free will. They propose that concerns about determinism and quantum indeterminacy stem from evolved psychological mechanisms designed to prevent manipulation and exploitation by others, rather than abstract physics.
there are certain strategic situations where being predictable is bad
“And so there are certain strategic situations where being predictable is bad.” 1:12:36
indeterminism doesn't get you free will
“Because indeterminism doesn't get you free will.” 1:16:18
David Pietraszewski uses a biological analogy of a fish with an oxygen detector to explain evolutionary mismatch in the context of free will. The speakers argue that free will is a coherent psychological representation, comparing debates over its existence to asking whether a fish with artificially supplied oxygen is truly suffocating.
We've teased those two apart in an evolutionarily novel way
“We have teased those two apart in an evolutionarily novel way.” 1:19:03
free will is real in the sense of it's an evolved representation
“So so I do think free will is real in the sense of it's an evolved representation” 1:23:53
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss how debates surrounding free will and determinism stem from different levels of analysis and varying conceptions of the self. They explore compatibilism versus incompatibilism, comparing how individuals define the conscious self versus unconscious evolutionary and genetic forces.
it's a levels of analysis thing, right? Where you can describe the software, but it doesn't make the intentional level phenomenon any less real.
“it's a levels of analysis thing, right? Where you can describe the software, but it doesn't make the intentional level phenomenon any less real.” 1:25:25
you could have a very narrow conception of self where it's just the conscious me that makes decisions.
“you could have a very narrow conception of self where it's just the conscious me that makes decisions.” 1:28:58
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof draw parallels between the historical debate on cognitive modularity in psychology and current disagreements over free will, suggesting that misunderstandings arise from mismatched definitions of mechanisms, the self, and what constitutes external manipulation.
it's not a you versus your mechanism, it's just mechanisms all the way down.
“it's not a you versus your mechanism, it's just mechanisms all the way down.” 1:31:48
if you view the self expansively, then you're not being manipulated by those things because those things are you.
“if you view the self expansively, then you're not being manipulated by those things because those things are you.” 1:35:07
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss how to empirically test theories of free will, examining individual differences in how people view the self, intentional intervention, and the distinction between being a victim of determinism versus enjoying new capabilities and power.
one is we're testing this individual difference thing of like where do you get off the train
“one is we're testing this individual difference thing of like where do you get off the train” 1:39:48
the psychology of free will doesn't just become like worrying about neuroscientists poking on your brain. It also becomes the psychology of power and capability.
“the psychology of free will doesn't just become like worrying about neuroscientists poking on your brain. It also becomes the psychology of power and capability.” 1:44:09
The hosts explore how advertising and scientific institutions are incentivized to exaggerate their ability to manipulate human behavior using priming or hidden techniques, mirroring popular anxieties about free will and control.
I wanna inflate the power I have to manipulate people against their their will or or beyond their consciousness
“I wanna inflate the power I have to manipulate people against their their will or or beyond their consciousness” 1:46:54
the institutional selection pressure selects for a version of psychology that says we are the special knowledge holders
“the institutional selection pressure selects for a version of psychology that says we are the special knowledge holders” 1:47:24
David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof discuss how applying an adaptationist framework to philosophical debates about free will can contextualize and clarify conflicting intuitions. Rather than declaring positions entirely right or wrong, the speakers suggest that adaptationism acts as a meta-theory explaining why various philosophical arguments arise, potentially transforming philosophy by treating its intuitions as evolved psychological readouts.
David Pietraszewski argues that an adaptationist perspective provides a meta-theory that contextualizes and explains all the arguments in the free will debate into a coherent whole.
“this provides a meta theory explaining and contextualizing all the arguments into a coherent whole” 1:52:59
David Pinsof notes that philosophical analysis explores evolved human intuitions and how the mind works rather than directly accessing fundamental reality.
“You're not actually getting into reality, you're just getting into the way the human mind works.” 1:56:33
The hosts briefly explore applying adaptationist analysis to other complex philosophical concepts, such as consciousness, before reflecting on the challenges of communicating expansive theoretical work. David Pietraszewski and David Pinsof conclude by discussing the difficulty of summarizing exhaustive evolutionary research into brief elevator pitches and expressing appreciation for working through these ideas aloud.
A passage from this discussion.
“taking an adapt adaptationist analysis to you know what the underlying conceptual machinery” 1:58:02
Dave Pietraszewski and David Pinsof wrap up their conversation on free will. They reflect on the philosophical debate, acknowledging the complexity of the topic and joking about whether there is a definitive answer to the questions they discussed.
A passage from this discussion.
“Thank thank you for um enlightening me on a on a topic that um I I didn't know much about.” 2:00:34
David Pinsof and Dave Pietraszewski deliver the episode outro, encouraging listeners to support the show on social media or Patreon. They finish with humorous banter about fanny packs and french fries.
The hosts jokingly suggest that listeners should send french fries inside a fanny pack.
“Ideally uh french fries inside the fanny pack.” 2:02:18